Gun-missile Air Defense systems, page 1

Planeman,

1km..........10km.........20km
.........................................
........_______________.......
......./******TDZ******\.....
.......|****************|....
.......|*****/ ````\*****|....
.......|*****|W E Z|*****|....
.......|***** \____/*****|....
.......\****************/.....
........````````````````......
...........................................

1km..........................30km............40km...........60km...............100km
............................APY-8 Lynx.....EOTS..........APG-81........................
...............................................................................GBU-39..............

Mind you, there is still the 'trip over snake' problem but the basics are all there. MANPADS and VSHORADS systems have maximum ranges of 4-6km and slants (+altitude) that are often half this, even today. This renders most efforts to turn SPAAGs into 'SPAMs' only a little more useful than their say the M42/M16/Ostwind precursors for much the same reasons: unless you REALLY MASS your air defence vehicles into layered flak traps, even networking just doesn't get you much for the downrange ability to respond to either the ultra high or ultra low altitude threats. And with cost equivalencies ranging upwards of an MBT, organic AD just becomes nearly impossible with all assets being held as division or higher special bragades that are themselves not able to rapidly respond on the march but must typically be held for (key signature) particular assignment to logistics depots or stagingchokes critical to ensure a breakout condition.

ADV's also have their own set of peculiar problems in that the gun gasses and recoil often foul or jar sensitive seekers and the ability to fire on the move or indeed /keep up with/ the escorted force is often limited as the chassis are often wheeled or very heavy, the onboard loads low and the overall loading very topheavy as well. Similarly, X or even Ku band emissions shine out like a flashlight in a well and relying on an onboard optical cuer alone is iffy at best for first sighting and particularly saturation attack sort. Thus armor units often /hate/ the compromise to mobility and unit signature that these systems bring. The best defense against direct air attack is decoys and highly distributed force dispositions.

The best counter to standoff ATGW and sling bombers is simply to disrupt them with interceptors that can chase beyond the target detection zone over a local horizon and/or AFTER launch and climbup to ceiling. Both of which require the ability to reinvest sensor systems into networked trackfile capable mosaics which have the ability to (MCG) cue weapons that do not have LOBL.

Ironically, the actual method then used to engage (heavy guided projectiles, conventional boost-slide rocket SAM, manned interception or hunting/turboSAM systems) can be highly varied and still be successful. So long as a defense in depth approach means that the weapon platforms are not fixed to a point-defended asset and thus 'point defense' limited to targets which will (increasingly) _never_ 'just fly overhead'.

Without the gun and sensor block on a turreted mount, most ADV would look like nothing more than conventional high mobility truck or APC type (VLS) systems. While massed guns perse would revert to their proper role as infantry suppression weapons of relatively low cost.

KPl.

[edit on 18-5-2006 by ch1466]

[edit on 18-5-2006 by ch1466]

[edit on 18-5-2006 by ch1466]