Does the Russian Tor-M1 render most of the USAF worthless?

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posted on Dec, 19 2006 @ 02:36 PM
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In Serbia you had several factors which contributed to the outcome. Smart tactics by the Serbs, favorable terrain/location and good systems. The Serbs moved their SAM's around very frequently, I remember reading one commander saying that his one system traveled for thousands of kilometers during the war. They rarely kept their systems on for very long and like I said they moved them right afterwards. This was problematic for the US because at the time the AGM-88 could not track after the radar had been shut off, now that's not a problem for us as we have a version that can. The Serbs also had favorable terrain, dense woodlands and rough roads provided cover and concealment for their mobile SAM's, it was difficult for the USAF to spot and track these units from high altitude. Serbia is also a small country, even though their SAM units moved frequently they could afford to because they had enough systems and range to provide overlapping and dense coverage, even though they're were changing positions daily. Because of these tactics the Serbs did preserve most of their forces, but they also shot down very few US allied planes and could not stop us from winning the A2A engagements.

Now, with respect to Iran the situation could not be more different. As you have indicated and show planeman their major SAM systems are fairly well dug in and positioned. There are no preparations to go mobile and reposition on short notice, some of their units are even placed near strategic instillations for defense. Iran also has open and vast terrain, making it difficult to travel without being detected and making overlapping coverage more difficult. Add to this the proliferation us UAV's on the battlefield and the situation becomes more interesting. Global Hawks using their impressive array of IR, visual, LADAR and SAR systems while feeding this information to US assets such as fighters, bombers and other armed UAV's makes concealed mobility that much more difficult. Only Iran's most advanced SAM system can shoot down these UAV's, however if they go active it makes finding and destroying them much easier for the US. I'm not sure however how prepared Iran is to deal with US ECM capabilities. Also another thing to keep in mind is the expanding use of LO assets, the F-22 and (in the future F-35) will make it much harder for SAM systems to remain intact for a long duration, especially when both fighters have AARGM capability.

To sum it all up, with an upgraded HARM, LO stand off munitions, UAV's and LO assets, improved sensors and info gathering/sharing capabilities the US is better off now against SAM's than it was in 1996-1999.

[edit on 19-12-2006 by WestPoint23]




posted on Dec, 19 2006 @ 09:59 PM
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A few things, and I don't want to turn this into a US-versus-Iran drama thread, but you must also factor in that a) Iran is very mountainous and that the mobile SAM systems will be relatively easy to hide (contrary to your point) - Iran's apparently poor tactics appear to be more a factor of doctrin than terrain, and that the SA-15 is a battlefield SHORAD system, in the same role that the SA-6 already serves Iran; and you can't find any static SA-6 units in Iran on Google Earth. Assuming that Iran doesn't throw the SA-15s away by using them in a way they weren't designed to be used (static) then these will pose a far greater and persistant threat thanb the numerous fixed SAM units in Iranian service.

As a side point, at this moment in time the US has no LO SEAD aircraft operational - the F-22 has yet to get an operational air to ground capability - SEAD would be down to F-18s and F-16s, both easily tracked by the SA-15's radar.

Now I am one of the more vocal critics of Iranian air-defences, but the point we ought to agree on is that the SA-15 is an impressive syatem which, if utilised in an intelligent and well disciplined manner would be a genuine concern even for US. The same would be true of quite a few other SHORAD systems also.

[edit on 19-12-2006 by planeman]



posted on Dec, 19 2006 @ 11:49 PM
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Iran's current air defense network consists of some static SA-2, SA-5 and I-Hawk sites, I cannot picture these dug in sites lasting very long in a conflict. It's short range point defense systems such as the Rapier and HQ-7 are also mainly immobile and place near key military and civilian sites. Due to their know location and limited capability (against heavy assets) I think these too would go fairly quickly.

But you are right about the SA-15 and SA-6, these offer Iran the best chance they have. Given that both of these are short range systems (and in limited quantity), even if they are deployed in a way to maximize their capabilities, they cannot indefinitely offer adequate protection from all US assets, if any IMO.


Originally posted by planeman
As a side point, at this moment in time the US has no LO SEAD aircraft operational - the F-22 has yet to get an operational air to ground capability...


You sure about this? The F-22 currently has the AN/APG-77(v)1 which gives it significant stand alone A2G capability. JDAM's have also been tested and cleared for the F-22.



posted on Dec, 20 2006 @ 12:39 AM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
Iran's current air defense network consists of some static SA-2, SA-5 and I-Hawk sites, I cannot picture these dug in sites lasting very long in a conflict. It's short range point defense systems such as the Rapier and HQ-7 are also mainly immobile and place near key military and civilian sites. Due to their know location and limited capability (against heavy assets) I think these too would go fairly quickly.
Good to see you read my posts on Iranian air defences, lol.



You sure about this? The F-22 currently has the AN/APG-77(v)1 which gives it significant stand alone A2G capability. JDAM's have also been tested and cleared for the F-22.

jdam is hardly an optimum SEAd weapon, though great in other ways. At some point in the future when F-22s, F-35s and LO-UCAVs are doing SEAD/DEAD then yes, the balance will turn against the SA-15s of this world, but right now the operational flexibility of the USAF's LO aircraft fleet is not to be over-estimated.



posted on Dec, 20 2006 @ 12:46 AM
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Originally posted by planeman
Good to see you read my posts on Iranian air defences, lol.


