posted on Sep, 13 2006 @ 03:40 PM
If that was 'all' I said, why did you feel the need to resynopsize it?
Given that you have forced me to correct your correction, lets cover what I did say:
1. Measuring the F-22 as a fighter for which Agility is important is in fact itself a mistake. A C-17 doesn't need 'agility'. Nor does a COE
2. The F-22 can see other stealths. Both with on and offboard asset capabilities that are themselves /very/ expensive to replicate. This is WHY it
doesn't need to be 'agile' and why, in particular, LO is itself not a single level advantage to the U.S. but part of a total-systems layered
3. LO is not a be all, do all, even if you can take theoretical work and transition it into a production airframe. Something which, despite all
their protestations of 'being our equals in the field' _none_ of the ROW has cared to PAY FOR doing. Once you have LO, you are still faced with the
need to employ it and if you cannot afford to buy an entire synergy of tactics and support mechanisms which enables stealth, you are STILL gonna be
SOL against the massed capabilities of the worlds only superpower. Against which (at present) LO is the only possible means to staying in the fight
for more than a few minutes but still not a determinative one so long as it is not used offensively. A fact YOU brought into this by making it an
F-22 vs. PAK-FA contest. Thus YOU are the one who has to make LO work as a be-all edge. Whereas I only have to prove that there are other ways to
avoid the mission costs.
You basically said don't give them (the other guys) the initiative (as if they are gonna try and cooperate with that!).
Most hick forces lack the ability to recognize what 'initiative' is, let alone wrest it from a professional force. Should the Argies have been
patrolling the peripheries of their airfields so that British SOF could not provide raid warning? Sure. But they didn't. Furthermore, given that
_we will be coming for them regardless_ (Offensive advantagement in action) and WE have multiple tiers of humint, droneint, satint, _they will die
where they sit regardless_. If they shift to roadbase operations they may live a little while longer but only until that becomes a signature as well.
For all of the 2-3 missions they can fly before a lack of fuel, munitions or spares stuffs up their FMC rates /anyway/.
Such is the basic limitation of LOGISTICS inherent to pretend-airpower. All the rest is just marketing hyped nonsense designed to take money from the
fools who will part with it for fashion.
You also introduced DEWs, which change the battlefield completely.
And this doesn't reenable agility in your mind? 500 million dollar budget. Threat: 90X 338 million dollar LO assets. Defensive Options: 5X 100
million dollar PAK-FA in 15 years. 50X 10 million dollar UCAV in 5 years. 7X 75 million dollar DEW sites in 10 years. Or a mix.
Better that you have a functional defense TODAY and money to upgrade. Cheap throwaways which use agility to solve for mechanical threats being the
smarter choice by far.
An F-22 will be as useless against DEWs as a PAK-FA - both are utterly obsolete.
Nope. Because an F-22 does several things which the PAK-FA cannot:
1. It functionally leverages small IAM and glide kit technology which means that /once the DEWS are gone/ (cruise). Or even during conditions of
overcast or other limited optical acquisition conditions, you can put 8 rounds 80nm downrange. And force the threat to deal with the incoming spread
of ARROWS NOT ARCHER, each of which can kill it depleting it's chemical/cooling loop in the process..
2. In areas where DEWS are not present or have been knocked out, the F-22 still gives you a 3.5hr round trip ticket to an 800nm radius compared to
JSF or F-Teens which are 7-10hr minimum subcruisers. Faster to do a given level of work means more work done with a _smaller fleet_ whose total cost
is LESS THAN the larger inventory of 'cheap' fighters.
3. The PAK-FA is _one direction_ in which Air Defense spending can go. DEWS systems are another. Both are likely to be defensive systems, at least
at first. Neither are going to be cheap. If you do not use the PAK-FA offensively, either because you cannot afford to costs inherent to making it a
bomber (support assets to ensure penetration and generate ISR targeting as well as onboard stowage of tailored A2G munitions, among other problems) or
because you cannot take that system leveraging as far as you could with say an IRBM or a wave of CMs then it's ability to WIN THE WAR NOT THE AIRWAR
is limited to what it can achieve as an A2A platform. Again assuming the logic of X many missiles onboard vs. Y many cruise missiles coming the other
way, it makes more sense to kill the PAK-FA's basing mode or compress it's on-ground turn period than it does to employ that asset as the 'only
survivable system' which can loiter in a given area to shoot those missiles down.
Comparitively, if you buy into a large composite of throwaway 'agile' assets whose bravery is not dependent on a man, then you may well have enough
money to buy BOTH the offensive (missiles) AND the defensive (laser/maser/A2A UCAV) options.
Don't try to teach granny how to suck eggs unless you are really sure you have the knowledge base by to prick the shell. The complexities of trade
between LO vs. LO as a 'standoff' nullification and agile-bypasses-LO-to-kill-other-assets are too great to summarize them in just a few sound-byte
sentences like you did.
If nothing else, three key elements which will have to continue to be acknowledged are as follows:
A. Airpower will never be abandoned so long as there is /any/ chance of 'going deep' to make radical changes to the nature of a frontally driven
war. Where this is a function of how much you invest vs. how much you are willing to lose, you either have to develop a means to suppress those
'incontravertible' threats which put your high value assets at most risk. Or you have to design to cost so that you can afford the attrition.
B. Small, 'agile', _uninhabited_, platforms also just happen to be very small signature ones which can be readily tailored (through single piece
monolithic castings that even the Soviets could achieve relatively easily) to work both the optical and radar acquisition process. And the evasion +
expendables element of terminal enagement as a function of AAM evasion and continued closure. Far better than a manned system and its wanna-live
C. By virtue of 'role simplification' inherent to limited mission volumes, small craft also happen to be much easier on the wallet to purchase in
numbers that can be lost without losing initiative. And this simplicity also translates into basing mode flexibility and hardiness of systems
reliability which eases the logistics burden of making them survivable away from predictable target locii.
Knowing this, if the Russians pull the dumbass monkey-see-monkey-do attempt to 'match' the F-22 as a function of envy rather than /ignore it/ as an
element in attacking what is _really important_ of our own assets (support missions, basing logistics, subsonic strike aircraft) then they truly are
nothing more than 'slavish' in their stupidity of trying to prove that they are our equal rather than our master.
Warfare never being about a _level playing field_. Or a poor man's peace whose military 'protection' is bought by robbing society of resource
allocations necessary to make them 'safe' in other ways. Like petroleum independence. Population control. And social equality.
All of which have their own costs. All of which must be shared with those which the military 'deems it's due' solely because they are 'so brave'
for exposing themselves to risks they _literally_ do not have to pay for the equipment to ameliorate the threat of. Ditch the man, cheapen the