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Are the Russians more prepared for Nuclear war?

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posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 04:14 PM
your posts dont make sense, I mean you're posting russian sources when documents discovered proved they horribly exaggerated what they achieved in the korean war?? I only compared the mig-15 to the f-86 sabre and the kill ratio, the mig was a good plane it owned the aircraft before the sabre, but that ended when the sabre came into the field. posting russians sources hardly proves your claim, especially when actual fact counters them.

go edit wikipediua because thats the most basic kind of information that u can find, and watch it get edited back to the truth, your russian sources have no substance, and soviet documents have shown to prove russian sources are liars.

secondly please adress this for me, considering how much russia spends on defense compared to the US how is it they are able to have deployed DEW and then continue to create missle defense systems that use missiles instead of DEW?? DEW would make ABM's obsolete because once targeted it's instantly taken out, so if they have the so called funds you claim they have why not just mass develope DEW? they are not, you post sources from 87 and un proven paper documents, if theyt had this technology they would demonstrate it like the US has done and sell it. instead they invest in ABM instead of DEW, this is documented so assuming they have DEW deployed everywhere is false. a point that you clearly avoided because I made it in my previous post.

DEW makes ABM's obsolete !. no funding.

aside from all of this garbage you even say that prison planet is a good reliable source of information for me and my country, which is obsurd so this doesn;t suprise me.

[edit on 30-12-2006 by ape]

[edit on 30-12-2006 by ape]

posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 04:35 PM
Well since everyone seems to be tooting there own horn here. Nuclear weapons are obsolete. Check out this baby. Its called the HAARP.

The HAARP can deliver a very large amount of energy, comparable to a nuclear bomb, anywhere in the world.
Can change weather patterns
Can block all global communications
Can disrupt human mental processes
Can be used for mind control
Can X- Ray the earth

And heres a video just for sh*ts and giggles...
alright, the above video gives me a F'ing headache heres another one.

The objectives of the HAARP project became the subject of controversy in the mid-1990s, following claims that the antennae could be used as a weapon. A small group of American physicists aired complaints in scientific journals such as Physics and Society, charging that the HAARP could be seeking ways to blow other countries' spacecraft out of the sky or disrupt communications over large portions of the planet. The physicist critics of the HAARP have had little complaint about the project's current stage, but have expressed fears that it could in future be expanded into an experimental weapon.

These concerns were amplified by Bernard Eastlund, a physicist who developed some of the concepts behind the HAARP in the 1980s and proposed using high-frequency radio waves to beam large amounts of power into the ionosphere, energizing its electrons and ions in order to disable incoming missiles and knock out enemy satellite communications. The US military became interested in the idea as an alternative to the laser-based Strategic Defense Initiative. However, Eastlund's ideas were eventually dropped as SDI itself mutated into the more limited National Missile Defense of today. The contractors selected to build HAARP have denied that any of Eastlund's patents were used in the development of the project. HAARP could not possibly operate in the mode Eastlund suggested. A quick review of Eastlund's patent and HAARP specifications will demonstrate that HAARP cannot deliver enough energy at a low enough frequency to make Eastlund's plan work.

After the physicists raised early concerns, the controversy was stoked by local activism. In September 1995, a book entitled Angels Don't Play This HAARP: Advances in Tesla Technology by Nick Begich, Jr., son of the late Congressman Nick Begich, claimed that the project in its present stage could be used for "geophysical warfare". The HAARP has subsequently become a target for those who have suggested that it could be used to test the ability "to deliver very large amount of energy, comparable to a nuclear bomb, anywhere on earth", "changing weather patterns", "blocking all global communications", "disrupting human mental processes" and mind control, and "x-raying the earth." These claims are generally disregarded by scientists and those involved with the project as being completely baseless.


In August 2002, further support for those critical of HAARP technology came from the State Duma (parliament) of Russia. The Duma published a critical report on the HAARP written by the international affairs and defense committees, signed by 90 deputies and presented to President Vladimir Putin. The report claimed that "the U.S. is creating new integral geophysical weapons that may influence the near-Earth medium with high-frequency radio waves ... The significance of this qualitative leap could be compared to the transition from cold steel to firearms, or from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons. This new type of weapons differs from previous types in that the near-Earth medium becomes at once an object of direct influence and its component." However, given the timing of the Russian intervention, it is likely that it was related to a controversy at the time concerning the US withdrawal in June 2002 from the Russian-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This high level concern is paralled in the April 1997 statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense over the power of such electromagnetic weaponry. Russia owns and operates an ionospheric heater as powerful as the HAARP, called 'Sura,' which is located in central Russia, roughly 150 km from the city of Nizhny Novgorod.


Russia, kiss yo ass goodbye!....

[edit on 043131p://4012pm by semperfoo]

[edit on 043131p://4412pm by semperfoo]

[edit on 053131p://3212pm by semperfoo]

posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 05:34 PM
semperfoo, do you have any evidence, that this "baby", as you tenderly call it, has ever been tested ?

Russia, kiss yo ass goodbye!....

This kind of American bravada from Hollywood action movies has always made me laugh
. Didn't think that applies to real life though, unless you're a child.

[edit on 30-12-2006 by Leevi]


posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 06:07 PM
obviously you lack a taste of humor, as semper expressed with his comment on 'kiss yo ass goodbye'.

lighten up please it's just a joke.

posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 06:17 PM

Originally posted by ape
obviously you lack a taste of humor, as semper expressed with his comment on 'kiss yo ass goodbye'.

lighten up please it's just a joke.

Taking into account the quality of your and semperfoo's posts here I sometimes have a hard time deciphering where you're serious and where not

posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 06:51 PM

Originally posted by Leevi
semperfoo, do you have any evidence, that this "baby", as you tenderly call it, has ever been tested ?

Russia, kiss yo ass goodbye!....

This kind of American bravada from Hollywood action movies has always made me laugh
. Didn't think that applies to real life though, unless you're a child.

[edit on 30-12-2006 by Leevi]

Yes I made a funny and it sailed right over your head. Lighten up around here ppl, sheesh.

Anyways Happy newyear everyone Im out.


posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 07:10 PM
the quality factor of my posts derives from the people im responding to, leevi.

posted on Dec, 30 2006 @ 07:33 PM

Originally posted by ape
the quality factor of my posts derives from the people im responding to, leevi.

Maybe you hardly understand the information these people provide ?


posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 12:13 AM
what exactly dont I understand?

posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 03:52 AM

Originally posted by ape
all on paper, whats funny is i dont see the russians doing deomstrations to prove all of this capability like the US does

Demonstrations such as? Does the strongest really have to prove his strength by intimidation or is that reserved for those who must still prove themselves? They have tested all their new type's of equipment just like elsewhere and occasion testfires some of their older ICBM's just like elsewhere...

and please dont give me the line of top secret or w/e, the US demonstrates it's force and the projection is clear,

I don't have to rely on top secret classifications to show with which country the initiative clearly lies. Why do you have to patrol SSBN's to prove your force 'projection' capability when it's only a proper defense that can clearly make a large scale difference in a nuclear exchange?