What can I say, I'm a fan...



Originally posted by planeman
jdam is hardly an optimum SEAd weapon, though great in other ways. At some point in the future when F-22s, F-35s...


Valid point, but you said no A2G capability. Also, there are plans for that, a version of the advanced AGM-88 (AARGM) for use in the F-22 and F-35. The F-22 will also get the SDB (and SDB II) which will offer capability against mobile targets as well as data links.

[edit on 20-12-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Dec, 20 2006 @ 12:46 AM
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EDIT: Double Post.

[edit on 20-12-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Dec, 20 2006 @ 02:39 PM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
Valid point, but you said no A2G capability. Also, there are plans for that, a version of the advanced AGM-88 (AARGM) for use in the F-22 and F-35.


Until the F-35 comes online the F-22 will have to carry such SEAD/DEAD weapons externally as they do not fit in the internal bays; i don't recall seeing any plans to adapt current harm type weapons for these bays and neither the JSOW or JASSM's will fit internally. So basically for the next decade or probably more the few F-22's in service wont be able to contribute much in the way of ground suppression beside possibly being able to respond to observed static defenses with Jdam's. As long as you keep your Sam TEL's moving around ( and given you can afford such density of systems that you have more than one line of defense) you will always inevitably manage short range flank shots before the escorting SEAD flight can intervene to suppress your attack on the strike aircraft... As long as the strike aircraft can not reach their targets at speed or at the right altitude due to fears about your continued presence you don't have to shoot them down either.


The F-22 will also get the SDB (and SDB II) which will offer capability against mobile targets as well as data links.


When!

Stellar



posted on Dec, 20 2006 @ 03:05 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX


Until the F-35 comes online the F-22 will have to carry such SEAD/DEAD weapons externally as they do not fit in the internal bays; i don't recall seeing any plans to adapt current harm type weapons for these bays and neither the JSOW or JASSM's will fit internally. So basically for the next decade or probably more the few F-22's in service wont be able to contribute much in the way of ground suppression beside possibly being able to respond to observed static defenses with Jdam's. As long as you keep your Sam TEL's moving around ( and given you can afford such density of systems that you have more than one line of defense) you will always inevitably manage short range flank shots before the escorting SEAD flight can intervene to suppress your attack on the strike aircraft... As long as the strike aircraft can not reach their targets at speed or at the right altitude due to fears about your continued presence you don't have to shoot them down either.
The F 22 can carry 8SDB's internally


The F-22A has the capability to carry a variety of conventional and Long Range Stand-Off Weapons (LRSOW) for air-to-ground ordnance delivery. When performing air-to-ground missions, the F-22A can internally carry two Global Positioning System-aided 250-pound GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb in place of two AIM-120s and two AIM-9 missiles. The Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) (Guided Bomb Unit [GBU]-39/B) is designed to provide the F-22A with multiple targeting capabilities. Langley munitions crews loaded the new GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb onto an operational F-22A Raptor 15 July 2006. The fit test, conducted by members of the 27th Aircraft Maintenance Unit and observed by experts from Lockheed, Boeing, Edwards AFB, Calif., and Eglin AFB, Fla., was the first time the new weapon had been loaded into a combat-ready Raptor.

Weighing in at 250 pounds and a diameter of only six inches, the advantage of the GBU-39 is the amount that can be loaded into an F-22. It increases the target capabilities of the F-22 by 400 percent. Instead of two JDAMs, it will carry eight SDBs internally.

www.globalsecurity.org...


Lockheed Martin also is working on a Surveilling Miniature Attack Cruise Missile (SMACM), which would be even smaller than the shrunk JASSM and would provide a loitering capability in addition to being a standoff munition. It would have a smaller warhead than JASSM but the same range of 200-plus nautical miles. Lockheed Martin projects the F/A-22 could internally carry eight SMACMs or two shrunk JASSMs.

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The LOCAAS warhead is being used in some configurations of Lockheed Martin's air-launched Surveilling Miniature Attack Cruise Missile (SMACM), and its seeker lives on in the company's ground-launched Loitering Attack Missile. SMACM also uses the LOCAAS engine and borrows from the LOCAAS airframe.

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When!

Stellar



On 22 April 2005, the Air Force announced that the Boeing Company, St. Louis, was awarded an $18.5 million contract for Low-Rate Initial Production of the Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB I) — the DoD’s miniature munition designed to kill fixed and stationary targets. The announcement follows a successful Defense Acquisition Board Milestone C decision review chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Milestone decision is the culmination of an aggressive eighteen month development and demonstration program that came in on time, on budget, and met all commitments made to the warfighter. The initial production contract is for over 150 GBU-39 munitions, over 25 Air Force common BRU-61/A carriages, and associated spares, trainers and technical support.

www.globalsecurity.org...


The Boeing Co. has been awarded its first production contract for the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), the Defense Department announced late April 22.

The low-rate production contract is worth $18.5 million and will provide the U.S. Air Force with 201 SDBs and 35 carriages. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2006, and the F-15E is to be the first plane to carry the small smart munition.

