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Originally posted by WestPoint23
Umm… where are you getting that from? The PAC-3 and upgraded PAC-2 systems are very capable of intercepting TBM’s such as SCUD’s, numerous tests and actual combat have shown that.
Accounts from the field indicate that the Patriots are being used in a manner known as the ripple-fire, where multiple Patriots are launched against a single threat in the hopes that their lethality will be increased simply by sheer dint of numbers. The ripple-fire method is more or less how the Patriot was designed to be operated, so it is not unusual that it is being applied in Iraq. But it is important to note this doctrine, because otherwise the impression might be gained that the missiles were destroying their targets on a one-to-one basis. Also, some of the Iraqi missiles are simply being let to fly unmolested if U.S. forces deem that they will land in unpopulated areas. This would imply that Patriot missile battery commanders are reserving their limited number of missiles for the most pressing threats.
Finally, the accidental downing of a British Tornado fighter by a Patriot missile on Sunday is a terrible reminder of the system’s limitations. Even if the operators do everything they are supposed to do, technical problems can and do crop up. Expectations of the Patriot's effectiveness must be reined in so that such tragedies can be side-stepped in the future.
To begin, the 32d AAMDC claims that the Patriot made nine intercepts out of nine engagements, allowing it a 100 percent success rate. This seems to be the result of a rather tortuous portrayal of the facts given in their own history. Reading through it, 23 Iraqi missile launches are documented (9 Ababil-100s, 4 Al Samouds, 4 CSSC-3s, 4 FROG-7s, and 2 unknowns). Of these, indeed, 9 apparently were intercepted by U.S. or Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, thanks to the at least 24 Patriot-type missiles (PAC-2, GEM, GEM+, and PAC-3) that were fired. However, that leaves 14 Iraqi missiles which were not intercepted. Excluding the one Ababil-100 which malfunctioned and blew up shortly after launch and the four FROG-7s which were outside of the Patriot’s range, leaves 9 Iraqi missiles which were not destroyed by the Patriot. The fact that they landed “harmlessly” in the desert or the Persian Gulf, in the words of the authors of the report, does not change the fact that they were not intercepted. In the CENTCOM area of responsibility at the time of the war, there were 1069 Patriot missiles (54 of which were PAC-3 missiles), and 29 U.S. and 5 Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, so there should have been ample assets on the U.S. side to counter these Iraqi threats. Claiming that the Patriot had a 100 percent interception rate seems disingenuous at best and an outright manipulation of events at worst. Also surprising is that after 12 years of criticism, following the dismal performance of Patriot in the first Persian Gulf War, the Army is still calling an "engagement" an interception, when by their own descriptions sometimes "engaged" Iraqi missiles were not intercepted. For example, the history for March 21, 2003, reports six Iraqi TBMs "successfully engaged and destroyed by Patriot systems to date." But that counts an Ababil-100 and an Al Samoud that were NOT intercepted on March 20th. This calls into question what evidence the Army has for the nine intercepts it does claim.
We conclude that the body of video we have reviewed contains data on at least 22 to 23 out of roughly 47 Desert Storm engagements. Of even greater significance, the video appears to include 17 to 18 out of roughly 30 engagements in Saudi Arabia. This indicates that there is a very substantial base of video information from which an assessment of Patriot's performance can be made.
We have found no convincing evidence in the video that any Scud warhead was destroyed by a Patriot. We have strong evidence that Patriots hit Scuds an two occasions (in WSMR Events 8 and 13), but in both cases we found video evidence that the Scud warheads fell to the ground and exploded. These clips suggest that even when Patriots could hit Scuds they were still not able to destroy the Scud warheads. We also have several other clips where it is possible that Patriots hit Scuds without detonating their warheads. but the evidence in these clips is quite ambiguous (see, for example, Additional Event 3).
In addition, we have estimated minimum miss distances for all cases where we could clearly observe Patriot missing Scuds. We present our summarized findings in tabular and graphical form in figures 8, 9 and 1O. The median minimum miss distance was roughly 600 meters. This is much larger than the press video minimum resolvable miss distance of 35 to 70 meters. To achieve lethality against Scud targets, a system like the Patriot must routinely achieve miss distances of meters to tens of meters, not hundreds to thousands of meters as observed in the video. This result of the video review by itself indicates unambiguously that there was a serious problem with Patriot during the Gulf War.
Also, since the PAC-3 is a dual Anti-Missile/Anti-Aircraft system it’s capable of intercepting cruise missiles/TBM/aircraft and other surface to surface missiles. In 91 the Patriots stationed in Israel/Saudi Arabia were able to hit SCUD’s and did so on several occasions, sure the hit rate wasn’t as high as previously thought (complicated issue if you want to get into it) and there were several glitches, but as another member said they were corrected in the subsequent years.
