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Russians claim bomber flights over US territory went undetected

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posted on May, 27 2006 @ 01:51 PM
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Missile defense systems also indirectly threaten populations. The Soviet ABM system was intended to protect Moscow against nuclear attacks, but rather than shielding the capital from nuclear peril, the system in fact had the opposite effect of attracting nuclear warheads. Many other facilities would have been targeted in addition to the ABM system, including political and military leadership targets. "We must have targeted Moscow with 400 weapons," a former Stratcom commander has stated.

www.thebulletin.org...


The Us might thus have to spend up to 400 Minuteman III's warheads out of a 1000 odd( current force levels) to overwhelm Moscow? Is that not success in terms of ICBM's required considering that everyone in Moscow would be in shelters under the city protected from the fallout effects? I would call a ABM system that requires almost half my enemies ICBM forces to destroy QUITE EFFECTIVE. Back in the day there were obviously far more warheads available but i think you will soon understand where i am coming from when i claim that ABM's ARE effective in that they create the sort of uncertainty that requires overkill to negate.


LGM-30G Minuteman III
Mk-12 150 1970 1 W62 x 170 150
Mk-12 50 1970 3 W62 x 170 (MIRV) 150/15
Mk-12A 300 1979 2-3 W78 x 335 (MIRV) 750/30

www.thebulletin.org...


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For the softer radar installations, a single W76 warhead detonated at 700 meters would have a kill probability of 74 percent. We have therefore assumed that each silo would be targeted with one ICBM with at least two W78 warheads at surface or shallow burst (approximately 200 meters), and that each radar would be targeted with two airburst W76 warheads from an SLBM.

www.thebulletin.org...


And at current force levels ( and the USSR also had far more warheads back in the day) that means the US will still use at least 20% of their ICBM warheads just to apparently saturate the old Moscow ABM system and ensure Moscow's destruction. Consider what your chosen source had to say about the Sa-5B :


By the end of the 1960s, targeting may have focused on Moscow, with all the missiles of a nuclear submarine committed to destroying the ABM system and the city. The capability of the Moscow ABM system might have limited the flexibility of British targeting by tying down most of the deployed force. Polaris appears to have been judged much more effective against the SA-5B Gammon interceptors of the Tallinn system. A 1970 study published by the British Atomic Energy Authority concluded that SA-5B interceptors were not a threat to British Polaris missiles, and that it would take only two Polaris missile payloads to saturate a standard SA-5B battery.

In 1972, the British government decided to develop a new front end for the Polaris missiles "designed specifically to penetrate [the] anti- ballistic missile defenses" around Moscow. This improved system, called Chevaline, was deployed in 1982. It carried pen-aids and three 40- kiloton maneuverable reentry vehicles that were "hardened" against the radiation effects of the nuclear ABM interceptors.

www.thebulletin.org...


So i guess the British ( and the DIA ) assumed the Sa-5 to in fact be a ABM system... Considering the effort to suppress them in the late 60's one can only begin to imagine how much effort it would have required to suppress the system circa mid 70's or mid 80's with the addition of thousands of additional SA-5 and S-300 types. How many warheads would have been left to target the reloadable 1300 odd ( at peak ; as far as i know) Russian nuclear missile silo's and their command centers? Where would all these warheads come from and how few would be left to target the widely dispersed industrial base of the USSR?


Industrial dispersal. The Soviets have been involved in an industrial dispersal program for more than 15 years. Their approach to the program has been and continues to be the siting of new industrial complexes in towns and settlements with populations of 100,000 people or less. The program has several advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of great economic importance from the standpoint of accelerating and expanding their economic development; this is especially true regarding growth of such sparsely developed areas as Siberia. Second, it prevents high concentrations of industry in a small number of large industrial centers and helps the Soviets make better use of their abundant natural resources. Third, dispersal creates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. strategic planners and greatly complicates targeting tasks.

Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an ongoing program designed to harden their industrial base. Included in this program are underground facilities, new plant construction techniques, construction of duplicate plants, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, and expedient techniques. The first three hardening methods can be productively utilized only for new facilities and require a long lead time for fruition. The fourth method, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, has near-term implications but is expensive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, is relatively inexpensive and has short-term implications; it will be the focus of this discussion.If current Soviet expedient hardening preparations for protection of their industrial base are implemented on a large scale, the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory capability could be significantly degraded. By utilizing relatively inexpensive and simple expedient techniques such as packing machinery in sandbags, the Soviets could make their industry relatively invulnerable to overpressures of a few pounds per square inch (psi). ( continue on next post )


Continue ...




posted on May, 27 2006 @ 01:53 PM
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Depending on the specific precautions taken in mounting and protecting machines, they can be made to survive overpressures in the range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate specific hardening techniques.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...


They wanted to win and they were doing what it took ( at the cost of the civilian economy) to do so when forced into a fight.

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Russia must now confront the theoretical possibility that a future U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system would be the straw that breaks the back of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Russia today can barely cope with U.S. offensive power, let alone a combination of offense and defense, a one-two punch they fear could deliver a knock-out blow to their strategic forces.


The author is either very ignorant or aiming to deceive his audiance as he forgets to mention a great many things including hundreds of Sam/ABM batteries and their thousands of missiles that makes a strategic attack on even the few hundred remaining Silo based ICBM's a very uncertain thing. As the last few pages worth of sources should indicate the Russians defense is currently so extensive that their offensive forces may not have to perform very well to not only survive the initial exchange but keep firing till their reloads run out. The US has NO declared defense ( i think they do but that is another topic entirely) against such a Russian counter strike even if they had reloadable silo's to keep on fighting.

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The Pentagon argues that its proposed 250 interceptor NMD system is so limited that it could protect only against a threat from a few dozen warheads. Under the proposed START III Treaty, the Russians would still possess 1,000 to 2,000 warheads over the next decade and beyond. The Administration contends that such a large force gives Russia "the certain ability to carry out an annihilating counterattack on the other side regardless of the conditions under which the war began."


Why should the pentagon spend so much time trying to please the Russians with limiting American defenses when the Russians are so 'weak' themselves? Did the Russians not 'lose' the cold war and if so why are their defensive and offensive nuclear forces still stronger to this day? Is the 'weaker' party normally stronger in terms of the damage he can inflict on you? If the US government went ahead with a national missile defense program in the early 90's to protect America from even a full scale nuclear attack ( meaning saving at few tens of millions of American lives at least ) one could have argued that America were in fact stronger but all they have done is negotiate and appease the apparent stronger party while that party designs and deploys ever newer and more deadly weapons. It can in fact be shown that they have helped pay for the deployment of those newer systems by helping to pay for 'dismantling' ( whatever that really means) older Russian weapons and nuclear weapons.


This danger is further compounded to the extent that the Bush Administration acts -- notwithstanding this behavior -- to provide U.S. taxpayer loan guarantees and other subsidies to Moscow center, even as the crackdown proceeds. On 12 December 1990, $1 billion in agricultural credit guarantees through the Agriculture Department's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program and up to $300 million in U.S. Export-Import Bank insurance coverage and loan guarantees were authorized for the Soviet Union.