I dont see any kind of high tech shows and demonstrations about high tech weaponry or anything thats mass. take a look at all of the deployed US battle groups and SSBN's and attack susb etc.

There are regular air shows and arms related shows all over Europe and the world where Russian arms manufacturers show of some of their products. What do you consider high tech weaponry ( something as dull and strategically useless - in a nuclear war - as aircraft carriers perhaps? ) and why do you insist that ever country behave in a overt militaristic way? Do you think the US sets a good example by parading carriers around the world why the dollar plummets to new lows?

funny whenever i do recall the russians demonstrating weaponry is always fails,

Then that more than anything else shows your selective memory and basic ignorance of the subject matter.

they have no plane,

They have plenty of planes but such is not really required for self defense when you will mostly rely on DEW's or air defense missiles with just a thousand or so decent fights to ensure local superiority when you require it.

the JSF will dominate sales and if the US felt any competiton the would possibly put the raptort up for purchase just to blow russia right out of the water?

If America wants to sell such high tech equipment to future enemies that's just fine as America has so far created her own enemies any ways.

, please dont sit here and tell me that raptors and JSF's are obsolete because thats just a pipe dream fantasy,

Against direct energy weapons they are and even against modern air defense missiles one can easily doubt their worth against Russia and wonder why they would be required against the third world nations the US insist on bombing so regularly.

can anyone else see the raptors being sold with of course limited capability just to blow russian competiton right out of the water if it ever did arise to that level?

Sure i have had rumors of such eventually happening and that more than anything else shows the whorish nature of the US military industrial complex that will sell out American security to the highest bidder.

i certainly dont see the projection of force by russia, the US on the otherhand has been projecting it's force strong since the

Then your blind deaf and dumb and need to start reading the source material i have provided so far.

collpase of theflawwed USSR system.

The flaw was in it's treatment of it's citizens and that is and never was connected to it's military prowess.

this is a more accurate view on where we stand.

Which shows why your view is not accurate and not supported by anything but your own misrepresentations of reality.

Six months ago i would have argued that the Russians still had more nukes and that the SS-18 could carry double the warheads the US has decided it could and given ten links showing the discussion in defense circles. Now i can just say it matters little how many nuclear weapons Russia operates as they have shown the capability to destroy ICBM's. You will find that oddly missing from all the math employed by the defense specialist that writes articles for major newspapers but does not make it any less true. Here is some references to all that independent of their clear technological and operational capacity to deploy DEW's and other EM weapons.

My character counter seems to be broke but that suits me.


By the end of the 1960s, targeting may have focused on Moscow, with all the missiles of a nuclear submarine committed to destroying the ABM system and the city. The capability of the Moscow ABM system might have limited the flexibility of British targeting by tying down most of the deployed force. Polaris appears to have been judged much more effective against the SA-5B Gammon interceptors of the Tallinn system. A 1970 study published by the British Atomic Energy Authority concluded that SA-5B interceptors were not a threat to British Polaris missiles, and that it would take only two Polaris missile payloads to saturate a standard SA-5B battery.

In 1972, the British government decided to develop a new front end for the Polaris missiles "designed specifically to penetrate [the] anti-ballistic missile defenses" around Moscow. This improved system, called Chevaline, was deployed in 1982. It carried pen-aids and three 40-kiloton maneuverable reentry vehicles that were "hardened" against the radiation effects of the nuclear ABM interceptors.


This new evidence reinforces longstanding concerns about systematic Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Battlefield management radars are
the long leadtime component of any ABM defense system and the Soviets seem to have gained a great deal of experience in this field since 1975 when they installed an ABM-X-3 radar in the Kamchatka impact area for their ICBM tests. Over the years, the Soviets have also been upgrading their surface-to-air (SAM) bomber defense systems--now presumed to perform an ABM role. Since the Carter Administration, the Soviets repeatedly have tested various types of SAM missiles in'a discernable ABM mode at altitudes above 100,000 feet and have deployed thousands of less capable SA-5 missiles around-Soviet cities. These illegal ABM activities and the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missle system clearly point to a Soviet decision to subvert the ABM Treaty shortly after signing it.

Refusals to acknowledge these Soviet treaty violations point to the perennial dilemma of what to do after detecting cheating. The Administra-. tion is doingitself and the country no favor by refusing to acknowledge the mounting evidence that the Soviets are developing a capability which seriously erodes strategic stability and will soon permit the Soviet Union to break out of the ABM Treaty. The Administration should document and publicize Soviet ABM activities and Treaty violations. It should accele- rate the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BDM) program. Unless Moscow can refute the evidence that its radar and weapons programs are not de- signed for an ABM role, the U.S. should abrogate the ABM Treaty.


Ironically, the development of the upgraded ground-based battle-management radars, which can track MIRVed RVs, was carried out during the ABM Treaty negotiations. Construction of these facilities could hardly have gone unnoticed by the West, for they resemble several Manhattan skyscrapers joined together in one unit. Construction began in 1972, and the first units became operational in the1980s. The well-known Krasnoyarsk Radar-the sixth of nine such radars--was a deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet leadership. Is it possible that United States and NATO spy satellites did not detect these massive structures? If not, then why are these flagrant treaty violations being ignored?

In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.


Immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5?s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.


However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).


Washington, D.C.): Today's Wall Street Journal features an extraordinarily timely column by the newspaper's highly respected Assistant Editorial Page Editor, Melanie Kirkpatrick. Thanks to Ms. Kirkpatrick, a dirty little secret is now in the public domain: Even as Russian President Vladimir Putin goes to great lengths to denounce President Bush's commitment to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack, railing about the threat thus posed to the sacrosanct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and seeking to divide United States from its allies, Russia is maintaining a national missile defense of its own that is clearly inconsistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

This revelation demands several responses: 1) President Bush should task his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board or some other independent blue-ribbon group to perform an immediate and rigorous assessment of former Defense Intelligence Officer William Lee's work on the Soviet/Russian NMD system and the classified official analyses that have, to date, minimized its strategic capabilities and significance. 2) Present the findings of such a study to the American people and U.S. allies. And 3) end the official U.S. practice inherited by Mr. Bush of allowing the United States to be the only nation whose missile defense programs are encumbered by the outdated and increasingly dangerous ABM Treaty, thereby clearing the way for deployment as soon as possible of effective anti-missile protection for this country, as well as Russia.


Russia inherited most of the Soviet empire's illegal national ABM defenses. Although the Hen Houses and LPARs located in the successor states created significant gaps in coverage, Russia still controls 12 or 13 of those radars. Consequently, SAM/ABMs still defend most of the Russian Federation from U.S. ICBMs, much of the SLBM threat, and Chinese missiles. Scheduled completion of the LPAR in Belorus will restore complete threat coverage, except for the gap left by the dismantled Krasnoyarsk LPAR. Granted, the Hen Houses are old, but the United States has been operating similar radars for 40 years.

