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Russians claim bomber flights over US territory went undetected

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posted on May, 17 2006 @ 09:06 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX
If you want to impress me, or generally make your point and show up my ignorance, i would like a independent source stating that the US is current flying drones over Iranian strategic locations or even over large tracts of Iranian land.


Not that I care about impressing you, but the challenge to deny ignorance was tempting. How about the Iranians, is the horses mouth enough?


Iran's intelligence chief accused the U.S. of flying unmanned drones over Iranian territory to gather intelligence on the country's nuclear sites, echoing reports by U.S. news agencies in recent days that such flights are happening.

WALL STREET JOURNAL 17 FEB 05


Is a few months current enough?
Perhaps more details such as this would help settle matters;


Q: Just to clean something up, can you definitively say from the podium that the U.S. military is not operating reconnaissance missions over Iran with unmanned Predator drones?

MR. DI RITA: I can. I mean, I don't know you if you've got anything you want to add to that -- (laughter) -- but it's not happening.

Q: You know that Iran is out now publicly saying that they're seeing these drones. They say it's a U.S. military operation.

MR. DI RITA: I would consider the source and leave it at that. I mean, I'm telling you that we're not doing those kinds of activities, and to the best of everybody's ability to try and determine who might be across the government, we've been able to satisfactorily convince ourselves that it's not going on out of this department, I mean -- or -- and it's not meant to imply it is anywhere else, either, I mean. But it's not for me to speak for other departments. It is our belief that it's not happening elsewhere, either. Just not happening.

Q: Just to clarify, is the U.S. government flying any aircraft over Iran for any reason?

MR. DI RITA: Not to my knowledge. And let me just be very careful -- and I'm not trying to be clever here. I don't speak for the U.S. government, I speak for the Department of Defense, and the Department of Defense is not. And I would welcome you asking that same question for other agencies of the government that do those kinds of activities, and I think that they would give you the same answer. But it's not for me to speak for other agencies.

Q: But one would think you would have the knowledge if another agency in government was flying over Iran?

MR. DI RITA: I would not think that. But I'm telling you, nothing I'm saying here is left -- meant to leave any other impression but that it's not happening out of this department; to the best of our knowledge, it isn't happening period. So --

Q: Are you trying to de-conflict the air space?

U.S. Department of Defense


Hmm, typical statement isn't it. For a deflective stance that is, denial is often said in loose terms so as to not openly confirm or deny. Word game, read between the lines.




posted on May, 18 2006 @ 01:18 PM
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Originally posted by urmomma158
^^^^^^ Once again more rhetoric.


Meaning information that you can not make sense of due to your own general ignorance? I could use simpler English words if you like but i can hardly teach you all you do not know any time soon. I would really appreciate if you could stop making your general lack of comprehension MY problem.


Why do you constantly deny the facts presented to you.


Because when i do it is not facts however much you insist that you would like them to be?


Some of what you post is utter BS and your intent to cover up what you do not know.


Everyone makes mistakes, and i am sure i must be getting at least something wrong, but compared to what you consider 'fact' and 'evidence' i am not at ALL worried that i am the one in error when responding to your meandering misrepresentations of the few facts that you are actually aware of.

Now i can , and have in very many instances, back everything i say with the 'evidence' you never manage on your own so feel free to point out the 'BS' you so frequently accuse me of typing.

Stellar



posted on May, 18 2006 @ 02:37 PM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
Quite frankly we don’t, and cannot know, unless further information is released.


We know that they managed to fly over an American carrier, without much being done to stop them, so why doubt that they can manage the same stunt in other areas of the world?


As far as I’m aware the Russians have not offered any proof beyond their claim concerning this incident, and the USAF has not shown any evidence to dispute the claims.


Well why would they want to offer more proof than letting the story reach 'Ria' Novosti? Why would the US administration want to let American citizens know how vulnerable they are to attack by a foreign power who can actually destroy the American way of life; something OBL/North Korea/China/Iraq could never EVER manage? It's a giant shell game to distract Americans from the real dangers that they are faced with.


Hence our predicament. We can argue about which scenario is more likely and why, but when it comes down to it, we simply don't know what happened.


Well you may not know what to make of it but having seen&read what i have i see no reason to doubt these claims.


Past precedents and public information can only get us so far.


If you do not want to get very far towards understanding the situation then there are a dozen ways to prevent yourself, yes.


Since I’m posting I might as well address one or two points. Stellar, if my sources are wrong, or false, then please feel free to correct me.


I just though i would give you a chance to evaluate what you said based on the additional information i provided but i guess you believe you got it right the first time; somehow.


I can say without hesitation that I do not have any bravado which will inhibit me from accepting (is shown) that my sources and views are wrong.


That is not what your record reflects imo..


Until then you should know that I care little about your comments toward me or my information.


I could see you that you did not care for what i had to say from the start and hence my efforts to give you time to rethink your arrogance.

Stellar

Edit : will respond in full to first post soonish.

[edit on 18-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 18 2006 @ 05:01 PM
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StellarX, I don't belive their radars are in good shape.

cisac.stanford.edu...
commdocs.house.gov...
www.cdi.org...
www.fas.org...
www.rachel.org...
cndyorks.gn.apc.org...

Their radrs are in bad shape please provide me with conflicting info please thank you.


[edit on 18-5-2006 by urmomma158]



posted on May, 18 2006 @ 05:40 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX
We know that they managed to fly over an American carrier, without much being done to stop them, so why doubt that they can manage the same stunt in other areas of the world?


Apples and oranges, which do you prefer? The claim here is that they were not detected by the radar and systems responsible for whatever area they allegedly flew over. Again, you may think you know what happened, and whether you want to admit it or not is irrelevant because the fact still remains that as it stand now you cannot defiantly prove that these claims are true. Like I said previously, past precedents only go so far.

I don't know why your being so sore about this topic, as if I am not allowed to question or present material which is contradictive of the almighty Stellar, oh boy... One more thing, contrary to your assertions, I am not the one throwing jabs and insults toward other members, nor am I the one doing the ‘attacking’.



posted on May, 18 2006 @ 06:16 PM
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Originally posted by urmomma158
StellarX, I don't belive their radars are in good shape.


