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Syrian threat: SAMs gallore

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posted on Jun, 19 2006 @ 03:59 PM
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ATS Google Earth Intell Group
Subject-: Syrian Ground-Based Air Defense
Research and analysis by: Planeman, 06/06.
_______________________________________________________________

Overview
Syria still operates a large number of static SAM systems which show up well on Google-Earth. Many of these systems are considered obsolete but Syria still invests much resources in maintaining them, and doesn’t seem to be trying to make them less susceptible to attack (something that has happened in the past) although more capable SA-6 is also deployed.

Rumours that Syria has SA-10 are abundant but as far as I can tell unconfirmed. I kept an eye out for SA-10s (which are hard to spot anyway) but didn’t notice any.

Background Research
Put together from a number of sources, Syrian SAM inventory:
SA-2 – Guideline – Fixed site -
SA-3 – Goa – Fixed site -
SA-5 – Gammon – 4 battalions (seemingly at two sites)
SA-6 – Gainful – Mobile (tracked) -
SA-7 – Grail - Man portable – 4000 missiles
SA-8 – Gecko – Mobile (wheeled) -
SA-9 – Gaskin – Mobile (wheeled) – 20 vehicles
SA-10 – Grumble – Mobile (wheeled) - ?UNCONFIRMED?
SA-13 – Gopher – Mobile (tracked) - 35 vehicles
SA-14 –Gremlin - Man portable - ?UNCONFIRMED?


SA-2 (NATO: Guideline)
The SA-2 is a first generation SAM system generally regarded as obsolete by the late 1960s. Although upgrades are possible, the system remains of limited effectiveness in the modern battlefield. Despite its shortcomings, Syria continues to operate at least 12 active SA-2 sites.

Active SA-2 sites:
1. 33 26 05 N 36 30 53 E
2. 33 32 50 N 36 46 30 E
3. 33 38 13 N 36 53 19 E
4. 34 36 33 N 36 40 40 E
5. 34 39 13 N 36 44 36 E
6. 34 40 20 N 36 40 21 E
7. 35 33 48 N 35 44 15 E
8. 35 36 20 N 35 51 36 E
9. 34 57 57 N 35 55 36 E
10. 35 57 13 N 37 16 07 E
11. 36 03 23 N 37 10 15 E
12. 36 04 12 N 37 20 29 E

Inactive SA-2 sites (assumed unused):
1. 33 21 11 N 36 32 53 E
2. 33 26 54 N 36 24 54 E
3. 33 29 28 N 36 24 58 E
4. 33 33 18 N 36 10 14 E
5. 33 36 02 N 36 48 09 E
6. 34 26 59 N 36 57 28 E
7. 34 36 51 N 36 35 48 E
8. 34 42 28 N 36 47 17 E
9. 34 47 23 N 36 36 56 E
10. 34 39 30 N 36 00 07 E
11. 34 44 43 N 36 03 27 E
12. 35 07 49 N 35 57 43 E
13. 35 24 46 N 35 55 19 E
14. 34 35 56 N 36 40 55 E

A closer look at one of the inactive sites illustrates the earthworks and bunkers designed to protect the site. The tell-tale “rosary” form of the site gives it away:


SA-3 Neva (NATO: Goa)
A significant increase in effectiveness over the SA-2, this system remains static (although mobile derivatives exist, they are not thought to be in Syrian service). The sites are susceptible to attack.

Whereas the SA-2 had only one missile per launcher, SA-3 came with twin missile launchers, made possible because the missiles were much smaller. Later quadruple launchers were produced. Syria operates both types with the older twin missile launchers concentrated in the south of the country and the quadruple launchers further north. Sites with twin-launchers have 4 launchers (8 missiles ready to fire) and sites with quadruple-launchers have 3 (12 missiles ready to fire).

Originally seen as a shorter ranged complement to the SA-2, the SA-3 is generally regarded as an altogether better system despite its smaller engagement envelope.

Syrian SA-3 sites:

1. 33 26 46 N 36 18 50 E ~ Twin
2. 33 32 20 N 36 27 16 E ~ Twin
3. 33 33 33 N 36 18 18 E ~ Twin
4. 34 32 42 N 36 45 09 E ~ Quad
5. 34 32 55 N 36 38 05 E ~ Quad
6. 34 42 24 N 36 47 18 E ~ Quad (SA-2 revetments still visible from past use)
7. 35 28 41 N 35 52 45 E ~ Quad
8. 35 30 55 N 35 48 57 E ~ Quad
9. 35 37 53 N 35 47 98 E ~ Quad
10. 35 48 49 N 37 25 52 E ~ Quad
11. 36 13 16 N 37 04 52 E ~ Quad

I haven’t found any inactive SA-3 sites so it seems reasonable to suppose that the Syrians still consider the SA-3 to be an important asset worth maintaining at full strength, unlike the older SA-2.


SA-5 S-200 (NATO: Gammon)
Syria is reported to have 3~4 battalions of SA-5 long range high altitude SAM system. Based deep within Syrian airspace, the system can cover the whole of Lebanon and most of northern Israel.
Strengths:
• Long range (162 miles)
• High altitude (66,000 ft)
• Large warhead
Weaknesses:
• Static bases are susceptible to attack and cannot be moved to cover advance
• Relatively ineffective against maneuvering targets
• Minimum range (38 miles) because of boosters


Using Google Earth there are two SA-5 sites in evidence providing cover for most of western Syria, all of Lebanon and much of Jordan and Israel:
1. 34 37 24 N, 36 46 16 E
2. 33 32 08 N, 36 41 27 E




Other SAM systems
The Syrians also operate SA-6, SA-8, SA-9 and SA-13 mobile SAM systems. These systems are generally very hard to spot by browsing satellite images because they look much like any other vehicle.

To see what an SA-10 site looks like, there is one based in Russia which can we seen at 56 43 07 N 37 30 00 E. I didn’t find any in Syria.




posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 09:56 AM
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What does Google Earth tell us about Syrian air defenses other than how pretty SAM sites look?

Well it is evident that Syrian air defenses are pretty poor. Syrian efforts to procure SA-10 “Grumble” SAMs from Russia in the early ‘90s seem to have fallen flat. The best SAM systems in Syrian service are the SA-6 “Gainful” and SA-8 “Gecko” mobile systems and with some lessons learnt from Serbia, these can be reasonably effective even today. But those lessons don’t seem to have been carried across to the woefully vulnerable static SAM sites seen in the above post.

Also, much of the country is heavily militarized. Some of the trenches are possibly scars of past wars but in general most towns have a SAM site instead of a soccer pitch. Farmers grow their crops around vehicle revetments and school children pass trenches on their way to school. And who are they defending against… Israel. All the defenses point to Israel. The Turkish and Iraqi borders are almost deserted in the way of military but the whole Southwest corner is one gigantean defensive position. Do they really think Israel is going to invade???? I am keen not to take a political side in any of the research I present, but I will say that Syria, with a tank position on every street corner, isn’t the sort of place I’d want my kids to grow up in.

The extent to which Syria is geared up for open war is evident in this Google Earth image of a coastal battery deployed in ready to fire positions. There are numerous other occupied defensive positions throughout Syria –and all in a time of relative peace:


WMDs
WMDs are pretty topical and Syria is often cited as deploying chemical weapon armed ballistic missiles. But a widespread hypothesis is that Syria can convert obsolete SA-2 and SA-5 SAMs to carry chemical or biological warheads. That is IMO silly scare mongering. Whilst it is technically feasible to equip them with the warheads, they are relatively short ranged and have no meaningful means of guidance. The controls are analog not digital which would complicate conversion to GPS or terminal guidance. They are also fixed site systems. By the time you’ve converted the missile to be mobile, new warhead, new guidance etc, then you might as well have invested in a more practical system – like the SCUD lineage…

Syria may have WMDs deployed but you can bet they aren’t converted SAMs. Several SCUD firing positions complete with underground bunkers, are dotted throughout southern Syria:



posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 10:08 AM
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Planeman amazing detail as usual. I wish my Sat images were as clear as yours. You see quite a bit more detail. Definately pro work and crazy informative. I see that they have been expecting much in the way of an attack from the air. However most these systems are very jammable but still lethal none the less. Some Air bases have air craft scattered about and then other bases look very well run with little aircraft available for imaging. Great stuff and Im still scouring as well. Thanks again planeman.



posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 03:53 PM
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Ok, I am now confident enough in my SA-6 spotting abilities to post those, and I also have 30 odd other SAM sites to add (ones previously missed).