Despite its economic difficulties, Russia continued development and production of the SA-10, adding (in 1992-1993 and 1997) two models with new missiles and electronics and replacing more than 1000 SA-5 missiles with late model SA-10s having greatly improved performance against ballistic missiles of all ranges. Russia is protected by as at least as many (about 8500) SAM/ABMs as in 1991, and they are more effective. No wonder Russia shows little concern for its proliferation of missile and nuclear technology.

Even more impressively, Russia has begun flight-testing the fourth generation "S-400" ("Triumph") SAM/ABM designed not only to end the "absolute superiority" of air assault demonstrated by the United States in the 1992 Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo operation, but also to improve Russia's illegal ABM defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. The S-400 is scheduled to begin deployment in 2000, more testimony to Russia's commitment to maintaining its national ABM defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty.


Mr. Lee's analysis is complex. To vastly simplify, he says he has evidence that Russia's surface-to-air interceptor missiles carry nuclear warheads and therefore are capable of bringing down long-range ballistic missiles, not just aircraft and shorter-range missiles, which is their stated purpose. Russia has 8,000 of these missiles scattered around the country, and Mr. Lee says he has found numerous Russian sources that describe how successive generations of SAMs were in fact designed with the express intention of shooting down ballistic missiles, which is illegal under the treaty.


The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.

It is interesting to note that the warhead of this anti-aircraft missile has a larger yield than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Part of the SA-5B network consists of a line of bases across the northwest approaches to Russia, known as the Tallinn Line. The current status of the nuclear warheads assigned to the strategic SAMs is unknown — they may have been placed with the tactical weapons in centralized storage. Yeltsin did announce in January 1992 that one half of all anti-aircraft nuclear warheads would be destroyed, and because of its age, the SA-5B Gammon


In 1968, the total Tallinn system consisted of nearly 30 operational launch complexes with a similar number under construction. Each complex generally consisted of three launch sites. Each site had six SA-5B Gammon launchers and a modest-sized Square Pair radar. Of the 30 operational complexes, only six were close enough to the Hen House radars in Olenegorsk and Skrunda to have a potential ABM role (see "Soviet ABM System, 1968").

There was considerable disagreement within the U.S. intelligence community at the time about whether the improved Tallinn system was to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, or some combination of the two. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) agreed with the air force, which in late 1967 concluded that the system "possesses significant capabilities in both a terminal defense and area ABM role." But six months later, in a memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, newly appointed Defense Secretary Clark Clifford said an ABM capability "now appears unlikely."

The CIA concluded that it did "not believe there is any deployment of ABM defenses outside the Moscow area," and the Tallinn system was "unlikely to have a present ABM capability," though it acknowledged, "the state of available evidence does not permit us to exclude this possibility." This view was shared by the navy, which decided that the system had "negligible capabilities against ballistic missiles."

There was general agreement that the limited Moscow and Tallinn systems would not be able to counter a large U.S. ballistic missile attack. In fact, the CIA later concluded that it "doubt[ed] that the Soviets will have an ABM system worth deploying against the U.S. threat in the foreseeable future."


The Bush administration’s policy was not an automatic continuity or continuation of all treaties with the USSR, but provided a framework to review each agreement and determine necessary changes. Such a review was particularly important for arms control agreements. As President Clinton stated in a letter to Congressman Gilman in March 1997, and I quote, “Particularly in the area of arms control, a case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary.” In that case-by-case review, the administration negotiated a memorandum of understanding [MOU] on succession to the ABM Treaty. The MOU, was concluded in September 1997 and identified Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia as the successor states to the treaty. This selection of successor states seemed to be consistent with a statement by the President that, and I quote, “neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet States with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS, Newly Independent States, as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.” That was the letter from the President to Congressman Gilman. The administration went on to reiterate in that same letter that the MOU on succession “works to preserve the original object and purpose of the treaty.” To summarize, the administration believed in 1997 that recognition of Russia alone or all of the successor states together would not have preserved the original purpose of the treaty.


In mid-1994 the Belarusian air force operated two interceptor regiments with MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29 aircraft; three strike regiments with MiG-27, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25 aircraft; and one reconnaissance regiment with MiG-25 and Su-24 aircraft. Four regiments had 300 helicopters, and one transport regiment had more than forty helicopters. Personnel numbered 15,800.

Belarus also had an air defense force with 11,800 personnel and 200 SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. The system was being integrated into Russia's air defenses in 1994 owing to Belarus's lack of resources.


Kazakhstan is investing the equivalent of one billion dollars to upgrade its air defense system, reports Interfax, with the upgrades reportedly being made by a British company, BAE Systems. The systems upgraded reportedly include the S-75, S-125, S- 200, and S-300. The size of the contract reflects the extent of the defense systems built by the Soviet Union


Structurally consist of three Corps, deployed correspondingly in Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k. The Force HQ is located in Kyiv.
48 000 men are in Air Defense service. The Force is armed with Air Defense complexes S-75; S-125, S-200, S-300. It also includes Fighter Aviation.
The Air Defense Force of Ukraine was developed at the basis of formations, deployed in Ukraine at the moment of its independence's proclamation.


These elaborate preparations mean that the Soviets are nearly capable of deploying the nationwide missile defense specifically prohibited by the ABM Treaty.This approach of stockpiling existing ABM components has also allowed the Soviets to proceed with their build-up of missile defenses in a way that makes it difficult for the U.S. to verify full compliance with the ABM Treaty, unlike the testing or deployment of space-based systems that would be readily detectable ABM Violations. The Soviets have continued to upgrade their vast air defense network.This violates the ABM Treaty because it gives Soviet surface-to-air missiles the ability to intercept and destroy missile reentry vehicles.The ABM Treaty allows the deployment of missiles capable of intercepting and destroying ICBM reentry vehicles only at designated sites.

Soviet surface-to-air missiles are deployed throughout Soviet territory. Tests of the SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12 surface-to-air missiles against ballistic missile reentry vehicles in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated the capability of these weapons to fill limited ballistic missile defense missions. According to defense reporter Peter Samuel, in some 100 cases "these classes of surface-to-air missiles have been observed in tests against ballistic missile warheads Moscow continues to violate ABM Treaty provisions that prohibit the deployment of ABM radars in the interior of the country. Specifically, the Soviets have not dismantled their illegal Pechora class radar at Krasnoyarsk Elaborate Preparations. Moscow also has been stockpiling such 10 The Washington Times, op.cit 11 Defense 2000, March 1988, p. 121 6 I I I although they pledged to do so at the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, providing they were reassured that U.S. radars in Greenland and Britain do not violate the ABM Treaty. So far, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar has not been dismantled.

The Soviets have been conducting advanced research on strategic defenses focusing on terrestrial and space-based-systems. This programmobilizes tee of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians to develop high-energy battle lasers, particle beams, and other directed energy systems that could disrupt or destroy ballistic missiles or their components. Radio frequency weapons, which can disable ballistic missiles by interfering with their electronic components, and kinetic energy devices, which destroy missiles and reentry vehicles by the force of collision, are also being explored.


Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
Union no longer exists and because the
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
the Russians have more than the one ABM
system permitted by the treaty.