In what might come to be seen as "AGSCAM," White House Press Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater today announced that less than $200 million remained in uncommitted CCC credit guarantees. The remainder, he claimed, had already been spent or committed over the month since they were originally authorized. U.S. commercial banks -- which actually extend the loans in support of U.S. grain sales and which are, in turn, "covered" by risk-free taxpayer guarantees -- could possibly be prevented from proceeding in the case of transactions involving grain that has not yet left the United States. This could probably be accomplished by the Administration, or the Congress, rescinding these taxpayer guarantees prior to the physical shipment of grain to the Soviet Union.

www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org...


The actions of the 'stronger' party while the other is busy shooting civilians in it's 'republics'? Read the rest of the article to begin to understand the scale of the 'aid' provided while all this was going on.

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In reality, a surprise offensive U.S. strike could, under some conditions today, destroy all but a few tens of Russian warheads, and Moscow's control over those surviving weapons might be lost. In the event of such an attack on Russia, all the rest of its strategic forces would be vulnerable to quick destruction.

www.cdi.org...


Right! They have the money to deploy new road mobile missiles and Sam/Abm's but they do not have money left to keep what they have ( 350 odd mobile ICBM's at least) dispersed and thus safe from a first strike even if such a first strike could reach all it's intended targets? Fool me once , fool me twice, etc....... Your government may want to trust the Russians when they say their dirt poor but remember that your friendly government officials are far more likely to be able to hide in deep bunkers ( and still rule however many of you are left ) than you are so why not investigate the matter yourself instead of assuming the enemy builds weapons but are too stupid to use them?

Continued...

[edit on 27-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 01:58 PM
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It is essential to consider Russia's shocking calculation of the adverse effect of U.S. national missile defense on its national security.


I find it strange that it's so 'essential' we talk about a American defensive system , that does not exsist , instead of talking about the existing massive Russian one. I assume the author would much rather we indulge ourselves in possibilities than realities when it comes to the defense of America?

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Russia today can barely cope with U.S. offensive power alone. On paper, a sudden U.S. strategic missile attack, an implausible but still basic scenario for Russian planning, could decimate Russia's strategic retaliatory forces. Today, fewer than 100 and perhaps as few as nine Russian warheads (out of an arsenal of 6,000) might survive


Many things 'might' happen but i did not notice the author giving us odds and if he did i imagine i could be a very rich man if this 'implausible' scenario plays out.The author factored in very little beside the official propaganda ( American strength&Russian weakness) and i did better research work ( if his somehow just completely ignorant; which i do not believe he is) at age 15.

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(compared to 2,000 invulnerable weapons for the United States).


Nothing is invulnerable and certainly not something with so many parts that may or may not 'function'. Using the word 'invulnerable' that way makes a mockery of war in general and especially those involving nuclear detonations.


The Bush administration’s policy was not an automatic continuity or continuation of all treaties with the USSR, but provided a framework to review each agreement and determine necessary changes. Such a review was particularly important for arms control agreements. As President Clinton stated in a letter to Congressman Gilman in March 1997, and I quote, “Particularly in the area of arms control, a case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary.” In that case-by-case review, the administration negotiated a memorandum of understanding [MOU] on succession to the ABM Treaty. The MOU, was concluded in September 1997 and identified Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia as the successor states to the treaty. This selection of successor states seemed to be consistent with a statement by the President that, and I quote, “neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet States with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS, Newly Independent States, as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.” That was the letter from the President to Congressman Gilman. The administration went on to reiterate in that same letter that the MOU on succession “works to preserve the original object and purpose of the treaty.” To summarize, the administration believed in 1997 that recognition of Russia alone or all of the successor states together would not have preserved the original purpose of the treaty.

www.missilethreat.com...



In mid-1994 the Belarusian air force operated two interceptor regiments with MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29 aircraft; three strike regiments with MiG-27, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-25 aircraft; and one reconnaissance regiment with MiG-25 and Su-24 aircraft. Four regiments had 300 helicopters, and one transport regiment had more than forty helicopters. Personnel numbered 15,800.

Belarus also had an air defense force with 11,800 personnel and 200 SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and SA-10 surface-to-air missiles. The system was being integrated into Russia's air defenses in 1994 owing to Belarus's lack of resources.

www.globalsecurity.org...



Kazakhstan is investing the equivalent of one billion dollars to upgrade its air defense system, reports Interfax, with the upgrades reportedly being made by a British company, BAE Systems. The systems upgraded reportedly include the S-75, S-125, S- 200, and S- 300. The size of the contract reflects the extent of the defense systems built by the Soviet Union

www.missilethreat.com...



THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE
Structurally consist of three Corps, deployed correspondingly in Lviv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovs'k. The Force HQ is located in Kyiv.
48 000 men are in Air Defense service. The Force is armed with Air Defense complexes S-75; S-125, S-200, S-300. It also includes Fighter Aviation.The Air Defense Force of Ukraine was developed at the basis of formations, deployed in Ukraine at the moment of its independence's proclamation.

ukraineinfo.us...


Is it only a coincidence that the 1972 ABM treaty were extended after the USSR's 'breakup' to cover three soviet 'republics' that each operated both the Sa-5/S-200 and the Sa-10/S-300 at the time? Throwing the word 'invulnerable' around ,while having very little constructive to say about Russian nuclear forces, tells me a great deal about the authors intent.

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Through Russian eyes, a U.S. missile shield around U.S. territory would threaten to mop up this residual force once it launched in retaliation.

www.cdi.org...


Continued ...



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:03 PM
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Since the basic premise is so obviously false one can only wonder how the author proceeds to assume such reasoning being behind the lack of a AMerican ABM defense. Is it not at least more logical to assume that the lack of such American defense ( for over three decades) has more to do with the overwhelming nature ot the SOviet/Russian threat than the absence of one? If the enemy can barely hurt you why not spend the extra money and make even suicidal efforts on his part completely harmless and thus pointless? It is simply illogical to argue that the lack of an American defense is due to no threat ( few warheads can = millions dead) when one looks at the massive Soviet efforts to defend themselves against so many incoming American warheads. One would be better advised to consider this a highly effective Soviet/Russian ploy to further disarm America by hyping the cost and attacking the effectiveness by using America's 'intellectuals' against America.


The George C. Marshall Institute recently released a study concluding that a 93% effective, three-layered defense based on "smart" kinetic energy weapons, could be deployed by the mid-1990s at a cost of $121 billion (or an annual cost of 3 to 4% of probable Department of Defense budgets). This figure is about 12% of the $1 trillion cost estimate of the Union of Concerned Scientists, which is widely quoted in the news media.I also saw it in a videotape that is shown by PSR on visits to Tucson schools. I asked about the basis forthe figure, and was assured that it was "documented." Some investigators at the Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington tried to find the "documentation."Peter Clausen of the UCS said that he was "not sure much lies behind it analytically."Some anti-SDI groups credited former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and James Schlesinger. Brown stated that the question was "not susceptible to [a]...detailed and documented approach." Schlesinger repeatedly refused to answer his mail or his telephone.

www.oism.org...


Even 'back in the day' ( circa late 60's) the to US military men ( meaning chiefs of staff) believed they could make a strategic defense works ( meaning save tens of millions of lives) so why on earth argue assume it could not be done in the 80's WHEN THE USSR HAD BEEN OPERATING SUCH FOR DECADES. How the USSR managed to turn American 'intellectuals' against Americans is something i have many theories on but it's probably a topic for another occasion.


