Help ATS with a contribution via PayPal:
learn more

The Super Hornet guns down the F-22 Raptor

page: 3
0
<< 1  2    4  5  6 >>

log in

join

posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 04:52 AM
link   

and no matter how much spin certain people like to put on it - that`ll be the way it`ll stay.


Oh? And you base that assumption on what? The fact that the US changed ROE’s in Desert Dtorm because the threat posed by the Iraqis didn’t outweigh the loss of friendly aircraft? Trust me the US didn't do that out of doctrine. If we had faced a worthy adversary those ROE’s would have never existed. The only reason the US has yet to engage in unrestricted BVR combat is because we have never been challenged to the point where it was necessary.




posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 08:35 AM
link   
Did anyone catch it?

This fight simulation proves that under the right circumstances ANY and EVERY weapon has a weakness. That is why superior technology doesn't guarintee victory. What happened in this exercise reinforces the need for in depth training of pilots in the strengths and limitations of the weapon systems they are using! We saw the same lesson when the F-117 Nighthawk was lost in Kosavo a few years ago. After the spectacular sucess of the Nighthawk in Desert Storm, many people forgot that Stealth Aircraft aren't invincible!

Let's be thankful that this was a test and not combat against a real enemy! If the Pentagon and the Air Force are smart, they will study this carefully and use the lessons to their advantage!

Tim



[edit on 12-4-2006 by ghost]



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 08:46 AM
link   

Originally posted by WestPoint23

and no matter how much spin certain people like to put on it - that`ll be the way it`ll stay.


Oh? And you base that assumption on what? The fact that the US changed ROE’s in Desert Dtorm because the threat posed by the Iraqis didn’t outweigh the loss of friendly aircraft? Trust me the US didn't do that out of doctrine. If we had faced a worthy adversary those ROE’s would have never existed. The only reason the US has yet to engage in unrestricted BVR combat is because we have never been challenged to the point where it was necessary.



absolute rubbish


you are spouting the same things said in the 1970`s as to the failures of the very best F-4`s and the very latest BVR missiles of the day - the sparrow.

like you they claim that BVR was the way forward and yet BVR shots MISSED there tagrets.

even when F-14`s engaged libyan fighters did bvr shots MISS.


BVR is NOT the way forward - we have gone full circle and back to 1960 here with the very same arguements and history will repeat itself with ancient MiG`s shooting the latest and greatest USAF fighters (that was vietnam - but since your 16 you wouldn`t remember it)



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 11:47 AM
link   

Originally posted by Harlequin
BVR is NOT the way forward - we have gone full circle and back to 1960 here with the very same arguements and history will repeat itself with ancient MiG`s shooting the latest and greatest USAF fighters (that was vietnam - but since your 16 you wouldn`t remember it)


Sad, but ture! People have been trying to get rid of the dog fight since the late 1950's. The Origion F-4 Phantom didn't have a cannon because the Air Force and Navy thought they could put an end to the days of the Dog Fight! Vietnam Proved that the concept didn't work. We tried an all BVR figher force then and learned that it didn't work!

They can learn this lesson now or later, but they will have to learn it some day!

Tim



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 11:51 AM
link   

you are spouting the same things said in the 1970`s as to the failures of the very best F-4`s and the very latest BVR missiles of the day - the sparrow.


You’re comparing the first generation Sparrow to the AMRAAM of today? C’mon the missiles and their support systems are world’s apart.



In 1963, production switched to the AIM-7E version. It used a new propulsion system, a solid-fueled rocket by Rocketdyne (either a MK 38 or later a MK 52). The new motor again significantly increased range and performance of the missile. Effective range of course depended greatly on firing parameters like launch speed and relative velocity of the target. In head-on attacks under optimal conditions, it could be as high as 35 km (20 nm), while in stern attacks, maximum effective range was more around 5.5 km (3 nm).