Joseph Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
for Defense, states:
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
permitted by the treaty, ringing
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
battle-management radars. Together
the Moscow defense and the vast
homeland defense formed an interlocking
system—nearly all of it illicit.10

The “10,000 to 12,000 interceptors” to which
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile


The missile troops are equipped with about 150 SA-2 Guideline, 100 SA-3 Goa, 500 SA-5 Gammon, and 1,750 SA-10 Grumble missile launchers. A program to replace all of the older systems with the SA-10, well under way by 1996, has been considered by experts to be one of the most successful reequipment programs of the post-Soviet armed forces. Seven of the military districts have at least one aviation air defense regiment each; two districts, Moscow and the Far Eastern, have specially designated air defense districts.

The borders of the Moscow Air Defense District are the same as those of the Moscow Military District. The Far Eastern Air Defense District combines the territory of the Far Eastern Military District and the Transbaikal Military District. Presumably, the boundaries of the other military districts are the same for air defense as for other defense designations.

Data as of July 1996


By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10,000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA-5/10 complexes. Yet the U.S. officially counts only the l00 interceptors of the "ABM X-3" system at Moscow, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. ABM X-3 is a scaled up model of the NIKE-X system, vintage late


"Full antimissile defence the length of the perimeter of the borders
of Europe and Russia is not planned," Ivashov said. "It is intended to
concentrate all that we already have, coordinating ABM systems, obtaining
opportunities to destroy ballistic missiles and opportunities in the
command structure, and directing those opportunities in directions
presenting a missile danger."

He said that the systems should cover peacekeeping contingents, and
the civilian population and civilian facilities as well as military
facilities, damage to which could cause significant harm to civilians.

The Russian side has no doubt that "NATO members will not start
purchasing Russian ABM systems on a large scale, like the modernized
S-300PMU or the new S-400, which can effectively combat ballistic
missiles, although NATO's European members do not have systems like
these", Ivashov said. Moscow does not in any case intend to extend its
missile technology to NATO countries, and Sergeyev said this frankly in
Brussels a few days ago.


Correspondent] The upgraded S-300 can hit a warhead even in space. This is exactly what the Americans are dreaming of when they speak about the ABM system. As soon as it is known about the launch of a combat missile, its trajectory is calculated immediately and air defence experts begin acting. There are just 7-10 seconds to locate a target, acquire it and launch an interception missile. They have done it.


In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.


Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.


Over the past decade, Russia has deployed thousands of S-300V and Antey-2500 missiles around its key military and industrial complexes. In addition, it has exported these systems throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing its ailing economy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, “in the worldwide competition to sell ballistic missile defense systems, the Russian Antey Corp.’s S-300V is a main contender.”(8) The advantage for buyers of Russian surface-to-air missiles is that, unlike buying from the U.S., there are no political strings attached and, more often than not, the weapons are significantly cheaper than their U.S. counterparts


First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34

Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."36 Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38


Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.

The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.

* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.

* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.


The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.


Note: SA-5 is actually a reused NATO reporting name: it originally referred to the Russian V-1000 Anti Ballistic Missile system, introduced in 1963 and retired the following year for unknown reasons. The SA-5 (as described here) is apparently considered to be a "highly modified version of it".


In addition to the interceptor missiles currently deployed, the missile defence system also comprises reconnaissance means (Dunay 3U and Don 2N radars) for target detection, tracking and guidance; command posts, missile silos and an all-encompassing data grid. The press service said that the Russian missile defence system can perform automatically and by signals from the early warning missile strike system. It automatically distinguishes between warheads and other (false) targets, jamming and interference.

As for the March 4, 1961 test, the V-1000 is said to have been launched from the 10th State Research Training Field and intercepted an R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) missile carrying a mock-up payload of 500 kg, which itself had been lanched from Kapustin Yar. The V-1000 interceptor is said to have comprised:16,000 carbide-wolfram core balls, a TNT load and a steel jacket. The disk-shaped damage area was perpendicular to the axis of the countermissile. The V-1000 created by Petr Grushin, Fakel Design Bureau, had a speed of 1,000 mps. In 1961 the nuclear version was tested (without the fissionable material). The test results laid the basis for the A-35 Galosh missile deployed in dozens around Moscow
While the 1961 test was with a conventional explosive, the Griffon and successive Russian missile interceptors were all armed with small nuclear warheads. The explosive capacity of such weapons gave an additional level of certainty to the destruction of any incoming missiles, and eliminating the need for somewhat more difficult “hit-to-kill” technology.

Update: The March 4 edition of Itar Tass quotes Lieutenant-General Vladimir Popovkin, the chief of staff of the Russian space troops, outlining the current capabilities of Russian missile defenses. The system, he said is capable of detecting ballistic targets and intercepting and destroying warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles….The ABM system for the country’s central district can spot warheads of missiles against the background of light and heavy false targets and active and passive interferences, as well as during the use by the enemy of other means to overcome the air defences. Russia’s ABM system consists of intelligence means, command posts, silos for launching interception missiles and the very missiles, and the system for relaying information linking all the ground facilities of the anti-missile defences into one cycle.

full article


In March 4, 1961, in the area of the A testing ground the V-1000 ABM with a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the R-12 BM launched from the State Central Testing Ground with a dummy warhead weighing 500 kilograms. The Dunai-2 radar of the A system detected the BM at a distance of 1,500 kilometers when it appeared over the radio horizon, then the M-40 central computer found parameters of the R-12 trajectory, and prepared target designation for precision homing radars and the launchers. The ABM was launched and its warhead was actuated by the signal from the command post. The warhead of the ABM consisted of 16,000 balls with a carbide-tungsten core, TNT filling, and a steel hull. The warhead had a fragments field shaped as a disk perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the ABM. The warhead was actuated by the signal from the ground with a deflection necessary for formation of the fragments field. The warheads of this type were designed under the supervision of Chief Designer A. Voronov. The M-40 central computer was designed by the Precise Mechanics and Computer Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the supervision of Academician S. Lebedev. The computer could make 40,000 operations per second.

The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid-propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM's homing. The V-1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile's automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.

Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.


However, in 1967 CIA decided that the SA-5 was purely an anti- aircraft system, and that the large phased array radars then under construction were for early warning of U.S. ballistic missile attack (and space track), but not for battle management, i.e. did not provide detailed target trajectory tracking data relative to an earth coordinate system to the SA-5 complexes.(1) Despite sporadic dissents by other members of the intelligence community and a major DIA challenge in 1982, CIA repeated its errors for the systems that appeared in the next two decades. CIA's erroneous assessments are the current dogma of U.S. policy makers.

In fact, in the 1950s the Soviets adopted a two track approach: ABM systems dedicated to the def ense of Moscow, the apex of the Communist Party's nomenklatura; and dual purpose SAM/ABM systems-- first the SA-5 then the SA-10--and large phased array battle management radars--first generation "Hen House" followed by second generation "LPAR"--for national ABM defense.(2) Moscow was defended by the best technology the Politburo had, the rest of the nation by the best it could afford.

