BlitzKreig: Everything

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posted on Dec, 25 2006 @ 04:59 AM
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Allies loosing it? I don't think so, old sport.

April 1940 - the Royal Air Force gave the mighty Luftwaffe a 'damned good thrashing' and won; the United States Army Air Force [Group?] bombed Germany by day [B17's and Liberators] and the RAF by night, using much heavier bombers, such as the Lancasters and Stirlings.

The only problem that I could envisage, would be on the Eastern Front, where German Aces carved up the ariel battlefield at will.

Russia also had their own air aces and, as the war swung in Russia's favour, the once mighty Luftwaffe were hard pressed and often failled to get even an aircraft off the ground to support their hard pressed friends on the ground.

Incidentally, if that fatman Goering had not switched targets midway through the Battle of Britain and kept hammering the Chain Home 1 and 2 Sites, the airfields in the south and southwest, England, alone as she was, would have lost the Battle and probably the war.




posted on Dec, 26 2006 @ 12:04 PM
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I think Blitzkrieg and Shock and Awe are very different.

Blitzkrieg is more about capturing KEY LOCATIONS quickly in order attain victory. Modern example would be the ground phase of the 1st Gulf War. It's more about not engaging/destroying more than you have to.

Shock and Awe is all about disrupty logistics, communications, and key units in rapid succession as to put the enemy in confusion and disarray and thus further inflict harm with more ease. With Shock and Awe you want to destroy KEY TARGETS even if it isn't immediately neccessary. I think the Battle of Britain is a better example of using Shock and Awe (although its effectiveness here is debatable). The Germans tried to knock out airfields, radar, and command centers all in the initial swoop.

I guess Pearl Harbor is also an attempt at WWII Shock and Awe. Destroy the Pacific Fleet in an impressive display of power so the US would sue for peace.

Clearly the use of the Atomic bombs was Shock and Awe.

[edit on 26-12-2006 by DoBravery]



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 07:52 AM
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DoBravery, the Battle of Britain had nothing to do with Shock and Awe and it had very little to do with Blitzkrieg.

On 10th July 1940, Goering unleashed his Luftwaffe against the Chain Home 1 radar/radio relay stations along the southern coast and Home Counties, in what was later known as the Battle of Britain. It was to be a war of attrition.

Early reconnaissance and intelligence had shown Goering that if he could force the Royal Air Force to react to his raids against key installations, then he could take the fight to the RAF and through attrition, destroy it.

His weapons of choice [for whatever reasons] were the Junkers Ju 87B Stuka dive bombers escorted and supported by Messerschmidt Bf 110s.

These were such a disaster and proved to be no match for the Hurricanes put up against them and with losses escalating to such a degree, that Goering was forced to change tactics and withdraw them from the battle.

His change of tactics was to see massed bombing raids by Dornier Do 17s and Heinkel He 111s, escorted to their targets by the Messerschmidt Bf 109s against the RAF airfields in the Home counties, southern and south western England - from the Thames Estuary to the bristol Channel.

The Battle of Britain started [officially] on 10th July and ended on the 31st October 1940 - during which time, the Luftwaffe lost 1,389 aircraft. [These losses are confirmed by unit diaries and official documents seized at the end of the war] There are however, no records of how many Luftwaffe aircrews were killed or wounded during the battle.

The Royal Air Force at the start of the battle could only muster 2,927 pilots of all ranks, from the RAF, Coastal Command and across the Commonwealth. Of these, close to 600 aircrew were killed for the loss of 792 aircraft.



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 09:35 AM
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Originally posted by fritz
Allies loosing it? I don't think so, old sport.


Not old and not very sporting when it comes to what i consider historic 'facts' .



April 1940 - the Royal Air Force gave the mighty Luftwaffe a 'damned good thrashing' and won;


It didn't win and the best that can be in my opinion be said about it is that it prevented the Luftwaffe from winning. In my opinion that battle was Germany's to lose ( as much as such things can be said about war time situations) and that's what they somehow managed to do.


the United States Army Air Force [Group?] bombed Germany by day [B17's and Liberators] and the RAF by night, using much heavier bombers, such as the Lancasters and Stirlings.


And they were suffered heavy casualties doing very little to change the strategic balance. If those strategic materials were invested in fighters there is no telling what might have happened in Greece, Italy, North Africa to say nothing of the far east against Japan! The base ideal of lashing out and trying to hurt a enemy which you could not by other means did more damage to Britain than good and without the involvement of the USAF ( to say nothing of the resources to construct to vast bomber fleets ) RAF operations over Germany and occupied Europe would have been petered out by 1941 as they simply lacked the capacity to build bombers faster than they were being shot down while doing effective damage.


The only problem that I could envisage, would be on the Eastern Front, where German Aces carved up the ariel battlefield at will.


Imagine if those aces and fighters were available for the defense of Germany proper against allied daytime bombers? The problem the Germans experienced on the East front were that they could dominate wherever they allocated ( even till the last years) their fighter wings but never could cover the entire front thus leading to large gaps where Soviet aircraft to punish the German forces as they soon learnt to do.


Russia also had their own air aces and, as the war swung in Russia's favour, the once mighty Luftwaffe were hard pressed and often failled to get even an aircraft off the ground to support their hard pressed friends on the ground.


Till the end they could do great damage at a given strategic area of the east front but ( meaning training and equipment were good till the end) but the size of those areas kept on declining...


Incidentally, if that fatman Goering had not switched targets midway through the Battle of Britain and kept hammering the Chain Home 1 and 2 Sites, the airfields in the south and southwest, England, alone as she was, would have lost the Battle and probably the war.


I am aware of these ideas but due to the dates ( they were still 'trying' to stage a invasion) they were in quite a hurry and it seems they may have very well believed that they had so weakened the RAF that a final battle over London ( which they assumed the RAF would have defend with whatever they had left ) could seal their fate and make a invasion possible. If not for the time constraints imposed on the Luftwaffe they might have not been so rash but one should also keep in mind that the RAF were greatly mismanaged and that it in fact retained greater capacity, if unused and miss allocated, than so commonly believed. I still believe that given time and strategic focus ( something Hitler had trouble with from time to time imo) the Luftwaffe could have and would have virtually grounded the RAF ( or at least ensured that it could only fight from central and northern bases) and that the bomber campaign resources would have had to be reallocated to fighter and anti aircraft production thus sparing Germany much of the later troubles.

Anyways!

Stellar



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 09:40 AM
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I believe it to be a good strategy, as long as you have backup forces to keep sending in. It seems to me to be a make or break move.



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 09:46 AM
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Originally posted by sweatmonicaIdo
Hitler may have gotten ahead of himself, but I think its safe to say that the Germans had the largest collection of competent military leaders ever in history. Just look at the names, Blomberg, Busch, Keitel, Rommel, von Rundstedt, the list goes on and on.

With that, you can't really explain Germany's defeat without mentioning the financial side of things. After a while, Germany simply couldn't borrow the money needed to keep its economy going. If you fight wars at the high level that the Germans were fighting at, you need to constantly be financing the war, but the money simply ran out.

It had nothing to do with stupidity. Too many times people make the mistake of saying that somebody was stupid and whatnot. But as incompetent as a leader may be, there is something called common sense and a simple acknowledgment of reality that may ultimately keep a man from making a certain decision. If you say the Germans were stupid, then you have to say our military leaders in Vietnam and Iraq were downright retarded, because the German military commanders were some of the best in modern history.


Well said! The Nazi's had the most advanced intelligence network for their time (and I believe we- USA- didn't catch up until the 60's correct?). The Generals were the cream of the crop. The problem was Hitler. And those that were completely submissive to him. His power came from being stuck on one thing, and being obsessive on one thing. His weakness was that as well, he couldn't accept other realities. He had a negative condition. Flash in the pan...

