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Originally posted by k4rupt
rogue1, you COMPLETELY ignored my question YET AGAIN. This is getting lame and childish. You are basically repeating the same thing AGAIN to completely ignore my question. I asked, why are you willing to trade millions of American lives for to obliterate China?
Originally posted by rogue1
Stellar bases most of his opinion on DIA reports from the late 70's and 80's, about Soviet Military power.
These reports were vastly overinflated and in some cases completely falsified Soviet capabilites.
The fact is that the Soviets were never that advanced and Russian cpabilities are not an extension from Soviet times.
Sorry Stellar but the Soviets/Russians weren't that advanced.
The following exerpt, refers to Team B, which I have shown in previous posts were the people behind the DIA's - Soviet Military Power reports.
For example, the range of the Backfire medium bomber was considerably overestimated, and the number of Backfires the Soviet Union would acquire by 1984 was overestimated by more than 100 percent (estimating 500 when the real figure was 235).
The Tu-22M designation was used by the Soviets during SALT-2 arms control negotiations, creating the impression that the Backfire-A aircraft was a modification of the Tu-22 Blinder. This designation was adopted by the US State and Defense Departments, although some contended that the designation was deliberately deceptive, and intended to hide the performace of the Backfire. Other sources suggest the "deception" was internal, because this made it easier to get budgets approved. According to some sources, the Backfire-B/C production variants were believed to be designated Tu-26 by Russia, although this is disputed by many sources. At Tupolev the aircraft was designated the AM.
Many of the development steps in manufacturing the AM were unique in their time. Special attention was given to the construction of the variable sweep wing - the basis of the whole project. The mid-mounted wings are variable, swept-back, and tapered with curved tips and a wide wing root. Two turbofan engines are mounted in the body, with large rectangular air intakes and dual exhausts. The fuselage is long and slender with a solid, pointed nose and stepped cockpit. The body is rectangular from the air intakes to the exhausts. The tail fin is swept-back and tapered with a square tip. The flats are mid-mounted on the body, swept-back, and tapered with blunt tips. The wing consists of a center section and two outer panels that have five fixed positions with respect to the leading edge sweep. The two-spar centre section has a rear web and bearing skin panel. The outer wings are secured to the centre section with the aid of hinged joints. The high-lift devices include three-section slats and double-slotted flaps on the outer wings (extension angle: 23~ for takeoff and 40~ for landing) and a tilting flap on the centre section.
During the SALT II process, the United States negotiating team obtained a statement from then-Soviet Premier Brezhnev that the Backfire's refueling capabilities would not be upgraded to allow them to function as intercontinental strategic bombers, and that the Soviets would only build 30 of these bombers per year. When the SALT-2 treaty was signed in 1979, the Soviets informed the USA that it would not equip the TU-22M bombers with air refueling devices. SALT II was not ratified, though subsequently the air refueling system was removed from all TU-22M.
According to press reports in the late 1980s, a defector stated that the Backfire was regularly exercised at intercontinental range, that this intercontinental range was greater than the Bison's, that the Backfire had a screw-in type refueling probe, that this screw-in refueling probe was stockpiled for every Backfire at all bomber bases, and that the Soviets had an active program of camouflage, concealment, and deception to mislead the West about the intercontinental range capability of the Backfire.
"DIA stated in its unclassified February 1990 Soviet Force Structure Summary publication on page 6 that: `The Backfire has an intercontinental strike capability when equipped with a refueling probe.'
The US proposed to the Soviets that they sign a politically binding declaration outside of START, which would commit them to: (1) not give the Backfire an intercontinental capability by air-to-air refueling or by any other means; (2) deploy no more than 400 Backfire; and (3) include all Backfire -- including naval Backfire--in the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] aircraft limits.
Team B overestimated the accuracy of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, feeding the unwarranted fears of a "window of vulnerability" for the US ICBM deterrent.
Perhaps most critical for the key issue of Minuteman vulnerability were the estimates of missile accuracy. In the early 1970s, Soviet missile accuracies tended to be underestimated. Perhaps in part in overcompensation, the estimates from 1977 through 1980 in turn overestimated Soviet missile accuracies, although this did not become clear until 1983. Although these overestimates of the late 1970s were closer to Team B's alarmist projections, they were not influenced by the unproven assertions of Team B but by the fact that tests of the SS-18 Mod 4 and SS-19 Mod 3 in late 1977 and early 1978 yielded better results than expected.
Team B estimated that the Soviet Union would field a mobile ABM system, which it did not.
While Gorbachev offers some reassurances on the
Krasnoyarsk radar (which do not involve dismantling this
facility that violates the ABM Treaty), little-publicized
advances in Soviet missile defense continue.
The Air Force Intelligence Service has discovered secret
underground silos believed to be for antiballistic missile radars
and interceptors that are banned under the ABM Treaty.
