It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
The bottom line is they ain't got no more money! To design, do research and development throught prototype stage, tool up for manufacture, produce sufficient quantities of product and spares across the board for all categories of weapons systems and continually upgrade them is beyond the capabilities of Russia alone.
Her pockets are real shallow these days. No follow through. What ever gee whiz stuff they may come up with will never go the distance in eith quality or quantity compared to Westrern standards. Crude weaponry and lots of propaganda just doesn't make it anymore
Originally posted by zikan42
omg, I keep trying to post and it wont work
stellar, arent the majority of the tanks and arty that russia has outdated? It doesnt have many t90s, does it?
alot of people that returned from the army told me that there is no order in russian army and that the training pretty much sucks.
How much do you think this will play a role in a war with u.s(much better training)?
Russia is not the old USSR. And while innovations may be born there never again will the might of the USSR exist with the ability for massive manufacture and to field monster armies.
Sorry but that is just common sense. It makes no sense to delude one's self into believing Russkie fantasies for my part. I have a much right to express my opinions here as anyone does so please cool it. Y'all can go back to your thread now.
Originally posted by Cruizer
Russia is not the old USSR.
And while innovations may be born there never again will the might of the USSR exist with the ability for massive manufacture and to field monster armies.
Sorry but that is just common sense. It makes no sense to delude one's self into believing Russkie fantasies for my part.
I have a much right to express my opinions here as anyone does so please cool it. Y'all can go back to your thread now
Originally posted by darksided
I think you are making a great point,
but I think it goes both ways. The US Patriot system is the only long range anti-aircraft/missile system of its kind actually deployed in combat, starting in 1991 and again in 2003, and both times there were major problems discovered.
Throughout the Kosovo War air campaign the major Russian missile manufacturer Almaz Central Design Burueau was quietly putting the finishing touches to a new family of highly effective S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. Destined to become widespread both inside and outside Russia, the presence of these missiles will "create major problems for [air strike] planners for years to come", and their significance has been greatly underestimated by Defence Ministers worldwide. This warning is made by Editors Chris Foss and Tony Cullen in the foreword of the forthcoming authoritative publication Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 2000-1 Edition.
www.janes.com...
The S-300 grouping features several different types of missiles built to strike at everything from low-flying drones and stealth cruise missiles to high-altitude reconnaissance airplanes and distant sensor platforms. Arrival of these systems in the arsenals of military foes will greatly complicate US operations, which continue to depend heavily on nonstealthy aircraft and will for years to come.
Gen. Richard E. Hawley, the now-retired former commander of USAF's Air Combat Command, told an AFA symposium in February that these new SAMs, if deployed in numbers large enough to create overlapping zones of engagement, would figuratively present "a brick wall" to nonstealthy fighters,
www.afa.org...
In 1997, the Russians unveiled yet another variant of the system, this time called S-300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit). Its larger missiles (9M96E and 9M96E2), longer range (200 kilometers), and better guidance system make the S-300PMU-2 a thorough modification of its predecessor. The system can engage targets between 10 meters and 27 kilometers above the ground.(7) The Russians claim that, during a series of tests in the mid-1990s, the S-300PMU-2 shot down a target ballistic missile traveling at 1,600 meters per second, and that the system can destroy targets traveling at 4,800 meters per second.(8) The Russians add that the system has a kill ratio between 0.8 and 0.98 against Tomahawk-class cruise missiles and from 0.8 to 0.93 against aircraft.(9)
www.missilethreat.com...
The missile had to have minimal reaction time, improved military utility, minimum time to target, ease of manufacture, and operate under a wider range of climatic conditions. The production missile had to be a 'certified round' - have a guaranteed reliability throughout its lifetime. The result was the TPK combined launch and transport container. This container was never opened between the time it left the factory and the launch of the missile inside. The vertical launch technique adopted used a catapult accelerator within the container to pop the missile to an altitude 20 m above the launcher, where the main motor ignited. The 4M330 featured the world's first gas-dynamic steering system, allowing quick manoeuvrability when homing in on the target.