Boeing expects to receive a second low-rate production contract, for about 667 bombs, in late calendar 2005, said Dan Jaspering, Boeing's SDB program manager. The Air Force plans to buy a total of 24,000 SDBs from the company through about 2015.

DOD said April 20 that it had approved the start of low-rate production of the 250-pound weapon (DAILY, April 21). SDBs are smaller than comparable munitions, allowing aircraft to carry greater numbers.

SDB has been successful in 21 of 23 guided flight-tests, "which is an excellent record for a development program," Jaspering told The DAILY. In one of the two failed tests, the culprit was "a small wiring mistake that we diagnosed rapidly," he said. In the other, a bomb did not detonate as planned, prompting Boeing to change how the guidance unit is mounted in the weapon.

Developmental testing of SDB is due to wrap up this summer. The Air Force plans to conduct operational testing in time to pave the way for a full-rate production decision in late fiscal 2006.

Boeing and Lockheed Martin are expected to compete later this year to give SDB the ability to hit moving targets.

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The Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) transition program (formerly known as Miniaturized Munitions Capability) provides the warfighter with increased kills per sortie on current and future manned and unmanned aircraft. The Small Diameter Bomb system includes two variants of the Small Diameter Bomb, a bomb carriage system, a mission planning system and logistics support. The GBU-39 variant of the 250-pound class bomb is equipped with an INS/GPS guidance system suitable for fixed and stationary targets. The GBU-40 second variant adds a terminal seeker with automatic target recognition capabilities more suitable for mobile and relocatable targets.

www.globalsecurity.org...



[edit on 20-12-2006 by urmomma158]



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 06:43 AM
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The SDB is already in full production and has been cleared on some aircraft with more to follow, the SDB II however is not expected to reach IOC until late 2009.



Link


As for the AARGM...


A more advanced HARM update program is known as AGM-88E AARGM (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile). The AARGM is a further improved Block VI missile, which uses not only the AGM-88D's GPS but also an MMV (Millimeter Wave) active radar seeker for terminal homing in its new WGU-48/B guidance section. The MMW seeker will employ active target recognition algorithms, and therefore be able to strike not only the radar emitter, but also e.g. the control vehicle of the site. The program started at the NWC (Naval Weapons Center) China Lake in 1998, and in March 2000, the first test firing of the MMW seeker in a modified HARM was successful. AARGM development continues with modified AGM-88 missiles, and an SD&D (System Development & Design) contract for the production AARGM was awarded to ATK (Alliant Techsystems Inc.) in June 2003. Developmental testing of the AGM-88E is scheduled for 2005, with a planned Initial Operational Capability in 2008. The CATM-88E will be the captive-carry training variant. A long term goal of the AARGM program is the development of an entirely new stealthy airframe, compatible with the internal weapon bays of the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter.

Link


AARGM

[edit on 21-12-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 02:00 PM
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Thanks for the information guys but it seems to me you are not really contributing anything i have not dealth with before? I mentioned before that the current weapons the F-22 deploys in the A2G role are IN and GPS weapons and the Serbs were quite successful with their GPS jammers in defending even relatively static targets and would probably explain why so few of their combat aircraft and strategic infrastructure were destroyed or even lightly demaged by week three. If the NATO air force can not manage to destroy such a enemy force on the ground in the first three weeks what does/did it hope to accomplish against the ground forces of the former USSR or now Russia that is litterally bristle's with anti air weapons?

Unless you have VERY good communcation and frequent information updates, not to mention great inter aircraft data-links, GPS bombs are not of much use against mobile targets that moves from hour to hour ( as even the very old Sa-6 can easily do ) ESPECIALLY since their designed to kill you and not the other way round...

I consider the current F-22 A2G armanents VERY limited untill some of the stand-off weapons you guys linked us to becomes operational that will not change much if at all.


I think probably the most critical thing that we really were missing while flying against Serbia and Iraq was the ability to update aircrews inbound to their targets on the changing threat.

The mission from Aviano Air Base in Italy to Kosovo or from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey into Iraq took two hours or more. The situation could change fairly radically given the presence of mobile Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). In the Iraqi situation, Saddam's SAMs did not move around much but in Kosovo enemy SAMs moved constantly. My favorite opponent was the Serbian SA-6 operator located outside of Ponikve, Serbia. I called him "Slavko the Destroyer" as he was extremely mobile. He was moving about every two days and that was making our tactical situation very difficult.

On one mission, Woody (our best pilot) had been told that the Ponikve SA-6 was far to his east. It wasn’t. Woody flew right through the middle of the SA-6 threat ring and ate two four packs of SA-6 missiles. He dodged eight SA-6 missiles in just one engagement. It was a fine piece of flying but I wish I had been able to alert him on Slavko's updated location -- preventing the whole engagement. I learned of the change as Woody was inbound to his target. Slavo had broadcast a short burst at a new location to calibrate his equipment. Our theater sensors delivered the new location to me through our MAT antenna back at the squadron. It showed Slavko's new position but there was no way to tell Woody once his mission began. I could not give him the updated threat picture. I hope that we can update the Prowler to give threat updates to the crew who are already inbound to their targets. This would make us more effective and would help save lives.

www.house.gov...


Why can they not update American aircraft in flight based on new intelligence and targetting data? Has this change substansially or at all and does GPS bombs have any relevence understanding that shortcoming?


