Not sure if this is of any use, but here's what else could be dug up. Along with the expected quotes. This first one is from a very long article, that I read to the end. Which is exactly where I found the goods.

Q: If there's so much trust between both sides, why is it that the United States can't get more visibility into the Yamantau mountain complex and other similar construction projects that are underway and closely tied to their command and control of nuclear forces?

A: Excellent question. Again, I don't want to identify anyone by name. But another senior official, very senior official and I had a discussion and that's one of the issues I brought up. I said, we've got folks in the United States who think you're committing a technical foul by, you know, you've got 20,000 people working there. You've got a lot of resource going to this place. Why don't you just take an American down there and show them what you're doing? And he said, got it. I don't know what's going to happen.

Q: Did they tell you what it was all about?

A: Yes. It's the same story that I got from Gen. Sergeyev over a year ago and it is not military-related. It is a national crisis center. That's the way it was described to me. I said you need to put it to bed.

Secret work on massive subterranean facilities may represent the greatest misuse of Russian funds. The largest, a complex with millions of square feet inside Yamantau Mountain in the southern Urals 850 miles east 94/95 of Moscow, is served by a railroad and a modern highway, and at one point, a former US Strategic Command chief estimated, housed at least 20,000 workers in newly fashioned cities.47...
Anonymous US intelligence sources say the Yamantau Mountain project alone has cost Russia some $6 billion since 199150

Some analysts argue that the principle targets for RNEP are in Russia and include the command facilities inside the Yamantau and Kosvinsky mountains.[5] Both of these facilities trace their origins to the Cold War when U.S. strategic doctrine emphasized targeting the Communist Party's leadership complex. Indeed, Yamantau and Kosvinsky were designed and built to prevent a decapitating first strike by U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Yamantau
Although construction of the command center at Yamantau began in the Brezhnev-era, the Russian Federation has remained committed to completing the facility. Yamantau has proven controversial and has allegedly drawn the ire of U.S. nuclear war planners.[6] In a 1997 Congressional finding, the U.S. House of Representatives noted (that) "the Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to be consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness, and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War strategic partnership between the United States and Russia."[7] The finding goes on to quote the Segodnya newspaper which claimed in 1996 "that the Yamantau Mountain project was associated with the so-called 'Dead Hand' nuclear retaliatory command and control system for strategic missiles."[8] A 1997 CIA report was less confident, noting "The rationale for the Yamantau complex is unclear."[9] Owing to the facility's location inside a rock quartz mountain (about 3,000 feet straight down from the summit), it is reportedly unsuitable for use as a command post. The silicon-rich quartz interferes with radio signals broadcast from within the facility, rendering communications links tenuous at best. Yamantau's communications capabilities are therefore limited to the use of transmitters broadcasting from outside the facility, which are vulnerable to existing weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile (and would be even more vulnerable to new bunker busters). Thus, rather than being associated with the so-called "Dead Hand" nuclear retaliatory command and control system, it is thought that Yamantau's principle purpose is to provide a wartime relocation facility for the Russia's top political leadership.[10]

PRE-PRODUCTION COPY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
of the
REPORT
of the
COMMISSION TO ASSESS
THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES