Originally posted by aaaaa
Putting aside the typically antagonistic tone of Stellar's response to my post, his following points can be addressed:
If you find the truth to be antagonistic ( or just those who try to introduce some?) that isn't something i can help you with but since your mature
enough to ' put it aside' we can, per your request, 'move on'.
Britain was bankrupt in 1940-
Meaning they had no substantial gold reserves left ( were in the process of shipping their last reserves in from the 'colonies') and basically
selling of their corporate assets to Wall street ( and thus their European masters) for cents on the Pound. They were in fact bankrupt before they
even declared war on Germany and at least some scholars have suggested that they HAD to declare war at that point if only to keep up the facade of
control and general resistance.
That didn't stop them from deploying forces that tied down Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine manpower and resources, or stop bombing raids on
Tying down the 'Kriegsmarine' so effectively that German submarines did seriously affect Britains resource 'train' accross the atlantic and from
the colonies? Why were the Germans so effectively able to get past the British "blockades' on so many occasions and why did they so often find out
where German capitol ships were by noting the impacts of 11/15 inch shells?
The 200,000 German soldiers stationed in Norway alone would have been a welcome addition to an invasion of the USSR.
Men they had in relative generous amounts but the roads and trains can carry only so much supplies and a additional ten badly equipped ( where were
the motorised and mechanized elements supposed to come from?) foot infantry divisions would not have changed the outcome in Russia as they won it (
Well the army won it and then Hitler threw it away as at Dunkirk and in North-Africa later) with rather less than they used anyways.
May 15 was the original target date of Barbarossa, consult the index in Guderian's "Panzer Leader" to read Hitlers orginal orders.
I am well aware of the original date and why they could not and did not invade then. Check on the prevailing weather conditions if you really want to
discuss this issue as the forces involved in the Balkans were not significant enough to postpone the invasion over.
North Africa was a small detachment of troops but a major drain on equipment and fuel supply for Germany.
It was not a major drain at all as the closeness of success and the consequences for the British empire were quite obvious to one and all. The Italian
merchant navy performed very well ( some say heroically; Rommel got the same per day fuel and general supplies as American armored formations got in
1944 in France while he had a chance to win) and even thought the Italian capitol ships could not make themselves count, for various reasons we can
discuss later, the escort ships certainly worked very hard to protect the convoys on which backs Rommel basically achieved victory. Germany had
'massive' ( far more than they had engines to use it with ) fuel supplies after the capture of France and low countries and in Russia they
frequently supplies themselves from massive Russian rail-head supply depo's that so frequently fell into their hands.
As for the Balkans and Greece, Crete alone took the resources of 4 German divisions and cost 4,000 lives and scores of aircraft.
Do you have any idea how many aircraft the RAF lost and how badly the RN got mauled for their 'efforts' to protect and evacuate the doomed
expedition? They lost all their heavy equipment considering the highly mechanized nature of the divisions deployed that is another huge loss that
managed to inflict completely insignificant casualties while in Greece.
Mountain and airborne/paratroop ( in some circle's confusing the two will land you in very warm water) divisions are less than half the size of
regular divisions and considering the fact that they were designed for these type of specific instances you have to use them somewhere and use them
when it matters; having paratroop/airborne divisions and assigned transport sitting around idly
is very costly not to mention the strategic ineptness of allowing the enemy to respond to such strategic 'aces' without them even having been
employed. Crete and Greece was a devastating setback for the North-African campaign and if those formations were kept in North-Africa O'Connor ( or
whoever they sent after he got captured really; they were 'winning' that fast)
After 10 weeks the Italian Tenth Army was no more. The British and Commonwealth forces had advanced 800 km, destroyed about 400 tanks and 1,292
artillery pieces, and captured 130,000 POWs. In contrast, the British and Commonwealth forces suffered 494 dead and 1,225 wounded. However the advance
stopped short of driving the Italians out of North Africa. As the advance reached El Agheila, Churchill ordered that it be stopped, and troops
dispatched to defend Greece attacked by the Italians. Also, on January 11, 1941, the HMS Illustrious suffered a crippling dive-bomber attack, allowing
the first troops of the German Afrika Korps to begin arriving in Tripolitania (Operation Sonnenblume), and the desert war would take a completely
different turn. 
Given other setbacks suffered during the early war years, the Allied troops of Operation Compass were highly publicized and became renown as
"Wavell's Thirty Thousand," which was used as the title of a 1942 British documentary chronicling the campaign.
Not perfect a source but you can work from there to discover which side were strategically far, far worse off for the Crete/Greece 'debacle' ( and
that's being generous in not calling Churchill a inept bumbling fool for his choices in this instance) so early on. North-Africa never needed to have
turned into a actual front as O'Connors brilliance ( not the ineptness of the Italians; they did well considering their equipment, training and
general situation) ensured that the Brits had a very real chance of taking the vital ports before Rommel ever appeared on the scene.
You may also read BH Liddell Hart's "The German Generals Talk" chapter 13 for background. This is history, not your dismissive trash
This is history as you say and i can quite honestly call this my area of 'expertise' if for nothing other than the shear volume of reading i have
done on the topic. Considering Hart's relative sanity i don't have to read that particular chapter to realise who benefited most by the capture of
the Balkans and that the late spring of 1941 ensured a later Barbarossa independent of the inept strategic efforts Britain launched in the region at
Churchill played a major role in dissuading Roosevelt and Marshall from launching a cross channel invasion in 1943, who were all for it. There
are too many sources to quote that refer to this reality.
And the reason i am not denying that to be the case. That being said a cross channel invasion in 1943 would have been a bloodbath of epic proportions
for the Allies and would have probably reigned in Soviet efforts considerably. Churchill probably got it 'right' in that failure ( ANZIO on much
larger scale with even less options or simply 'back into the sea') in 1943 would have precluded another serious attempt in 1944 and thus a second
world war lasting well into the decade with both sides deploying nuclear weapons.
Stalin set Zukov against Koniev in a race to capture Berlin that cost more than 100,000 Soviet soldiers thier lives in an unneccessary
bloodbath, read both general's memoirs or serious Stalin biography to get a flavor of that contest.
So suddenly it takes a Machiavellian plot by Stalin to get a hundred thousand Soviet soldiers killed? Didn't Stalin order Koniev to halt so that
Zhukov could catch up and how is that a, 'fair' anyways, 'race'? Sounds more like a insurance policy and the choice to take Berlin suburbs with
tank armies ( Zhukov) was not required considering how it could have been reduced by the artillery divisions ( and almost armies one can say) of that
time. There was not in my opinion any good operational excuse for the half a million casualties the SU suffered in the operations around Berlin and
it's clear that it was a strategic decision ( Stalin's) to capture as much as possible as fast as possible so as to enable a better post war
negotiating position with the allies.
Hostage crises that are resolved effectively in your opinion when all or a substantial portion of the hostages are murdered? How sick is
So accidents are now murder? You mean the US armed forces murdered at least a hundred thousand Iraqi's in their latest criminal invasion of Iraq?
14 SSBN could be deployed by Russia in a crisis? Crew training and experience are essential for that to happen, as is equipment that is
maintained and reliable. It is fantasy to suggest that a Russian navy that does not exist could do this.
It is a 'fantasy' that western defense and intelligence specialist apparently consider 'real' but i really don't care as they don't really need
them to ensure their current strategic dominance.
They can not even conduct a successful missile test lately.
So how many missiles tests and launches have they had over the last say five years and what was the failure rate? Lets just compare it to 'world'
standards and get some 'facts' involved as i am quite tired of these vague allusions to the 'reality' that the Russian armed forces just
evaporated over the last decade.