You can have fun and play Nazi all you want (by that I mean flirting with facism), but at the end of the day you know it's a downward spiral that is impossible to work because man is inherently good. There is NO getting around that law.

[edit on 27-12-2006 by jaguarmike]



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 11:34 AM
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StellaX - my humble apologies for calling you an 'old chap'. It's just a phrase we Blue Jobs use from time to time, don't you know.

Anyway Old Bean [another phrase] to take you to task: quote: April 1940 - the Royal Air Force gave the mighty Luftwaffe a 'damned good thrashing' and won; you replied with:

It didn't win and the best that can be in my opinion be said about it is that it prevented the Luftwaffe from winning. In my opinion that battle was Germany's to lose ( as much as such things can be said about war time situations) and that's what they somehow managed to do.

Actually Stella, the Royal Air Force did win the battle, because the Luftwaffe withdrew from the arial battlefield and the ground forces due to invade England dispersed.



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 01:48 PM
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Originally posted by fritz
StellaX - my humble apologies for calling you an 'old chap'. It's just a phrase we Blue Jobs use from time to time, don't you know.


I meant it as a joke, really...


Actually Stella, the Royal Air Force did win the battle, because the Luftwaffe withdrew from the arial battlefield and the ground forces due to invade England dispersed.


Maybe it's splitting hairs but i what i tried to suggest is that the Luftwaffe had almost every superiority and that a better conducted campaign might very well have resulted in victory and invasion( the invasion is another possibly even more complex question) despite all the things that the RAF could have done to improve on the performance that despite all their mistakes were good enough.

Does that make my point of view any clearer or did you just want to restate your position?

Stellar



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 03:56 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX



Originally posted by fritz
StellaX - my humble apologies for calling you an 'old chap'. It's just a phrase we Blue Jobs use from time to time, don't you know.


I meant it as a joke, really...


Actually Stella, the Royal Air Force did win the battle, because the Luftwaffe withdrew from the arial battlefield and the ground forces due to invade England dispersed.


Maybe it's splitting hairs but i what i tried to suggest is that the Luftwaffe had almost every superiority and that a better conducted campaign might very well have resulted in victory and invasion( the invasion is another possibly even more complex question) despite all the things that the RAF could have done to improve on the performance that despite all their mistakes were good enough.

Does that make my point of view any clearer or did you just want to restate your position?

Stellar


No, not really StellarX, so I'll give you an almost perfect sitrep for the battle:

I was stationed at RAF Biggin Hill for almost 5 years and during that time, I did a lot of hobb-nobbing with ex fighter pilots who'd actually fought in the Battle of Britain and I also met Adolf Galland. This led me to research the subject much deeper and I got to see an aweful amount of stuff that was not available to the public at the time and I managed to obtain several photographs that I know are still not in the public domain. I was there from 1974-1979.

From what I was able to see, Goering and Hitler made two elemental mistakes during the battle:

1. The first, was to give up attacking the Chain Home 1 sites which turned out to be absolutely vital to the outcome of the battle and

2. The second was once the attacks on the airfields got under way, Goering should have pressed home this advantage because:

2. [a] The 11 Group Sector Airfields of Debden, Hornchurch, Kenley, Northolt, North Weald and Tangmere were all but destroyed whilst Biggin-Hill was subjected to it's 3rd raid in 72 hours - a raid which all but lasted a week;

2. The 11 Group Major Fighter airfields at Detling, Croydon, Ford, Eastchurch, Hawkinge, Hendon and Gravesend, were all slightly damaged but the other fighter airfields of Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Lympne, Westhampnett, Thorney Island, Stapleford and Rochford went almost unscathed apart from the odd hit and run raid by Messerschmidt Bf 109s.