SA-6 Kub (NATO: Gainful)
A mobile system with the missiles mounted on a tracked chassis, the SA-6 is generally the most potent 0 and most feasibly upgraded, SAM system in Syrian service.

The system is hard to spot on Google Earth because it is not unlike any other vehicle. But the Syrians have made things easier for us by deploying it in heavily entrenched positions not unlike the static SA-2 and SA-3 systems it was designed to replace. This makes it far more susceptible to preemptive strike. They also have the missiles painted white so they show up easier. However it is only after seeing someone else on the google earth community forum mark the sites up as SA-6 that I have taken my question marks down.

SA-6 sites
1. 32 46 03 N 36 05 55 E
2. 32 47 32 N 36 11 53 E
3. 32 48 41 N 36 08 08 E
4. 32 51 08 N 36 12 04 E
5. 33 03 28 N 36 10 19 E
6. 33 32 30 N 36 35 45 E
7. 33 35 26 N 36 34 14 E
8. 33 18 53 N 36 12 03 E
9. 33 24 21 N 36 09 09 E
10. 34 37 14 N 35 57 43 E
It has an engagement envelope similar to that of the older SA-3 but is generally more effective.

Other additional SAM sites not previously noted. Most though not all are courtesy of google earth community forum.

SA-2
1 . 32 35 52 N 36 21 12 E
2 . 32 42 16 N 36 14 54 E
3 . 32 48 13 N 36 19 32 E
4 . 32 49 52 N 36 13 41 E (empty)
5 . 32 54 32 N 36 23 02 E (empty)
6 . 33 02 07 N 36 12 03 E
7 . 33 17 01 N 36 23 40 E
8 . 33 21 28 N 36 06 37 E
9 . 34 26 59 N 37 59 37 E
10 . 34 50 43 N 35 54 54 E
11 . 35 15 09 N 35 56 14 E (empty)
12 . 35 40 25 N 35 47 14 E
13 . 36 09 02 N 36 59 05 E (empty)
14 . 36 14 22 N 37 18 24 E

SA-3
1 . 32 36 24 N 36 14 46 E Quad
2 . 32 46 17 N 36 10 42 E Quad
3 . 32 56 09 N 36 12 38 E Twin
4 . 32 59 34 N 36 20 43 E Quad
5 . 33 28 26 N 36 06 55 E Twin
6 . 34 28 47 N 37 37 51 E Quad
7 . 34 31 17 N 37 41 02 E Quad
8 . 34 32 05 N 37 35 05 E Quad
9 . 34 40 56 N 36 04 34 E Quad
10 . 35 02 57 N 35 54 17 E Quad
11 . 35 07 03 N 35 53 53 E (empty)
12 . 35 19 51 N 35 55 26 E Quad
13 . 36 11 19 N 37 27 14 E Quad
14 . 36 17 50 N 37 09 35 E Quad

SA-5
1. 32 37 40 N 36 17 39 E (empty)



posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 04:31 PM
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According to Russian arms brochures the Sa-5's minimum engagement range is 0.3 km. and the other claim is once again Western sources confusing the Sa-5 with the missile it was based on ( V-1000). I am not sure if that range was after the last upgrade or since when but it was certaintly never the distance quoted above.

Only thing that i am going to disagree with atm. Great pictures and thanks for the huge amount of effort you put into this.

Stellar



posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 04:36 PM
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That's some superb work.

Thanks for the information - the coverage zones that extend all the way into Israel are especially interesting.



posted on Jun, 20 2006 @ 05:14 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX
According to Russian arms brochures the Sa-5's minimum engagement range is 0.3 km. and the other claim is once again Western sources confusing the Sa-5 with the missile it was based on ( V-1000). I am not sure if that range was after the last upgrade or since when but it was certaintly never the distance quoted above.

Only thing that i am going to disagree with atm. Great pictures and thanks for the huge amount of effort you put into this.

Stellar
Thanks, I just used widely quoted performance figures. The way I see it they are nearly always optimistic anyhow. But re the SA-5 - I can't imagine getting a very good kill probability launching it against targets at 300m unless they are a hovering helicopter. Maybe 300m relates to the warhead arming distance?