When CIA concluded in 1967 that the SA-5 was just an anti-aircraft (SAM) system, and that the Hen House radars were just for early warning (and space tracking), a majority of the U.S. intelligence comunity joined the CIA choir. Subsequently ClAts analysis of the SA-5 and the Hen House radars was extended to the SA-10 and the LPARS. Once enshrined, CIAls erroneous analysis was not challenged even when "hard" evidence to the contrary appeared.(31)

By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10, 000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA-5/10 complexes.


On 29 November 1960 the first attempted intercept of an R-5 IRBM by the V-1000 was fully successful. (1) The anti-ballistic missile passed within the kill radius of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the V-1000. But the warhead itself had not completed development and was not installed. The five following intercept attempts were unsuccessful - five R-5's and two V-1000's were expended (three times the system failed to launch the anti-ballistic missile in time):

1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. (3)Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept. But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.

(2)On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio-guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.

Manufacturer: Vympel/Grushin. Launches: 37. Failures: 5. Success Rate: 86.49%. First Launch Date: 1958-10-16. Last Launch Date: 1962-11-01. Launch data is: incomplete. Apogee: 100 km (60 mi). Total Mass: 8,800 kg (19,400 lb). Core Diameter: 1.00 m (3.20 ft). Total Length: 14.50 m (47.50 ft). Maximum range: 300 km (180 mi). Boost Propulsion: Solid rocket. Cruise Propulsion: Storable liquid rocket, AK-20I/TG-02. Cruise engine: S2.726. Cruise Thrust: 102.900 kN (23,133 lbf). Guidance: Radio command. Maximum speed: 3,600 kph (2,200 mph). Ceiling: 25,000 m (82,000 ft).


Indeed, the upgraded S-300 PM is reported to be capable of hitting a warhead in space and already provides adequate protection to Russia's major cities. In seven to ten seconds a target can be located, fixed, and an interception missile launched. Around 10,000 troops are placed on permanent, around the clock, combat duty with apparently a great deal of work to suggest possible overstretches. "On average, the air defense troops detect and track over 250,000 aircraft, including more than 100,000 foreign aircraft and 1,000-1,500 foreign reconnaissance aircraft every year," commented Mikhailov.


Based on operational nuclear--capable delivery platforms, knowledge about the size and composition of the nonstrategic stockpile during the Cold War, and statements made by Russian officials about implementation of the 1991-1992 presidential initiatives, we estimate that Russia maintains approximately 2,330 operational nonstrategic warheads and some 4,170 nonstrategic warheads in reserve. The operational warheads include: approximately 700 warheads for antiballistic missile and air defense systems (the A-135 system around Moscow and the SA-10 Grumble/S-300 system); some 975 air-to-surface missiles and bombs for delivery by land-based Tu-22M Backfire and Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft; and 655 warheads for cruise missiles, anti-air missiles, antisubmarine rockets, and torpedoes delivered by submarines, surface ships, and land-based naval aircraft. All naval warheads are stored on land.


On 04 March 1961 an R-12 ballistic missile fitted with a mockup in the form of a 500-kg steel plate, simulating a standard warhead, was launched from the State proving ground at station Sary-Shagan. The target was detected by proving ground radars at a range of 1,500 km and destroyed by a V-1000 antimissile missile, outfitted with a high-explosive-payload.

In 1963 the Griffon [NATO reporting name] interceptor was paraded in Red Square, and characterized as an ABM interceptor. The Griffon was a two-stage liquid fueled interceptor that was 16.5 meters long with a range of over 250 kilometers. Construction of the RZ-25 ABM system, which employed the V-1000 interceptor, was first detected in the early 1960's near the Estonian capital Tallinn. However this construction soon ceased. A highly modified version of the Griffon, the Gammon, was subsequently developed.

The Gammon is a 'highly refined' version of the Griffin ( wich was succesfully tested at the Russian ABM testing grounds against SS-4)wich the DIA and CIA in their wisdom decided to call a SAM system when all the evidence suggested that it was a dual use system at worse and a full blown ABM system, under the guise of a SAM system, at worse.


"Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R"

So the number of US ICMB's and SLBM's are not nearlly of any importance in my opinion as they have refused to build a defense that could discourage a Russian attack ( which it wont launch as it's doing just fine destroying the US economy by more passive means) and ensure American strategic strength.

The truth is however that even Russian ICBM/SLBM are by no means inferior and certainly more effective given the absence of a admitted American defense. I think the US has such defenses but their inability to protect their world leading civilian economy ( the Russian civilian economy that 'collapsed' in the 90's were not much to talk about anyways) speaks volumes as to who does not hold the proverbial whip today.


posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 04:38 AM

Originally posted by ape
yeah and what i can recall also from russian sources is that they were going to take over the US economically and militarily right before they collapsed hard

The Russians were aiming to reach such strategic dominance in the early or mid 80's that they could dictate world affairs and is evident by their self chosen ( if sometimes badly managed) reform process ( called the collapse of the USSR in the west) they apparently did. They were operating so many and such superior nuclear and conventional offensive and defensive forces that they could do as they liked and that's what they did sparking that long awaited reform process.

so anything coming from russian sources is a bunch of crap IMO.

Well national intelligence services lie as that is part of their method of operation so obviously the Russians/Soviets lied about whatever suited them at whatever time. The fact that they deployed two types of ICBM's ( more than 1300 road mobile missiles with ranges of 8000 km with single warheads ) and managed to call them 'long range missiles' without the western intelligence exposing them as liars and treaty breakers. The sad reality is that it's the western intelligence agencies that deceived their populations by claiming that the USSR did not have the overwhelming superiority that they well understood they had. This is all well documented by the way...

In July 1988, US Army Colonel Edward H. Cabaniss led an American INF inspection team to Petropavlovsk in Kazakhstan, approximately 2,000 kilometers east of Moscow. Petropavlovsk was the location of the V.I. Lenin Heavy Machine Building Plant, where the American team conducted a closeout inspection of the former SS-23 missile launcher production facility. The last of 239 SS-23 missiles was destroyed at the Saryozek Missile Elimination Facility on 27 October 1989. The final SS-23 launcher was eliminated the same day at the Stan'kovo elimination facility.

The Soviet Union had negotiated separate diplomatic agreements with both Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, where Soviet INF missile units had been based. In the case of the INF Treaty, the Soviet-declared data was not agreed to by each side, and it was not included in the Treaty. Later it turned out that the Soviets had falsified some of their INF data. In April of 1990 the Soviets admitted that they had covertly provided SS-23 missiles banned by the INF Treaty to three East European nations - East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. At least 120 Soviet-controlled SS-23s covertly deployed in Eastern Europe, which the US INF negotiator termed "deceit and mendacity" during the negotiations. In February 1990 President Bush sent Congress a report stating that the Soviet SS-23 deployment did constitute "bad faith." But he didn't say whether it was a violation of the INF Treaty. The State Department was embarrassed by the discovery later that some Soviet-declared INF data was false, because the State Department had repeatedly vouched for its accuracy in public when advocating the Treaty.