According to Mr. Rostow's memo, the Chiefs recommended MIKE-X deployment at 25 cities to save the lives of 30 to 50 million U.S. citizens, if attacked. McMamara opposed the Chiefs' proposal on the grounds of MAD theology and simplistic "action-reaction":

* it was "inconceivable" that the Soviets would react in any other way but to restore the status quo ante, i.e. 120 million U.S. population fatalities;
* both sides would spend a lot of money and end up where they started, but we would waste the most because offensive weapons were so much cheaper than ABM systems;
* the danger of war would not be reduced;
* the FSU had "been wrong in its nuclear defense policy for a decade" because everything spent on all types of defenses (air and missile) had been wasted.(15)

The Chiefs saw it quite differently:

* NIKE-X would save tens of millions of lives against a Soviet population attack, and that was a worthwhile objective;
* while they could not predict with confidence how the Soviets would react, all likely reactions had a substantial price and would divert funds from other military programs--no free lunches;
* the risk of nuclear attack would be reduced

www.fas.org...


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The Trident D-5 is a strategic system designed to strengthen and secure the US nuclear force. It has the capability to destroy hardened targets, as well as being highly effective against civilian population centers. The use of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads enables the Trident D-5 to destroy a large number of silo-based missiles in a first strike. However, the Russian and Communist Chinese reliance on mobile systems makes any such attack futile.


The D-5 only came in service when the 'game' was over ( so to speak ) and it's added accuracy matters very little as the warheads are unlikely to reach the ground in the first place. Before the D-5 even came into service the USSR almost 1000 land mobile ICBM's ( beside their sea based and Silo based) so it was a little too late to change much anything in terms of 'winning' a nuclear exchange in the near term.

*

For this reason, it is likely the targeting follows official US doctrine of retaliation strikes following a nuclear attack.


Since avenging the dead (Instead of trying to save people before vengeance is called for) is what American nuclear strategy is seemingly based on.

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The submarines carrying the Trident D-5 missile have sufficient range to attack from the safety of US territorial waters, as well as being numerous and nearly impossible to find while deployed. The combination of countermeasures and multiple warheads would overwhelm enemy missile defense, striking many vital population centers.

missilethreat.com...


Overwhelming defense may very well happen but how many targets would be moved off the list to accomodate the saturation of the few targets deemed very important? The question simply remains how one wins a nuclear war when all your forces are promptly used up while the enemy gets to reload ( his land mobile systems) and reload and reload till your forced to surrender for lack of the same capacity. Either way the D-5 were introduced AFTER the 'cold war' 'ended' so it added a capability when non such were required anymore? Makes no sense to me using the convetional 'fact set' introduced by the author.

Continued...



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:05 PM
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LGM-118 Peacekeeper is an intercontinental-range, silo-based, solid propellant ballistic missile. It is currently the only truly modern missile defending the United States from foreign aggression.


From your source:


September 19, 2005 :: News
The gradual retirement of the American Peacekeeper ballistic missile, the most powerful land-based missile in our arsenal, came to an end with the formal ceremony today at Francis E. Warren Air Force base in Wyoming. The ceremony marks the conclusion of the missile’s deactivation. The Peacekeeper, which could carry up to ten independently targetable nuclear warheads, was designed and built in response to a considerable Soviet lead in offensive nuclear warheads, as a means to shore up the United States deterrent against a Soviet first strike attack.

missilethreat.com...


So very ironicly the only 'truly modern missile defending the United States , the'peacekeeper', has been'retired' while older missiles are being 'upgraded'. Does that make any sense under the assumption that America is growing stronger?

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The program began as the MX system in the late 1970s, as a way to increase the US counterstrike capabilities against the Soviet Union, which was focusing on hardened shelters and a highly capable missile defense.


Well all they had in terms of air defense in the late 1970's were the "easily overwhelmed" ( from some of your other sources) Moscow ABM system and Sa-2/5's ( S-300 in 1980) so i guess that issue has been decided then?

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The MX was designed with an advanced guidance system and a large number of warheads. It was the first US surface missile to use a cold- launch system, meaning it is ejected from the silo before the engine ignites, as the large size of the Peacekeeper prevents it from being launched out of Minuteman silos in the normal fashion.

missilethreat.com...


The actual reason for cold launching is to prevent the Silo from being damaged so it can be re-used ( reloading) as was done on large scale in the USSR at the time of the deployment of the MX in the US. As to the warheads the SS-18 carries 14( the so called mod 5 - actually the ss-26- may carry up to 28; "only the Russians know for sure") and all of larger yield.


The Warhead: Target Ratio and Other Details
The agreements-in-principle reached in and around the Washington summit of 1990 make sense only if one assumes that the party with which they were made is totally benevolent and would not dream of cheating or of using the situation created by the agreements to win a war.
Angelo Codevilla, Global Affairs, summer/fall 1990

In the draft START agreement, the Soviets have committed themselves to reducing their force of heavy missiles from 308 SS-18s to 154 SS-26s. (The latter has been hastily rebaptized the SS-18 Mod. 5 for cosmetic reasons-the accord bans new types of ICBMs.) How many warheads (lighter, more ac-curate, and more lethal warheads) can the SS-26 SS-18 Mod. 5 carry? Codevilla guesses 28; only the Soviets know for sure. (The SS-18 carries 14.)

www.oism.org...


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The Peacekeeper is the most advanced strategic asset developed by the United States. The system easily has the range to reach its primary targets in Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). With its Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads, powerful payload, extremely high accuracy, and modern penetration aids, the Peacekeeper is highly effective against multiple hardened targets, which is its main function.


And yet we do not know for sure how effective it would have been against a hardened silo ( empty at that) and even if they were all destroyed there were almost 800 - 1000 mobile ICMB's that were moving around and being reloaded. Deploying anything in a silo at this stage was rather pointless without effective anti missile defenses ( as the USSR/Russia had) if you would be unable to protect it to reload for the extended nuclear war the USSR were preparing to fight and win.


The SS-18 was deployed in modified SS-9 silos, and employed a cold-launch technique with the missile being ejected from the silo prior to main engine ignition. The rocket was placed in a transport-launch canister made of fiberglass composites. The container was placed into an adapted R-36 silo. The specially hardened silo was 39 meters deep and had a diameter of 5.9 m. Prior to main engine ignition the missile was ejected from the container with the help of a solid-propellant gas generator located in the lower unit of the transport-launch canister. According to Western estimates, the SS-18 was deployed in a silo with a hardness of at least 4,000 psi (281 kg/sq. cm; 287 bar), and possibly as high as 6,000 psi (422 kg/sq. cm; 430 bar).

www.fas.org...


Considering that the US silo's at the time were hardened to only 300 psi ( upgraded to 1700 -2000 psi by 1979) and with no active defenses in the form of ABM defenses their silo based forces were far more vulnerable than Soviet Silo's even assuming no active defenses. Pretending that the "Peacemaker" could have kept the peace in the absence of the USSR's plain interest in doing so, while completely disarming America by strategic blackmail in the form of disarmament talks, is a completely misrepresentation.

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The original 50 Peacekeeper missiles could theoretically destroy as many as 500 Soviet missile silos. However, the Soviet deployment of road mobile systems, missile submarines, and early warning radars would render such an attack futile. For this reason, it is likely that the Peacekeeper missiles were targeted at Soviet cities, in keeping with official US doctrine.


Continued...