3. Because things were so bad in 11 Group, the 3 main Sector airfields of 12 Group [Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall and Duxford] as well as the fighter station at Tern Hill were seconded to 11 Group.

Then there was Hitler's reaction to the retaliatory raid on Berlin. He ordered Georing to flatten London - a political reaction to a military non-event - an order which Goering should have strenuously refused to carry out!

By caving in and attacking London, this allowed the RAF to regroup and recover in sufficient quantities that they managed to stem the tide and turn the tables on a heavily depleted Luftwaffe and force them to undertake night operations.

So you see StellarX, the Royal Air Force won and the Luftwaffe didn't!



posted on Dec, 27 2006 @ 07:12 PM
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It is a good tactic for taking a country in one fell swoop. You have infantry mixed with armor, and air support/bombardment. We used it in Iraq 1991 and Iraq 2003. Hitler invented it and used it very effectively. The only reason it didn't work in Russia, was the same reason it didn't work for Napoleon, they froze to death.



posted on Dec, 28 2006 @ 06:54 AM
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Originally posted by fritz
No, not really StellarX, so I'll give you an almost perfect sitrep for the battle:

I was stationed at RAF Biggin Hill for almost 5 years and during that time,


Your not exactly young, are you! Nothing like disagree with someone who lived the history your questioning to keep one on your toes.



I did a lot of hobb-nobbing with ex fighter pilots who'd actually fought in the Battle of Britain and I also met Adolf Galland. This led me to research the subject much deeper and I got to see an aweful amount of stuff that was not available to the public at the time and I managed to obtain several photographs that I know are still not in the public domain. I was there from 1974-1979.


Much of that information may not have been available at the time but i have seen all the arguments and information you have provided below in one format or another so it has since mostly come to light...


From what I was able to see, Goering and Hitler made two elemental mistakes during the battle:


ONLY TWO! hehe...


1. The first, was to give up attacking the Chain Home 1 sites which turned out to be absolutely vital to the outcome of the battle and


They had their own radar networks at the time so i have never found this particular argument to be quite useful or accurate. I can't assume that the Germans did not understand the importance but i am open to the idea ( as has been suggested by many scholars the last few decades) that they did not understand how effectively the Brits centralized their control of air defenses. That being said some others have suggested that the Germans simply gave up bombing those targets because they did not think they could effectively prevent it from working? Any comments on that?


2. [a] The 11 Group Sector Airfields of Debden, Hornchurch, Kenley, Northolt, North Weald and Tangmere were all but destroyed whilst Biggin-Hill was subjected to it's 3rd raid in 72 hours - a raid which all but lasted a week;


I have read that had they kept up the bombing of the southern airfields there was not much the RAF could have done about it at the time hence Churchills decision to alleviate the pressure by sending bomber raids against Berlin three nights in a row..


2. The 11 Group Major Fighter airfields at Detling, Croydon, Ford, Eastchurch, Hawkinge, Hendon and Gravesend, were all slightly damaged but the other fighter airfields of Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Lympne, Westhampnett, Thorney Island, Stapleford and Rochford went almost unscathed apart from the odd hit and run raid by Messerschmidt Bf 109s.


But the pilots were also exhausted and the airfields that had to pick up the extra traffic were also suffering added problems as result...


3. Because things were so bad in 11 Group, the 3 main Sector airfields of 12 Group [Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall and Duxford] as well as the fighter station at Tern Hill were seconded to 11 Group.

Then there was Hitler's reaction to the retaliatory raid on Berlin. He ordered Georing to flatten London - a political reaction to a military non-event - an order which Goering should have strenuously refused to carry out!


It was not retaliatory as it took place a week after the main British raids which were , as i suggested earlier, not in response to any major or significant attempts to bomb London proper. As i understand the situation Churchill deliberately kept sending missions against Berlin hoping to distract the luftwaffe into retaliating but that may in the end not have mattered much as Kesselring believed ( due to to large intelligence gathering problems) that the RAF might be defeated in a final air campaign over London . I am not sure if this is a widely supported view but it's what i concluded from studying this issue up to this point.