About 7500 AIM-7D and 25000 AIM-7E missiles were built, and the Sparrow was used heavily in Vietnam by the USAF and the U.S. Navy. The first combat kill was scored on 7 June 1965, when USN F-4B Phantoms shot down 2 MiG-17s. However, the initial combat results were very disappointing. The potentially long range of the AIM-7 could not be used, because unreliable IFF capabilities of the time effectively required visual identification of all targets. Coupled with the high minimum range of the missile of 1500 m (5000 ft) and poor performance against manoeuvering and/or low-flying targets, this led to a kill probability of less than 10%. Therefore, the improved AIM-7E-2 was introduced in 1969 as a "dogfight missile". It had a shorter minimum range, clipped wings for higher manoeuverability, and improved autopilot and fuzing. The AIM-7E-3 had further improved fuzing and higher reliability, and the AIM-7E-4 was specially adapted for use with high-power fighter radars (like the F-14's AN/AWG-9). Despite all problems, more than 50 aircraft were shot down by Sparrow missiles during the Vietnam air war.

AIM-7 Sparrow





The AIM-120A is powered by a solid-propellant rocket motor in a WPU-6/B propulsion section. Before launch, the launching aircraft's fire control system programs the missile's inertial autopilot in the WGU-16/B guidance unit to bring it into a homing basket in the vicinity of the target. The autopilot can receive mid-course updates from the aircraft via a data link. The AMRAAM's WCU-11/B control section controls the missile in flight with the four movable tail fins. As soon as the target is within range, the AMRAAM activates its active radar seeker for autonomous terminal homing. The 23 kg (50 lb) WDU-33/B fragmentation warhead is detonated by an FZU-49/B fuzing system consisting of a "smart" (anti-clutter) proximity fuze and an impact fuze. The effective range of the AIM-120A of course highly depends on the firing parameters, and official performance data are classified. Typical quoted figures for maximum range vary between 50 km (30 miles) and 70 km (45 miles). For the lower portions of the AMRAAM's range envelope (minimum range is said to be 2 km (2200 yds)), where the mid-course guidance updates are not needed, the AIM-120 is a true fire-and-forget weapon.

The guidance unit of the AIM-120C is upgraded to WGU-44/B standard. The first P3I Phase 2 missile is the AIM-120C-4 (first delivered in 1999), which has an improved WDU-41/B warhead. The AIM-120C-5 is a C-4 with a slightly larger motor in the new WPU-16/B propulsion section and a new shorter WCU-28/B control section with compressed electronics and ECCM upgrades. Deliveries of the AIM-120C-5 began in July 2000. The current production version of AMRAAM is the AIM-120C-6, which features an updated TDD (Target Detection Device). The AIM-120C-7 (P3I Phase 3), development of which has begun in 1998, incorporates improved ECCM with jamming detection, an upgraded seeker, and longer range. The latter feature was specifically requested by the U.S. Navy to get a (somewhat) suitable replacement for the AIM-54 Phoenix very-long range missile, which was then planned to be retired together with the F-14D Tomcat around 2007 (actual official retirement was already in Spetember 2004). The AIM-120C-7 was successfully tested against combat-realistic targets in August and September 2003, and IOC was then planned for 2004.

AIM-120 AMRAAM


Because of the recent introduction of the AIM-120 it has only been fired in combat 3 times and has hit the target every time.



The Slammer also has an astonishing record in both flight tests (once proper sofware was perfected) and in combat. For example, in one test over White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, one F-15C Eagle ripple-fired four AIM-120A's at 4 QF-100 drones. The drones were performing evasive maneovers, releasing chaff, and were also equipped with jammers. All 4 AIM-120's hit the targets dead-on. This and other tests earned the nickname Slammer (One F-15 driver compared firing the AMRAAM at targets to being like clubbing baby seals), as well as other nicknames such as "The World War III Shot". Some people have even taken to calling the AMRAAM the "Go Get'em Fido" Missile. The Slammer has been fired in combat on 3 occasions. On the first, which took place on 27 December 1992, an F-16C patrolling the No-Fly Zone over Iraq destroyed an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat head-on at medium range. Later on 17 January 1993 another F-16C shot down an Iraqi MiG-23 at closer range, at the limit of the AMRAAM's no-escape zone. The third kill in AMRAAM history took place over Bosnia when a Serbian tactical fighter, flying in a terrain-hugging profile, was hit by a U.S. Slammer.

AIM-120 “Slammer”



even when F-14`s engaged libyan fighters did bvr shots MISS.


Again your using the past to judge the more recent A2A missiles, like I showed the Sparrow wasn’t great from the start partly due to technical limitations and design constraints from the era when it was designed. If you could show to me that the same problems persist in the more recent BVR missiles then I might be more accepting of your point. However all you have done is looked toward the past while ignoring recent changes.