[edit on 27-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:15 PM
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"In theory" in could prove many many strange things ( given people trust my judgement and ask no questions as this author hopes for) such as the fact that the USSR were deploying ground and space based lasers that could damage if not destroy American Sat's and ICBM's in transit. I could probably prove that they were changing America's weather system at will from at least the mid 80's and were exploding micro nukes to destroy grain silo's and dam's even earlier. If i had the authority this author thinks he has people would probably not ask questions as long as his audiance were Russian and happy to hear such things being said about the 'weak' enemy. Either way the Russians spent huge ammounts of resources to protect their civilian population against such attacks if that ever happened.


Consider the size and nature of the effort involved: In the mid-1970s U.S. intelligence satellites revealed massive underground constructions in Russia. According to Major General George Keegan, former chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence, there were "incredible photographs of civil defenses of all types going up all over the Soviet Union."

In the 39 largest cities of the former USSR every apartment house built after 1955 had a nuclear blast and fallout shelter built into the foundation. Every new factory also had a shelter system. Underneath Moscow there were 75 huge underground command posts, each one as large as the Pentagon. According to Gen. Keegan, these were protected from nuclear assault by four hundred feet of earth fill and a hundred feet of reinforced concrete. Huge storage containers were also detected by USAF intelligence These contained water and diesel fuel.

At present, Jastrow said, our deterrent rests primarily upon our Trident submarines.
Soviet attack could destroy submarines in port (about 2/3 of our force), and the 200
Soviet killer subs could probably stalk and destroy some of those that were on station.Because of difficulties in communications, about half the surviving submarines (maybe six)would launch their missiles.

laissez-fairerepublic.com...



This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).
Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.
The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.

www.piedmontcommunities.us...=page&GID=
01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575



Civil Defense
A dozen years ago, we studied in detail Soviet civil defenses in a number of cities. If we believe those cities are typical and extrapolate the amount of building they have done in the meantime, then according to these unproved assumptions, the Soviets now have good shelters for most of their city population.

Whether this extrapolation is right or not, I do not know. The CIA has either neglected its duty to find out, or has found out -- but not told us. Plans to protect millions of people cannot be considered secret information. We should know, and we have a right to know. We have done practically nothing about civil defense.

www.commonwealthclub.org...


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The Peacekeeper is deployed purely out of Minuteman missile silos, although it was originally planned to deploy another 50 in railcars. The missile can be launched within several minutes of a nuclear strike, has emergency airborne launch controllers, and is protected from nuclear strikes with its hardened silo and shock-protected launch canister.


So while the Russians went with mobility in all arms the Americans packed their "most dangerous weapons" in static silo's with NO admitted active defenses? Sounds like a dumb idea to me but the author decided to focus on the 'destructive power' IF they ever reached their intended targets. The current SS-18 force can still destroy ALL ( or very nearly) American silo's given you use the same basic data set the author seems to have chosen for deciding on destructive power of nuclear warheads.

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In the worst case scenario, only a handful of Peacekeeper missiles could do a tremendous amount of damage to an enemy nation, greatly increasing the risk of a failed first strike. Its high reliability and survivability makes it extremely effective as a counterstrike weapon. Its cold-launch system allows for a sustained nuclear conflict, as silos could be refurbished and reloaded with another missile.

missilethreat.com...


As i have pointed out so far the data set employed by the author has no bearing on current , or even cold war, realities and thus every theory he comes up with is highly suspect ( the few i did not debunk outright) as he must be aware of the alternate sets he chose not to use.


No nation would survive. Russia is not invulnerable and while the US is CURRENTLY more vulnerable still no one would win.


Continued ....

[edit on 27-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:18 PM
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Both nations might very well be destroyed ( nuclear war is certainly going to be more unpredictable than those before it; and they were) but looking at the data i have suggests to me that the USSR prepared to not only fight such a war but to come out the other side as a functioning state with it's labour force largely intact and able to provide itself the resources to fight a protracted war. People are always quick to point out how Russian civilians suffered, and how little resources were available for their use, but having looked at what was spent to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war the only thing i am surprised about is how they have kept it going to this day without more regular starvation and general misery. People in America and the world really have NO idea how much it took out of the USSR to do what it did with so much less.

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is expected to penetrate as much as 60 meters [200 feet] through 5,000 psi reinforced concrete. It will burrow 8 meters into the ground through 10,000 psi reinforced concrete. Northrop Grumman is working on with Boeing to develop this conventional bunker buster. They are under contract to Air Force Research Laboratory's Munitions Directorate at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
www.globalsecurity.org...

And how on earth do they plan to get those to the few countries that has such reinforced bunkers or ICBM silo's? The self same countries tend to have extensive air defense networks and those bombs are not going to glide 150 km even at high altitude where airplanes are unlikely to survive long or at all. Why is it not yet in service and what threats will the bomb carriers face when these weapons do make it onto the scene?

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In the Summer of 1991, a team of Los Alamos nuclear weapons scientists delivered a briefing to the Defense Science Board, provocatively titled "Potential Uses for Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order."


Why provocatively? Why should the US not prepare whatever weapons is required to fight and win when it's forced to?

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Shortly after Bill Clinton entered the White House, Representatives John Spratt (D-S.C.) and Elizabeth Furse (D-Ore.) introduced an attachment to the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, prohibiting U.S. weapons labs from conducting any research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons. The measure, which was passed and signed into law by President Clinton, defined low-yield nukes as having a yield of five kilotons or less.


Uping the effects ( by making it so large) it will have on the local populace is just another strategy to prevent America from prosecuting an attack effectively when required as they will sooner or later be.

*

Destroying a target buried 1,000 feet into rock would require a nuclear weapon with the yield of 100 kilotons. That is 10 times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.



The B61-11 officially replaced the B53, a nine-megatons thermonuclear bomb first deployed in 1962. The large yield could destroy facilities buried 750 feet (250 meters) underground.

www.nukestrat.com...


So what changed and how can 100 kiloton weapon suddenly do what a nine megaton weapon used to do considering how ineffective the RNEP turned out to be when it comes to penetrating ANYTHING?


Whether the drop tests prompted changes to the design is unknown, but DOE initiated two alterations to the B61-11 in 1998 (ALT 336) and 1999 (ALT 349. Moreover, in 2000 Sandia National Laboratories followed up with an inter-agency study of the penetration capability of the B61-11. One year later, in December 2001, the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review informed Congress that the capability of the B61-11 was inadequate and incapable of holding at risk some deep and hardened targets:

The B61-11 "cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets."

www.nukestrat.com...


*

Even the effects of a small bomb would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air. Detonating a similar weapon on the surface of a city would kill a quarter of a million people and injure hundreds of thousands more. www.globalsecurity.org...


If probably could kill 250 000 given they all stood outside, shoulder to shoulder, right under it with no protecting clothing and no generaly taking no precautions to protecting themselves. In that way i am sure this statistic could be proved 'accurate', somehow.


Some shelter designs have been proved capable
of withstanding overpressures of more than 300
psi. (An overpressure of 200 psi would be sustained
at a distance of about 0.5 miles from
ground zero of a 1 -megaton airburst . I 3 ) In Operation
Plumbbob (carried out in Nevada in 1957),
cylindrical structures of 10-gauge corrugated steel
and of concrete sewer pipe were buried at depths
of 1.5 to 3.0 m (5 to 10 ft). Pressures as high as
149 psi and radiation in excess of 100,000 rad were
experienced above ground (as would occur at
about 1 km or 0.6 mile from ground zero of a
1 -megaton airb~rst’~), but there was negligible
deformation of all of the shelters and negligible
radiation levels were recorded inside .45(p84)
Many varieties of expedient shelters were tested.
(Continued on next post)


Continued...