These are located throughout the Soviet Union, near command
bunkers, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and other strategic
sites. The Soviet ABM plant near Tyumen has recently
doubled in size. It is believed that as many as 3,000 SH-08
and SH-04 interceptors will be produced there -- far more than
the 100 that are allowed by treaty. In addition, electronic
monitoring of the Soviet nation-wide network of phased-array
radars revealed testing related to battle-management
capabilities (Washington Ernes Mar 10,1988).
It regarded as ominous, rather than reassuring, that no intelligence information had been acquired on Soviet development of a nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare capability, again raising concerns over a looming threat that did not arise.
Team B saw as a "serious concern" the possible upgrading of Soviet mobile intermediate range missiles (SS-20s) to ICBMs and criticized the draft NIE for estimating that the SS-16 mobile ICBM program would remain small. In the event, no SS-16s were deployed, and no SS-20s were upgraded to ICBMs.
The SS-16 is a three-stage, solid-propellant, single-RV ICBM that the Soviets claim has not been deployed. The system was first tested in 1972; the last known test took place in 1976. The SS-20 LRINF missile is closely related to the SS-16. The SS-16 probably was intended originally for both silo and mobile deployment, using equipment and a basing arrangement comparable to that used with the SS-20. The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage, the RV, or the appropriate device for targeting the RV of that missile. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it indicates that the SS-16 activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of SALT II, which banned SS-16 deployment.
When the INF Treaty entered into force in June 1988, Votkinsk was a closed city of 100,000 people located in the Ural Mountains, approximately 1,000 kilometers northeast of Moscow. Three INF missiles had been assembled there: SS-12s, SS-20s, and SS-23s. The Votkinsk plant still assembled some of the Soviet Union's most modern ballistic missiles, specifically the SS-25 missile.3
Encased in large missile canisters, SS-25 missiles were shipped from the plant in special railroad cars to operational military units. The SS-25 was not banned under the INF Treaty. However, the missile's first stage was physically similar to the SS-20 first stage; its missile canister was similar in size and weight; and its railcar exiting the assembly plant was similar to those used to transport SS-20s. The major difference in the two missiles was that the SS-20 was a two-stage missile in which the second stage was 2.87 meters long, while the SS-25 was a three-stage missile, with a second stage 3.07-meter-long.4 Given these similarities and differences, treaty negotiators had to agree upon an inspection process that would allow U.S. inspectors to be sure that no SS-20 missiles or missile stages were leaving the plant.
3. SS-20 data taken from the IISS Military Balance 1981-1982, page 105. Mod 2 is the version so often discussed in the European theater, with 3-150 KT RVs. The range of Mod 2 is given at 5600 kilometers. By shifting to a single 50 KT RV, a range of 7400 kilometers is obtained. Both Mods clearly meet the SALT II criterion of being an ICBM, yet the SS-20 is not listed anywhere in the agreed statements or understandings as being a SALT II accountable ICBM. Despite the fact that the Mod I only has a 5000 kilometer range, any missile that has been tested in an ICBM mode is supposed to count.
With respect to exotic technologies for ABM defense, Team B castigated the NIE for failing to draw more attention to the threat of Soviet development of charged particle-beam directed energy interceptors, stating that it would be "difficult to overestimate" the magnitude of the Soviet effort, yet by those very alarmist words it did so.
The Soviets are also developing an airborne laser. Assuming a successful development effort, limited initial deployment could begin in the early l990s. Such a laser platform could have missions including antisatellite operations, protection of high-value airborne assets, and cruise missile defense.
The Soviets are working on technologies or have specific weapons-related programs underway for more advanced antisatellite systems. These include space-based kinetic energy, ground- and space-based laser, particle beam, and radio frequency weapons. The Soviets apparently believe that these techniques offer greater promise for future antisatellite application than continued development of ground-based orbital interceptors equipped with conventional warheads. The Soviets also believe that military applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile defenses.
The USSR's high-energy laser program, which dates from the mid-1960s, is much larger than the US effort. They have built over a half dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges, and they have over 10,000 scientists and engineers associated with laser development. They are developing chemical lasers and have continued to work on other high-energy lasers having potential weapons applications - the gas dynamic laser and the electric discharge laser. They are also pursuing related laser weapon technologies, such as efficient electrical power sources, and are pursuing capabilities to produce high-quality optical components. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short-term electric power - a device that has no counterpart in the West. The scope of the USSR's military capabilities would depend on its success in developing advanced weapons, including laser weapons for ballistic missile defense.
