Originally posted by ultralo1
It never fails to amaze me how people CHOOSE to buy into the 'cavalry myth' propoganda like complete suckers for what is obvious in any properly
parsed rereading of the text.
Dude I respect your knowledge on the subject but this one statement got my goat. I was stationed with several guys who were there. So to them and me
it is "cavalry Fact".
The first question you have to answer is why the Cavalry were needed at all and what their response means, tactically-
1. You sent out an understrength vehicle team with compromised opsec from the getgo a 'conditional certainty' due to the indig forces attached.
Not least of these was insufficient gun trucks and insufficient ammo onboard them but going ANYWHERE more than an hour out from air or FSB is
_moronic_. In fact it stinks of the 'I know, let's send out a smaller unit and see if they'll bite!' doctrine of SEA.
2. T'wer me there would also be an airmobile or air assault unit able to put down a (preleaped) Mike Force behind any '800 man' (how the hell do
you mass that many people in a high desert environment without marshaling logistics and transit route notices via UGS?) attack with the intent of
bagging the limit on live intel and lamenting woman who watch their husbands paraded off like chained dogs.
3. You did not reach your objective. Which means someone else has to do the S2D2 dance /again/. Just to prove you haven't been scared off using
4. You did not maintain unit cohesion which meant you had to drive back 'into the valley' and rerisk soldiers which had just escaped. Assuming you
had a choice on entering the choke to begin with, this is double-the-dumb-blonde Spearmint factor.
5. You did not decisively engage the threat to a finished fight condition, _owning_ the battleground and if need be the village that you can be
equally 100% sure 'were cheering the home team'. Which means the next time an opportunity for this crap happens they will be encouraged by a
partial success and a chance to modify their tactics and weaponeering rather than cringing, utterly terrified of bringing down the wrath of the
Americans. The chief definition of change being how to respond to airpower.
6. You did not have adequate coordination with your air support (GPS, + lase, + offset bullseye fixed point = secure threat positioning) nor a
specific initial response plan to dismount and defilade or run a mounted endrun hasty attack against the ambush when SOP is ALWAYS to defeat shock of
fires by getting out from under and turning THEIR flanks with shock and _maneuver_.
7. If you had had another BHD scenario, you didn't have the numbered CAS elements to cover both parties or go to the rescue on the ground. And
/another/ hour to wait for more.
The next thing that must be dealt with is how you define Cavalry-
Hollywood would have you believe in The Cavalry as an over-the-hill force to save the settlers 'at the last possible second' (staked bait goat).
The military defines the Cavalry mission as a _screening force_ designed to PREVENT surprise engagements by acting as a tripwire and/or speedbump so
the main body can have time to react.
WHY are you playing to Hollywood's model? Especially when the best cavalry element is one which has been on-scene for upwards of 8-10 hours BEFORE
you got there and has the sensor technology to be _completely_ untouchable from the ground?
What frankly pisses me off is that if they had first-and-lasted the column with mines or salvo fire LAW, not a single one of you would have lived long
enough for help to arrive via Hollywood's definition of fast-ambulancing. And you jolly well know it.
Lastly, you have to put the tactical picture into the Strategic One-
And you KNOW damn well what our getting our sorry butts kicked out of Iraq ultimately means in terms of 'What's On Second.' The AfG insurgent
tactical competencies will rise exponentially with the arrival of foreign assistance even as familiarity with your doctrine will lead to a contemptive
exploitation of it in theirs. The very same force model (as is proving untouchable in Iraq) will then likely be used with a highly proficient
technical cadre using cutout/throwaway emplacement teams for IED or small ambush until the success rate leads to quadrupled 'volunteer force' rise
in the total insurgent numbers. Leaving us with yet another 'insurgency becomes civil war' condition as the primitive minds over there respond to
whatever independent parties have the apparent strength to inspire them into taking trophy kills when and where they can. Because you're in their
bryar patch now where everyone lives by reputation and coup is the name of the game on foreigners whom _nobody_ will begin a vendetta to avenge.
/Never Intending/ to 'win' tactically, is how the insurgent threat NEVER LOSES, ultimately, strategically.
Thus the only way for the occupation force to win is to make sure it's a game never played. Meaning you have to be leaner, cleaner, harder, MEANER
_all the time_. Every time they come at you, you have kill them, utterly. Leaving them so in terror of what happens when Americans do a little house
cleaning that no fatwa from a crazed mullah across the border is incentive enough for them to play more than possum.
Under such partisan loyalty conditions, the only thing you have going for you is the certainty in their minds that each attack will be met with a
no-holds-barred OVERWHELMING FORCE response that makes every little abo aware that they might have to pay for what their mother's second cousin does
with wargames on their turf.