Would that be the early warning kind of radars or the hundreds, if not thousands, of Sam radars? I never suggested everything was perfectly well with their old early warning radar networks but that the claims of it's demise was much inflated to start with EVEN IF they probably no longer need it anyways.


Their radrs are in bad shape please provide me with conflicting info please thank you.


[edit on 18-5-2006 by urmomma158]


I am not going to play your game by defending something i never said. I suggest you concentrate on what i said if you want to 'attack' me ( which is clearly your goal regardless of my arguments or positions).

What i suggested by my statements so far is that the Russian are clearly not much worried about early warning ( they either have as much as they want or do not fear an American attack at all) as they keep upgrading their nuclear forces anyways. Would it really make sense to deploy all those ABM system S-300 varieties and nuclear missiles if they were afraid or worried that they would not get enough time to defend themselves? My point was never that their early warning was VERY GOOD but that it's current state was apparently good enough however bad some Russian sources ( all with disarming America in mind) and their Western lackeys wants to convince us it is. If Americans disarm due to the perception ( that the Russian love helping to create) that the Russians can not defend themselves against an American attack of any size the joke will certainly be on America in the long run. Don't be fooled when a sworn enemy feigns weakness.

Stellar



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 11:18 AM
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Originally posted by StellarX
Don't be fooled when a sworn enemy feigns weakness.


Am I to assume that this is applicable to the topic at hand? You know, the one which the Russians claimed happened.



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 12:27 PM
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Originally posted by StellarX
Would that be the early warning kind of radars or the hundreds, if not thousands, of Sam radars? I never suggested everything was perfectly well with their old early warning radar networks but that the claims of it's demise was much inflated to start with EVEN IF they probably no longer need it anyways.
The very large early warning radars which scan at thousands of miles not the sam radars. Please show me that the claims are inflated. It's not demised, they make identification mistakes and is not getting any better. If you didn't know what was going on you have wasted thy time.



I am not going to play your game by defending something i never said. I suggest you concentrate on what i said if you want to 'attack' me ( which is clearly your goal regardless of my arguments or positions).

What i suggested by my statements so far is that the Russian are clearly not much worried about early warning ( they either have as much as they want or do not fear an American attack at all) as they keep upgrading their nuclear forces anyways. Would it really make sense to deploy all those ABM system S-300 varieties and nuclear missiles if they were afraid or worried that they would not get enough time to defend themselves? My point was never that their early warning was VERY GOOD but that it's current state was apparently good enough however bad some Russian sources ( all with disarming America in mind) and their Western lackeys wants to convince us it is. If Americans disarm due to the perception ( that the Russian love helping to create) that the Russians can not defend themselves against an American attack of any size the joke will certainly be on America in the long run. Don't be fooled when a sworn enemy feigns weakness.

Stellar
Nuclear forces dont mean anything in defednding yourself in a nuclear attack unless you're talking of intercepting a nuke with a nuke(which barely works). Again please show me conflicting information which you have not provided yet. Well there has been proof of this so called weakness since the Russian EW radars misidentify targets and are not getting any better. Their S300 batteries are unproven in combat. We do not know how they will perform and unless you're joking EW radars are needed. Well if Russia already delpoyed all those ABM systems and they found a problem in their Ew radars after being deployed they're pretty much stuck with them. Im not saying the ABM systems won't work. Plus how are the issues of EW radars and their ABM systesm related they can still intercept but it's significantly weakended. You were the one claiming the sources we're lying and now you're saying they're simply overinflated,if there's on thing you're good at it's avoiding comments and sweeping us away from the real issue with your rhetoric.


[edit on 19-5-2006 by urmomma158]



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 01:33 PM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
Am I to assume that this is applicable to the topic at hand?


Well if you took time out to think about it ( some need more than others) you would have realised that it did as this event got very little press in the West but serve to tell Russians and others what their government can do when it needs&wants to. The Russian government are quite adamant that they can defend themselves against all threats but strangely so many Russian academies and groups inside Russia proclaim very loudly that Russia can not do so at all. These groups are all pressing for disarmament and strangely America always seems to 'lose' when such treaties are signed.


However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).

www.jinsa.org...


And they still control the entire process and the propaganda that ensures that Russia looks suitable 'weak' in western eyes so that they can lie about their true strenght without the Western public catching on.


The event began with Gen. Charles Horner, retired head of the U.S. Space Command. He told the assembly that the Pentagon does not "want to talk about space control because they are afraid of groups like you that will be protesting in the streets."

Since World War II, over $130 billion has been wasted on research and development (R&D) for Star Wars. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is now spending about $10 billion a year on space weapons. The Bush administration is expected to announce its new national space policy in June and the directive will likely give the Pentagon the green light to move forward with offensive technologies for military space control and domination.

www.cndyorks.gn.apc.org...


Why do you think American leaders need to invent the " threat" in Iraq and people like OBL? They have lost the propaganda/economic battle to convince the American people of the danger that China and Russia poses so they just create other threats.


You know, the one which the Russians claimed happened.


A Russian newspaper claimed it happened so maybe the information leaked quite by accident ( to the general public) and was mostly intended for high authorities.

Stellar



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 04:30 PM
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Originally posted by urmomma158
The very large early warning radars which scan at thousands of miles not the sam radars.


Then be more specific in the future.


Please show me that the claims are inflated.


Your own cited sources would tell you as much if you ACTUALLY READ THE MATERIAL instead of once again assuming ignorance on my part.


Its most visible guard against a calamity is the Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. There, beginning Dec. 30, Russian and American officers will sit side by side at computer screens 24-hours a day. Their job: Monitor data from U.S. Space Command sensors, primarily long-range radars and satellites that detect the heat of a rocket blastoff.

"We really do not worry about Russia, missiles going off, or early-warning systems getting false reports or anything like that," said Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre. "We're confident that will not be the case."

Added Peter Verga, a Pentagon policy-maker, "If an early warning radar in Russia fails, we think it would be because the power went out, which is a local time-zone problem, and not because there's a fundamental problem within the system."

The department, which has spent $3.6 billion on year-2000 compliance, has invested $10 million in Russian weapons computers to ensure they don't misread the date rollover to 2000. Technicians also ridded the Moscow-Washington "hot line" of any potential bugs and installed backup telephone connections.

cndyorks.gn.apc.org...



On 11 February, an unnamed Russian Defence Ministry was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying that the existing system was perfectly adequate: "In coordination with other structures, Russia's early-warning system fully monitors the possible launch of ground- or sea-based US intercontinental ballistic missiles."

www.acronym.org.uk...


The 'scientific rocket' was actually old ballistic missile and since it did not do what 'scientific' rockets should do the Russians took notice. What would you expect them to do? There are explanations like that for the other incidents aswel but you have clearly been suckered like the rest of the West.


It's not demised, they make identification mistakes and is not getting any better.


They really do not but even if they did they have the system in place to double check with redundant sensors. The original system had the capacity to double and triple check and now that they are losing the 'triple check' capacity everyone freaks out? Ignorance.


If you didn't know what was going on you have wasted thy time.


"Thy?" Your ignorance is very nearly palpable but i guess you will be the last ( as the dozens of times before) to notice.


Nuclear forces dont mean anything in defednding yourself in a nuclear attack unless you're talking of intercepting a nuke with a nuke(which barely works).


It works just fine and your damn well ignorant for denying that basic reality.
Nuclear weapons play a large part in denfense as the more you have the more you can keep in reserve for a second strike on any suriving enemy forces or strategic targets.


The missile was armed with a 1 kT W-66 enhanced radiation thermonuclear warhead, which was detonated by ground command. It destroyed the target's warhead not only with the nuclear blast, but mainly with the very high neutron flux. The whole flight time for an intercept was expected to be not more than 15 seconds.

Full scale testing of the Sprint and the MSR began in mid-1970, and the first successful intercept of a reentry vehicle by a Sprint occurred in December 1970. A total of about 50 flight tests, the majority being successful, were conducted between this date and December 1973.

During the 1960s, the initially planned nation-wide ABM system had been reduced in scope for cost reasons (see also article about LIM-49 Spartan). The final plan, introduced in 1969, was called Safeguard, an ABM system to defend only SAC's ICBM bases, and not the cities of the United States. The SALT I treaty of 1972, and a 1974 addendum, limited Safeguard to only one site with 100 ABMs. On 1 October 1975, the U.S.'s one and only Safeguard ABM site became operational with 30 LIM-49A Spartan and 70 Sprint missiles. However, because the very limited defense offered by a single ABM site did not warrant the costs, the site was deactivated by Congress the next day. About 150 Sprint missiles were built for flight tests and
operational deployment.

www.astronautix.com...


Based on operational nuclear--capable delivery platforms, knowledge about the size and composition of the nonstrategic stockpile during the Cold War, and statements made by Russian officials about implementation of the 1991-1992 presidential initiatives, we estimate that Russia maintains approximately 2,330 operational nonstrategic warheads and some 4,170 nonstrategic warheads in reserve. The operational warheads include: approximately 700 warheads for antiballistic missile and air defense systems (the A-135 system around Moscow and the SA-10 Grumble/S-300 system);

www.thebulletin.org...

continued......



[edit on 19-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 04:38 PM
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Part 2

The Russian ABm system the Russians admitted to were at least as effective if not more so considering the time they had to invest in their own system.


The Soviets have developed a surface to air missile -- SA-12. This missile is mobile. They are about to deploy it. In a few years they will have hundreds of them -- maybe 1000 or 2000 -- maybe more. The Soviets claim these missiles are there to defend against incoming airplanes.
What counts in such a defense is acceleration -- how quickly the missile can turn. That acceleration, published in reliable British sources, is "at least 10 times the acceleration that any pilot can stand." I estimate that with appropriate available equipment, these surface to air missiles could stop any incoming ballistic missile --particularly ours.

Our ballistic missiles carry few if any decoys. Our retaliatory missiles do not as yet have the capability, nor are we seriously working on the capability to make them take a more complicated path to reach their predetermined target. We don't even try any evasive action, yet we see the development of very real Soviet defenses.
Not to mention the combat ready condition of this and other ABM systems.

www.commonwealthclub.org...



Again please show me conflicting information which you have not provided yet.


I provided you information on why those early warning radars are still good to go and still covers a great many attack sectors. Since they have long since been overtaken by systems in space there is NO reason to suppose they have to cover all approaches.


Well there has been proof of this so called weakness since the Russian EW radars misidentify targets and are not getting any better.


As i said before they do not 'misindentify' any more often than does their American counterparts so why focus on things that go wrong on either side anyways?


Their S300 batteries are unproven in combat. We do not know how they will perform and unless you're joking EW radars are needed.


Like saying the F-22 is unproven in combat and ignoring the fact that the F-117 tested much of technology the F-22 will carry. Do you come up with these 'arguments' all by yourself or do you have a very ignorant friend helping you? Why on EARTH will you argue that we can not estimate how effective the S-300 systems are by looking at the older systems they are based on? Do you think Western sources have never managed to look at the hardware in question?


When CIA concluded in 1967 that the SA-5 was just an anti-aircraft (SAM) system, and that the Hen House radars were just for early warning (and space tracking), a majority of the U.S. intelligence comunity joined the CIA choir. Subsequently ClAts analysis of the SA-5 and the Hen House radars was extended to the SA-10 and the LPARS. Once enshrined, CIAls erroneous analysis was not challenged even when "hard" evidence to the contrary appeared.(31)

By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10, 000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA-5/10 complexes. Yet the U.S. officially counts only the l00 interceptors of the "ABM X-3" system at Moscow, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. ABM X-3 is a scaled up model of the NIKE-X system, vintage late

"To the best of my knowledge, reports of Kosygin's remarks lumping Moscow and Tallinn (the SA-5) together as ABM systems never reached DIA. Whether it was reported elsewhere I do not know. In any case, it did not deter McNamara from telling Congress six months later that U.S. intelligence, i.e. the CIA, was now confident that
the system was only a SAM, not a dual purpose SAM/ABM although such systems could have some marginal ABM capabilities."

www.fas.org...


Even the CIA admitted all those years ago that the SA-5 "could have some marginal ABm capabilities" and yet here you are busy arguing the S-300 cant do that AT ALL or for that matter be effective against airplanes.


Throughout the Kosovo War air campaign the major Russian missile manufacturer Almaz Central Design Burueau was quietly putting the finishing touches to a new family of highly effective S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. Destined to become widespread both inside and outside Russia, the presence of these missiles will "create major problems for [air strike] planners for years to come", and their significance has been greatly underestimated by Defence Ministers worldwide. This warning is made by Editors Chris Foss and Tony Cullen in the foreword of the forthcoming authoritative publication Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 2000-1 Edition.

www.janes.com...



The S-300PMU/SA-10 family of SAMs are true analogues to the US MIM-104 Patriot, providing similar capabilities against aircraft targets at all altitudes, as well as ballistic missiles. With later variants offering genuine 'shoot and scoot' capabilities, the S-300PMU/SA-10 systems are both highly lethal, and highly survivable.

www.strategycenter.net...



Indeed, the upgraded S-300 PM is reported to be capable of hitting a warhead in space and already provides adequate protection to Russia's major cities. In seven to ten seconds a target can be located, fixed, and an interception missile launched. Around 10,000 troops are placed on permanent, around the clock, combat duty with apparently a great deal of work to suggest possible overstretches. "On average, the air defense troops detect and track over 250,000 aircraft, including more than 100,000 foreign aircraft and 1,000-1,500 foreign reconnaissance aircraft every year," commented Mikhailov.

www.jamestown.org...


Continued.

fixed bolding



[edit on 19-5-2006 by masqua]

Edit ( I WAS GOING TO DO THAT!!!) thanks anyways


[edit on 19-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 04:52 PM
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Part 3


Meanwhile, Russia's de facto national missile-defense network, with at least 8,000 modern interceptors and 12 long-range radars, will gain in strategic importance as the United States and Russia decrease the number of offensive nuclear weapons to lower and lower levels.

The Moscow-system missiles, the SA-5 and SA-10/12, were tipped with small nuclear warheads so they didn't require the incredible bullet-hitting-bullet complexity of the U.S. systems developed during the Clinton years. U.S. spy satellites repeatedly identified tactical nuclear-warhead storage sites at the interceptor bases spread across the Soviet empire.

* G.V. Kisun'ko, the chief designer of the ABM systems developed or deployed around Moscow for more than three decades, confirms in a 1996 memoir that large Hen House and Dog House radars at Sary Shagan were designed as battle-management radars for the early Soviet ABM system for the defense of Moscow. Kisun'ko also stated that the SA-5 was designed as a dual-purpose SAM/ABM in conjunction with the Hen House radars.

* B.V. Bunkin, the designer of the follow-on SA-10 and SA-12 (S-300 PMU and S-300V in Russian nomenclature) missile systems, and several other Russian sources, confirmed that these also were dual-purpose SAM/ABMs. SA-10s largely have replaced the thousands of SA-5 interceptors deployed across the Soviet empire during the Cold War. Bunkin's latest SAM/ABM design, the SA-20, is scheduled to begin deployment this year.

www.findarticles.com...


No threat at all.


Well if Russia already delpoyed all those ABM systems and they found a problem in their Ew radars after being deployed they're pretty much stuck with them.


Indeed but these days they probably serve mostly as backup systems and we should not forget how easily the Russians still manage to keep secrets from the Western public. IF they could build 654 odd ICBM's SS-20 ( were simply called long range missiles instead of ICBM's to hide the scale of Russian superiority) one wonders how many interceptors of the full blown ABm variety they could build and simply lie about. Your argument is entirely based on assuming/hoping that the enemy is simply 'inferior', somehow, while all evidence indicating otherwise.


According to western data, the rocket was tested in three different Mods. The SS-20 Mod1&3 carried a single warhead whereas the SS-20 Mod2 carried a MIRV warhead. The Mod2 equipped with three warheads with a yield of 150 KT each became the standard missile. In this version the warheads are placed on a post-boost vehicle.

On 10 August 1979 the tests of the modernized "Pioneer"-UTTKh (15Zh53) began on the Kapustin Yar test site. They continued through 14 August 1980, and on 17 December 1980 the missile designated as SS-20 Mod3 was deployed. This variant had the same propulsion system as earlier versions, but it due to upgrading of a command structure and instrumentation -service unit it was possible to improve accuracy (CEP) from 550 to 450 meters, to increase maximum range by 10 %, and to increase the area covered by the warheads.

www.fas.org... 21m.htm



When the INF Treaty entered into force in June 1988, Votkinsk was a closed city of 100,000 people located in the Ural Mountains, approximately 1,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Three INF missiles had been assembled there: SS-12s, SS-20s, and SS-23s. The Votkinsk plant still assembled some of the Soviet Union's most modern ballistic missiles, specifically the SS-25 missile.3

Encased in large missile canisters, SS-25 missiles were shipped from the plant in special railroad cars to operational military units. The SS-25 was not banned under the INF Treaty. However, the missile's first stage was physically similar to the SS-20 first stage; its missile canister was similar in size and weight; and its railcar exiting the assembly plant was similar to those used to transport SS-20s. The major difference in the two missiles was that the SS -20 was a two-stage missile in which the second stage was 2.87 meters long, while the SS-25 was a three- stage missile, with a second stage 3.07-meter-long.4 Given these similarities and differences, treaty negotiators had to agree upon an inspection process that would allow U.S. inspectors to be sure that no SS-20 missiles or missile stages were leaving the plant.

www.fas.org...


They knew and they said NOTHING. How is the strategic balance affected when one suddenly credits Russia with 654 more mobile, reloadable ICBM's?

Continued...



posted on May, 19 2006 @ 04:55 PM
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Part 4


# Shevardnadze, in belatedly admitting on 23 October 1989 that the Krasnoyarsk radar violated the 1972 ABM Treaty, again signalled that the civilian leadership had been blind-sided by the military.

# In March 1990, scores of Soviet-made SS-23 (73 as far as i know )shorter-range missiles banned by the 1987 INF Treaty were discovered illegally hidden in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Kremlin put out the word that this was the work of the military and that the discovery of these caches came as a shock to the Gorbachev regime.

# Some U.S. officials have found comfort from Kremlin explanations that the massive Soviet fraud in connection with the new Conventional Forces in Europe agreement -- by which tens of thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, and armored personnel vehicles were slipped outside of the zone covered by the Treaty or exempted by simply calling them "naval infantry" -- were also the work of the military acting without permission from the Kremlin's civilian leadership.

www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org...


Read the entire thing to begin to understand how easily they cheated whenever they wanted. It in fact looks like they were allowed to arm themselves while America were disarmed. Do you really trust those who tell you that the Russians will hide the missiles everywhere but that they will not have the systems required to make use of them? Some of my previously links pointedly indicates that the Russians are not in fact worried.


Im not saying the ABM systems won't work. Plus how are the issues of EW radars and their ABM systesm related they can still intercept but it's significantly weakended.


Seems to me you do not have much of an idea of what your saying, not saying or even considering... 100 interceptors with nuclear warheads are simply going to prevent the first few dozen American ICBM's from doing much , if any, damage to Moscow which will give Moscows citizens more time to get into their bunkers-under-every-factory and generally evacuate the city as best they can. The question becomes how much missiles America is willing to expend to try destroy Russias leadership and one of their larger rail and industrial Hubs. It is creating this kind of uncertainty that gives the defender with the ABM's the edge as he can spread his missile forces without worry of them being actively countered by enemy systems that migth be effective or even very effective.


You were the one claiming the sources we're lying and now you're saying they're simply overinflated,


I am saying some lie and some inflate their claims beyond reality for their own aims which is normally to help disarm America so removing the threat of it's values and freedoms spread around the world.


if there's on thing you're good at it's avoiding comments and sweeping us away from the real issue with your rhetoric.


If you are so easily confused by the information that are supposed to help you understand what i base my views on i wonder what the point of serious discussion will be later on. If you can not handle the information required for a worthwhile perspective then why are you even here?

Stellar

[edit on 19-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 05:51 PM
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^^^^ I guess i have been ignorant yet, one article still intrigues me. www.globalsecurity.org...

Im not saying their EW system is totally vulenerable but some systems are a little unreiable and have been closed down.they're still protected though. By the way how many nuclear tipped sams does Russia have for BMD??? I think the upcoming US defense system is tupid since it doesn't use nuclear tipped missiles and body to body impact which isn't always 100% reliable. A nuclear tipped one will gurantee an interception.The upcoming miscourse and terminal midcourse are a bunch of crap. Unless of course you build more ICBM's and modify them for BMD. i think if the US's entire BMD plan cannot be canceleld nuclear tipped one'should supplemnt it.

However no matter what BMD defenses are still subject to overwheliming so if there was a nuclear war neither side would prevail.

[edit on 20-5-2006 by urmomma158]



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 07:49 PM
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Originally posted by WestPoint23
The Russian A-135 ABM system is limited consisting of about 100 interceptors, as such it is vulnerable to a saturation attack, and there are questions about its capability to withstand a concentrated attack with complex counter measures.


Complex counter measures not being something that they had back in the day and something one should expect that the Russians were well aware of?


Under the ABM Treaty the Soviets have every right to defend Moscow with precisely 100 launchers -- which are, we believe, reloadable.

We not only have abided by the ABM Treaty, we have not even put up 100 launchers anywhere, to defend anything. This is a serious omission on our part. Just as the Soviets have every right to defend themselves, we have every right to defend ourselves.
The Soviets are protesting SDI because they have a monopoly on defense, and intend to keep it. Why half of the politician in the free world agree with the Soviets that we should not defend ourselves is beyond me.

The Soviets have developed a surface to air missile -- SA-12. This missile is mobile. They are about to deploy it. In a few years they will have hundreds of them -- maybe 1000 or 2000 -- maybe more. The Soviets claim these missiles are there to defend against incoming airplanes.
What counts in such a defense is acceleration -- how quickly the missile can turn. That acceleration, published in reliable British sources, is "at least 10 times the acceleration that any pilot can stand." I estimate that with appropriate available equipment, these surface to air missiles could stop any incoming ballistic missile --particularly ours.

Our ballistic missiles carry few if any decoys. Our retaliatory missiles do not as yet have the capability, nor are we seriously working on the capability to make them take a more complicated path to reach their predetermined target. We don't even try any evasive action, yet we see the development of very real Soviet defenses.
Not to mention the combat ready condition of this and other ABM systems.

www.commonwealthclub.org...


The assumption is made that American held the initiative and that only America can do 'complex' enough things which they enemy will not expect to happen. So how effective were American countermeasures decoys at the the time and why assume that the missiles could not be intercepted with nuclear warheads before they had time to disperse their warheads/decoys properly or for that matter intercepted after the decoys burnt up during re-entry?


Sandia's work was followed by a study by the General Research Corporation for the DDR&E and a hurried look at the problem by the Strategic Military Panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee.

on performing the study, we required that all the elements of the system be employed in very nearly the same way that they were used in an air defense role, but allowed the introduction of operational doctrine and procedures specifically tailored for an ABM role. We assumed the interceptors to be armed with nuclear warheads-a sine qua non for ABM capabilities. This approach later became known as the "mini-mod system" when many more imaginative modifications to the system were introduced in response to the identification of its specific shortcomings when used for missile defense.

The study was completed and published in December 1969. It generally confirmed the basic results of the Sandia analysis: the nature of the ballistic missile defense problem and the characteristics of the existing U.S. missile threat allowed the SA-2 system-under restricted circumstances-to defend portions of the USSR against a part of the U.S. Minuteman force. To provide

www.cia.gov...



It is not my purpose here to deal at length with the technicalities of SAM upgrade, but these analytical results shed light on some important considerations. Any ABM capability that might be ascribed to the SA-2 system was highly qualified and conditional. But those who took the possibility seriously noted that some capability could indeed be shown to exist. Those who denigrated the possibility emphasized that such capabilities were "technical" or "theoretical" and not "real," though no means for giving meaning to those characterizations ever emerged. It was also pointed out that no country would rely upon a defense which depended upon the attacker's behaving in a certain way which made him peculiarly vulnerable; on the other hand, it was noted that the approaching strategic arms limitations negotiations might freeze the offense so that

www.cia.gov...



precisely such a situation might occur. Discussions about the possibilities of changing reentry angles or burst heights quickly showed that it could be accomplished only with great difficulty.

The report we prepared was not enthusiastically received. In several parts of the Agency and elsewhere in the community, we were charged with having added fuel to a destructive fire by not rejecting out of hand a palpably ridiculous suggestion. Within the defense technology community, we were ridiculed as delicate flowers unwilling to go the whole way in addressing the possibilities of upgrading SAMs. Throughout the rest of the debate-through the SALT considerations and the preparation of NIE 11-3-71-CIA's defensive weapons systems analysts alternately defended the possibilities of SAM upgrade or argued against its likelihood depending upon the particular protagonist being encountered.

www.cia.gov...


So funnily even the old Sa-2 could in fact probably do the 'impossible' . Will we really argue that nuclear tipped interceptors could not do serious damage to even massed missile attacks?

Continued.....



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 07:59 PM
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Part 2

*


Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat.


Not everyone agrees ( and i have numerous sources if you wish to look at all of them) and one must once again assume the USSR just could not do what others did.


Building on the ABRES experience, the NIKE-X system that emerged in 1963-64 was a revolutionary advance in ABM technologies combining a powerful, multi-aperture phased array radar (MAR), an IBM 360 type computer, and a high acceleration missile (SPRINT) for low altitude intercepts. NIKE-X was designed against MIRVs with high performance RVs, while the computer and the SPRINT interceptor took advantage of atmospheric filtering to discriminate precision engineered decoys and other countermeasures. The MAR radar combined battle management, target and interceptor tracking functions and was highly resistant to nuclear effects. The only high confidence way to overcome the NIKE-X system was to exhaust the stock of interceptors with real RVs

www.fas.org...


Considering that Moscow were ringed with Sa-2's and Sa-5's to help attack the incoming missiles could it really be saturated that easily and at what cost to American strategic missile forces? Was one city really worth that many missiles and just how many do you in fact launch at once ( since you will lose your missile based forces after 30 minutes or less) to make sure of Moscow's destruction? One can argue that SAC and the nuclear subs would help but at the time they were armed with rather short range missile against which the SA-5 would have probably have been very effective.


Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

"The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...


*

The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters.


I guess we should ask what he considers a "small number" as the true number to ensure target destruction with all the known variables would NOT be insignificant IF the data showing Soviet defensive efforts were properly evaluated. As Edward Teller said few if any American missiles carried decoys at the time and how effective they would be is anyone's guess considering nuclear detonations as method for warhead destruction. Why do we assume the USSR would not upgrade to cope with such an American capacity as soon as they got it? Fact is those 100 interceptors were jsut a destraction as the true ABM shield was AROUND moscow in the form of Sa-5's and 10's.


However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system, confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review, which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).

www.jinsa.org...


*

” The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.


It did not need to be any more advanced as the US system was a GREAT model and would have very likely saved tens of millions of American lives and here is why i believe that to be true.

Continued.......



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 08:05 PM
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Part 3


The Joint Chiefs used a version of that 1966 NIKE-X briefing to ambush McNamara when they met with President Johnson at his ranch in December 1966, persuading Johnson to overrule McNamara and order deployment of U.S. national ABM, although not the defense against the FSU that the Chiefs proposed.(13) While the Chief's briefing is not available, a memo for the record prepared by W. W. Rostow, then President Johnson's national security adviser, is.(14)

According to Mr. Rostow's memo, the Chiefs recommended MIKE-X deployment at 25 cities to save the lives of 30 to 50 million U.S. citizens, if attacked. McMamara opposed the Chiefs' proposal on the grounds of MAD theology and simplistic "action-reaction":

* it was "inconceivable" that the Soviets would react in any other way but to restore the status quo ante, i.e. 120 million U.S. population fatalities;
* both sides would spend a lot of money and end up where they started, but we would waste the most because offensive weapons were so much cheaper than ABM systems;
* the danger of war would not be reduced;
* the FSU had "been wrong in its nuclear defense policy for a decade" because everything spent on all types of defenses (air and missile) had been wasted.(15)

The Chiefs saw it quite differently:

* NIKE-X would save tens of millions of lives against a Soviet population attack, and that was a worthwhile objective;
* while they could not predict with confidence how the Soviets would react, all likely reactions had a substantial price and would divert funds from other military programs--no free lunches;
* the risk of nuclear attack would be reduced

www.fas.org...


The system ( as one of the earlier links also indicates) would have been effective in it's aims of saving lives and making strategic missile allocation far harder and would not have been prone to prompt failure as some says if it was anything like the American system. Since the USSR could get it's hands on almost anything it desired in terms of technological data only their engineering and industry could prevent them from building these systems and the evidence i have seen does not suggest that it did it this case.

*

A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."

Link



The components of the new Moscow ABM system include two interceptor missiles: a long-range modified Galosh ABM designed to engage ballistic missile RVs outside of the atmosphere; and the Gazelle, a shorter range, high-acceleration missile designed to engage RVs after they have reentered the earth's atmosphere. The ABM system also includes the new, large, multifunction Pillbox radar at Pushkino near Moscow. The radar provides 360-degree coverage against incoming missiles and is expected to become operational by 1990. This new system will allow the Soviets, for the first time, to engage ICBM and SLBM RVs accompanied by penetration aids, because the end atmospheric interceptor can engage the RV after most penetration aids are stripped off by the atmosphere. In addition, the new system apparently will comprise the full 100 launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty. The system, however, has major weaknesses. With only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression.

www.fas.org...


That is the entire quote and the little bit the author chose to quote certainly does not make clear what is added and what was not. Fact is they knew that Russian radar centers were extensively datalinked and that targetting information could be sent from other sites if one was suppressed or destroyed. The suppression is obviously only true for the new interceptor ( low altitude) type deployed so the intent of the author becomes even clearer.

*

At the time of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the new ABM system had still not reached full operational capability.


And it was a 'upgrade' so it did not have to reach 'full operational capability' with all it's added capacity to retain the older capabilities. It's this type of claim that clearly seeks to make use of the average readers ignorance to influece their perception towards assuming weakness when the REAL question should be why Americans do not have their own defensive systems while the 'inferior' Russians can not only build one but maintain it at high cost for so very long. As i indicated earlier even the older system was at least as effective as the original American system and thus well capable of dealing with limited ( few dozen) strikes. The only suckers are the American public who are still COMPLETELY defenseless against even single missiles.

*

Much of the early warning radar upgrade program associated with the improved system had not yet been completed, and of those radars that had been updated, several were in republics other than Russia.

Continued.....


[edit on 20-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 08:18 PM
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Part 4


Let's talk about the early warning systems. My understanding is that as the Soviet Union broke up, that the radars in its forward states were dismantled. How has the early warning system been affected by the loss of these radar stations in the outlying states of the former Soviet Union?

There were eight [ground-based] early warning stations in the Soviet Union, in Russia. And there was also a space-based system. Out of the eight stations, five were left outside of Russia. However, the only one, not some, but only one, radar station was destroyed. The only one that's not working now is the one in Latvia, in Skundia. As a result, a sector formed where, if we had not taken any additional measures, we would not have been able to observe the launches with a second echelon of systems; only with the first one. However, we took the following measures. We compensated partially for this empty, so to speak, sector, by other stations. That's the first thing. The second thing is that an attack from the West is probably least conceivable given the current situation. So we don't foresee any problems here.

When were these measures taken to fix the radar problem in Latvia? What year?

By September 1st, of the last year, the station in Skundia stopped working. And at the same time exactly, partial measures were taken to compensate for the loss of that sector. All the other stations are fully operational, such as the one in Ukraine, in Azerbaijan. We are planning to put into operation a station in Belarus, in Beronovich.

www.newshour.org...


So once again a total "non starter" towards proving anything but the authors bias.

*

The sharp decline in the Russian defense budget after the break-up also effectively ended most work on the program, and the early- warning network quickly deteriorated. Despite these problems, the system has continued to operate at partial capability, and a secret presidential decree in 1995 declared that it was still operational.


Was it really a question of money or did they in fact have the money but chose not to spend it on early warning?


The two nations have explored ways of addressing the problem at least since last year, when another CBO study suggested giving Russia access to the U.S. early warning satellite system. Faced with considerable political pressure not to release such sensitive information to the Russians, Daschle asked the budget office to consider "nontraditional" alternatives.

Since then, according to the letter, the CBO has learned that Russia has built seven new early warning satellites, but "is unable or unwilling to devote the resources necessary to launch them."

The United States could buy Russian rockets -- which are less expensive than American rockets -- and launch six of the satellites for about $200 million, the CBO said.

The letter lists several arguments against the option, including the fact that if Russia were sufficiently worried about false alarms, it could cough up the money itself. In addition, the six satellites would not allow Russia to monitor launches around the globe, only in the United States.

www.fas.org...


So they probably had the Sat's but chose not to deploy them? What does that mean?

The Cold War with Russia is not over.
Yamantau
A Huge Anthill?

In my opinion it means they have the resources but they have chosen to invest it in other projects which they apparently consider more worthy. Would they really neglect their Early warning when they are clearing spending huge ammounts of resources in other 'secret' ( and not so secret) projects?

*

In February 1998, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said at a press conference that Russia was "standing down a number of the ABM system's missiles from alert duty." The current state of readiness of the interceptor missiles is unclear. The radars associated with the system have other missions in addition to supporting the ABM system, so they remain operational.

Link


Meaning that most of the men manning those missiles are in their bunks ( 15 feet from the control center) instead of all sitting in their chairs waiting for a nuclear war? Since we do not know what Russian words 'standing down' were translated from i really do not believe it's cause for celebration. I believe it's much like that scam where it's claimed that Russian and American nuclear weapons are no longer 'targeted' at each other; the fact that that could/can change with the press of a button not being mentioned. If the enemy is in range , so are you.

*

Although it represents an improvement over the earlier A-35 system, the upgraded A-135 system suffers from limited capabilities. Although it might be effective against single warheads,


Well ALL systems have 'limited' capabilities since that's pretty much how the universe works. It 'might' be effective against singular warheads? The Russians demonstrated in the early 1960's that they could hit a medium range ballistic missile warhead with a CONVENTIONAL explosive warhead.

Continued..........



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 08:25 PM
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A statement released by the press service of the Russian Space Troops reports that “The missile defence system of the Space Troops is always combat-ready and capable of fulfilling any mission,” according to a news item from the Russian Interfax military news agency. The statement comes on the forty-third anniversary of the first test launch and successful intercept by a Russian missile interceptor, the V-1000 (later known as the SA-5, or Griffon), in 1961:

As for the March 4, 1961 test, the V-1000 is said to have been launched from the 10th State Research Training Field and intercepted an R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) missile carrying a mock-up payload of 500 kg, which itself had been lanched from Kapustin Yar. The V-1000 interceptor is said to have comprised:16,000 carbide-wolfram core balls, a TNT load and a steel jacket. The disk-shaped damage area was perpendicular to the axis of the countermissile. The V-1000 created by Petr Grushin, Fakel Design Bureau, had a speed of 1,000 mps. In 1961 the nuclear version was tested (without the fissionable material). The test results laid the basis for the A-35 Galosh missile deployed in dozens around Moscow
While the 1961 test was with a conventional explosive, the Griffon and successive Russian missile interceptors were all armed with small nuclear warheads. The explosive capacity of such weapons gave an additional level of certainty to the destruction of any incoming missiles, and eliminating the need for somewhat more difficult “hit-to-kill” technology.

Update: The March 4 edition of Itar Tass quotes Lieutenant-General Vladimir Popovkin, the chief of staff of the Russian space troops, outlining the current capabilities of Russian missile defenses. The system, he said is capable of detecting ballistic targets and intercepting and destroying warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles….The ABM system for the country’s central district can spot warheads of missiles against the background of light and heavy false targets and active and passive interferences, as well as during the use by the enemy of other means to overcome the air defences. Russia’s ABM system consists of intelligence means, command posts, silos for launching interception missiles and the very missiles, and the system for relaying information linking all the ground facilities of the anti -missile defences into one cycle.

www.missilethreat.com...



The V-1000 had two stages. The first stage was a solid-propellant booster, and the second stage was a sustainer stage with a warhead which was equipped with a liquid-propellant engine developed by the Design Bureau of Chief Designer A. Isaev. In addition to the fragmentation warhead a nuclear warhead was also designed for the missile. The flight tests of the missile, which could intercept targets at altitudes of up to 25 kilometers, started in 1958. The parallel approach to the target at a strictly counter course was chosen as the method of the ABM's homing. The V-1000 was delivered to the trajectory calculated according to the homing method along the regular curve, parameters of which were defined by the predicted target trajectory. P. Kirillov was the Chief Designer of the missile's automatic pilot. On March 26, 1961, the ABM destroyed the warhead of the R-5 BM with 500 kilograms of TNT. Overall, during the trial of the A system 11 launches of ABMs were performed which destroyed warheads of BMs, and experimental ABMs with heat seeking self-homing warhead, radio-controlled fuses, and optical fuses were also launched. The S2TA version of the V-1000 ABM with a heat seeking self-homing warhead was tested at the A testing ground between 1961 and 1963. The flight tests of the V-1000 with the nuclear warhead (without the fissible material) designed in Chelyabinsk-70 were conducted in 1961. For this warhead two types of proximity fuses were designed and tested: the optical fuse (designed by the GOI under the supervision of Chief Designer Emdin) a and radio-electronic fuse (Chief Designer Bondarenko) for the R2TA and G2TA versions of the missile.

Systems for surmounting of air defenses intended for domestic BM were also tested during the trial of the A system. The launched target ballistic missiles were equipped with inflatable false targets Verba, unfolding false targets Kaktus, and Krot active jammers. Overall, the field tests of the A system showed a principle possibility of BM warheads interception. Experiments under the coded name Operation K were conducted (K1, K2, K3, K4, and K5) to check a possibility of the A system functioning under the influence of nuclear explosions at altitudes of 80 to 300 kilometers between 1961 and 1962 at the Sary-Shagan testing ground. The A system showed its capability to function even when a conventional enemy used nuclear weapons.

www.fas.org...


*

a multi-warhead strike would likely overwhelm the system, and there are also questions whether its sensors would not be blinded by the explosions of its own missiles' nuclear warheads.


So this system with it's 100 missiles was intended to shoot down singular warheads? They have maintained it for so many decades to stop ONE missile? We know that the rather older American system could function in the nuclear explosion environment so why assume so much less for the Russian system which are normally much better fortified against such effects?

Continued....


[edit on 20-5-2006 by StellarX]



posted on May, 20 2006 @ 08:34 PM
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Building on the ABRES experience, the NIKE-X system that emerged in 1963-64 was a revolutionary advance in ABM technologies combining a powerful, multi-aperture phased array radar (MAR), an IBM 360 type computer, and a high acceleration missile (SPRINT) for low altitude intercepts. NIKE-X was designed against MIRVs with high performance RVs, while the computer and the SPRINT interceptor took advantage of atmospheric filtering to discriminate precision engineered decoys and other countermeasures. The MAR radar combined battle management, target and interceptor tracking functions and was highly resistant to nuclear effects. The only high confidence way to overcome the NIKE-X system was to exhaust the stock of interceptors with real RVs

www.fas.org...


Once again the Russians steal everything ( well if you listen to some people) but the author apparently assumes they would forget what their nuclear armed interceptors would do? Assuming stupidity for the enemy as basis for your own security is STUPID and the author is unlikely to be this stupid. What we should be asking is why we have to put up with such deception by people who tell us they have our best interests in mind.

*

In addition, the extremely complex radar and command center electronics reportedly have a low combat readiness rate, and in the interests of safety the system's nuclear warheads were usually stored separately from the missiles.


Because Russians can not manage complex stuff one assumes? If i tell you that i have a hundred guns ( and i have proven i know how to use them) but tell you that i 'store them seperately' will that make you feel any better about breaking into my house? Why believe so many reports suggesting weakness when they originate almost entirely from Russian 'arms control organizations' and their American 'friends'?

*

Bringing the missiles into operational readiness would require at least 12 hours, an operation that would likely be performed at early stages of a developing nuclear crisis. As a result of its low performance and extremely high operation and maintenance costs, the A-135 system has been controversial within Soviet, and later Russian, decisionmaking circles throughout its existence.

Link


I would store my 100 guns within 12 hours reach yes and who do we have to thank for such a silly claim? I have looked at this article again and again and the notes are so meager, and link to such horrid source material, that i am probably stupid for even bothering to try point out the dozens of factual errors. There is so very little truth to discern that i should treat the whole article they way i have the few points you picked; something i would probably do if i had 72 hours in a day.


Yes it is, besides the Moscow centered A-135 system your magical array of less then thousand’s of unproven S-300 systems is not going to provide a sufficient defense capability to a full out nuclear attack.


And i have not pretended that Moscow would not very likely be a smoking ruin after a full scale ( or even limited) nuclear war either. What i have said is that they tried very hard , for very long, to come up with the systems to counter PASSIVELY as many enemy warheads as they could giving them time and options if only towards evacuating their cities or to force American strategic planers to allocate many more warheads per target to 'ensure' destruction. If you do not know where the enemy deploys his thousands of 'maginally capable dual use ABM/Sam's how would you decide what targets he woulf defend with them and how would that affect how many warheads you assign per target?


Improvements in air defense missile guidance threaten to blur
is the development of the SA-12b Giant air defense, possibly intended for point defense of mobile ICBM launchers. the distinction between missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and tactical cruise missiles, and those capable of intercepting some strategic ballistic missiles, thus making the ABM Treaty "increasingly irrelevant" (Jane's Defence Weekly 8 Aug 87, p. 226).

www.oism.org...



The Russians already have a deployed anti-missile system to protect their territory, featuring not only the permitted ABM system around Moscow but also thousands of nuclear-armed surface-to-air interceptors and a network of tracking radars available for use in a clearly impermissible way. If Treaty prohibitions on the deployment of missile defenses are allowed to stand, the United States will remain the only one undefended.

www.newsmax.com...



This new evidence reinforces longstanding concerns about systematic Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. Battlefield management radars are the long leadtime component of any ABM defense system and the Soviets seem to have gained a great deal of experience in this field since 1975 when they installed an ABM-X-3 radar in the Kamchatka impact area for their ICBM tests. Over the years, the Soviets have also been upgrading their surface-to-air (SAM) bomber defense systems--now presumed to perform an ABM role. Since the Carter Administration, the Soviets repeatedly have tested various types of SAM missiles in'a discernable ABM mode at altitudes above 100,000 feet and have deployed thousands of less capable SA-5 missiles around-Soviet cities. These illegal ABM activities and the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missle system clearly point to a Soviet decision to subvert the ABM Treaty shortly after signing it. Continues on next page


Continued.....




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