In the draft START agreement, the Soviets have committed themselves to reducing their force of heavy missiles from 308 SS-18s to 154 SS-26s. (The latter has been hastily rebaptized the SS-18 Mod. 5 for cosmetic reasons-the accord bans new types of ICBMs.) How many warheads (lighter, more ac-curate, and more lethal warheads) can the SS-26 SS-18 Mod. 5 carry? Codevilla guesses 28; only the Soviets know for sure. (The SS-18 carries 14.)

The bottom line is that the May accords will nearly double the Soviet counterforce warhead-to-American strategic target ratio (now 3.5 to 1).

According to Codevilla, the Pons Asinorum of the agree-ment concerns chemical weapons. The US will effectively cancel its binary munitions program and reduce its stocks to 5,000 tons. The Soviets promise to reduce to 5,000 tons when and if we help them dispose of the lethal material. US intelligence has already decreased its estimate of the size of the Soviet stockpile from 300,000 to 50,000 tons. (The Soviet Union is thus already 85% of the way to the goal, while the US lags behind due to delays at the Johnston Island in-cinerator.) The agree-ment will allow verification of how much has been destroyed-but not of how much is left.

Now that the political roof has fallen in on the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union has done an about-face on a 16-year ``nyet'' on the US proposal for equality of conventional armaments in Europe.

Soviet Union. A ``technical detail'' that slowed the START Treaty concerns missile throw-weight. The Soviets are supposed to decrease their first-strike arsenal of SS-18s by half. But according to a CIA memorandum, the upgraded model of the SS-18 (the SS-18 Mod 5) ``can still maintain the capability to destroy all US silo-based ICBMs.'' Frank Gaffney, former Defense official, said that the Mod 5 has ``roughly twice the payload capability of its predecessor, higher yield warheads and vastly improved accuracy, thanks to important innovations in Soviet propellant and guidance system.'' He estimates that Soviet capability for attacking hard targets may be greater with 154 Mod 5s than with 308 SS-18 Mod 4s. They may have to allocate only one Mod 5 warhead per target, instead of two, to have a high kill probability.

While the Gorbachev regime may have the most benign intentions, the Soviet Union becomes increasingly unstable. Moscow News (Mar 17-24, 1991) maps 76 cities, districts, and regions where citizens are in ``mortal conflict'' on ``ethnic grounds.'' A year ago, only a third of these flashpoints were in evidence. Also, the possibility of an accidental launch remains. Soviet General Kochemasov disclosed that a Soviet ballistic missile left its launch pad ``of its own accord.'' Fortunately, the missile (which may have carried a nuclear warhead), crashed nearby.

The reason: a factor of two uncertainty exists concerning the method for estimating the'yields of Soviet underground nuclear tests. Critics contend that, with current test measuring capa bilities, a test at 150 kilotons would occasionally appear on the measuring instruments to be 300 kilotons, and more important occasionally appear to be only 75 kilotons. Finally, the TTBT would prevent testing of nuclear weapons designed for the defen- sive purpose of attempting to minimize nonmilitary casualties and damage from a nuclear exchange.

When the first evidence of Soviet testing well above the TTBT limit came to light in 1976, the initial U.S. government response was to stop releasing reports of Soviet nuclear test yields to the public tific basis to cast doubt on the yield estimates themselves In 1977, the Carter White House ordered the intelligence community to adopt a new methodology that in effect cut estimates of these yields in half doubled the yields of their underground testing and again appeared to be in violation of the TTBT The next step was a search for some scien Within a year of this change, the Soviets nearly During this period there were press reports, since confirmed by the Reagan Administration of Soviet tests with estimated yields or central values, the middle of the range of estimates of possi ble yields) well above 150 kilotons responded by withholding the facts and making misleading statements The Carter Administration See infra p. 9 See. for example. Jack Anderson U.S. Can't Tell If Russia Cheats on Test Ban," Th Washington Post,

Soviets responded by increasing their testing yields to over 300 kilotons. The Soviet Union apparently had some tests as high as 350-400 kilotons.

Testing at these yields enables the Soviet Union to develop new and improved nuclear weapons systems for its seemingly unending series of new missiles. At the same time, the U.S. limits itself to testing at 150 kilotons and cannot develop weapons suitable for use on its MX, Trident 11, or Midgetman ICBM unless it adapts existing, older designs. The only other available option entails the serious risk that major new strategic systems will be deployed with warheads that will not deliver their expected yield because of the lack of appropriate testing.

Treaties that favor the USSR, the TTBT gives Moscow a significant military advantage. This undoubtedly will grow with time. The Soviets have, in effect, boosted the yields at which they test.

The higher the yields tested by the Soviets, the more the U.S revises its methodology to legitimize these tests. The Soviet Union has tested and will continue to test at slightly more than twice the maximum allowable yield calculated by the U.S. at any given time. Thus, if the U.S. takes action in the future to legi timize Soviet tests now estimated at 300 kilotons or more, the Soviets will be able to test at 600 kilotons by any procedure 'apparently acceptable to Moscow. The Soviets have rejected all negotiations concerning improved verification

2. The United States made a unilateral" statement regarding the method of defining "heavy" ICBMs similar to what was done during SALT I. On 16 August 1977, the United States informed the Soviet Union that they considered the upper throw-weight limitation for a light ICBM to be 3600 kilograms (approximately 7936 pounds). The Soviets did not respond. See Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s statement on page 17 of SALT II Agreement: Vienna June 18, 1979, Selected Documents No. 12B by the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 1979. Throw-weight was not the only unit of limitation used to divide heavies and lights, however. The launch-weight of the SS-19 was also given and not acknowledged. This failure to define basic terms alone should have been grounds to reject the Treaty.

3. SS-20 data taken from the IISS Military Balance 1981-1982, page 105. Mod 2 is the version so often discussed in the European theater, with 3-150 KT RVs. The range of Mod 2 is given at 5600 kilometers. By shifting to a single 50 KT RV, a range of 7400 kilometers is obtained. Both Mods clearly meet the SALT II criterion of being an ICBM, yet the SS-20 is not listed anywhere in the agreed statements or understandings as being a SALT II accountable ICBM. Despite the fact that the Mod I only has a 5000 kilometer range, any missile that has been tested in an ICBM mode is supposed to count.

When the INF Treaty entered into force in June 1988, Votkinsk was a closed city of 100,000 people located in the Ural Mountains, approximately 1,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Three INF missiles had been assembled there: SS-12s, SS-20s, and SS-23s. The Votkinsk plant still assembled some of the Soviet Union's most modern ballistic missiles, specifically the SS-25 missile.3

Encased in large missile canisters, SS-25 missiles were shipped from the plant in special railroad cars to operational military units. The SS-25 was not banned under the INF Treaty. However, the missile's first stage was physically similar to the SS-20 first stage; its missile canister was similar in size and weight; and its railcar exiting the assembly plant was similar to those used to transport SS-20s. The major difference in the two missiles was that the SS-20 was a two-stage missile in which the second stage was 2.87 meters long, while the SS-25 was a three-stage missile, with a second stage 3.07-meter-long.4 Given these similarities and differences, treaty negotiators had to agree upon an inspection process that would allow U.S. inspectors to be sure that no SS-20 missiles or missile stages were leaving the plant.