Another limiting factor is space-based intelligence assets, officials said, which have not changed much since the Gulf War. Likely on call for the current operation, intelligence officials said, are US National Reconnaissance Office Ferreg signal and electronic intelligence satellites to pick up air defence radars; KH-11A+ radar imaging satellites; Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellites; various eavesdropping satellites; and Europe's MOPS meteorology spacecraft.

Such satellites, especially the imaging ones, follow very specific tracks and pass over an area of interest infrequently. Before the current operation, such satellites were unlikely to have photographed Yugoslavia's difficult terrain. "There could be new buildings there we didn't know before," one industry official said.

The USA hopes to solve some of these problems with the Discoverer II series of small imaging satellites, which will be launched in the 2002 timeframe, officials said.

www.janes.com...


How come they did not have good terrain information on Yugoslavia? I mean that was back in 1999 after nearly 40 years of American spy sattelies in orbit?


Nevertheless, one of the things that you like to have after a mission -- the "Aviano Electronic Attack Wing" flew 770 missions - is the ability to tell commanders how many threat radars we killed. Our answer was always, “Don’t know, probably none.” Each mission resulted in a soft kill. Upgrading HARM to zero in on a radar even after it is turned off may give us both soft and hard kills next time.

For those looking at the current campaign, I have seen the SAM threat picture for Afghanistan. It is not very daunting and we may let our guard down on EW because of that. Only lower-grade SAM systems are there. But when you look at the SA-10s and SA-20s in countries the War on Terror may take us to, aircrews face a fearsome threat. We must maintain the ability to master new enemy air defense systems.

We learned on September 11th that the intelligence picture we saw -- of a dangerous world -- was accurate. Unfortunately, we ignored it. If we are to continue the War on Terror, allied aircrews will face very robust, advanced surface-to-air missile systems. U.S. and allied forces need to be able to handle them. One of my deputies in Kosovo was killed in the Pentagon. My other deputy luckily was not. One of the things we were planning before the hit on the Pentagon was a brief on these new advanced SAM systems. I think Members of Congress need to see the capability of these new threats to allied aircrews and especially their real ability to burn through our current jamming.

I am very worried about these new systems. I know that the Kosovo campaign would have shifted radically had advanced SA-10 SAMs ever shown up in theater. As the squadron's Intelligence Officer, I was asked one question each morning: where are the SA-10s and have the Russians delivered them to Serbia or not? That would have radically changed the situation. For the future, we have got to plan on facing such fearsome SAM batteries in the next conflict.

www.house.gov...



Interview with Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, PBS Frontline, “War in Europe,” 22 February 2000. Serb IADS operators may have been able to trade short-term effectiveness for longer-term survivability because allied aircraft typically could not find and successfully attack fielded Serbian forces and other mobile ground targets. Had they been able to do so and kill enemy troops in large numbers, the Serb army’s leadership would have insisted on a more aggressive air defense effort. That would have enabled NATO to kill more SAMs but at the probable cost of losing additional friendly aircraft.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...



104 Even against relatively unsophisticated air defences a comprehensive jamming capability is essential if losses are to be restricted, particularly if aircraft are to penetrate at low level. In the case of the US EA-6B Prowler the aircraft stands-off in such a way that the geometry of the total attack allows its jamming to cover the penetrating bombers. In the Balkans almost all of the stand-off ECM capability was provided by the EA-6B, a force of only a little over 90 aircraft world-wide, already stretched, and one providing the bulk of the US capability in this field. As a result, providing aircraft for the Balkans resulted in withdrawing units from the Middle East and even reinforcing from the Far East. The increasing age of the EA-6B force is a concern for the Pentagon and there is now much debate about a follow-on system, but that will be expensive and certainly not easy to bring into service quickly.[228]

105 No European Ally deployed airborne electronic warfare aircraft with capabilities to match the American EA-6B Prowler. This aircraft and system proved critical in suppressing enemy air defences and the need for this capability is being examined by the MoD with other NATO European allies.[229] We discussed European shortfalls in this and other areas in our recent Report on European Security and Defence.[230] Remedying these shortfalls is part of NATO's 'Defence Capability Initiative'. We taxed the Secretary of State on whether Europe was ever likely actually to acquire such capabilities. He told us—

There is little doubt, at the moment, given what we know about the Kosovo campaign and the kind of equipment assets that were required, that even then [in 2003] we would not be in a position, given the capabilities we are setting out in the headline goal, to be able to conduct precisely this kind of operation. This is because very many of the assets, particularly in the air campaign, are simply not assets that European nations for the moment have available.

www.publications.parliament.uk...



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 02:21 PM
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That said, however, JFCs in future contingencies will almost surely have to contend with threats of double-digit SAMs, namely the Rus-sian S-300PM (NATO code name SA-10) and the comparably lethal SA-12 through SA-20, well before the F-22 and F-35 begin coming on-line in operationally significant numbers. The SA-10 and SA-12 are lethal out to a slant range of 80 nautical miles, five times the killing reach of the earlier-generation SA-3.51 One SA-10/12 site in Belgrade and one in Pristina could have provided defensive coverage over all of Serbia and Kosovo. They also could have threatened Rivet Joint, Compass Call, and other key allied aircraft such as the airborne command and control center and the Navy’s E-2C operating well outside enemy airspace.