Goering should have refused but he was having his own problems and the advice he got from Kesselring did not help him to make decisions that he should never have been required to make in the first place. He was a brilliant man in many respect, and not entirely to blame for the failure over Britain, but this was simply too much responsibility on those two shoulders and it was obvious relatively quickly imo.


By caving in and attacking London, this allowed the RAF to regroup and recover in sufficient quantities that they managed to stem the tide and turn the tables on a heavily depleted Luftwaffe and force them to undertake night operations.

So you see StellarX, the Royal Air Force won and the Luftwaffe didn't!


As i suggested it was not as much caving in as pressures on Goering that he could not handle. That being said one wonders what Kesselring would have done in the same position?

That all being said i have not really seen you say anything i have not seen, read or heard before and i still think that the battle was Germany's to lose and not Britains to win and however inconsequential a fact that might seem i think it reflects the prevailing conditions and mindsets involved best..

Stellar



posted on Dec, 29 2006 @ 09:28 PM
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Another version of BoB




“These worries would become critical as the Luftwaffe shifted its attention across the English Channel. At first, things went well for the Luftwaffe. After the beginning of the Battle of Britain on 13 August 1940, the Bf-109s were allowed to range freely and engage British fighters at will, using the fluid tactics devised by Moelders in Spain. The British were trained in traditional inflexible formation tactics that put them at a disadvantage, but the RAF quickly adopted the Luftwaffe tactics. “

“While the Bf-109s ranged freely, the job of protecting the bombers fell to the twin-engine Bf-110s. It didn't work. The Bf-110s were slaughtered, and so by early September the Bf-109s were ordered to operate as bomber escorts. Forced into a defensive posture, the Bf-109 was at a disadvantage relative to Hurricanes and Spitfires.”

“The limited range of the Bf-109 was also proving a liability, as it could not stay over the battle area for long before having to return home. After the bombings campaign was switched from British airfields to British cities, the RAF began to gain the upper hand. “

“The last action of the Battle of Britain was on 31 October 1940. The British had lost 631 Hurricanes, 403 Spitfires, and 115 Blenheim fighters, for a total of 1,149. The Luftwaffe lost 610 Bf-109s, along with 235 Bf-110s and 937 bombers, for a total of 1,782. Worse, many of the British pilots who had to bail out returned to battle the next day. Luftwaffe pilots who bailed out went to prisoner of war camps…”



www.faqs.org...

www.worldwar-2.net...

freespace.virgin.net...


www.johndclare.net...

It seems in the first month of the fighting the kill ratios were close to 1:1 and shifted to 2:1 in RAF favor when the Germans went down town London and the range limitation of the Me-109 became a critical factor.

The descision to go down town was inplace of attacking the coastal RAF/RN installations in preperation for Sealion invasion. In that capactity Goering won out over Raeder.

Hitler never wanted war with UK this is why he elected to choose Goering path rather than Halders path. As it was the conditions for invasion were just about in place and all it needed was several weeks of bombings of RN ports and RAF airfields along the south coast to launch the invasion. By early September Germany already controlled the channel which was all the Army required of it in the plan to get across the channel.

[edit on 29-12-2006 by psteel]



posted on Dec, 31 2006 @ 04:41 PM
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During the entire war the combined allied airpower & naval power sank only 2000 Axis warships/vessels in the European Theatre plus another 3000 commercial vessels. The German Sealion invasion force counted 4300 vessels and they established a 50% cut off mark as the 'point of no return' for their forces. So for the RAF/RN to scuttle Operation Sealion, they would have to sink over 2300 vessels . In other words they would have to inflict , in a matter of weeks, what would have normally have taken several years of naval warfare, all by themselves!!!!