____________________________________________________________________________________


What happened in this exercise reinforces the need for in depth training of pilots in the strengths and limitations of the weapon systems they are using! We saw the same lesson when the F-117 Nighthawk was lost in Kosavo a few years ago. After the spectacular sucess of the Nighthawk in Desert Storm, many people forgot that Stealth Aircraft aren't invincible!


I don't think most people thought the Raptor was invincible, just that it would be harder to shoot down. As such the only thing that we can conclude from these two images without knowing the rules and parameters of this exercise is that the Raptor can be shot down, but then again people already knew that.

[edit on 12-4-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 11:58 AM
link   

Originally posted by WestPoint23
Because of the recent introduction of the AIM-120 is has only been fired in combat 3 times and has hit the target every time.


Actually, no, I posted in the Cope India thread that in GulfWar I, AMRAAM had a 50% kill ratio.



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 12:10 PM
link   

Actually, no, I posted in the Cope India thread that in GulfWar I, AMRAAM had a 50% kill ratio.


Well can you be so kind as to post it here? My source says that it has only been fired in combat three times with all three missile hitting their target.



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 12:39 PM
link   

Originally posted by WestPoint23

Actually, no, I posted in the Cope India thread that in GulfWar I, AMRAAM had a 50% kill ratio.


Well can you be so kind as to post it here? My source says that it has only been fired in combat three times with all three missile hitting their target.


www.saunalahti.fi...

From the above, you can click and look through, it does seem an extensive bit of research has been done on the whole thing though .


KILLS BY TYPE AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS

06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum's

... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill

... 1 x Maneuvering Suicide's 08 x F-1 Mirages

... 5 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

...................

46 Total


[edit on 12-4-2006 by kilcoo316]

Mod Edit: please follow the fair use quidelines and quote only 1-2 paragraphs ... Thanks

[edit on 4/12/06 by FredT]



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 02:42 PM
link   

Note 8. Last three kills are being assessed. All are considered to be AMRAAM kills, but todate the results of the F-15 engagement has been a mystery. News Services say that the Foxbat landed and was not downed, aircrews say that the F-15 was credited with a Kill.


The same site also states that one of the engagements where an AIM-120 was used is inconclusive because there are conflicting reports. The site assumes it was a miss due to lack of evidence. However if one assumes that it was kill then the AIM-120 has a 75% Kill Ratio in the Gulf Region. Now combine that with the kill credited to the F-16 in Bosnia and the figure is much higher than 50%.
That's the reason why my and other sources don't list this engagement because it inconclusive.

[edit on 12-4-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 04:35 PM
link   
You guys using examples of BVR missiles from the 60s and 70s have to be nuts to compare those missiles with modern ones. Computer technology of the 60s and 70s was such that to have about a fourth the power of a modern pocket calculator, you need a HUGE computer (i.e. missiles of the time weren't too smart). Modern missiles are a heck of a lot smarter and have a LOT more processing power in them. And as avionics continue to improve, you can bet the farm that BVR will become popular because once pilots gain the complete capability to know exactly who or what they are shooting at without any doubt, without having to be within visual range, they will start doing so.

If we are ever going to rely on automated UCAV-type fighter aircraft one day (everyone talks about this coming about soon), you can really be sure that BVR will be used because to a robotic aircraft, what a human considers WVR and BVR won't make much of a difference. 600 miles could be "WVR" to a robot if it is using specialized sensors or a satellite or something.



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 04:57 PM
link   
NO

what westpoint will continually ignore is 1 point:

the F-4 and the AIM-7 was considered to be THE best platform of the time - similar to how the F-22 is viewed today.


Its role was a BVR killer using the new `super missile` the sparrow , and yet when it came to it , shots had to be ripple fired so that *maybe* 1 hit.

and that was BVR.


and here we are in 2006 and the very same arguements are being put forward , that AMRAAM is so good that guns on figthers are not needed anymore.


so you can happily sit there and throw test figures at me all day long - i can do the same about the Sparrow when it was tested - amazing kill chance at BVR fantastic performance etc etc

and yet in the reality of war the missile just didn`t perform.

honestly - if all the missiles did what they say on the tin - then there would be no flying aircraft in iraq after the first 12 hours ; thats how many SAM`s were shot off at the US aicraft when they went over the border.


edit:

AMRAAM has been in service for 15 years now - and you claim that only 3 have been fired??? IOC date was september 1991.