Fortunately for NATO, the Serb IADS did not include the latest-generation SAM equipment currently available on the international arms market. Early, unsubstantiated reports, repeatedly denied by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that several weeks before the start of the bombing effort, Russia had provided Serbia with elements of between six and 10 long-range SA-10 systems, delivered without their 36D6 Clam Shell target- designation and tracking radars.52 Had those reports been valid, even the suspected presence of such SAMs in the enemy’s IADS inventory would have made life far more challenging for attacking NATO aircrews.53 As Lieutenant General Short later commented darkly, “It would have profoundly changed the balance of the threat and our ability to maintain air superiority.”54 The inescapable message here is that the Air Force cannot afford to wait for the F-22 and F-35 deployments to help solve its SEAD conundrum. It must begin coming to effective grips now with this increasingly clear and present danger.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...


Based on the above information it seem that at least some intelligence officers involved thought that the threat of even a single S-300 type system would have changed the campaign 'radically' but just how much less effective could the NATO attack have been against anything but VERY static targets?

So what kind of damage did the NATO 'alliance' in fact inflict?


An antiseptic war, fought by pilots flying safely three miles high. It seems almost too good to be true-and it was. In fact-as some critics suspected at the time-the air campaign against the Serb military in Kosovo was largely ineffective. NATO bombs plowed up some fields, blew up hundreds of cars, trucks and decoys, and barely dented Serb artillery and armor. According to a suppressed Air Force report obtained by NEWSWEEK, the number of targets verifiably destroyed was a tiny fraction of those claimed: 14 tanks, not 120; 18 armored personnel carriers, not 220; 20 artillery pieces, not 450. Out of the 744 "confirmed" strikes by NATO pilots during the war, the Air Force investigators, who spent weeks combing Kosovo by helicopter and by foot, found evidence of just 58.

Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf area had been such a success! The anti-Iraq Coalition's first air raid quickly shattered Iraq's air defenses, and soon after Coalition aircraft freely flew above Iraq, destroying targets without being afraid that they could be shot down. Also, they showed to the whole world how they could guide their missiles-even into a targeted window of a building.

www.geocities.com...



Indeed, Clark acknowledged that the Yugoslav military's command-and-control system has been well-shielded and versatile, with fiber-optics, cables and microwaves. It overlaps with the commercial system in ways that make it hard to take down.
Despite the damage to many of its best planes, the MIG fighters, the Yugoslav air force still has 380 of its 450 aircraft. Eight of the country's 17 airfields have not been struck, and six more have sustained only moderate or light damage.
Although Clark declared that the Serbs' integrated air defense system is now "ineffective" overall, it remains a powerful defensive weapon: It has kept NATO planes generally at altitudes above 15,000 feet, too high to most effectively hit Milosevic's field forces.
And U.S. forces report that Serbian air defense troops are not ducking combat, as most Americans think, but are engaged in tactical games with the NATO fliers in a bid to lure them into missile and artillery traps.
"Day after day, we see an intricate cat-and-mouse game played between us," said Navy Lt. Cmdr. Mark Kirk, a reservist assigned to an attack wing of radar-jamming planes at Aviano Air Base in Italy.
By official estimates, the Serbs still have three-quarters of their most sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, the mobile SA-6, and 60% of their less sophisticated SA-2s and SA-3s.
Many outside analysts acknowledge that they have been surprised by the relative lack of damage done so far by the air campaign.
At this rate, "it would take a very long time to destroy Yugoslavia's military," said Eliot Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore who conducted a lengthy study of the 1991 Persian Gulf War for the Air Force.
Cohen said that, even adjusted for the great destructive power of the precision-guided weapons in this fight, Operation Allied Force has only about one-fifth the intensity of the Gulf War's air campaign.
Daniel Goure, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the deeper problem is that NATO could end up bombing Yugoslavia "into the past" and still not persuade Milosevic to capitulate and reopen Kosovo to its ethnic Albanian refugees.
Because of this, he said, the campaign may turn out to be "a marvel of technology--and a political-military disaster."

www.aeronautics.ru...



The commander's unit, the 23rd Fighter Squadron, one of two F-16CJ squadrons deployed at Aviano, has alone fired 150 HARMs since the start of the NATO bombing campaign. "We have had some classic 'weasel kills' ­ hitting SAM radars with HARMs while they are guiding missiles at allied aircraft ­ but they are few and far between."

Due to recent experience in Iraq, the US SEAD community has become increasingly interested in achieving "hard kills" or physically destroying enemy SAM systems, rather than just temporarily suppressing them by hitting easily repaired radar antenna with HARMs. "We are carrying out destruction of enemy air defence [DEAD], but we are not able to kill as many SAMs as we would like here.

"In the European theatre the terrain makes it so much harder to find those guys than in the Iraqi topography. We team up with the [F-15E] Strike Eagles and F-16CGs for DEAD. They use precision-guided munitions [PGMs] and cluster bombs, mostly PGMs.

"The Serb radar operators do not come up very often. They sometimes emit a bit. They are trying to get enough guidance data to fire at us. Once they do that they are changing positions. You've got to make something happen in the hour. You need good intelligence to make this happen. It is demanding to get it all together for successful DEAD attacks."

www.janes.com...