And also, the mobility thing, correct me if I’m wrong but the Patriot is an area defense system; it wasn’t primarily designed to rapidly move day to day with the troops, other systems in the US inventory provide that capability.
[edit on 18-7-2006 by WestPoint23]
Even though I fail to see how I "skirt around the topic", but sure, and since you are the authority on the subject here, why don't you kick it off and please fill me in on what is the hard data of Patriot system success/failure rate?
Regular stuff like various relationships of linear, hybrid and complex systems to free and bounding variables, parameter sets, condition sets, etc.
StellarX, if button pushers actually met system engineers face to face, and listened to what they had to say, they would no longer think that it's some guy from the motor pool that knows better.
Originally posted by StellarX
Better than some , worse than others...
Originally posted by StellarX
AEGIS being the scam of note that it is one has to wonder how effective a broken-from-the-start thing can ever be. Either way it's too damn expensive and i seriously doubt if it will shield a CBG from a saturation attack of any ( 10+ missiles) scale.
Originally posted by StellarX
Well i did not find it to be very complicated but i might have got something wrong. As previously indicated these errors were apparently NOT solved.
The Patriot role in OIF was defense against tactical ballistic missiles; it had no assigned air defense role, but it did have a self-defense role against anti-radiation missiles. The Patriot deployment was substantial, involving up to 40 U.S. fire units and 22 fire units from four coalition nations. Two types of Patriot interceptor missiles were used: the improved PAC-2 missile, which is the traditional Patriot interceptor; and a new hit-to-kill missile, the PAC-3. Both were used with success in OIF, with the bulk of the engagements falling to the PAC-2. All nine enemy tactical ballistic missiles that threatened areas designated for Patriot defense were engaged. Eight of these engagements were observed by enough other sensors to conservatively declare them successes; the ninth engagement is judged to be a probable success. None of the attacking tactical ballistic missiles caused any damage or loss of life to the coalition forces.
Patriot System Performance Report Summary
The first TBM launch of the war occurred at 0924Z, and targeted TAA THUNDER. Units from the 101st AA Division, specifically its helicopter fleet and 4,000 soldiers, occupied TAA THUNDER. The impact of a high explosive warhead would have caused significant casualties and damage to helicopters. MG Dick Petreaus, the 101st ADA Division Commander, later stated,
“…PATRIOT saved the 101st!” This launch was detected first by the USS Higgins, an AEGIS cruiser off the coast of Kuwait in the Arabian Gulf. The Higgins gave the area one and a half minutes notice when it immediately notified the Coalition Forces Land Component Command Headquarters and the 32d AAMDC.
“The CSM and I personally witnessed the commencement of combat operations for the Patriot force today while visiting D/5-52 ADA; the timing of moving the float radar to that location could not have been more impeccable. The system performed relatively well with the firing of three GEMs. The second EM selfdestructed shortly after launch. The successful intercept was a real confidence booster to the troops and the state of Kuwait. CBS embedded media arrived at the D/5-52 ADA location and shot interviews with the ECS crew. I witnessed the interviews and all were sincere and professional. The Brigade remains postured to counter additional tactical ballistic missile threats and is prepared to support accelerated ground attack plans for CFLCC and support the CFACC’s current air campaign plan.” – from COL Glaeser’s (Cdr, 11th ADA Brigade) Commander’s Narrative, 20 March 2003
PAC-3 Records its First-Ever Combat Kill
At 1030Z, the AMDWS picked up a second Iraqi launch of an Ababil-100 from just south of Al Basrah. Indications showed Camp COMMANDO and Camp Doha as the intended targets. 1LT Scott, SGT Spicer and SGT Bostick were on shift inside the ECS, conducting maintenance when the headset called in “SCUD Launch – SCUD Launch”. They brought the radar up to radiate and as 1LT Scott recalled, “just then a TBM appeared on our scope heading directly towards us; and the ground impact point appeared to be right in front of us, vicinity Camp Doha.” E/2-43 ADA, organically part of the 108th ADA brigade, but OPCON to 11th ADA brigade in Kuwait, fired two PAC-3 missiles and destroyed the Iraqi TBM. The TBM was intercepted just three miles away from its intended destination by E/2-43 ADA, which was located just outside Cam Doha.