The "new" unoccupied SA-5 position is interesting. It looks to me like it might be a war time redeployment position. The road infrastructure is more basic but there are better revetments for reload trucks, one associated with each launcher:

It is also much nearer the Israeli border (see "3" below):


Looking at SA-5 sites around the world, the Libyan ones seem the best designed with shelters for the launchers and reloads.



posted on Jun, 21 2006 @ 06:14 PM
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Originally posted by planeman
Thanks, I just used widely quoted performance figures.


Those are normally just fine but i've been reading a great deal about the extra capabilities of Russian Sam's so that's why i know...


The way I see it they are nearly always optimistic anyhow.


The Russians actually tend to understate the performance of some of their Sam's ( like their ABM capabilties ) so one should be aware of them not seeking publisity for the sake of good press.


But re the SA-5 - I can't imagine getting a very good kill probability launching it against targets at 300m unless they are a hovering helicopter.
Maybe 300m relates to the warhead arming distance?


Lets just say that as far as i understand the last incarnation ( upgrade) of the Sa-5 could destroy targets as little as 300 meters from the launch even if that would be an extremely wastefull way to employ such a long range missile ; much better handled by point defense missiles and guns which would normally be deployed to protect Sa-5 type long range systems from cruise missiles and other threats.

Either way awesome pictures and information! What you should attempt to do next is look at North Korea's defense installations that they have been building for far longer than their Iranian counterparts. If that's not a challenge enough why not check out Russias? I for one would be most interested to see how and what Russian deploys these days and where they have chosen to do so.

I am giving you a Wats for the efforts so far.

Stellar



posted on Jun, 21 2006 @ 07:27 PM
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Thanks. Re SA-5, is there anything to suggest Syria has upgraded missiles?

My tour of North Korean air defenses is well under way and all I can say is thatthey are naff. Literally thousands of AAA position none of which have radar. One SA-5 battery (another unoccupied), a handful of SA-2 and that's about it.

China and Libya are interesting but Iran is posing the biggest curiosity.

[edit on 21-6-2006 by planeman]



posted on Jun, 21 2006 @ 07:31 PM
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The minimum range of the SA-5 is correct as posted by Planeman. My understanding is that the semi-active guidance doesn't kick in until after the boost phase. There actually aren't a lot of systems that can hack an Rmin of 300m, due warhead arming time, and guidance issues. Unless you do a ballistic launch only, hoping that the proximity fuse, if armed in time, goes off.

Another thing to remember is that SA-5 was designed to counter large bomber formations, not agile fighter type aircraft. Hence manoeuvrability wasn't a big requirement for the system, and neither was minimum range because at the speed the bombers would fly at, and their RCS, there was plenty of time to get the big missile airborne, and on the way to the target. SA-2 and SA-3 also suffer from limited manoeuvrability, though to a lesser extent than SA-5. SA-10 on the other hand is a whole different kettle of fish, and if Syria have it, then it complicates things.

All in all, an exceptional post mate. A WATS vote is on its way. I look forward to reading more of your work.



posted on Jun, 21 2006 @ 07:52 PM
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very nice work, shame the images arn't a live feed so are slightly out of date but it's a good idea of what there able to deploy. I would vote you for WATS but I'm out of votes .



posted on Jun, 25 2006 @ 06:46 AM
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I thought the Russians delivered to SYria the lastest SAM gizmo..did that go thru.. DO any of these 70's era SAMs really work..will they bring down an Israeli F-15 if it ventures into Syrian territory?



posted on Jun, 25 2006 @ 07:45 AM
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SA-3 brought down F-117 and F-16 in Yugoslavia.



posted on Jun, 25 2006 @ 11:20 PM
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I think that F-117 was actually hit by AAA, a lucky shot..and considering how many sorties were flown over Yugoslavia, the Serbian defenses were a complete failure as the coaltion planes were mostly able to bomb with impunity..it's a far cry from for example the Vietnam or Yom Kupper war where these missiles were blowing away American planes like crazy..In the Yom Kupper War the Syrians/Egyptians destroyed 1/2 the Israeli Air Force in the opening days with those things, Israel lost so many planes that The US had to emergency order the US AirForce pilots to fly to TelAviv, land their plane, and give the keys to the nearist Israeli pilot. Those missiles just don't work like that anymore..

