1. If 'The Early Months' from September 1939 to April 1940 encompass the sitzkrieg then the MODERN DOCTRINE (as well as awareness of Hitler's
ultimate intent and utterly debased genocidal attitudes) has failed. British and French forces did not make a serious push into Germany /despite/
declaring war because they simply did not have the offensive logstics to make a 2-front campaign workable. OTOH, modern systems would ONLY work (as
shock/hard psyop devices) during the opening days if not hours that a 'Final Countdown' type engagement could be fought. Because without the
supporting infrastructure, the Allies would never be able to support modern systems. And with it, the Germans would never attack.
2. Assume what you like. What destroyed the French army in the field was the lack of communications and decent command architecture. If you don't
send the British into Belgium (alls you need do is drop bridges and the best Hitler can do is burn the capital) and you keep the French armored corps
together, the Germans have NO CHANCE because they will be met as they exist the logging trails and bottled up by a BOTH numerically -and- technically
superior force. In this one key area modern weapons systems might actually be useful in that there would largely be no CAS/BAI (pure blitzkrieg)
campaign as even simple cannon rounds (with 400+ knot speeds and smart LCOSS) give modern Jets a more or less insuperable advantage of 1-3 shells per
3. Damn straight you do. But since you cannot just 'transfer' single units (teleport an entire airbase through time) you would be better off going
with composite elements which /probably/ have a 30 day deployment pallet count and attached if not imbedded CS/CSS units. The best example, again,
being the notion of an on-cruise CVBG.
4. This is foolish. Because Germany engineered the border crossing incident as 'their 9/11' SPECIFICALLY because they knew that the threat could
not stand up to their weapons systems, 1v1. Now, you use largely similar Polish tactics of dispersal with airpower ONLY and Gripens or MiG's as the
representative modal, and the Germans will _lose their entire first wave_. Past which strategic interdication on logistics and Warsaw/Krakow don't
mean much because, even if Germany can 'sort and reshuffle' a terrible morale crisis; those same AIRCRAFT no obsolesce the mobile group tactics of
BOTH the Panzer I/II -and- the Cavalry.
Of course, IMO, people greatly misplace confidence in 'their' slaughter dogs simply because there are so few instances in history where the
technology and the tactics are so badly predicted that the a force disparity of the kind we are talking about could occur. i.e. Bullies whack the
weak. If you were to knock out 20-40% of ALL D1/R1 mission aircraft, political factors would take over to prevent a national collapse and/or mutiny
as the forces routed.
Again, for this scenario to happen, you must introduce modern weapons systems into a 'quick response' type engagement where you are working the
silver bullet factor (limited expenditure of munitions for maximum shock value) more than anything.
Let Pearl Harbor Burn. Kill the Japanese CVBG etc.
5. Why? Why fight an enemy with limited stocks of smart weapons when the ONE THING that is saving your ass is your ability to _rapidly regenerate_
combat power. You blow YOUR bridges. You cluster bomb THEIR front line brigade units. And then, maybe, if you know exactly where he was sleeping on
that particular night, you put a Storm Shadow into the Wolfs Layer and the Eagles Nest and the Chancellory. You cannot afford to be picky with long
duration missions when the enemy is advancing, not in the paltry tens of an OIF type tank brigade. But HUNDREDS. With the simple intent of rolling
up your basing modes from under you.
Again SHOCK VALUE plus INTENSITY dictates the tactical target set selection and particularly for the RDF:1940 scenario, you need to consider how much
of the big picture you need or have in the first few hours.
Once you have dealt with the initial threat of contested air supremacy, then, maybe during the NIGHT of Day 1, you can do some semi-strategic
But there is just no reason to assume that the battle would last long enough (or the Allied OOB be unit
rganic populated enough with things like
automated COMINT/SIGINT and artillery networking) to have anything but the initial results (airpower dictated) matter.
If your assumptions are wrong, so will your conclusions be. 'Assuming' I was not operating from within the threatened country, my big worry would
not be Poland. Because given I can sterilize the German ubermenche machoism in the testacle, through real-politick strikes on the innermost of the
five rings, I can always reliberate that nation.
No. My worry is what about Russia? If you humiliate the Germans you have created a power void which you had damn well better be able to fill and
with a UNIT LIMITED force of modern systems and logistical support this is not going to be possible.
Which invites political instability and the Soviet communism in a worst case scenario (inplace WOL or active combat). Even as the USSRs strategic
depth and slave labor pool limits the number of options available to interdict with tacair and ground forces from a 'containment and counterstrike'
At best, it invites you to face off with a nuclear armed Soviet state 'in another 10 years' and STILL face 5 plus more decades of 'lost the long
war' economic waste.
OTOH, if you /let/ Germany win the principle Eastern fights. And then stem the tide of the ground war with conventional (period) force application
using modern doctrine and C2 of existing French/Brit forces. While smacking Hitler down, you can start the process of reducing Europe from a bunch of
stuck up feudalistic city states towards one federalized NATION state.
Which is what a lot of the LOMD psychology here is about. Not 'what if' tactical gaming (nothing in the way of unit TOEs and total OOB as a
supporting logistical infrastructure). Just a bunch of sore football losers trying to replay the big game with weapons that -they think- would surely
let them win.
Without THINKING about doing anything better with the 'obvious outcome' than whipping it out and saying "SEE OURS WERE BIGGER THIS TIME!".
If you want to rewrite history, do it in a big way. Leave Germany to reoccupy at least the AHE states as a breakwater against Russia AND a stalking
horse one to the Allies. Then /challenge/ the West to come up with an integration plan which makes something out of Europe other than a
Marshal-Becomes-NATO welfare dependencies.
Time Travel with military force is less about staving off the Alamo scenario than it is leverage the existing outcome into a new possibility.
Anything less is strategically stagnant as well as tactically unlikely to succeed. Commandos would never survive in a rabidly Nazist Germany of 1940.
Any more than they did in the real war. A U.S. that could afford boomers and attack boats in the midoceans would never have the economic problems to
either slow their rearming or to require a sneak attack (isolationist defeating) political impetus for joining another idiotic 'over there'
knight-war hypocrisy. Because, just as today, we would think that war would be cheap and bloodless as a Sunday sporting event.
So again, you have to assume a highly limited super-force rather than a generally overwhelming one.
The only thing to be gained from refighting such a campaign 'as an independent operator' (able to provide tactical advisement as much as systems
expertise to select governments given specific SHAFE type controls over their national forces) would be if you acknowledged the one thing that
Hitler was right. Not in what he did. Nor certainly in the way he went about doing it. But in ultimately coming close to creating a continental
power block that could economically and socially withstand external pressures even as fallout from a megalomaniacal personal ego.
He was right.
The 'smart idea' then being to let him get /almost there/ while unifying Allied responses to his threat (assuming the Stalking Horse role) so that a
sudden-save could still leave sufficient dynamism to overcome a staticist inertia that plagues Europe to this day.
Dynamism meaning defeat with ease so that society has no overwhelming nationalistic hatred of a people. So much as a well defined image of 'what
could happen if...' we don't all band together to police ourselves.