So they broke treaties left right and center and the US politicians always just let them get away with it thus undermining what little strength the US retained in the 80's.

( russia never eliminated the MAD factor with the US even when they developed a better missle this is a fact I dont need any bias sources or opinions to challenge this)

They did eliminate the MAD factor as they deployed both active and passive defenses in massive numbers.

The Soviet belief that war might be protracted requires the survivability needed for follow-on strikes, along with war reserves, protection for people and equipment, and the capacity to reload launchers. For their ICBM, LRINF and air defense forces, the Soviets have stocked extra missiles, propellants, and warheads throughout the USSR. ICBM silo launchers can be reloaded in a matter of days, and provision has been made for the decontamination of those launchers. Plans for the survival of necessary equipment and personnel have been developed and practiced. Resupply ships are available to reload Soviet SSBNs in protected waters. Despite these comprehensive warfighting objectives and ambitious development and deployment programs over the years, the Soviets are continuing to modernize all aspects of their strategic forces. Much of what the Soviets have done since September 1981 involves the consummation of programs begun in the 1970s and offers the first signs of new programs designed to help remedy weaknesses still remaining and to allow them to attain their own objectives in the face of prospective Western programs.

Civil Defense
A dozen years ago, we studied in detail Soviet civil defenses in a number of cities. If we believe those cities are typical and extrapolate the amount of building they have done in the meantime, then according to these unproved assumptions, the Soviets now have good shelters for most of their city population.

Whether this extrapolation is right or not, I do not know. The CIA has either neglected its duty to find out, or has found out -- but not told us. Plans to protect millions of people cannot be considered secret information. We should know, and we have a right to know. We have done practically nothing about civil defense.

Consider the size and nature of the effort involved: In the mid-1970s U.S. intelligence satellites revealed massive underground constructions in Russia. According to Major General George Keegan, former chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence, there were "incredible photographs of civil defenses of all types going up all over the Soviet Union."

In the 39 largest cities of the former USSR every apartment house built after 1955 had a nuclear blast and fallout shelter built into the foundation. Every new factory also had a shelter system. Underneath Moscow there were 75 huge underground command posts, each one as large as the Pentagon. According to Gen. Keegan, these were protected from nuclear assault by four hundred feet of earth fill and a hundred feet of reinforced concrete. Huge storage containers were also detected by USAF intelligence These contained water and diesel fuel.

At present, Jastrow said, our deterrent rests primarily upon our Trident submarines.
Soviet attack could destroy submarines in port (about 2/3 of our force), and the 200
Soviet killer subs could probably stalk and destroy some of those that were on station.
Because of difficulties in communications, about half the surviving submarines (maybe six)
would launch their missiles.

(4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing construction of a massive underground facility of unknown purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye (formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16) that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to exceed reasonable defense requirements.

(5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness, and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War strategic partnership between the United States and Russia.

(6) Russia appears to have engaged in a campaign to deliberately conceal and mislead the United States about the purpose of the Yamantau Mountain project, as shown by the following:

Peter Pry, a former CIA analyst and author of a new book on Russian nuclear operations, said the continued construction of the Russian strategic defense sites is ominous and cannot be dismissed by U.S. officials as "inertia" from Cold War-era strategic policies. "It shows they take the threat of nuclear war so seriously that they're willing to spend scarce resources on it," Mr. Pry said, adding that he was not familiar with the CIA report. "These things are tying down billions of dollars in rubles that could go into other enterprises the Russians need - for example, providing housing for Russian military officers." Mr. Pry said Russian press reports say the underground facility at Yamantau Mountain covers an area as large as the Capital Beltway.

The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels, and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents, and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor, mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just no comparison between the two."

So couple that with the ABM and direct energy weapon defenses as well as overwhelming superiority in both conventional and nuclear forces and you get a US economy that have been slowly declining ( rapidly on occasion like the 60% dollar devaluation the last five years) and a economy that retains little of it's former vitality.

dont talk like russia has something better than the f-22, this is pure fantasy and dishonesty,

As i said against direct energy weapons or massive air defenses ( where will it fly from when they nuclear strikes have destroyed the air bases it deploys from?) such weapons are only good for terrorizing third world nations into accepting worthless dollars as payment for actual goods.

please be realistic as this is thr weapons forum and we dont need a bunch of unreliable biased opinions on how russian weaponry will simply dominate the US,

The sources are mostly from western defense journals or quotes from western defense specialist or secretaries of defense. They may not be reliable to you but it's the best a lay person can come up with in terms of a objective investigation of this matter.

on mig alley the US pilots had a 7-1 kill ratio and the russian sources only tried to save face by being dishonest and making up obsurd numbers, anyone who challenges this is misinformed.

Like there was no dishonesty involved in claming that the US had such a hard time not writing off it's jets in non combat 'accidents'? There is no good evidence as far as i am concerned that claims more than 600- 800 mig-15's destroyed and considering the training standards and the fact that the allies lost more than 3000 planes written off i can not consider the Korean air war a example of overwhelming superiority on the US side.

once again take a look at the US projection of force, anyone who says ther JSF and raptor are a waste of money or are obsolete against russian forces is just being biased and ignorant,

Well i do believe that the Raptor is obsolete against direct energy weapons as it's simply too expensive lacking at this time the capacity to properly interdict mobile forces with great accuracy while not exposing itself to counter fire in the process. I do not consider myself all that well informed but to compare what you think you know to what i can prove with relative reliability is imo quite the farce.

I mean your posting links to ' the soviet empire' like it is actually legit,

I never posted a link to that site or used the information there as argument and once again you can not judge a entire site based on the prevailing general conditions. I myself would not use such source material ( easier and more reliable to quote from defense or intelligence journals) but you often find things worth following up on even the strangest of sites. You would be well advised to not point fingers and insult others while your clearly rather incapable of holding a adult discussion when your ideas are tested with material you have no knowledge of.

give me a break man. ' communist MEGA TECH vs yankee crap', it doesn't get more biased then that, plus the posters on that site are a bunch of biased idiots who need to get checked, I remember when i tried to reg for that forum to debate them and I never got a response or anything I couldnt post anything, bunch of commie dishonest sources HAHAHA.

Always nice to be able to believe in conspiracies when it suits you.

the links you provided are outdated and crap.