BUT I beleive the Russians have newer generation missiles like the TOR-M1 missile that are actually supposed to be very effective vs the latest western planes..I know the US was desperatly trying to get Russia not to sell them to Syria & Iran..I think the Iran deal has been postponed until the nuclear issue is resolved but I think the Syrian deal went thru and the missiles shouls have been delivered by now..any infos??



posted on Jun, 26 2006 @ 07:38 AM
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Originally posted by jajabinks
I think that F-117 was actually hit by AAA, a lucky shot..and considering how many sorties were flown over Yugoslavia, the Serbian defenses were a complete failure as the coaltion planes were mostly able to bomb with impunity..it's a far cry from for example the Vietnam or Yom Kupper war where these missiles were blowing away American planes like crazy..In the Yom Kupper War the Syrians/Egyptians destroyed 1/2 the Israeli Air Force in the opening days with those things, Israel lost so many planes that The US had to emergency order the US AirForce pilots to fly to TelAviv, land their plane, and give the keys to the nearist Israeli pilot. Those missiles just don't work like that anymore..

BUT I beleive the Russians have newer generation missiles like the TOR-M1 missile that are actually supposed to be very effective vs the latest western planes..I know the US was desperatly trying to get Russia not to sell them to Syria & Iran..I think the Iran deal has been postponed until the nuclear issue is resolved but I think the Syrian deal went thru and the missiles shouls have been delivered by now..any infos??


My info is that the Syrians have some current generation SA-14 Igla man portable SAMs, (equiv to Stinger) and possibly some SA-18 Igla. But no SA-10 or anything like that. Iran wants SA-10/20 but has bought SA-15 Tor instead - whether deliveries are delayed I haven't heard. A good place I get info is from Tel Aviv university's published arms balance documents; if anything they over play the threats so if they don't say syria has SA-10,,,,













[edit on 26-6-2006 by planeman]



posted on Jun, 26 2006 @ 08:22 AM
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Here is the interesting article where Colonel Dani Zoltan whose battery(SA-3) believed to shot down F-117 explain how he was able to do it.

www.strategypage.com...

Shows what able commander can do even with outdated technology.



posted on Jun, 26 2006 @ 09:02 AM
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Originally posted by ArcPeter
Here is the interesting article where Colonel Dani Zoltan whose battery(SA-3) believed to shot down F-117 explain how he was able to do it.

www.strategypage.com...

Shows what able commander can do even with outdated technology.
Thanks, that's really interesting. One particular comment:

--- His radars and missile launchers were moved frequently, meaning that some of his people were always busy looking for new sites to set up in, or setting up or taking down the equipment. His battery traveled over 100,000 kilometers during the 78 day NATO bombing campaign, just to avoid getting hit. They did, and his troops knew all that effort was worth the effort.

Does not seem to have been learnt by the Syrians - all their sites are well established with extensive revetments - and the compariative lack of disused sites shows that they aren't frequently moved.



posted on Jun, 26 2006 @ 06:02 PM
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One problem with moving your SA-3 battery is that you are focusing on survival, not killing the enemy. Even for experienced battery operators, you are talking in the order of an hour to set up and an hour to pack up the site. Tie this in with operating from less than ideal sites, and you pretty much lose the reason for having a SAM battery in the first place - protection of your vital assets. Taking out two aircraft in a 78 day war is a pretty poor conversion rate, and is pretty much an acknowledgement that the system as a whole had zero chance of beating the allied air attack, and ensuring that assets survived was more important in the off chance that the political leaders remained in power.

Systems such as SA-2 and SA-3 pose little challenge to an effective air force that utilises stand-off jamming, long range cruise missiles and stand-off weapons to target fire control radars, stealth platforms, and superior ISR coverage. Yes, the system can hide, but if you are hiding, you aren't shooting. There is a trade-off, and most older SAM operators realise that they are on a hiding to nothing if they light up a Coalition aircraft. Hence the increase in unguided shots, and using SAMBUSH tactics in an attempt to blind-side a pilot flying dumb.

Now SA-10/20 is a slightly different story, with improved EPM, multi-target engagement capability, and substantially longer range. You can bet that any such system will be tracked via a range of intelligence systems, and the FCR will be close to number one on the joint targeting list come zero hour.

Oh, and SA-14 is far from a current generation MANPAD. While it has a different seeker to SA-7, it is still an older scan reticle, with no IRCCM. SA-18 is much better, both in terms of EPM and also range.



posted on Jul, 13 2006 @ 03:44 PM
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One problem with moving your SA-3 battery is that you are focusing on survival, not killing the enemy.