[edit on 12/4/06 by Harlequin]



posted on Apr, 12 2006 @ 07:47 PM
link   

NO

what westpoint will continually ignore is 1 point:

the F-4 and the AIM-7 was considered to be THE best platform of the time - similar to how the F-22 is viewed today.

Its role was a BVR killer using the new `super missile` the sparrow , and yet when it came to it , shots had to be ripple fired so that *maybe* 1 hit.

and that was BVR.


And what you continually ignore is the fact that you cannot judge current systems of today based on past performance of totally different missiles, support systems, and aircraft. Again the only way you could make such a judgment is if you can prove (notice I said prove not claim) that the same flaws that were present in the AIM-7 missile and or F-4 are still present in the AIM-120 and or F-22.


AMRAAM has been in service for 15 years now - and you claim that only 3 have been fired??? IOC date was september 1991.


I don't claim that, that's what the facts show, true IOC was in 1991 and a handful of fighters in Desert Storm carried them but they were never used. And since Desert Storm the AMRAAM has been fired only 3 or 4 times (depending on your source) in combat.

You have to remember that there haven’t been many air wars since Desert Storm that the US has engaged in. And although IOC for the USAF was reached in 1991 the AIM-7 was still heavily used. Also, the USN didn't start using AMRAAM’s until 1994.

From the links provided above.


The first LRIP (Low-Rate Initial Production) AIM-120A was delivered in October 1988, but it took until September 1991 that IOC (Initial Operational Capability) was finally achieved.

Although a few AIM-120As were deployed to the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in early 1991, no AMRAAMs were fired in that conflict. The first combat use of an AIM-120A occurred in December 1992, when an F-16C shot down an Iraqi MiG-25 during Operation Southern Watch.




Since Hughes and Raytheon were incorporating extremely advanced technology into the AMRAAM, there were severe developpment probelems, promptin gin 1985 a review, which extended the development phase by two years, and delayed the initial production date from 1986 to 1989. Even further evaluation probelms delayed the actual service enty date to 1991. To date, around 800 AMRAAMs have been fired in testing, and 3 have been fired in combat.




Successful Navy operational testing on the F/A-18C/D aircraft was conducted by Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force during FY94 and included an evaluation of the missile system’s effectiveness and suitability, maintainability, and supportability in the Navy operational environment.

The missile is operational on U.S. Air Force F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The Navy began receiving AIM-120A deliveries in 1991, but delayed Fleet introduction until integration with the F/A-18 aircraft was completed in 1993. Fleet introduction coincided with F/A-18 IOC when CV/CVN load-outs began to include AIM-120A. AMRAAM is combat tested, scoring two kills during Operation Southern Watch, and one kill in Bosnia.

Link


[edit on 12-4-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Apr, 13 2006 @ 12:06 PM
link   
Why are so many people surprised that an F-18 "downed" an F-22? Sure the F-18 is a little old but its still highly maneuverable and capable in any dogfight. It doesn't matter what kind of cool high tech gizmos you have on your plane. In a dogfight, anything can happen.



posted on Apr, 13 2006 @ 12:14 PM
link   
As FredT said (in this thread, or another one, I can't remember which), in GW1 BVR was given the axe after an EA-6 or A-6 was shot down on a BVR Blue on Blue incident. It wasn't confirmed that it was, but the evidence was that it was, so the commanders made the decision to change the ROE to prohibit BVR engagements.

[edit on 4/13/2006 by Zaphod58]



posted on Apr, 13 2006 @ 12:44 PM
link   

Originally posted by Zaphod58
As FredT said (in this thread, or another one, I can't remember which), in GW1 BVR was given the axe after an EA-6 or A-6 was shot down on a BVR Blue on Blue incident. It wasn't confirmed that it was, but the evidence was that it was, so the commanders made the decision to change the ROE to prohibit BVR engagements.

[edit on 4/13/2006 by Zaphod58]


And what is to prevent exactly the same scenario occuring in future conflicts, rendering BVR combat as an unworkable dream?