Outdated does not mean untrue or no longer relevent and if you want to point out the inaccuracies in that 'crap' you would probably retain a little more credibility than you otherwise would


posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 04:52 AM

Originally posted by Leevi
It's now "free world", just look at it, pure democracy.. brought by who ? Yeah, you don't have to think twice to make your choice


posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 10:22 AM
you know alot of those quotes I was not even talking to you? what are you formating them like im directing the reply at you?

now onto your sources, you have a piece from 1997 saying russia is making more bunkers, you have piece form 1988 saying how developed russias bunker system is and its survivability, and then another piece from 1997 saying how russia is digging into a mountain built to withstand a nuclear war and so on and on, so according to you this eliminates the mad factor? the US position for it's leaders and it's arsenal would just be totally wiped out and russia would survive and prosper to live another day? im sorry that does not happen in a nuclear war russia would get wasted just like the US would, only a 'scholar' on ATS would claim the russians eliminated MAD ( which they never did ). what the US ensured is that the leadership and second strike capability always remained and it was always ensured even if the civilian population got decimated. its harsh but take a look at the nature of a nuclear war, how long do you think those people can live underground in bunkers or shelters under homes in cities? the food would run out and then what? they would die of starvation or die of horrible radiation, nobody survives this man you're a freaking nut case.

all of this is on paper and alot of it is old, what does this prove stellar? yes you need to project force, infact what I can recall from russia when they actually were a superpower was they always demonstrated and sold all of their tech for profit, and this did this very often a clear demonstration of force.

the US has the option the either bomb russia from the sky, from the sea and from the ground so what in the hell makes you so confident that russia could repel this when they 1.) dont have the air and sea option they only have the gound option because they dont excell at the other options, not to mention stategic nuclear weapons that can be fired from subs which russia in the past expressed concerns. if you think any ABM defense is going to detect a low flying stealth AGM-129a as you have obviously showed you're misinformed about the missile in that is is built conventional with a nuclear option and totally disregarded it in a different thread, this missle alone used strategicallly would take out any of your soviet defenses, not to mention what hell would come from the sea and ground, so please stop being biased.

now please tell me the logic which you have failed to adress twice in deploying DEW along with continued new development of ABM's ? that hardly makes sense because one of them is a wastefull investment and one of them makes the other obsolete and was designed to replace. DEW technology is very expensive to maintaine, not only that it is still being developed for solid battle field use and defense by the US who invests more in this than russia ever did, what in the hell makes you think the ruskies who can't even make more than 1 su-47 and cant even afford to patrol nuclear subs ( which are not obsolete despite your OPNINON ) can deploy DEW to counter the US? pure fantasy and stop calling me ignorant because I dont agree with you, I have caught you maNipulating the truth tho suite your own opinion here many times, I dont need to read any more of your sources because every single link is nothing but babble and fantasy like the russians have some massive high geared war machine ready to crush all opposition, yeah I think i heard that in the cold war too. =[

so basically you disregard the triad which is a must for any superpower? the soviets feared the US nuclear sub fleet, especaially the capabilitys of the strategic nuclear weapons the fleet possessed because it ensured damage no matter what they did, the fact you disregard the need for ssbns and attack subs instantly takes away any kind of credability you had to the conversation.

secondly despite my countries problems we still put every other country to shame econmically and it takes a massive bloc of european countries to even compete with us and the standard of living ( i know because i live here ) is far better than europe, so please dont give me those biased lines, I know people in germany and in france right now who say it sucks and want to come to the US to live and work, me and every other american are in control of our own destiny, once fair tax is passed it would usher in a new age for america, you might wanna consider getting a visa.

why are you telling me it was the civilian sector that rotted and not the military? I already know this as I have already explained and posted facts of why the soviet union collapsed and could not compete or keep up with the US militarily or econmically, the spending along with a crumbling domestic situation is what lead to the collapse, the reforms made previous to prevent this could not adress it in time, the soviets were trying to keep up with the US, we took our development to another level under reagan and the soviets with their current domestic situation could not support the foundation it built, of course you finally now recognize this because you were infact debating it that the union was fine and that 'I dont know the reason for the break up because im misinformed' or w/e. Hmm im on to thw twist up game stellar as it wont work for me, I was started suspecting this when you would not adress alot of highstreets points, hmm.

posted by stellarX
There are regular air shows

oh yeah because flying around the same su-47 and outdated migs every year is really a clear projection of success and power?

[edit on 31-12-2006 by ape]

posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 09:56 AM


Russian politicians are head over heels debating plans of U.S. imperialists and their bloodthirsty military, man-made disasters and floods. They are probably totally unaware that Russia has long build it own facility similar to HAARP. The facility Sura is as powerful as HAARP. It is located in Russia's central area, in a remote and desolate place some 150 km from the city of Nizhny Novgorod. One of the leading scientific research institutions of the USSR, Research Institute of Radiophysical Studies, owns the facility.

The facility was commissioned in 1981. “Using this unique facility, researchers achieved extremely interesting results regarding the ionosphere behavior. They discovered the effect of generation of low-frequency emission at the modulation of ionosphere current. At the beginning, Soviet Defense Department mostly footed the bill for similar research projects.

posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 02:04 PM
How about yes buddie.. you calling my grandfather a lier???? You obviously don't even know what happened in N.Korean war buddie.. you gotta check your sources seriously.. otherwise don't post your filth and slander around here

What u are talking about in 7:1 kill ratio is against n.korean pilots who had never flew before and then the were suddenly flying mig planes. But it's not the point, the point is that the soviet pilots were patrooling the skies over important objects in n.korea like plants and factories. You really forgot to mention that US sabres and b-52's were lost every time they went against soviet ace pilots and the ratio was 3:1, so buddie dont't pull that bs up from your ass. My grandpa was in that war and I don't think he would tell me the lies... your posts are ignorrant.. telling u again, research 1st what happened in N.korean war only then you can tell me what happened from your opinion in N.Korea.
Just calm down... buddie.. u are just mad that Ukrainian ace pilot in N.Korea was the 1st one to score the most planes his name was Sergei M. Kramenko.


posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 02:09 PM
err sucks u cant edit older posts, i meant the agm-129a has been upgraded to take on both conventional and nuclear missions.

dude you post russian sources when they are proven liars, they claimed they killed more sabres then what was actually deployed and this is a fact, I have posted plenty of information about the sabres kill ratio against the mig 15, the sabre pilots not only beat the honchos they beat everyone else who flew in a mig.

[edit on 1-1-2007 by ape]

[edit on 1-1-2007 by ape]

posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 06:04 PM
dude what you are saying bs... come on... grow up. I know the person who flew there.. helllooooo.. are you a moron ur just pretending????
Sabres were OWNED In NORTH KOREA!!! all sabres have killed were korean pilots. not the russian... you are full of american propaganda.. just go die


posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 07:37 PM

"Review of archived and previously classified documents released after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 disputes the numbers of claims by U.S. pilots, stating that the VVS lost only 345 MiGs. In turn the Soviets claimed to have shot down more than 1,300 U.N. aircraft including more than 650 Sabres. However, USAF records revealed that there were only about 660 Sabres deployed to the Korean theater in the entire war. This fact makes the Soviet claims highly dubious. USAF records also show 224 F-86s lost to all causes, including non-combat. Many air engagements are corroborated by both sides, but with conflicting claims of kills."

go edit wikipedia then and watch it get changed back to fact. and this is just starting out with basic international knowledge.

posted on Jan, 1 2007 @ 09:59 PM
who knows maybe the sabres were owned, maybe the russians did destroy 650 out of 660 sabres, can you prove anything else you say???/

posted on Jan, 2 2007 @ 03:40 AM
I can't believe I read ape say that the Russians have no good air or sea based nukes...guh.

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