Sam's do not have to kill anything if they can prevent the enemy air force from effectively attacking ground forces. Not being able to defend fixed target areas at all times when up against such a massive enemy armada proves absolutely nothing. If we gave the serb forces air defenses forces to the same value as NATO forces they would never even have bothered attacking as they would not only be completly ineffective but also be destroyed if they tried to interdict Serb forces.


Even for experienced battery operators, you are talking in the order of an hour to set up and an hour to pack up the site.


Depending on the system and how many of the radar resources you want to employ. Tracking and data information can be sent by land lines from other radar sites as has been done in Russia for very very many decades.


Tie this in with operating from less than ideal sites, and you pretty much lose the reason for having a SAM battery in the first place - protection of your vital assets.


This depends entirely on circumstance and who is fighting who with what sort of force level and skill disparities. Fixed sites can be defended unless your air defense assets are very limited ( as is the case when your attacked by NATO forces operating up to 1000 aircraft against you..) and not worth the risk to your few defense systems. Few countries ( that do not tow the American foreign policy line ) have the air defense capacity or skill to make much of a difference but the Serbs apparently proved what skill couple with completely outdated systems can achieve.


Taking out two aircraft in a 78 day war is a pretty poor conversion rate,


They claim they shot down 40 or more , as i recall, so mabye you should ask them about that.
Whatever the truth may be NATO failed to interdict Serb ground forces and their mobile ground forces pretty much did what they wanted to do as was admitted by many ( British government reports and many other ) .


and is pretty much an acknowledgement that the system as a whole had zero chance of beating the allied air attack, and ensuring that assets survived was more important in the off chance that the political leaders remained in power.


The system did not have to 'beat' the American air attack as that is not the point of air defenses. They did manage to protect Serb ground forces and that was in itself a massive achievement considering their limited means.


Systems such as SA-2 and SA-3 pose little challenge to an effective air force that utilises stand-off jamming, long range cruise missiles and stand-off weapons to target fire control radars, stealth platforms, and superior ISR coverage.


It was apparently more than enough to ensure that the NATO bombing campaign was ineffective against Serb ground forces; blowing up fixed structures in large cities when you have the country completely surrounded and outgunned is the type of achievement only government propaganda agencies can make look good.


Yes, the system can hide, but if you are hiding, you aren't shooting.


Survival to pose the same level of threat tommorow is your only choice when you can not afford losses. Inversely not losing airplanes, when you have them to spare, to complete the missions speaks volumes of NATO commitment to life up to their stated 'aims'.


There is a trade-off, and most older SAM operators realise that they are on a hiding to nothing if they light up a Coalition aircraft. Hence the increase in unguided shots, and using SAMBUSH tactics in an attempt to blind-side a pilot flying dumb.


The percentage of HARMS fired unguided is more than the percentage of unguided Sa-3/Sa-6's shots in that campaign . That's what i recall reading and i suggests ( in my mind at least )clearly that allied SEAD/DEAD packets did not feel all that confident in their ability to trade shots 'fairly'.


Now SA-10/20 is a slightly different story, with improved EPM, multi-target engagement capability, and substantially longer range. You can bet that any such system will be tracked via a range of intelligence systems, and the FCR will be close to number one on the joint targeting list come zero hour.


It's a huge improvement but i would say that they older systems are great to start with and that Sa-10's , when finally fired in anger, will make a rather large impression on those unlucky enough to be targetted.


Oh, and SA-14 is far from a current generation MANPAD. While it has a different seeker to SA-7, it is still an older scan reticle, with no IRCCM. SA-18 is much better, both in terms of EPM and also range.


They were shooting down NATO cruise missiles with older systems not so long ago.....

Stellar



posted on Jul, 13 2006 @ 03:59 PM
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In a war these would be the first targets along with the communications infrastructure.

Ground based SAMs are pretty much sitting targets. Manpads are useless agaisnt high altitude and very fast nap of the earth bombing.

The rest would be the highest priortity targets for an attack so they would not last more than a few days.

Current EW systems are more than capable of protecting aircraft from getting shot down.
The best a SAM can hope to do is disrupt some bomb runs. SAMS have very low life expectancy in a war.



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