And:
In 1995 MKB Fakel developed a new 48N6E2 missile for the S-300PMU system, the Favorit. This had a capability against medium range ballistic missiles, incorporating lessons learened from Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War. In that war the surface-to-air missiles would successfully intercept the incoming rockets but the incoming warheads would still get through. Favorit was tested against a series of Scud launches at Kapustin Yar and succeeded in destroying every warhead. As with other modern Russian surface-to-air missiles, the Favorit is launched verticallly, and only in the air after clearing the launcher does it pitch over in the direction of the target. This technique proved of great interest to other surface-to-air missile developers, notably France.
And:
In 1999 MKB Fakel announced development of new rocket versions 9M96E and 9M96E2. Development of these new missiles had begun in the 1980's. The missiles had, respectively, masses of 330 and 420 kg, ranges of from 1 to 40 and 1 to 120 km, and altitude capabilities of from 5 to 20 and 5 to 30 km. Both were ejected by a cold gas cartridge from vertical container-launchers, the motor igniting 30 m in the air above the container. They were equipped with self-contained inertial guidance with updates from the ground, and used gas dynamic steering. Near the target they were capable of what the Russians called 'hyper-manoeuvring', being able to turn 20 degrees in 0.025 seconds. Trials showed the missiles had a 70% kill rate in intercepts of tactical missile re-entry vehicle's, with miss distances of a few metres. This extreme accuracy allowed a light (24 kg) warhead to be carried. The mobile launcher carried four rocket containers. In the S-300PMU-1 variant, launchers for the 5V55R, 48n6Ye, or 48N6Ye2 rockets could be mounted interchangeably on a single vehicle. By the time the latest version went into production, MKB Fakel had produced over 16 basic types of surface-to-air missile, 30 modernisations of these basic versions, and exported missiles to over 50 countries.
www.astronautix.com...
The S-300P is a highly effective SAM that first entered service with the former Soviet Union in 1980. Capable of engagements at short and long range and from low up to high altitude the S-300PMU, especially with later variants, effectively replaces the earlier SA-1/2/3/4/5 systems. As well as being used against aircraft the S-300 and variants are capable against cruise missiles and some varieties of ballistic missiles. In Soviet service many S-300PMU units were deployed to defend Moscow and other key sites. Other units were deployed at the Army or Front level in anti aircraft regiments. An S-300P battery may field up to 12 TELs each with 4 missiles mounted in container-launchers. A battery also has a command post, 76N6 Clam Shell 3D target acquisition radar and a 30N6 Flap Lid A I-band phased array radar (PAR) for fire control. A regiment comprises three such batteries and also employs the 36D6 Tin Shield long-range surveillance radar or with later versions the 64N6E Big Bird long range F-band 3D surveillance PAR
www.harpoonhq.com...
Considering the missile was never tested against a ballistic missile until the Gulf War itself, it did a pretty good job even though it couldn't destroy the incoming missile.
However, I'd also point out none of the problems of 1991 were visable in 2003, instead it was a different set of issues. The Patriot I was used in 1991,
the Patriot II was used in 2003,
and today the US deploys the Patriot III.
While tested as often as international competitors, it is still considered the defacto standard of anti-missile weapon systems, because it is the only weapon system to be thoroughly tested in combat with an abundence of data to draw from, and improve upon.
If it was me, I'd take the Patriot over any other system, because it is the only proven system against Ballistic missiles. I'll take a proven system that has been heavily tested and invested in over a leading competitor with no practical experience outside of controlled testing anyday, and that goes for any military product.
And btw, that is why I am against many of the 'futuristic' style weapon proposals that are unproven, when proven alternatives should be persued and enhanced instead (IMO).
In combat, "neato" doesn't carry much weight, but "reliable" sure as hell does.
Originally posted by zikan42
stellar, im still a bit unsure about russian tanks stockpiles, after all, we;ve seen how old tanks perform against new ones in persian golf.
Outside the USSR, licenced versions of T-72 were made in Poland and Czechoslovakia, for WARPAC consumers. These tanks had better and more consistent quality of make but with inferior armour, lacking the resin-embedded ceramics layer inside the turret front and glacis armour, replaced with all steel. The Polish-made T-72G tanks also had thinner armour compared to soviet standard (410mm for turret). Before 1990, Soviet-made T-72 export versions were similarly downgraded for non-WARPAC customers (mostly the arab countries). Many parts and tools are not interchangeable between the Russian, Polish and Czechoslovakian versions, which causes logistical problems.
The Yugoslavs called their copy the M-84, and sold hundreds of them around the world during the 1980s. The Iraqis called theirs the Assad Babyl, which means "Lion of Babylon," though the Iraqis assembled theirs from "spare parts" sold to them by the Russians as a means of evading the UN-imposed weapons embargo. More modern derivatives include the Polish PT-91 Twardy and Russian T-90. Several countries, including Russia and Ukraine also offer modernization packages for older T-72s.
The T-72 is common around the world in the armies of many potential enemies of the U.S. and other Western nations. Many Western analysts regard this as worrisome because, at least theoretically, its 125 mm 2A46 main gun is capable of destroying any modern main battle tank in the world today, including the M1 Abrams. On the other hand, on those three occasions when Soviet clients using T-72s have met Western armies that possessed modern main battle tanks —Lebanon in 1982 (against the Israeli Merkava), Iraq in 1991 (against the U.S. M1 Abrams and the British Challenger 1), and again Iraq in 2003— the T-72 did not show its abilities. After clashes in Lebanon in 1982, both the Israelis and the Syrians claimed their main tank's superiority, but there is no verifiable evidence of a T-72 destroying a Merkava or vice versa. In the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi tank units were heavily defeated, although this might have more to do with the poor training and full air supremacy than with any deficiencies of the T-72 itself. Furthermore, while facing the most modern Western tanks, the versions the Iraqi army fielded were out of date at the time. The Iraqi T-72s were downgraded export versions that had not been significantly upgraded over time and were firing inferior ammunition (often with steel penetrators and half-charges of propellant).
en.wikipedia.org...
Granted they did not have airsupport and other privilages russia would. Please explain more...
also, comment on russian industrial capabilities and compare they to american.
I have no doubt that russia would have an edge in nuclear exchanges, but im still not sure about conventional forces..please explain some more
I have a feeling the guy above will get burned hard.
Originally posted by StellarX
In 1997, the Russians unveiled yet another variant of the system, this time called S-300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit). Its larger missiles (9M96E and 9M96E2), longer range (200 kilometers), and better guidance system make the S-300PMU-2 a thorough modification of its predecessor. The system can engage targets between 10 meters and 27 kilometers above the ground.(7) The Russians claim that, during a series of tests in the mid-1990s, the S-300PMU-2 shot down a target ballistic missile traveling at 1,600 meters per second, and that the system can destroy targets traveling at 4,800 meters per second.(8) The Russians add that the system has a kill ratio between 0.8 and 0.98 against Tomahawk-class cruise missiles and from 0.8 to 0.93 against aircraft.(9)
www.missilethreat.com...
And reliable is not something i would call all that many modern American fighting systems so we can probably agree on that.
I apologise for offending anyone by my point of view of Russian hardware.
It is borne out by living through every day of the Cold War. We were scared into believing every day the Sovs were momentarily on their way over the pole with nukes.
Little did we know then their crappy bombers didn't have the range.
Over the years we heard of all this constant stream of Soviet propagana. Kruschev and the the "we will bury you" crap , and so on. The BS about how Russians invented the 1st TV, radio, airplane, submarine and all the rest of the patent bullcrap.
As time went on those of us with military backgrounds or knowledge of certain weapons realized that it was the popularist media that half created the image of the invincible Sov weapons and soldiers. For years we were blunted into thinking that the cobbled up MiG 25 was hot feces- like every previous MiG of the year touted as invincoble by the press. We found out it was cold crap instead and a big dog.
Even in 1991 it was more of the same stuff with how "the uncomplicated Russ armor in Iraq would destroy the M-1s with their high-tech complexity."
After the Wall came down we found out how brokeass the USSR really was. Their shuttle sits in a park and their military guys get paid infrequently when the motherland scrounges up some rubles.