(Not having a dig at your post, just an observation on the general use of it as an excuse for BVR not getting the kills it should).

[edit on 13-4-2006 by kilcoo316]



posted on Apr, 13 2006 @ 02:58 PM
link   
The main issue in the Gulf War was that USN and USAF fighter carried different IFF systems; the Tomcat in particular had a relatively weak IFF systems. Now since the USAF attacked from the East and USN from the South having incompatible IFF systems created a danger of friendly fire incidents. So the commanders concluded that the air defenses could still be taken out with relative ease even if they imposed stringent BVR ROE’s, so that's what they did.



As Lieutenants Mark Fox and Nick Mongillo demonstrated with their F/A-18s, Navy fighters were just as capable of shooting down enemy jets as Air Force F-16s and F-15s. Navy fighters did not score additional fixed-wing kills during the war, however. Horner and his staff knew that the electronic gear on Air Force fighters could differentiate between friendly and enemy aircraft, but they were not as confident about the Navy's IFF equipment. Naval leaders placed greater faith in their interceptors. Nevertheless, since there were more than enough Air Force units to handle those relatively small number of Iraqi fighters that elected to "dog fight," Horner wisely chose not to employ other coalition aircraft and risk accidental, or "blue-on-blue" shoot downs.

Gulf War


Now, you asked “and what is to prevent exactly the same scenario occuring in future conflicts, rendering BVR combat as an unworkable dream? And the answer is...



The Navy, U.S. Air Force and FAA joined together to evaluate the new Identification Friend or Foe wave form known as Mode 5. The current wave form used by the U.S. military and NATO allies, Mode 4, uses 1960s technology and has several critical challenges that the replacement Mode 5 promises to solve. This OSD mandated upgrade provides warfighters with unprecedented security, performance, increased mission effectiveness and will lower the possibility of misidentifying friendly assets.

The Mode 5 IFF system is made up of two key components: the interrogator and a transponder. A platform (ship or aircraft) with an interrogator has the ability to send out a secure signal that only transponder equipped platforms can translate. These platforms can then, in turn, respond providing a positive identification as a friendly asset. This significantly enhances the warfighter's situational awareness.

Mode 5 (IFF)


And



The test, held recently at the Navy test range at Patuxent River, Md., examined a new AWACS Identification Friend or Foe, or IFF, demonstrator interrogator system. The interrogator transmitted a new waveform known as Mode 5. The Mode 5 Interrogator capability will provide significant additional identification performance over the current capability being used.

It will give warfighters new levels of security and performance, increase mission effectiveness and lower the possibility of misidentification of friendly assets, said Maj. Trent Thomas, Mode 5 test lead for the Air Force and chief of AWACS mission system requirements at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla.

The identification capability has two key components: the interrogator and the transponder. A platform with the interrogator has the ability to send out a signal to every platform with the transponder.

The transponder units then send a signal back to the interrogator identifying it as a friendly asset. Only a platform with an interrogator unit can send out a signal to identify and locate friendly assets.

Link


And



The Mark XIIA Mode 5 Program stems from the DoD Mark XII Improvement Initiative begun in 1995. The Navy, responding to USD (A&T)/VCJCS tasking, led the Joint Service/NATO development of the Mode 5 waveform as documented in STANAG 4193. POM funding supports a formal FY02 Navy program start, with the potential for eventual establishment of a Joint Service Program with Army and Air Force. The Mark XIIA Mode 5 Program is responsive to the Combat Identification Mission Needs Statement (MNS) dated 13 April 1992 and reviewed/revalidated in 1998. The Improved Combat Identification Capabilities Operational Requirements Document (ORD) is in the second round of Service staffing (Flag-level chop) following the successful 0-6 level review conducted April – June 2000. Other program documentation is in initial staffing, and subject to formal program approval and funding

Mark XIIA Mode 5 platform-tailored ECP kits will be developed, tested, and procured, with full production beginning in FY05. State-of-the-art Open Systems Hardware (OSA) interrogator and transponder sets will accommodate easy installation and integration of Mark XIIA Mode 5 VME cards that also provide for new-technology cryptography.

Link


And



Reliable and secure positive identification (ID) systems are essential elements of battle management in the naval environment. In addition to distinguishing friend from foe for weapons employment, the Navy requires secure, jam resistant Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems for battle group air defense management and air traffic control. Identification is multifaceted and includes information received from several sensors (both cooperative and non-cooperative systems).

Older E-3 AWACS IFF system received codes from aircraft that weren't always processed correctly. There was also a chance the codes could get garbled, which made it more difficult to identify the aircraft as friend or foe. By 1997 a new system had an improved reliability to correctly identifying the codes and improves the ability to determine the location of an aircraft under surveillance, which will help ensure IFF operators give accurate IFF information to higher headquarters or other aircraft.

Identification Fiend or Foe (IFF)


And



E-3 Sentry aircraft were among the first to deploy during Operation Desert Shield where they immediately established an around-the-clock radar screen to defend against Iraqi aggression. During Desert Storm, E-3s flew more than 400 missions and logged more than 5,000 hours of on-station time. They provided radar surveillance and control to more than 120,000 coalition sorties. In addition to providing senior leadership with time-critical information on the actions of enemy forces, E-3 controllers assisted in 38 of the 40 air-to-air kills recorded during the conflict. For the first time in the history of aerial warfare, an entire air war has been recorded. This was due to the data collection capability of the E-3 radar and computer subsystems.

In Operation Desert Storm the intensity of battle coupled with large forces using Information Age weaponry and communications created the most intense electronic battlefield ever witnessed. The E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) was an integral part of the battle serving as the "eye" that tracked all battle space aircraft and directed interceptions while safeguarding our forces from surprise enemy aerial attack. The overwhelming density of diverse electronic signals transmitted and received created such a congested environment that the E-3s’ full mission capability was greatly hindered. This E-3 problem had to be quickly corrected and a dedicated software support team sprung into immediate action. The E-3 radar software was rapidly revised, flight tested, and on its way to deployed aircraft within 96 hours. This quick reaction, modification, and change-out during the heat of battle emphasizes the operational necessity for easily supportable software.

AWACS


Other Sources
Link 1
Link 2

[edit on 13-4-2006 by WestPoint23]



posted on Apr, 14 2006 @ 08:24 AM
link   
Ask a skilled fighter pilot what he thinks of neutral engagement (nose to nose or mutual turn in) WVR fight and, if he's honest, he will tell you it's a crap shoot that he avoids if at all possible.

First and foremost because today he's looking at a 2 mile bubble that a HOBS weapon can kill in _without moving the nose an inch_. And for which his expendables has only a limited effect.

This more or less makes mush out of conventional 1-2 circle fighting geometries to the extent that you have to consider the range at which you're commited to a fight vs. the range that you can employ your last missile option /before/ risking a 133 million dollar jet.

As the driving considerations of 'do I or don't I'. IMO, with the Raptor, that decision is ALWAYS going to be "Not Just No But HELL NO!". Because, as a stealth operator, he cannot afford to make the fight an even match with the threat, just on the basis of flat plating the airframe to the 'residual' (deep penetration OCA remember) S2A followup.

That said, the reason the Sparrow/F-4 combination didn't work in Vietnam was because it did.

3 frats and an Aussie gunboat later and VID was required. Not because 3 kills was too much. But because we were not able to -accept- those losses as a function of having pounded the Viet airbase infrastructure into heated slush. And so had to come back and do it again and again and again to in-flight 'fighters' vs. grounded _targets_.

And this in turn meant that the whole Sparrow system was screwed because the 'quick lock' radar mode that _had_ to be used from the point (3.5-5 nm) that you typically tallied a MiG-17 at was itself flawed in the way the SARH emitters in the wing vs. antenna-point indexing angle was callibration skewed and perfectly good weapons thus did _exactly_ what they were supposed to: Fly out, fail to get good tether:seeker connectivity and failsafed. Boom. Over and over and over again.

Go to Full Systems Lockon and things change as the enemy starts dying from about 8-11nm out and has a dramatic tendency to increase the 'Turn Here!' rate at which he both magnifies his own signature and yields aspect so that you can run up from behind and rape him.