Breaking down the figures some more, the 1000 RN vessels fighting a force of about 500 German vessels in 1940 sank about 450 German ships/boats or about 40 per month [ 0.037 / RN vessel / month]. The 1944 allied European forces counted about 5000 vessels against 3000 German vessels and sank about 2000, for a rate of about 0.033 / Allied vessel /month. The German invasion force counted 4300 vessels and this is a density of 10 times the historical 1940s levels, and just maybe leading to 10 times the sink rate as well or 370 KM vessels sunk per month for the duration of Sealion?

But its still no were near enough, they would need to sink >2000 vessels in a matter of weeks or at least 10 times such a hypothetical sinking rate. In return the Axis sank about 2000 allied vessels over the five years or ~200 vessels sunk by 500 German warships in 1940, or 0.033 vessels per month. Given a much higher RN fighting density of say 5 :1 this should add up to 80 vessels per month sunk or a 4.5:1 kill ratio in the RN favor.

During naval conflicts a crippled ships is as good as sunk vessel for the better part of a year[s] before repairs are effected. In the context of Sealion they are out of the fight, so if we look from this POV things appear quite different. During the first half of the war, RN vs KM naval clashes usually resulted in 0.25 sunk or crippled warships per attacking vessel per clash, on each side. However vessels of minesweeper or patrol vessel rarely sunk or crippled more than 0.13 per attacking vessel per clash. Trouble is neither side had all gun armed vessels escorting. Fully ½ of the RN fleet were gun armed vessels , the rest had merely machineguns, incapable of sinking anything. In the German fleet 80% of the escort fleet had guns. So the real clash would be between 260 German gun armed vessels and 500 RN gun armed vessels.

Balancing this off would be attacks on the barge fleet. In Crete 1941 this was about 1 barge sunk per attacking warship sortie [ cruiser/destroyer] , which is 4 times the rate of sinking warships. However these attacks benefited from advanced intelligence based on Ultra decrypts and radar equipped warships where as the Italians had none. That allowed unthinkable ambush situations to be exploited. The 1940 RN fleet had no such capability, since only a few capital ships had radars and naval intelligence was really poor.

A lot is put on the un sea worthiness of the German invasion barges, but these turned out to be quite seaworthy able to survive up to gale force winds & waves , so the 1 barge sunk per attacking vessel is completely unrealistic in the 1940 context. Its probably not unrealistic to peg this value at 0.5 barges sunk or crippled per attack on barge fleet. That would suggest about twice the normal kill rate. So following that logic the RN patrol fleet should result in 0.25 barges sunk or crippled per attack and the RN average kill rate should be roughly 0.31 per clash after KM fleet is neutralized.

KM fleet included 66 warships out of 260 gun armed vessels with the rest being patrol/minesweeper vessel, or an average of 0.16 RN vessel sunk or crippled per attacking KM gun armed vessel per clash. To neutralize the entire KM fleet of



posted on Jan, 2 2007 @ 11:25 AM
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There are two official versions of the Battle of Britain and these belong to the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe respectively, the accounts being told in the official RAF War Diaries and in the Luftwaffe War Diaries. [Published by Cajus Bekkar - ISBN: 0345287991]

According to the RAF War Diaries, the Battle of Britain was fought between the 10th July and 31st October 1940 and conducted by the Germans, in 4 phases.

Phase 1 from July 10th – August 7th, saw concentrated attacks against the Chain Home radar sites, coastol convoys moving along or passing through the English Channel and raids against coastal towns that were likely to be of use to the Germans after the invasion of England – Operation ‘Sea Lion’.