In the Post WW 2 era the Sovs kidnapped German technical personnel to the USSR and forced them to continue their development of weaponry which the Sovs lied was their own! Literally every 2nd generation jet of the VVS was German-designed.
Anyhow after a lifetime of listening to Soviet bullsh11t the Russky wonder weapon stuff just kinda caps it off for me. I love technology as much as the next person and in a clinical way am interested in perusing articles on innovative stuff they've done. But from hard evidence of the past lies I have to behold it all with a jaundiced eye. Don't wish to argue for the sake of it so y'all know where I'm coming from.
Originally posted by rogue1
You don't seem to understand the difference between a calim and a fact, somehing which pervades most of your posts.
Over the past decade, Russia has deployed thousands of S-300V and Antey-2500 missiles around its key military and industrial complexes. In addition, it has exported these systems throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing its ailing economy in the wake of the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, “in the worldwide competition to sell ballistic missile defense systems, the Russian Antey Corp.’s S-300V is a main contender.”(8) The advantage for buyers of Russian surface-to-air missiles is that, unlike buying from the U.S., there are no political strings attached and, more often than not, the weapons are significantly cheaper than their U.S. counterparts
www.missilethreat.com...
*The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.
* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.
* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.
www.findarticles.com...
However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.
Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.
In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).
www.jinsa.org...
Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
Union no longer exists and because the
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
the Russians have more than the one ABM
system permitted by the treaty.
Joseph Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
for Defense, states:
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
permitted by the treaty, ringing
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
battle-management radars. Together
the Moscow defense and the vast
homeland defense formed an interlocking
system—nearly all of it illicit.10
The “10,000 to 12,000 interceptors” to which
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile
capability.1
www.cato.org...
The Bush administration’s policy was not an automatic continuity or continuation of all treaties with the USSR, but provided a framework to review each agreement and determine necessary changes. Such a review was particularly important for arms control agreements. As President Clinton stated in a letter to Congressman Gilman in March 1997, and I quote, “Particularly in the area of arms control, a case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary.” In that case-by-case review, the administration negotiated a memorandum of understanding [MOU] on succession to the ABM Treaty. The MOU, was concluded in September 1997 and identified Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia as the successor states to the treaty. This selection of successor states seemed to be consistent with a statement by the President that, and I quote, “neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet States with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS, Newly Independent States, as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.” That was the letter from the President to Congressman Gilman. The administration went on to reiterate in that same letter that the MOU on succession “works to preserve the original object and purpose of the treaty.” To summarize, the administration believed in 1997 that recognition of Russia alone or all of the successor states together would not have preserved the original purpose of the treaty.
www.missilethreat.com...
In mid-1994 the Belarusian air force operated two interceptor regiments with MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29 aircraft; three strike regiments with MiG-27, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25 aircraft; and one reconnaissance regiment with MiG-25 and Su-24 aircraft. Four regiments had 300 helicopters, and one transport regiment had more than forty helicopters. Personnel numbered 15,800.
Belarus also had an air defense force with 11,800 personnel and 200 SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. The system was being integrated into Russia's air defenses in 1994 owing to Belarus's lack of resources.
www.globalsecurity.org...
Kazakhstan is investing the equivalent of one billion dollars to upgrade its air defense system, reports Interfax, with the upgrades reportedly being made by a British company, BAE Systems. The systems upgraded reportedly include the S-75, S-125, S- 200, and S-300. The size of the contract reflects the extent of the defense systems built by the Soviet Union
www.missilethreat.com...
THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Structurally consist of three Corps, deployed correspondingly in Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k. The Force HQ is located in Kyiv.
48 000 men are in Air Defense service. The Force is armed with Air Defense complexes S-75; S-125, S-200, S-300. It also includes Fighter Aviation.
The Air Defense Force of Ukraine was developed at the basis of formations, deployed in Ukraine at the moment of its independence's proclamation.
ukraineinfo.us...
They can claim all they want to, but as many people have said it has never been battled tested at all. Whose to say these tests aren't rigged like many people say of the AMerican systems ? WHat would make the Russians any different ? Nothing.