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:21 PM
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Originaaly posted by StellarXhis is the fiction that the USSR never subscribed to but did their best to make the USA believe.

In most cases i could include far more source material but given that you do not seem interested in dealing with what i do provide i would rather not spam more than i have to make a point.
You can't simply defend against all attacks.. after the attacks the air dfenses will be down and make shelters vulnerable to earth penetrating munitions. How long can you live in a shelter?? You can't live there forever. While ia gree nike x shouldn't've been taken out you won't save the country from being ravaged by nukes. And eventually you will run out of supllies and peopel in the shelters will die. With nike X's big warheads you''go blind.


The Soviets have a first strike arsenal: at least 5000 warheads of sufficient yield and
accuracy to destroy any US military target.
(Although the total number of US warheads is impressive, Jastrow pointed out that the
majority are carried by the "air-breathing" part of our strategic triad -- B-52s and
cruise missiles -- which would be unable to penetrate Soviet air defenses.)
At present, Jastrow said, our deterrent rests primarily upon our Trident submarines.
Soviet attack could destroy submarines in port (about 2/3 of our force), and the 200
Soviet killer subs could probably stalk and destroy some of those that were on station.
Because of difficulties in communications, about half the surviving submarines (maybe six)
would launch their missiles. A single submarine carries enough warheads to destroy the
200 largest Soviet cities.
breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare, could render the Tridents vulnerable to preemptive
destruction sometime in the next decade.
The US has 900 comparable warheads.
A
However, loss of their "cloak of invisibility,"
Is that why you provided a 1986 source not covering the latest US arsenal. You are speaking of conventiona alcm's





The ACM is a low-observable, air- launched, strategic missile with significant improvements over the ALCM-B in range, accuracy, and survivability. Armed with a W80 warhead, it is designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within any potential enemy's territory. The ACM is designed for B-52H external carriage.
www.fas.org...


I covered all claims in the cited part in my response to Westpoint ( just above) earlier so no reason to do that all again unless you state why you disagree with my responses&explanations.
There are many other sources concernign this even in some of the sources you rpovided. You blindly posted up the princeton.edu link.


I covered this exact quote in my response to Westpoint. Feel free to ask more specific questions but i exposed most of those claims as outright lies.
Even your own sources conflict with you. there are still gpas in coverage.


And the interceptor would still have to miss the missile heading for that Silo meaning 200 warheads going to waste beside any getting shot down. How many missiles do you fire at 100 interceptors if you want to destroy each Silo for certain? If such a strategy were truly in evidence then the Moscow ABM system would have payed for itself rather well. In fact look at what your quoted source page also mentions.
The interceptor will not fend off al attacks no matter how many interceptors you arm. Pretty soon the radars won't be standing.


The Us might thus have to spend up to 400 Minuteman III's warheads out of a 1000 odd( current force levels) to overwhelm Moscow? Is that not success in terms of ICBM's required considering that everyone in Moscow would be in shelters under the city protected from the fallout effects? I would call a ABM system that requires almost half my enemies ICBM forces to destroy QUITE EFFECTIVE. Back in the day there were obviously far more warheads available but i think you will soon understand where i am coming from when i claim that ABM's ARE effective in that they create the sort of uncertainty that requires overkill to negate.
Your other radars will eb crippled by EMP. O ahigh yield warhead for example detonated over the US would fry all electroniucs ovcer the continental US.



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:26 PM
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people were not aware of the awesome destructive
potential of a single bomb, and the air raid
alarms were not maintained upon the approach
of the airplane that was carrying it. In Nagasaki,
investigations showed that scarcely any of the
approximately 400 persons who were in tunnel
shelters at the time of the attack received burns
or serious injuries. This fact gives credibility to
the estimate that 30% of the deaths and injuries
could have been averted had the tunnel shelters
been filled to their rated ~apacity.~~(p~) Carefully
built shelters, though unoccupied, stood up well
in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 28(P237)
At Hiroshima, persons who were in buildings of
better construction had a fair chance of survival.
Between 0.5 and 1.25 km from ground zero,
where casualties in the open ranged from 90% to
loo%, the casualties in buildings varied with the
degree of structural damage (among other factors).
In buildings sustaining light damage, 51 % of the
occupants escaped injury. 13(p547)

www.oism.org...



Myth: In the worst-hit parts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki where all buildings were demolished, everyone was killed by blast, radiation, or fire.

° Facts: In Nagasaki, some people survived uninjured who were far inside tunnel shelters built for conventional air raids and located as
close as one-third mile from ground zero (the point directly below the explosion). This was true even though these long, large shelters
lacked blast doors and were deep inside the zone within which all buildings were destroyed. (People far inside long, large, open shelters are
better protected than are those inside small, open shelters.)

Many earth-covered family shelters were essentially undamaged in areas where blast and fire destroyed all buildings. Figure 1.5 shows a
typical earth covered, backyard family shelter with a crude wooden frame. This shelter was essentially undamaged, although less than 100
yards from ground zero at Nagasaki.4 The calculated maximum overpressure (pressure above the normal air pressure) was about 65 pounds per
square inch (65 psi). Persons inside so small a shelter without a blast doorwould have been killed by blast pressure at this distance from
the explosion. However, in a recent blast test,5 an earth-covered, expedient Small-Pole Shelter equipped with blast doors was undamaged at 53
psi. The pressure rise inside was slight not even enough to have damaged occupants' eardrums. If poles are available, field tests have
indicated that many families can build such shelters in a few days.

The great life-saving potential of blast-protective shelters has been proven in war and confirmed by blast tests and calculations. For
example, the area in which the air bursting of a 1-megaton weapon would wreck a 50-psi shelter with blast doors in about 2.7 square miles.
Within this roughly circular area, practically all them occupants of wrecked shelters would be killed by blast, carbon monoxide from fires,
or radiation. The same blast effects would kill most people who were using basements affording 5 psi protection, over an area of about 58 square miles.6

www.oism.org...


Your choice of sources proves that you will believe anything, as long as it suits you, given your basic ignorance of the topic matter.

Stellar


[edit on 27-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 02:32 PM
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The SA 5B will not be standing for long. Nuclear interceptors have their own disadvantages. the polaris si old. The D-5 is the newest.


The author is either very ignorant or aiming to deceive his audiance as he forgets to mention a great many things including hundreds of Sam/ABM batteries and their thousands of missiles that makes a strategic attack on even the few hundred remaining Silo based ICBM's a very uncertain thing. As the last few pages worth of sources should indicate the Russians defense is currently so extensive that their offensive forces may not have to perform very well to not only survive the initial exchange but keep firing till their reloads run out. The US has NO declared defense ( i think they do but that is another topic entirely) against such a Russian counter strike even if they had reloadable silo's to keep on fighting.
You won't be able to use all those interceptors. Not to mention not all are nuclear armed. Nuclear tipped one's have thier own disadvantages.