And deploying a aircraft like the F-22 against third world nations is not economically worth the trouble unless it's not about economics or security anyways in which case one should make them more than marginally useful in the A2G role which is all they are going to be in the short "till- the-end-of-the-decade" term.

I lost some data during editing so excuse the possible disjointed nature of the response.


Stellar



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 03:06 PM
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Originally posted by Retseh
Do you have any evidence of this.


Well that depends on what you consider evidence? Would the fact that the NATO attack were not more effective be such in your opinion? I include some source material as to the problems NATO had against strategic targets ( which you normally use your Cruise missiles on) and unless you believe that so many targets could just escape general destruction wihout active Serbian intervention then you must consider that they did in fact bring down the many hundreds of cruise missiles they claimed to. My past efforts to find some 'credible' sources giving detailed information as to the numbers of cruise missiles NATO lost to Serbian defences came up empty but i might start looking again if you asked.

Stellar



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 03:59 PM
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Seems to me that a few dozen Hellfire carrying Predators roaming the countryside would make for a pretty good SEAD system. As impressive as the TOR system is, hitting it with a Hellfire is going to be like putting an M-80 firecracker in a toy truck.

As far as Iran's mountains go the advantages work both ways. Mountains can be used to mask attacking aircraft from radar sites.

If planeman can put togather as much information as he has about Iran's defences, how much do you think that the USAF has compiled? Iran's problem is that they don't have the information gathering capacity that the US has. In the event of a serious war Iran's Air Force and their SAM capability is going to have an exciting, but short life.



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 05:28 PM
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Originally posted by JIMC5499
Seems to me that a few dozen Hellfire carrying Predators roaming the countryside would make for a pretty good SEAD system. As impressive as the TOR system is, hitting it with a Hellfire is going to be like putting an M-80 firecracker in a toy truck.


If you can somehow manage to find such a highly mobile system , without finding it by swallowing missiles, then hitting it will be the end of it but this is not a static strategic target and it can very nearly fire on the move so unless your willing to lose your UAV in swarms ( the system cost exchange rate is most certainly in your favour) your not going to have much luck imo.

The Serbs managed to shoot down UAV's by the dozen ( confirmed in the mid 30's and unconfirmed around 45-50) and they were 'easy' prey even to old pre-world war two anti aircraft gun systems... So UAV's will probably have be deployed in swarms to breech anti aircraft lines and then proceed to penetrate to strategic areas to flush out more high value systems...


As far as Iran's mountains go the advantages work both ways. Mountains can be used to mask attacking aircraft from radar sites.


In the Serbian example rough terran favoured the defense and i think this is historically the norm...


If planeman can put togather as much information as he has about Iran's defences, how much do you think that the USAF has compiled?


They apparently lacked map's before the campaign against Serbia so who really knows?


Iran's problem is that they don't have the information gathering capacity that the US has.


Which in many instances seems to be as much hype as reality...


In the event of a serious war Iran's Air Force and their SAM capability is going to have an exciting, but short life.


I would have to say that's probably the case and unless they have been playing it smart ( in terms of signals intelligence and so forth ) for at least the last two decades they have probably compromised too much air defense data for their own good. If American war planners do not want to lose planes and pilots and there is no ground invasion the system might hold up reasonable well but in case of a ground invasion or a decision to destroy the air defenses ASAP they will probably only lose a few dozen and not more than a hundred even in damage write offs. The reason i think it might be reasonable high is because i expect the Iranian air force to put up a decent and organized defense thus making SEAD and DEAD operations rather more challenging. If Iran can somehow get their hands on even a few S-300 batteries ( unlikely) and keep their Tomcat's bases in operation then things will get 'interesting' ( in the sense that we might learn but not bleed) and US losses might be more than that few dozen...

That all being said there wont be a invasion of Iran before something dramatic does not happen somewhere in the world and all this lies about what the Iranian president supposedly said about Israel ( he never used the word 'map' and was actually referring to the Israeli administration being swept out of office) is just pretext in preparation for a major event ( probably staged by western intelligence agencies )which might then be blamed on Iran.

And before i wander many more miles off topic i'll stop here!

Stellar



posted on Dec, 21 2006 @ 05:30 PM
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Originally posted by JIMC5499
Seems to me that a few dozen Hellfire carrying Predators roaming the countryside would make for a pretty good SEAD system. As impressive as the TOR system is, hitting it with a Hellfire is going to be like putting an M-80 firecracker in a toy truck.


If you can somehow manage to find such a highly mobile system , without finding it by swallowing missiles, then hitting it will be the end of it but this is not a static strategic target and it can very nearly fire on the move so unless your willing to lose your UAV in swarms ( the system cost exchange rate is most certainly in your favour) your not going to have much luck imo.

The Serbs managed to shoot down UAV's by the dozen ( confirmed in the mid 30's and unconfirmed around 45-50) and they were 'easy' prey even to old pre-world war two anti aircraft gun systems... So UAV's will probably have be deployed in swarms to breech anti aircraft lines and then proceed to penetrate to strategic areas to flush out more high value systems...


As far as Iran's mountains go the advantages work both ways. Mountains can be used to mask attacking aircraft from radar sites.


In the Serbian example rough terran favoured the defense and i think this is historically the norm...


If planeman can put togather as much information as he has about Iran's defences, how much do you think that the USAF has compiled?


They apparently lacked map's before the campaign against Serbia so who really knows?


Iran's problem is that they don't have the information gathering capacity that the US has.


Which in many instances seems to be as much hype as reality...


In the event of a serious war Iran's Air Force and their SAM capability is going to have an exciting, but short life.


I would have to say that's probably the case and unless they have been playing it smart ( in terms of signals intelligence and so forth ) for at least the last two decades they have probably compromised too much air defense data for their own good. If American war planners do not want to lose planes and pilots and there is no ground invasion the system might hold up reasonable well but in case of a ground invasion or a decision to destroy the air defenses ASAP they will probably only lose a few dozen and not more than a hundred even in damage write offs. The reason i think it might be reasonable high is because i expect the Iranian air force to put up a decent and organized defense thus making SEAD and DEAD operations rather more challenging. If Iran can somehow get their hands on even a few S-300 batteries ( unlikely) and keep their Tomcat's bases in operation then things will get 'interesting' ( in the sense that we might learn but not bleed) and US losses might be more than that few dozen...

That all being said there wont be a invasion of Iran before something dramatic does not happen somewhere in the world and all this lies about what the Iranian president supposedly said about Israel ( he never used the word 'map' and was actually referring to the Israeli administration being swept out of office) is just pretext in preparation for a major event ( probably staged by western intelligence agencies )which might then be blamed on Iran.

And before i wander many more miles off topic i'll stop here!

Stellar



posted on Dec, 22 2006 @ 11:14 AM
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Originally posted by StellarX
If you can somehow manage to find such a highly mobile system , without finding it by swallowing missiles, then hitting it will be the end of it but this is not a static strategic target and it can very nearly fire on the move so unless your willing to lose your UAV in swarms ( the system cost exchange rate is most certainly in your favour) your not going to have much luck imo.


Well considering that the TOR is goint to tell us where it is every time it lights off it's radar, that shouldn't be too hard. A few decoys sent in first should give an approximate location.

Serbia was a joke. Due to political considerations, no pure SEAD missions were ever flown. There was never an active effort made to remove Serbia's air defences.

[edit on 22-12-2006 by JIMC5499]



posted on Dec, 22 2006 @ 11:15 AM
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I find it hard to take credibly someone still claiming that the Nato forces lost more aircraft then stated 7+ years after it ended with no evidence at all to support this contention. Wanting it to be so and it being so is a very different thing.



posted on Dec, 22 2006 @ 01:21 PM
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Originally posted by JIMC5499
Well considering that the TOR is goint to tell us where it is every time it lights off it's radar, that shouldn't be too hard. A few decoys sent in first should give an approximate location.


You disappoint me Jim....


. Targets can be acquired and tracked while the TELAR is moving and missiles can be fired without stopping; However, the reaction time is somewhat longer (around 10 seconds rather than 4) whilst in motion. An APU (auxiliary power unit) is fitted so that the main engine can be shut down while the radar and missile systems continue to operate when stationary, enabling long periods of readiness.

There are two radar systems mounted on the TELAR:

* "Dog Ear" E/F-band pulse/doppler phased-array surveillance radar (maximum detection range 25 km/16 mi) which can detect up to 48 targets and track ten of them, including IFF functionality.
* "Scrum Half" G/H and later K-band phased-array engagement radar (maximum tracking range 20 km/12 mi) which can guide two missiles.

There is also a small antenna to communicate with missiles after launch and before they are acquired by the engagement radar. The surveillance radar can be folded down horizontally when travelling, to reduce the height of the vehicle, and the tracking radar can partially rotate away from vertical to reduce its height. There is an optical tracking system to complement the tracking radar and allow engagements in a heavy ECM environment.

en.wikipedia.org...


So it has, like practically every other Russian air defense system different radars to accomplish different tasks and it's not only the S-300 and F-22 systems that are being upgraded or already employing LPI systems...

If it can fire on the move or scan and be miles away before you can assign planes or stand off munitions how will you kill it so easily?


Serbia was a joke. Due to political considerations, no pure SEAD missions were ever flown.


So the expenditure of 600 or more Harm's were expended for what purpose? Fact is you can not fly 'pure' SEAD missions against a target that was never static to start with and you will just have to accompany every strike package hoping to suppress threats as they exposed themselves. I have posted so many links earlier showing that the Serbs were active and that there was a deliberate and failed effort to destroy their air defenses? Do you have anything beside your opinion so that i may inform myself if i am not so in your opinion?


There was never an active effort made to remove Serbia's air defences.


So contrary to all the source material i posed you still say this? If it's your opinion that's fine but if you want to post it as fact i will need some sources.

Stellar



posted on Dec, 22 2006 @ 01:26 PM
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Originally posted by burmafrd
I find it hard to take credibly someone still claiming that the Nato forces lost more aircraft then stated 7+ years after it ended with no evidence at all to support this contention.


So noted and i hope you don't go around believing un-sourced unsupported opinions very often! I think i made it clear that it's a opinion and that i would not like to defend it as fact at the current time?


Wanting it to be so and it being so is a very different thing.


Agreed but in my mind it would probably be the best way to explain away many odd things that happened , and did not happen, before, during and after the NATO campaign there...

If you want to see what i based my opinion on feel free to ask!

Stellar



posted on Dec, 23 2006 @ 04:31 AM
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Originally posted by ape
sup stellar, in your opinion how do you think the US would go about taking out these installations?


Not sure how they would and that's my point.



Originally posted by ape
please post proof of your statistics, there are many different class cruise missiles and the agm-129a is a stealth cruise missile, the only cruise missiles that have been shot down are tomahawks and CALCM'S, all of which the agm-129a performs better than.


The stocks of stealth strategic type cruise missiles are relatively low and expending such limit stocks in anything short of a full blown nuclear war is not at all wise. By the end of the NATO campaign in Kosovo even stocks of regular cruise missiles were running low...


Defence chiefs in the US have announced a plan to begin converting nuclear cruise missiles to carry conventional warheads.

But it is unclear how long the process will take, with some estimates claiming 12 to 18 months. There is no up-and-running production line for new cruise missiles.

But with no end in sight to the bombing campaign, it is thought that at the present rate of striking the USAF could use up all its remaining cruise missiles before the end of the month.

The air force said it had received White House approval for a $51m programme to convert 92 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles into conventional missiles, and fit a new guidance system. However, this still has to be ratified by Congress.

news.bbc.co.uk...



i asked this question when it was mentioned "cruise" missiles are easily taken out yet nobody highlighted on the different class of cruise missiles that were and were not used in those operations.


Sorry if i do not answer within the day; my plate is pretty full as it is... As i said the type of cruise missiles the US forces could use in most situations where those the Serbs could deal with under the prevailing conditions.


Originally posted by ape
I keep trying to get a response but have failed in doing so about the AGM-129a stealth ACM being able to take out the tor-m1 in regards to the opinion about cruise missiles being obsolete against air defenses.


Expending such a weapon on a mobile systems is a complete waste of time and if you manage to hit it it's not because your weapon is good or stealthy but because the enemy is badly trained or totally incompetent.


Originally posted by ape
did the serbs render every class of cruise missile useless? which class was the US using or were they using all of them?

was the agm-129a used? www.defencetalk.com...


You rarely render things complete useless but you can make their use strategically or tactically inefficient which given mostly balanced forces can tip the initiative in your favour. The US could afford however inefficient Tomahawks were as there were always more to fire against the relatively small number of strategic sites the Serbs had to absorb these missiles with. Against a nation like Russia such inefficient weaponry will get you in trouble very quickly but against a small state one can afford mistakes or inefficiency.


after doing more research i found out they only used CALCM'S and tomahawks not ACM's which are more capable and that was just in 1999


True as far as i know.


stellar and westpoint are you sure different class cruise missiles wouldn't work against an array of air defense installations? they only used tomahawks and CALCM'S.


Nothing is invulnerable and even the most sophisticated weaponry might not prevail over inferior systems when operated outside of specifications or under the wrong general conditions by insufficiently trained personal. It is sometimes better to deploy less technical and sophisticated weapons if you do not have the means to train personal in their effective use. I am not suggesting that modern air defenses are invulnerable but that for the same resource and currency expenditure one will defend yourself more effectively. If you aim is to attack others then it's obviously better to invest in air force infrastructure as they are as good in the defensive role as in the offense.

Even the Israeli's paid a heavy price while figuring out how to deal with the Sa-6 and we know how fast they had to , and apparently did, adapt or die.....


The SA-6 surprised the Israelis in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They were used to having air superiority over the battlefield. The highly mobile SA-6 took a heavy toll on the slower A-4 Skyhawk and even the F-4 Phantom, forming a protective umbrella until they could be removed. The radar warning receivers on the Israeli aircraft did not alert the pilot to the fact that he was being illuminated by the radar. Once the RWRs were reprogrammed and tactics changed, the SA-6 was no longer such a grave threat. Pilots dubbed the SA-6 "Three Fingers of Death", in reference to the launchers appearance.

Serbs using modified SA-6s were very successful in shooting down numerous Croatian and Bosnian aircraft and helicopters, including Scott O'Grady's F-16 Fighting Falcon in 1995

In contrast to the elaborate Patriot missile or even the simpler Hawk system fielded by US forces, most of the system rides on two tracked self-propelled vehicles, rather than towed or mounted on trucks, and either the launcher or control vehicle can be set to launch in only 15 minutes after changing location.

en.wikipedia.org...



the way I look at it is this, if the US was to attack any kind of SAM installation they would not hold back on the number of missles used to take out these installations. the objective would be completed one way or another.


They only really attacked Iraqi air defenses in the 2003 campaign after more than a decade of attrition ( they frequently attacked Iraqi air defenses during those ten years in violation of too many international treaties to count) learning much about it so the Kosovo incident is better example of what happens when trained operators use relatively modern ( the Sa-3/6 systems were both first deployed in the 60's ) air defense systems efficiently in their intended roles in favourable terrain.

The number of missiles you expend on mobile systems is mostly irrelevant and it's efficient intelligence gathering and sharing that will allow successful SEAD and possible, if those are conditions are met and AD operators are slow to realise, DEAD missions. DEAD missions against mobile air defenses in European terrain conditions is never going to be easy and IMO only possible against completely inferior forces.

Stellar





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