Phase 2 lasted from August 8th to september 6th. During this period, the Luftwaffe went after the RAF on the ground or in the air, with 11 Group taking the brunt of the offensive;

Phase 3, 7th September until October 5th, will forever be remembered as 'The Blitz', the attempt by the Luftwaffe, to bomb England in to submission;

Phase 4 October 6th to October 31st – the end of the Battle of Britain. Having lost the main battle, the Luftwaffe resorted to carrying out low lever raids against coastal towns and airfields whilst maintaining the Blitz – but only until bad weather over the North Sea and English Channel prevented further raids.



posted on Jan, 2 2007 @ 10:01 PM
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Originally posted by fritz
DoBravery, the Battle of Britain had nothing to do with Shock and Awe and it had very little to do with Blitzkrieg.


I kind of disagree. I don't think the BoB was a great example of shock and awe, but I do think it was more shock and awe than the initial blitzkrieg of Western Europe.

1st-I don't think the Germans expected the blitzkrieg to be so successful against Poland and France. I don't think they expected any sort of shock and awe effect.

2nd-Shock and Awe is more about obliterating Key Targets. Blitzkrieg was about capturing Key Locations while AVOIDING excessive engagement. As you mentioned, the Luftwaffe was trying to suck out and destroy the RAF--not avoid it. If rather than bypassing the Maginot Line--the Germans obliterated it with bombing, then I'd say the blitzkrieg was shock and awe.

3rd-I think by the BoB, the Germans did EXPECT to crush the RAF swiftly. I'm saying they were attempting to accomplish shock and awe. Hitler and Goering had big heads over the Luftwaffe. I think they expected to destroy the RAF and dictate terms--they never had the amphib to really conduct Sea Lion (Invasion--but that's another debate).

Yes the Germans did try to size up the RAF with the Stukas and Bf110's, but the 109's and bombers were ready to go all along. They toyed with the RAF cat and mouse-like around the channel in July 1941; launched thousands of sorties in August and September against the airfields, command centers, ports, radars. In late September early October Hitler was already postponing any invasion plans.

The Germans fully expected to Shock and Awe the British. Because the British fought back so well, the Battle of Britain dragged on attrition-like. I think realistically it was all decided in 3 months. Even in the end when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London, it was trying to scare the British into backing down.



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 03:53 AM
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Shock and Awe is a 21st century euphemism that cannot in any way, be likened to the tactics used by the Germans during the Second World War.

Firstly the Germans simply did not have the aircraft or land based weapons capable of producing the weapons effects the Coalition Forces could, in the preparatory bombardments prior to the invasion of Iraq.

If you take a single wing of B52s, they could carry more conventional iron bombs than could the entire Luftwaffe in 1940.

Tube artillery calibre is on equal par, but modern artillery are able to use many types of ammunition not available in 1940, and of course modern artillery systems are able to fire further and rates of fire have been dramatically improved.

If we look at rocket artillery, there is really no comparison. In the Wehrmacht, rocket artillery was in its infancy and, like the B52/Luftwaffe analogy, a single MLRS launcher is comparable to the entire rocket forces available at the time.

I do wonder DoBravery, if you are not referring to the tactics of the Russian forces from 1942 onwards, where they employed massive aerial, tube and rocket artillery bombardments to totally subdue the enemy.



posted on Jan, 3 2007 @ 03:39 PM
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Originally posted by fritz
Shock and Awe is a 21st century euphemism that cannot in any way, be likened to the tactics used by the Germans during the Second World War.

Why not? If you define what you mean by Shock and Awe, then we can test it out. Thoroughly destroying units of an army in order to break the will of the rest of your opponent goes back long before the 2nd Gulf War.

Blitzkrieg is a tactic. Shock and Awe is a tactic. It can be done right and work, or be done wrong and fail--just as with any tactic.



I do wonder DoBravery, if you are not referring to the tactics of the Russian forces from 1942 onwards, where they employed massive aerial, tube and rocket artillery bombardments to totally subdue the enemy.


I think that is a great example as well. As I also mentioned the bombing of Pearl Harbor. It turned out to rally the US. But what if the carriers were caught at Pearl? Destroying the Pacific fleet in an attack is just as much Shock and Awe as destroying Iraq's army and air defenses.





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