Why should the pentagon spend so much time trying to please the Russians with limiting American defenses when the Russians are so 'weak' themselves? Did the Russians not 'lose' the cold war and if so why are their defensive and offensive nuclear forces still stronger to this day? Is the 'weaker' party normally stronger in terms of the damage he can inflict on you? If the US government went ahead with a national missile defense program in the early 90's to protect America from even a full scale nuclear attack ( meaning saving at few tens of millions of American lives at least ) one could have argued that America were in fact stronger but all they have done is negotiate and appease the apparent stronger party while that party designs and deploys ever newer and more deadly weapons. It can in fact be shown that they have helped pay for the deployment of those newer systems by helping to pay for 'dismantling' ( whatever that really means) older Russian weapons and nuclear weapons.
Surviving a fulls cale attack is not possible nulcear warheads will go through and yourdefenses will be destroyed int he process ny EMP airbursts. Once that's done BLU which can penetrate any shelter will kill off the poplulation in bunkers and anyways you can't live in a bunker forever.


I find it strange that it's so 'essential' we talk about a American defensive system , that does not exsist , instead of talking about the existing massive Russian one. I assume the author would much rather we indulge ourselves in possibilities than realities when it comes to the defense of America?
there's no use pretending it will not exist.



The Us might thus have to spend up to 400 Minuteman III's warheads out of a 1000 odd( current force levels) to overwhelm Moscow? Is that not success in terms of ICBM's required considering that everyone in Moscow would be in shelters under the city protected from the fallout effects? I would call a ABM system that requires almost half my enemies ICBM forces to destroy QUITE EFFECTIVE. Back in the day there were obviously far more warheads available but i think you will soon understand where i am coming from when i claim that ABM's ARE effective in that they create the sort of uncertainty that requires overkill to negate.
600 is still alot and after EMP has fired everything the aircraft can come and drop BLU which penetrate 5000psi to take out the bunkers. You can't live underground forever you will run out of supllies.


hey wanted to win and they were doing what it took ( at the cost of the civilian economy) to do so when forced into a fight.
wanting and achieving are 2 different things.


The author is either very ignorant or aiming to deceive his audiance as he forgets to mention a great many things including hundreds of Sam/ABM batteries and their thousands of missiles that makes a strategic attack on even the few hundred remaining Silo based ICBM's a very uncertain thing. As the last few pages worth of sources should indicate the Russians defense is currently so extensive that their offensive forces may not have to perform very well to not only survive the initial exchange but keep firing till their reloads run out. The US has NO declared defense ( i think they do but that is another topic entirely) against such a Russian counter strike even if they had reloadable silo's to keep on fighting.
Who ever said anything about taking out silo's. It will be ACM 129's and you are not taking into account how emp will fry your radars. The CDI source is a first strike and using surprise mass attack to overwhelm defenses. You can't stop too amny and a few nuke airbursts wil fry your radars. Thencomes the next wave of which you will be helpless.



[edit on 27-5-2006 by urmomma158]



posted on May, 27 2006 @ 03:01 PM
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So very ironicly the only 'truly modern missile defending the United States , the'peacekeeper', has been'retired' while older missiles are being 'upgraded'. Does that make any sense under the assumption that America is growing stronger?
Only pointing out that the US ahd the capability to decimate Russia nd overwhelm defenses.


And yet we do not know for sure how effective it would have been against a hardened silo ( empty at that) and even if they were all destroyed there were almost 800 - 1000 mobile ICMB's that were moving around and being reloaded. Deploying anything in a silo at this stage was rather pointless without effective anti missile defenses ( as the USSR/Russia had) if you would be unable to protect it to reload for the extended nuclear war the USSR were preparing to fight and win.
Pretty soon we will bge able to defend them


As i have pointed out so far the data set employed by the author has no bearing on current , or even cold war, realities and thus every theory he comes up with is highly suspect ( the few i did not debunk outright) as he must be aware of the alternate sets he chose not to use.
you're still using the same type of warheads which gies you the same disadvantages.


Both nations might very well be destroyed ( nuclear war is certainly going to be more unpredictable than those before it; and they were) but looking at the data i have suggests to me that the USSR prepared to not only fight such a war but to come out the other side as a functioning state with it's labour force largely intact and able to provide itself the resources to fight a protracted war. People are always quick to point out how Russian civilians suffered, and how little resources were available for their use, but having looked at what was spent to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war the only thing i am surprised about is how they have kept it going to this day without more regular starvation and general misery. People in America and the world really have NO idea how much it took out of the USSR to do what it did with so much less.
You just contradicted yourself in the same paragraph.



And how on earth do they plan to get those to the few countries that has such reinforced bunkers or ICBM silo's? The self same countries tend to have extensive air defense networks and those bombs are not going to glide 150 km even at high altitude where airplanes are unlikely to survive long or at all. Why is it not yet in service and what threats will the bomb carriers face when these weapons do make it onto the scene?
with all those nuke bursts during the nuke attack(they will come in waves) Your radar's wont be there not to mention you will be able to use aircraft like the F 117 and B-2 to penetrate defenses and standoff jameers .


So what changed and how can 100 kiloton weapon suddenly do what a nine megaton weapon used to do considering how ineffective the RNEP turned out to be when it comes to penetrating ANYTHING?
It burrows first and then detonates. By detonating something at the surface you won't penetrate as much and RNEP is nothing compared to the BLU.


f probably could kill 250 000 given they all stood outside, shoulder to shoulder, right under it with no protecting clothing and no generaly taking no precautions to protecting themselves. In that way i am sure this statistic could be proved 'accurate', somehow.
ypu're talking about killing them outside with a weapon used for underground detonations!?!?!? ps...BLU



posted on May, 29 2006 @ 11:46 AM
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In 1966, the Soviet Union conducted state trials of the S-200 system. Sources indicate that the initial missile did not meet its stated specifications: for instance, its original range on paper was 200 kilometers, although in reality it was only effective up to 160 kilometers. Nevertheless, Moscow still considered the missile a vital part of its defensive architecture, and made the system operational. The S-200 began its initial deployment in 1967. .....In 1975, the Soviets completed an upgrade of the S-200, which featured a longer range of 250 kilometers and a modernized fire-control radar. The Soviets hoped that the upgraded S-200 would be able to engage short-range attack missiles in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. These attempts failed. Nevertheless, the system was deployed in large numbers during the late 1970s and the early 1980s.(3) By the mid-1980s, 130 sites and 1,950 launchers were operational.

missilethreat.com...

Funny how even test results go bad. Even the Patriot which you criticize did well in tests with PAC 3 interceptors.


Maximum target speed 4300 kph. One missile per launch vehicle. Western sources mixed this missile up with the Dal system, later code-named Gammon, with lateral boosters. Vega/Dubna code names used as well.
www.astronautix.com... You claim it's a highly inproved version of the V 1000 yet it only intercepts targets of 4300kmph which is slower than the V 1000 ?????


But the lie about the Soviet "military superiority" . . . is not just the biggest but also the most dangerous lie of our time. . . . It is the biggest lie not only because it is often based on exaggerations, false figures, and pure concoctions, but also because it ignores some major politicogeographic realities. . . . [It] is . . . also . . . the most dangerous lie of our time . . . for at present it is virtually the only rationale for the arms race. This lie is also dangerous because it poisons the political atmosphere and sows fears, hostility, and distrust. . . . Thus, since this real situation is so rudely and persistently distorted, the motives can be only sinister. Is it not logical to assume so?
www.is.wayne.edu...