That said, what nobody ALSO seems to remember is that the AIM-9B was even worse for while the AIM-7 could present engagement parameters as a function of range rate and angle off (as a calculated graphical value). The Sidewinder had NO envelope presentation. And so could only be launched 'by eye' in a dynamic scenario for which the RMin and RMax was often 500ft of valid shot parameters between a 2,000 and 4,000ft marker through which the threat jet was travelling at as much as 900fps. Now chuck in strictly limited (2G on rail and 20-25` cone plus clutter variables) seeker constraints. And the requirement to push a further sequence of buttons 'under the sill' to go from radar to heat. As well as USAF Fluid Four training (wall of Sparrow shooters, works real good WHEN YOU START BVR).

And you have the perfect formula for using one weapon that does work, sorta (limited frat in a mixed forces turning fight), in situations for which the other is a literal unknown that could really hurt friendlies with two glowing holes of max-A/B trying to pretend they can yank and bank with a 350knot angles fighter as a 500 knot energy machine.

IFF is not that big a deal anymore. IF you have a limited force count over-country and IF they are all stealth, the simple historical-track capability of the AEW&C, combined with JEMS and 2D ISAR (EPulse) systems can provide superb recognition capabilities. Even as AESA and Datalink increasingly remove the volume-isolate problem of looking at airspace defined in thousands of cubic miles with a sodastraw defined by bars of anywhere from 1.2 to 2.5 degrees subtended arc.

i.e. There is a LOT less screwup between the moment you push and the moment you judy your target.

Again, just the simple notion that you CAN see X as a Y target geometry construct (angle off, range and opening/closure rates) is itself a good indicator of target ID with VLO assets.

To which must be added the lower wasteage of missiles inherent to the turn signal 'honor the shot' effects of a threat player that doesn't know specifically (hi PRF/CW as a heads up morte) that he's under attack and thus can only randomly adjust his flight vector to compensate for possible shots.

ARGUMENT:
My big worry here is that people are in fact NOT TAKING SERIOUSLY the Cope India results. Which should be a /world wide/ clarion call to shift towards sacrificial assets (UCAV) that do not require close escort by manned aircraft.

Because if you look at the InAF claims that "With TKS we are just as good as the Americans..." as being even /half true/. With only 183 Raptors slated to replace over 700 Eagles, we cannot afford to dick about with numerically larger forces than can relay even marginal contact reports to distributed formations (returning some of the refuse-fight options). While ourselves forced to close with a vanguard force _just to get at_ someone behind them.

Now admittedly the scenario I described was largely a fixed target DCA profile but even in an OCA environment, it is possible for stack-back (shelf) and offensive split (pinch plus swingouts) tactics to be brutally compressing to nosepoint plus TOF on a supercruise shooter and especially if you yourself are running with sub optimal loads of AMRAAM (2 with IAM vs. 6 without), you cannot afford to be making the 'ultimate sacrifice' to save other manned assets. While having only a 2-10nm bootknife as backup.

Instead, you must ABSOLUTLELY REFUSE TO LOSE. By refusing to engage beyond a given 'screw the visual, no radar merge!' cutoff line.

And that means putting the bombers ahead of the fighters in a way that makes the THREAT bring his nose off and stabilize as he tries to blow up robots.

Not the other MiG Sweep way around that once we used to our horror in an S2A infested environment.

CONCLUSION:
The reality is that the F-22 pilot did indeed make a mistake. That being that he would be exposed to an opfor under conditions for which the Hornet is designed to win the fight. Which is to say coming into an engagement without a first-shot decision on hostility and probably less than 320 knots on the clock to keep nose hose rates very high as everybody goes ape at the 3/9.

THIS is how dumbass morons in the back of beyond harass as much as hassle the USN with 'everyday' encounters with threats that may or may not give notice at 20 miles that today they feel strong enough to take some scalps.

But it is NOT the way the Raptor should be used, /ever/.

COE baby. Contempt Of Engagement.

You are a sniper interested in multishot kills from beyond the threat optics and MAWS range. Not a flying monkey doing ID tree acrobatics purely for the sake of 'getting in close' for a chance of browning your nose in someone elses' tail pipe.

Maybe we can afford to trade 48 million dollar Super Hornets to 20 million dollar MiG-21 Lancer upgrades that way. We sure as heck cannot give away the _BILLION DOLLAR_ techbase which the Raptor represents. For want of a pilot coming into a 1v.whatever (it's your side of the number column that counts, not their's) and thus making an abominable mistake before he even starts to dance.


KPl.

