Iran Menace: Surface-Air Missiles
How good are Iranian air defenses ?
Continuing my in depth look at Iranian military capability, this thread will encompass what I’ve found out about Iranian SAMs and AAA.
The low down
Iranian air defenses aren’t up to much. They have some OK equipment but not a lot and little that really threatens medium/high flying US strike
aircraft. The latest acquisition, the infamous Tor short range SAM system deserves its excellent reputation but isn’t enough in itself to offer
credible defense. Iran is a huge country and its SAMs are too few to effectively cover it. Most of the SAM batteries have far fewer launchers than
would be optimum.
However, the SAMs are effectively dispersed to make them much trickier to preemptively strike although key systems such as the limited number of SA-2
(HQ-2) and SA-5 long range SAMs would be relatively easy to neutralize.
Iran operates:
* SA-2 (HQ-2) “Guideline” medium range high altitude SAMs
* SA-5 “Gammon” long range SAMs
* Improved-Hawk medium range SAMs
* Rapier short range SAMs
* Crotale (HQ-7) short range SAMs
* Tigercat short range SAMs (probably retired)
* SA-6 “Gainful” medium range SAMs
* SA-8 “Gecko” short range SAMs
* SA-15 “Gauntlet” short range SAMs (on order)
* Various shoulder launched SAMs
* Various AAA including 23mm and 35mm
Now I’ll start running through the individual systems in no particular order.
1. Rapier
Google Earth imagery suggests that the Rapier is still a key air defense system for Iran.
The Rapier fire unit is trailer mounted with four missiles
Quantity in service: 30 launchers{1}. Generally reported as many unserviceable due to spares shortages although there are credible reports of
Iranian reverse engineered production of missiles and limited upgrades{2}.
Capability: Very much a point defense system with a short range of just 6km and an altitude limit of about 3km (~10,000ft) means that they are
unlikely to pose a threat to most US combat aircraft. The early model Rapier also had a limitation which means that it cannot engage targets flying
below the level of the launcher which impedes its effectiveness in mountainous terrain (which makes up the bulk of Iran). These Rapier I missiles do
not have a warhead, instead requiring a direct impact to guarantee a hit. Comparable Rapier units operated by the British in the Falklands war were
initially attributed with great success (14 claimed kills) but have since been credited with only two confirmed kills giving an extremely hit
probability against fast moving jets (although there are contributing factors in this case). Unlike their modernized Rapier siblings deployed by 9
other countries, Iranian Rapiers do not have a credible anti-cruise missile capability.
Deployment. Google Earth imagery suggests that Rapier is deployed as point defense for air bases and strategic sites. Of the 30 launchers
reported, I have found 14 giving us a fair idea of where the system is deployed.
Prior to the revolution, Iran was set to manufacture the British Rapier system even being allowed to export it. The primary version was to have been a
tracked vehicle similar in configuration operational application to the US Chaparral system but decidedly more capable. When the revolution killed off
these ambitions Iran was left with just the static Rapier I systems it’d purchased in the early seventies. The tracked Rapier’s which had been
ready for delivery to Iran were diverted to the British Army.
At least one Iranian Rapier system was vehicle mounted on an all-terrain truck with reloads. There is no indication that this modification has been
adopted for regular service.
Google Earth evidence
Rapier deployments can be found at several Iranian air bases and around Tehran and some nuclear facilities. Typical deployments are of just one or two
launchers which is sub-optimum and points to the launcher/missile shortage.
1. Mehrabad Air Base, Tehran: (3 launchers in 2 positions)
2. Nantaz nuclear facility: (4 launchers in 2 positions)
3. Ghale Morghi air base, Tehran: (2 launchers in 1 position)
4. Rapier site just east of Tehran (2 launchers in 1 position)
5. Air defenses at Umidiyeh air base (3 launchers in 7 firing positions)
6. Air defenses at Khatami air base (unconfirmed but positions consistent with Umidiyeh)
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Sources and references
{1} Tel Aviv University (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Iran.pdf
{2} NTI missile chronology
www.nti.org...