It turns out many of those weapons never existed. Declassified CIA estimates of Soviet military power suggest the Defense Department's fears were caused by a phantom arsenal of nonexistent weapons. One example: The much-feared improved T-80 tank never existed. It appears analysts mistook an outmoded T-72 retrofitted with armored fabric side skirts for a new weapon.

In fact, the Soviets weren't even maintaining the weapons they did have. At a press conference late last year, Gen. Eugene Habiger, top commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, acknowledged that during the 1980s "the Russians weren't modernizing their forces as we were." As a result, "The service life of their systems is coming to an end."
www.popularmechanics.com...



* USSR\Russia, was originally deployed with the ZA-PVO in the strategic air defence role. It was phased out starting in the 1980s and completely gone by around 2001.
* Ukraine retained a number of sites after the breakup of the USSR.
* Libya has approx. 6 S-200 battalions.
* North Korea has approx. 4 S-200 battalions.
* Poland has approx. 3 S-200 battalions.
* Syria has approx. 4 S-200 battalions.
* Iran has about 10 Launchers.
* Bulgaria has 1 S-200 battalion.
* Other users include the Czech Republic, India, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Uzbekistan.
en.wikipedia.org...

Did you know they were very vulnerable to the US SRAM.


The ABM Treaty did not ban all antiballistic missile systems. It permitted the research, development, and limited deployment of ground-based ABM systems. As signed in 1972, the two sides were permitted two operational ABM sites, each with 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles, with associated radar, storage, and test facilities. A 1974 amendment reduced the number of permitted operational ABM sites to one per side. The deployments were limited to ground-based ABM systems, which were the technological approach of the time and included fixed ground-based launchers, ground-launched interceptor missiles, and associated ground-based radars. Deployment of ABM systems based on "other physical principles" and including constituent parts capable of substituting for these ground-based ABM components was to be subject to discussion and agreement by the parties. Development, testing, or deployment of sea-, air-, or space-based, or mobile land-based systems were all banned.
www.fas.org...
Most of the Double digit SAMS are TMD's not ICBM defenses.





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posted on May, 29 2006 @ 12:13 PM
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Although U.S. offensive capabilities have changed considerably since 1989 with the advent of the Peacekeeper ICBM and Trident II D5 SLBM, the basic ABM mission remains the same: to destroy the ABM system and then the Russian leadership targets in Moscow, and to ensure penetration of the main ICBM force against Russian silos to the south and east.

In the late 1990s, the effects of the Soviet Union's demise reduced Russian ABM capabilities. The Skrunda radar closed in 1998, leaving a significant gap in Russia's ability to detect submarine missiles launched in shallow trajectories.
www.thebulletin.org...

The US's defense supression has increased since the 80's.


The same year, signs began to emerge that the Soviet ABM system was undergoing a more fundamental change--replacement of some or all of the nuclear warheads with conventional warheads. In February 1998, the commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces said that the system needed some minor modifications, but that the "nuclear umbrella" over Moscow would once again be opened. A few days later, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, commander in chief of strategic missile forces, suddenly declared that the ABM system, with conventional warheads on the Gorgon and Gazelle interceptors, was combat-ready and would be placed on 24-hour alert status.
www.thebulletin.org...


Target
Weapon* Type Weapon No. Warhead Type Warhead Yield (kt) Total Warheads Total Yield (kt)
Moscow system
Cat House radar Trident I C4 1 W76 100 2 200
Dog House radar Trident I C4 1 W76 100 2 200
4 Gorgon launch complexes Minuteman III 32 W78 335 64 21,440
4 Gazelle launch complexes Minuteman III 68 W78 335 136 45,560
Subtotal
102

204 67,400
Early warning radars**
Hen House radar (Olenegorsk) Trident I C4 1 W76 100 2 200
LPAR radar (Skrunda) Trident I C4 1 W76 100 2 200
LPAR radar (Baranovichi) Trident I C4 1 W76 100 2 200
Subtotal
3

6 600
Total
105

210 68,000
kt=kilotons. *We assume each Gorgon launch complex was targeted by eight Minuteman III missiles, each carrying two 335-kiloton W78 warheads; that each Gazelle complex was targeted by nine Minuteman III missiles, also each carrying two W78s; and that each Trident was downloaded to at least two warheads. Both Moscow radars could also be targeted by warheads from a single missile. **The LPAR and Pillbox radars at Pechora and Moscow, respectively, were under construction in 1989, and would later be targeted as well.
www.thebulletin.org... 2109(105 missiles) waheads for the radars and 100 interceptors. (That's about a missile for a missile and the Minuteman has only 2-3 waheads).

en.wikipedia.org... (using a 20mt bomb)



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posted on May, 29 2006 @ 03:20 PM
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In a number of ways, the Mickelsen facility was a technological marvel. The 80-foot-tall truncated pyramid that housed the antennas for the MSR dominated the flat landscape around the town of Nekoma. The structure's four-foot-thick concrete walls were sloped at a 35-degree angle to provide hardening against the effects of nuclear blast. Each sloping surface of the pyramid held a radar antenna that was 13 feet in diameter and contained five thousand phased-array elements.
www.globalsecurity.org...
Although the radars are hardened the antenna's T/R modules are still vulnerable. Just because it's hardened doesn't make it invulnerable to nuclear detonations and only against a certain level of yield.In space there is no air and you have to rely on it's x ray effects which still cause nuclear effects. When faced with a mass attack you will go blind(especially with all those MIRV's ) Not to mention MIRV's are hardened from nuclear effects .......

SAFEGUARD's "technical sweetness" was overshadowed by its limitations. With only one hundred missiles, the system could provide only limited protection to the ICBMs near Grand Forks and supply some measure of protection to the central United States against an accidental launch or a light ICBM attack. Moreover, SAFEGUARD was not the optimum system for the point defense of hard targets. It started out as the SENTINEL project, which was supposed to provide nationwide protection against a light ICBM attack. When President Nixon shifted the emphasis of the program to defending ICBM fields, the United States wound up using an area defense system for a point defense mission. The area defense concept involved the use of the large, powerful long-range radar systems that were hallmarks of the Mickelsen complex. In addition to being subject to blackout caused by the detonation of nuclear warheads, these radar systems could be attacked directly. Once they were destroyed, the SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles were electronically blind and therefore useless.
www.globalsecurity.org...

Wheni said they didn't work I meant that they were no pancea towards Nukes since many would still go through and cause havoc. That's why hit to kill was conceived so you neutralize nuclear effects from affecting your own radars. No NMD method is completely effective . They all have their own disadvantages.

Although some were political osme obvious one's were technicla/technolical

It seems strange that the US Congress voted to shut the system down after it had been operational for barely 24 hours. The were many reasons why it was done. Many were political, and some were technological. It had been known for many years, that the system could be overwhelmed by the Soviets if they used multiple warheads on their missiles - the Soviets were arming their missiles with MIRVs. It was also felt that the huge radars were very vulnerable to attack and represented a critical failure point of the system, even though they had been designed with highly redundant systems and hardened against nuclear attack. Although these were well known problems with the Safeguard system, and all other systems before that, Congress just lost the ability to continue to support it.
www.paineless.id.au...