[edit on 14-4-2006 by ch1466]



posted on Apr, 14 2006 @ 09:41 PM
link   
While the USAF/USN fighters have dominated the skies over Korea, Vietnam and the SW Asia, the greatest threat now to any military aircraft will be AAA and SAM's not other enemy aircraft. The Raptor's stealthiness(not invisiblity) give it a huge edge over other fighters. Now let's talk reality. With WVR head-on approach speeds of Mach2+, unless you have a radar/IR lock on your target, you haven't a chance to shoot it down with a missile or gun. Any fighter with a greater than 1:1 thrust ratio can go vertical and within a few of seconds to lose a missile. It's a little known fact, in order to keep missile weights down, they don't have much motor burn time especially in the z-axis. Look at the size on SAM's versus AAM's, I doubt that there's an AAM that can climb much more than a mile from the horizontal plane . That's why pilots are trained to head for the roof after a face-to-face pass. AAM's are designed to shoot down enemy largely from behind and within a 45 degree cone from ac centerline. Anything angle-of-attack much greater than that and the missile will run out of thrust. That why the USAF is working on scramjet motor for the AAM 120! Heh,heh,heh



posted on Apr, 15 2006 @ 01:47 PM
link   

Originally posted by ch1466
[...] We sure as heck cannot give away the _BILLION DOLLAR_ techbase which the Raptor represents.[...]


Interesting point. Do you think that the F-22's would back out of a WVR fight when such a situation arises to protect the several billion dollar worthy American tech base that an enemy/rival state could gain from a felled Raptor in its posession if it loses at WVR fights (to the likes of say a flanker or a mig-29) .... which is very possible BTW.



Till other rival nations catch up to the tech level the Raptor represents, is it possible that the US would keep the F-22 out of challenging WVR scenarios if they arose and decide to field lesser (at least in tech terms) jets for WVR and keep the Raptor solely for BVR ???

[edit on 15/4/06 by Stealth Spy]



posted on Apr, 15 2006 @ 02:34 PM
link   
Stealth Spy,

>>
Interesting point. Do you think that the F-22's would back out of a WVR fight when such a situation arises to protect the several billion dollar worthy American tech base that an enemy/rival state could gain from a felled Raptor in its posession if it loses at WVR fights (to the likes of say a flanker or a mig-29) .... which is very possible BTW.
>>

I would. But then again I don't see the Raptor as a 'protector of other airframes'. I think that is where the aircraft is totally misconstrued by both the AF and media.

The very instant you tie a hunter to the coattails of a herd, it loses it's proactivity. That which makes the F-22 most useful is in fact that the combination of winged standoff munition (now down to 30 grand each), supercruise and stealth means _it doesn't have to fight anybody_.

It can run from, run around or outlance just about anything. Which means you don't need to be heroic. So long as you operate alone and unattached and let small groups of you create confusion of intent through mulitple strike paths backed by SOLID EA.

>>
Till other rival nations catch up to the tech level the Raptor represents, is it possible that the US would keep the F-22 out of challenging WVR scenarios if they arose and decide to field lesser (at least in tech terms) jets for WVR and keep the Raptor solely for BVR ???
>>

The future of AAW is going to be dominated, not by 15 mile per minute supercruise. But rather 186,000 /mile per second/ DEWS.

ABL can reach so far in killing TBM threats that they have to 'scan the backfield' for other aircraft and even satellites to prevent an essentially LOS 'dazzle threat'.

The F-22's chief advantage, now, is that it can transit between target and base in half the time of any other jet. While it's 'Lower LO' and superior weapons carriage format give it some choices in terms of what it does when it gets there (I have heard persistent rumours that AMRAAM's next P3I-4 will include a DEAD capability).

THAT is what they should have been concentrating on, all throughout EMD.

As is, we are buying the JSF as a pilot employment machine and setting ourselves up to take /massive/ losses when somebody decides to put an ATL type capability onboard a business jet type platform and declare Air Superiority over a cube of airspace probably 60-100km wide 'against all comers'.

If you can't see the indian, shoot down the arrow (high energy motor burn signature). And then fly robots collision-kill 'interceptors' out to meet him in a fashion that makes it 'a dogfight anyway' once you've soaked his LRAAM count.

That's how I would tackle a penetrating LO force determined to roll me up.


KPl.





new topics




 
0
<< 1  2    4  5  6 >>

log in

join