In 1995 MKB Fakel developed a new 48N6E2 missile for the S-300PMU system, the Favorit. This had a capability against medium range ballistic missiles, incorporating lessons learened from Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War. In that war the surface-to-air missiles would successfully intercept the incoming rockets but the incoming warheads would still get through. Favorit was tested against a series of Scud launches at Kapustin Yar and succeeded in destroying every warhead. As with other modern Russian surface-to-air missiles, the Favorit is launched verticallly, and only in the air after clearing the launcher does it pitch over in the direction of the target. This technique proved of great interest to other surface-to-air missile developers, notably France.
www.astronautix.com...
First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.28 Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.29 If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.30 Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.31 As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.32 Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.33 Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.34
Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.35 The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."36 Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.
The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...
The SA-5 was designated the S-200 Volga by the Soviets — the SA-5A and SA-5C are conventional versions; the SA-5B is nuclear. The warhead probably has the option for either command or proximity detonation. It was designed in the 1950s to counter American high-altitude aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie and SR-71 Blackbird, as well as the new stand-off missiles such as the Hound Dog, Blue Steel, and Skybolt. The United States has long claimed the SA-5B has an ABM capability (and was tested in this role in the 1970s), particularly given the sizable 25 kiloton nuclear warhead it carries. Over 2,000 missiles are deployed (the percentage of the nuclear SA-5B version is unknown), though the aging SA-5 has increasingly been replaced by the SA-10 Grumble. However, the SA-5 has received numerous upgrades and modifications, including terminal maneuvering capabilities.
www.cdi.org...&f/database/rusnukes.html
In March 4, 1961, in the area of the A testing ground the V-1000 ABM with a fragmentation-high-explosive warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the R-12 BM launched from the State Central Testing Ground with a dummy warhead weighing 500 kilograms. The Dunai-2 radar of the A system detected the BM at a distance of 1,500 kilometers when it appeared over the radio horizon, then the M-40 central computer found parameters of the R-12 trajectory, and prepared target designation for precision homing radars and the launchers. The ABM was launched and its warhead was actuated by the signal from the command post. The warhead of the ABM consisted of 16,000 balls with a carbide-tungsten core, TNT filling, and a steel hull. The warhead had a fragments field shaped as a disk perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the ABM. The warhead was actuated by the signal from the ground with a deflection necessary for formation of the fragments field. The warheads of this type were designed under the supervision of Chief Designer A. Voronov. The M-40 central computer was designed by the Precise Mechanics and Computer Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences under the supervision of Academician S. Lebedev. The computer could make 40,000 operations per second.
The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid-propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM's homing. The V-1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile's automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.
Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.
www.fas.org...
1961 began with another string of failures (5 further launches were planned in the first test series). A variety of warheads were wasted in attempting to destroy the incoming missiles. Once, manually, and twice, automatically, the missile made a more-or-less successful intercept. But this was followed by three failures, indicating a great amount of time and effort were needed to develop the intercept method.
On 4 March 1961 the V-1000 achieved a world first - the destruction of the re-entry vehicle of an R-12 IRBM. This was followed by the destruction of an R-5 re-entry vehicle. In all, there were 11 launches with military warheads, plus launches of developmental warheads. The S2TA variant used an infrared-homing self-guiding high-explosive warhead and was designed by Storozhenko at the GOI State Optical Institute in Lengingrad. It was capable not only of determining the moment for warhead detonation, but also was capable of guiding the anti-ballistic missile independently using an on-board computer. The R2TA version used a radio-guided explosive warhead, with two types of proximity fuses used to determine the correct moment for warhead detonation. These were the G2TA, a radio ranging system, developed by Bondarenko and an optical system, developed by Emdin at GOI. Flight tests of the V-1000 with a nuclear warhead designed at Chelyabinsk-70 were also carried out.
www.astronautix.com...
ussians systems are reliable, based on what ? Their combat record ? They have none
I'm clicking the ignore button on you bud so I'll never have to read any of your wise guy tripe again, thankyou. Smirk all you like pal.
And by the way von Braun was no war criminal or a member of the Nazi party.
Originally posted by Cruizer
I'm clicking the ignore button on you bud so I'll never have to read any of your wise guy tripe again, thankyou. Smirk all you like pal.