However, only days after the North Dakota site became operational, the House of Representatives voted to close it and end all ABM programs. This decision was prompted by scientific testimony that the ABM systems in development were not technologically sophisticated enough to defend against incoming ICBMs, as well as the fact that the Soviets’ fielding of multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads increased the number of warheads carried by each ICBM and presented an arsenal that could easily overwhelm any foreseeable ABM system. Further, the Safeguard interceptor missiles employed nuclear warheads that would destroy the target missile by exploding within range of the blast radius. This defense proved counterproductive as the electro-magnetic pulse from the explosion blinded the tracking radars on the ground. To address this problem, the Army began research on destroying incoming missiles through collision, or hit-to-kill, technology.
www.basicint.org...

In my previous post i meant 210 , I put the nine there by accident.

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posted on Jun, 1 2006 @ 03:09 PM
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Well i am taking a vacation from ATS and the information i provided should be enough to come to the logical conclusion if one understands the English language and is generally interested in discovering 'the truth'.

I appreciate the fact that your willing to spend time trying to disagree with the information I provided ( well every 5th or 10th fact at least; well done) but i think that has more to do with how you feel about me than with any errors i made. I think you should take a step back ,finally read ALL the material on ALL the source pages i provided, and consider the nature of your 'arguments' as they are clearly weak and do nothing to refute the volume and general integrity and colour of the 'picture' i painted.

At some future date ( when you have grown up&wiser) i might address the few new claims you make but your last two post just restates your opinions after i proved them to be based in ignorance. Avoiding the mass of the source material to attack a few points should suggest to you that your more likely wrong in general than right in general and until you are willing to contest the majority of the claims ( with good source material meaning no sources working for disarmament organizations) i am not going to take your meager efforts seriously. Spite does not impress me.

Stellar



posted on Jun, 1 2006 @ 04:19 PM
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^^^^^^I do agree with some points but not all even after reading all the sources. You have made some errors and so have I. The picture you painted has been weakened. How is Globalsecurity a disarmnament organization(you use it as well)???? I haven't avoided anything in your sources just pointing out some mistkaes in your overalll interpretation of things and sources. Some of the source material you posted was rather weak on some points and even contradicted yourself. No hard feleings,I don't have a problem with you just your mistakes. None of your sources have made specific counter claims and even the sources you provided don't agree with you. I have seen this on other threads as well. The Us already has it's hands on many double digit sams acquired from illegal channels and we have some nice info from the Israeli's. For now the US is vulnerable but soon it won't be, it will have it's own defense and everything will be datalinked for targeting. Your article stated that if you datalink it with high performance radars you can intercept. Anyways in certain scenarios the early warning radar's wont be there to help the sams.

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posted on Jun, 2 2006 @ 08:54 AM
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Wow- you guys have really put up ap huge fight. Should be in the debate forum, but whatever. I have NOT read all those posts because I have neither the time nor the mental stability, so if any points I make are redundant that is why. Think of this tactically. If you were a commander and you were forced to launch nuclear missiles at well-defended areas such as Moscow (as was previously detailed) then here are a few things you might throw in that, while simple, are very effective tactics.

Decoy missiles: Who says all the 'heads have to hold nuclear warfare? A few with traditiional explosives or even nothing would suffice to draw off attackers. Launch the decoys first and let the enemy expend themselves, or launch them at the same time. This tactic was tried and proven particularly in World War II on D-Day and other battles with paratroopers. They would drop dummy paratroopers to draw enemy fire and to confuse the enemy. Nuke-Nothing. It all looks the same balled up into missile form.

Non-primary targets-There was a large column above concerning the attack of Moscow, stating statistics like it would take 400 missiles out of the 1000 to overwhelm defenses and so forth. What this fails to detail is that destroying a capital is not nececssarily going to win the war. You have to blow up the rest of the country's defenses. Germany made it to Moscow-that changed pretty quick. What I'm saying here is that expending missiles on one target may not be the greatest of strategic options because you have to take down other target which, while secondary, may have important purposes. EXAMPLE:Nuke-building factory. Uranium mines. Power Plants, and so forth.

Wartime Manufacturing-The second total war breaks out everything goes into it. Which means factories are gonna start building planes, tanks, and nukes. So the statistics above stating that "there will be x many missiles needed to take out, so only y will be left," is not entirely accurate. Think of the bombs made during the Manhattan project. These were not as big as the ones we have now, but they didn't need to be. They did the job. And if we needed to (or others as the case may be) we could build more warheads and arm them in a matter of time. If worst came to worse, screw the delivery ICBM and mount it on a good, old-fashioned airplane. B-52 Buff, B-2 Spirit, B-1 Lancer, it's all good.As long as the warhead gets there and lands, things go boom. Things can be built during wartime, and while they may not be in the first attack, they will be there when they are needed.



posted on Jun, 2 2006 @ 08:54 AM
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Wow- you guys have really put up ap huge fight. Should be in the debate forum, but whatever. I have NOT read all those posts because I have neither the time nor the mental stability, so if any points I make are redundant that is why. Think of this tactically. If you were a commander and you were forced to launch nuclear missiles at well-defended areas such as Moscow (as was previously detailed) then here are a few things you might throw in that, while simple, are very effective tactics.

Decoy missiles: Who says all the 'heads have to hold nuclear warfare? A few with traditiional explosives or even nothing would suffice to draw off attackers. Launch the decoys first and let the enemy expend themselves, or launch them at the same time. This tactic was tried and proven particularly in World War II on D-Day and other battles with paratroopers. They would drop dummy paratroopers to draw enemy fire and to confuse the enemy. Nuke-Nothing. It all looks the same balled up into missile form.

Non-primary targets-There was a large column above concerning the attack of Moscow, stating statistics like it would take 400 missiles out of the 1000 to overwhelm defenses and so forth. What this fails to detail is that destroying a capital is not nececssarily going to win the war. You have to blow up the rest of the country's defenses. Germany made it to Moscow-that changed pretty quick. What I'm saying here is that expending missiles on one target may not be the greatest of strategic options because you have to take down other target which, while secondary, may have important purposes. EXAMPLE:Nuke-building factory. Uranium mines. Power Plants, and so forth.

Wartime Manufacturing-The second total war breaks out everything goes into it. Which means factories are gonna start building planes, tanks, and nukes. So the statistics above stating that "there will be x many missiles needed to take out, so only y will be left," is not entirely accurate. Think of the bombs made during the Manhattan project. These were not as big as the ones we have now, but they didn't need to be. They did the job. And if we needed to (or others as the case may be) we could build more warheads and arm them in a matter of time. If worst came to worse, screw the delivery ICBM and mount it on a good, old-fashioned airplane. B-52 Buff, B-2 Spirit, B-1 Lancer, it's all good.As long as the warhead gets there and lands, things go boom. Things can be built during wartime, and while they may not be in the first attack, they will be there when they are needed.



posted on Jun, 2 2006 @ 11:40 AM
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^^^^Thats just what im saying. It all depends on how you carry out the attack and what options are available to you..



posted on Jun, 6 2006 @ 09:29 PM
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Somehow I really don't think that Russia would try that besides the Tupolev is definately NOT stealthy. They need to make them selves look good because many nations are looking at Russia being the former strong man and they do need that appeal. However do not underestimate Russia. She could be a formidable enemy if provoked. If she's pushed into a corner she'll come out swinging. Count on it. Not that I think Russia wouldn't do that incursion (if they really did) Believe me there's enough advanced radar that can pick up bugs on radar. SO somehow I rather doubt they did. I'd be very interested if they really did and with what technology.



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