“They launched another TBM and I was sitting at the helm here on CHAT. The alarms go off, the AMDWS goes off, there’s an AMDWS launch point and impact point, you got the little football moving and everybody just executed like you trained. It was so satisfying as a leader to see everybody executing as they train; nobody got excited. Information was passed, CHAT was up, people were talking on CHAT. And, before you knew it we had a report on CHAT that a battery had launched two PAC-3 missiles, and then it wasn’t minutes later the battery had a confirmed kill. So, it all worked. The sirens in Kuwait went off, people went to bunkers, people put on their masks, MOPP suits, people were leaning against structures inside the building, the concrete structures. Everybody was at ease and the Patriot did its thing.” – COL (P) Anderson, CofS, 32d AAMDC
After the second TBM launch, the I MEF Commander then directed the 108th ADA brigade to move B/2043 ADA to cover Umm Qasar. Coalition forces could not afford to have the port damaged by an Iraqi TBM. The port city was critical, especially for humanitarian relief efforts. Three more TBM launches occurred in quick succession. At 2103Z, missile number three was launched from West of Al Basrah. This Ababil-100 was not intercepted, but fell harmlessly into the Persian Gulf. The fourth missile, launched at 2208Z from North of Al Basrah was an Al Samoud. It too was not intercepted and fell harmlessly into the Kuwaiti western desert. Missile number five was launched at 2320Z and was another Ababil-100 targeted at Camp UDARI. C/5-52 ADA fired one GEM and one PAC-2 missile and destroyed the incoming TBM.
The 32d AAMDC sent out FRAGO 2 accelerating the timeline for detachment of forces. C/2-1ADA was ordered to 31st ADA brigade and E/2-43 ADA would eventually be relieved by C/6-52ADA, a Config-2 Patriot unit from the 69th ADA brigade out of Germany.
AT 1001Z, AMDWS indicated an Iraqi TBM was inbound towards TAA FOX and the city of Al Jahra. This one was another Babail-100. Kuwaiti Firing Battery 3 engaged with one GEM missile, but Kuwaiti Firing Battery 5 actually intercepted the TBM with two GEMs of their own. The engagement was significant for two reasons. First, had this Iraqi missile hit either Ali Al Salem airfielf or Camp Doha, particularly the command facilities for all Coalition land forces in Southwest Asia, the casualties and loss of equipment may have been severe. Second, this was the sixth Iraqi TBM that was successfully engaged and destroyed by Patriot systems to date and
marked the first-ever Patriot engagement in combat by a Kuwaiti Patriot battery. The Iraqi TBM was intercepted by the Kuwaiti Air Defense Battalion, commanded by Colonel Jasem Al-Huwaitan. Kuwaiti Firing Battery Five, commanded by Major Majid Al Khalidi, fired two GEM missiles and destroyed the incoming Ababil-100. This removed doubts about the GEM capability to destroy missiles. The Kuwaitis were defending not only their country, but were also Coalition Forces. They were fully integrated into the Patriot command and control network, passing information and accepting missions from the Patriot command. The Kuwaitis also freely exchanged parts, missiles, and equipment with the United States.
Originally posted by StellarX
If by doing what it was supposed to do you mean shooting down blue force aircraft then your quite accurate! They are easily deployable in the same sense that elephants are and they are more likely to 'trample' friendly forces.
Originally posted by Willard856
I guess another way to look at the fratricide engagments (ignoring the fact that it was blue on blue for a second), the system shot down some fairly advanced western aircraft with good self-defence systems. The common consensus was that if you got a targeting spike from a Patriot, it was time to start reaching for the ejection handle. Not so for the Iraqi systems. I would include S-400 in the same category based on what I have heard of its capabilities. But as far as I'm aware, there is no available data on SA-10/20 engagements of advanced platforms?
You skirt around things by doing exactly what you just did. We can play this game all day if you want. I've addressed all the issues you have raised, you haven't addressed a single one of mine.
Now you're yanking my chain. How far off topic do you want to go? And I've already told you, I'm not going to provide any classified data on here.
You were the one who said that telemetry data is freely available on the net.
So, for the fourth time, I'm calling you. Post it here, and I'll apologise and move on. Simple really.
Ah, and now it all becomes clear. I've met people like you before. You sit in an office, poke holes in everything that happens operationally, but at the end of the day you've never flown into a threat WEZ, you've never picked up a rifle and been shot at, and you've never been on a ship that has been the target of a maritime strike.
Of course, I've only done one of those three things. But you know what? The guy in the motor pool who's opinion you seem to think counts for zip knows more intuitively than you ever will by sitting at your desk designing what you think the warfighter need
The reason "button pushers" don't talk to people like you is adequately demonstrated in your posts. I've given examples, sources, and asked questions and answered yours, and all you've done is change topic, gone off-topic, deflected and ridiculed. Those system engineers who I have met and worked with who listen and understand rather than judge are worth their weight in gold, because they keep me and my friends alive. Maybe the lack of "button pushers" who engage you should tell you something?
Don't bother replying. I'm done wasting energy on you, and your reply will be the same tired crap you always produce. People can make their own judgements about your level of understanding, and what you actually contribute to this discussion.