The Soviets have now progressed beyond technology research, in some cases to the development of prototype laser weapons. They already have ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with US satellites. In the late 1980s, they could have prototype space based laser weapons for use against satellites. In addition, ongoing Soviet programs have progressed to the point where they could include construction of ground-based laser antisatellite(ASAT) facilities at operational sites. These could be available by the end of the 1980s and would greatly increase the Soviets' laser ASAT capability beyond that currently at their test site at Sary Shagan. They may deploy operational systems of space-based lasers for antisatellite purposes in the l990s, if their technology developments prove successful, and they can be expected to pursue development of space-based laser systems for ballistic missile defense for possible deployment after the year 2000.
ASATs The Soviets may have a new "direct-ascent" antisatellite
capability, according to the Pentagon's annual report
to the Congress. This would be more effective than the "coorbital"
ASAT, which has been operational since 1971. It is
speculated that the new ASAT could carry a nuclear warhead.
Lasers: According to Paul Nitze, the Soviets have over a
half dozen major development facilities, including an ABM test
center at Sary Shagan. US intelligence sources suspect that
Soviet lasers have already damaged some American spy
satellites. In 1984, Richard DeLauer testified that it would
take the US about ten years to reach parity in laser weapons.
Active Measures (Wet)?: Since July 1986, there have
been seven terrorist bombings, three assassinations, five highly
suspicious "suicides," and one disappearance among European
scientists and officials working on SDI-related projects.
(Washington Inquirer, 12/18/87).
At the annual meeting of The American Civil Defense Association (TACDA) in Los Angeles, October, 1985, Dr. Teller stated that the U.S.
has made encouraging progress in research on x-ray lasers. But he believes the Soviets are a decade ahead of us in strategic defenses.
In 1976, a KH-11 or Code 1010 satellite was "painted" by a Soviet laser
and sustained "permanent damage," according to a senior Air Force official.
This source said that such paintings continued into the late 1980s.
One potential method might be a powerfull ground-based laser (why was the infrared sensor on one of our satellites suddenly blinded as it passed over the USSR?) A laser on the Mir space station recently "illuminated" an ICBM during the cruise phase of its flight in space, demonstrating Soviet ability to detect and track a missile, according t o Pentagon sources (Washington Inquirer , July 24, 1987).
The purpose of Mir may indeed include bringing about "peace" -- Soviet style,
implies absence of opposition.
The large-scale but ineffective Soviet civil defense efforts were also depicted as an important part of a Soviet design to be able to fight, and win, a nuclear war.
He spoke of the astonishing civil defense measures which have been developed, and continue to be developed, in the Soviet Union. He stated
that 25% of all Russian factory workers are in training programs preparing them for civil defense leadership roles. Major defense
manufacturing facilities in Russia have been dispersed well clear of all existing major industrial areas so as to afford a large measure of
protection for those industries in the event of nuclear war. Keegan alleged that he was in possession of ample evidence to show that the
Russians are in the process of building up huge stocks of foods and grains, in preparation for war. He said that all the evidence points to
the fact that the Russians are not merely aiming for superiority but are "preparing for war. . . ." Evidence available quite openly in
Russia, contained in Soviet literature, shows that already the Soviets have constructed enough mass-shelters in key strategic industrial
areas to protect More than sixty million from nuclear attack. Bunkers have been provided for the civilian population in all main cities,
including several which are the size of football fields. "My collection team." said the Major-General. "have identified grain-storage bunkers
the size of several football fields on the perimeter of all main cities, guarded by the military -- the most elaborate of their kind in the
world. We are observing the most extensive peace-time war preparations in recorded history. . ."
More about the man :[url=http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=6003&page=1]MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE J. KEEGAN JR.[url]
In 1968, Radio Moscow reported that the most reliable protection available against nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons was "evacuation from large cities and industrial areas". Soviet leaders assumed that American attacks would be centered around cities and industrial centers, so with proper warning time, Soviet citizens could escape to rural and suburban areas without harm.
In the event of an American nuclear attack, there were nine (9) different warning signals that could be broadcast throughout the city. One of these signals (which corresponded to different levels of urgency) would be played all over the city using sirens, loudspeakers, whistles, and radios.
When citizens heard the signal, they were instructed to move to a pre-assigned location, or "collection point", from which they would be evacuated to rural or suburban areas, out of harm's way. Every available mode of transportation (including trucks, cars, trains and buses) would be used to get as many people as possible away from the city center in the shortest amount of time.
This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed
cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).
Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as
reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.
The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation
and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders
hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.
Industrial dispersal. The Soviets have been involved in an industrial dispersal program for more than 15 years. Their approach to the program has been and continues to be the siting of new industrial complexes in towns and settlements with populations of 100,000 people or less. The program has several advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of great economic importance from the standpoint of accelerating and expanding their economic development; this is especially true regarding growth of such sparsely developed areas as Siberia. Second, it prevents high concentrations of industry in a small number of large industrial centers and helps the Soviets make better use of their abundant natural resources. Third, dispersal creates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. strategic planners and greatly complicates targeting tasks.
Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an ongoing program designed to harden their industrial base. Included in this program are underground facilities, new plant construction techniques, construction of duplicate plants, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, and expedient techniques. The first three hardening methods can be productively utilized only for new facilities and require a long lead time for fruition. The fourth method, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, has near-term implications but is expensive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, is relatively inexpensive and has short-term implications; it will be the focus of this discussion.
If current Soviet expedient hardening preparations for protection of their industrial base are implemented on a large scale, the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory capability could be significantly degraded. By utilizing relatively inexpensive and simple expedient techniques such as packing machinery in sandbags, the Soviets could make their industry relatively invulnerable to overpressures of a few pounds per square inch (psi). Depending on the specific precautions taken in mounting and protecting machines, they can be made to survive overpressures in the range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate specific hardening techniques.7
The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of
the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels,
and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President
Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents,
and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system
begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor,
mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just
no comparison between the two."
Team B even suggested incredibly that the ABM Treaty helped the Soviet leaders "to pursue a goal of achieving assured survival of the USSR and assured destruction for its major adversary."
Team B also reported "an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces" and criticized the NIEs for failing to describe adequately the scale of the Soviet military effort. While Team B was estimating a relentless, continuing buildup at a growing pace, it was later learned that, in fact, Soviet leaders had just cut back the rate of spending on their military effort and would not increase it for the next nine years.
To be sure, the Soviet Union continued to spend a great deal on its large military programs, but it was not the limitless buildup in pursuit of a war-winning capability that Team B ascribed.
Team B went even further. Its report argued at length that there was no constraining effect resulting from the requirements of the civilian economy. The NIEs were attacked for even suggesting that economic considerations might limit Soviet military growth, and Team B itself asserted that "Soviet strategic forces have yet to reflect any constraining effect of civil economy competition, and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future."
As you can see the DIA reports were wrong in critical areas, hence so is stellars argument. No matter how mnay times I point it out theough he ignores it
Originally posted by Omniscient
I would beg to differ; I believe the US' admitted stock of nuclear warheads exceeds 10,000, and this is assuming and they are being 100% honest in how many warheads they own; I'd expect the real number to be much higher. The US might not be able to kill EVERY LAST citizen with nuclear warfare, but I think they could cover somewhere from 300-600,000 square miles (keep in mind I have absolutely no idea what the area of China is); however, that's easily enough to wipe out every major, semi-major, and even small city in the country.
Originally posted by yeoldehomer
Keeping in mind the USA has enough nukes to blanket the world 3 times over. Also, AFAIK the USA is the only country to possess bunker busting Nuclear warheads.
Originally posted by Lecter
Russia alone has a nuclear warhead pointed at EVERY single city in the US with a population more of 10k ppl, multiple for major citys.
Originally posted by StellarX
I you don't much mind i would really like if you at least read a few pages of the thread you just posted on. Since that practice helps me to avoid making embarrassing/stupid comments i believe it migth very well help you aswell.
Originally posted by Stratrf_Rus
This is wrong. Russian missiles are pointed at strategic targets and ignore US population. The reason is that a nuclear war it would be vital to destroy the potential damaging targets; not some innocent morons in a city.
Originally posted by rogue1
The Russians have more than enough missiles to to pursue countervalue ( economic and civilian targets ) and counterforce ( military targets )targetting at the same time.
Russian SLBM's are not accurate enough for countervalue targetting anyway are only good enough for city busting.
As for stratr_F's information, he has ben proven wrong several times and never provides sources for his claims, which are wrong most of the time anyway.
You know to me what's scarier? There are actually people that believe China wants to wipe out US in the first place. That's HELLAVA LOT MORE scary, a sign of what the American public education has become over the years.
Originally posted by EarthUnificationFrontier
This thread is idiotic in the first place, but what you said is so bs to the point that i have to write something about it.
China cannot feed itself without US imports?
You just made my day, period.
China in 2003 imports 24% of its total rice consumption, which all of them virtually came from Thailand. USA my ass.
This thread seems to have gotten off track a little bit. If you read the original post, it QUOTES the Chinese plans of what they want to do to the US. Not heresay, but actual quotes from the military authorities. It speaks of a chem/bio attack on the soil of the US, wiping out as many of the US population as possible. While I certainly don't want to believe that China wants to wipe out the US, the facts remain that these words were said publicly.
I am not the brightest person on the planet, but for something like this to be said with such detail is scary. To turn a blind eye to this is a mistake. I also do not claim to know all of the politics involved with Chinas infrastructure, but if this was a total lie, I have to believe that it would not have been allowed to be said. I believe (correct me if I am wrong) that there are extremely strict policies of what can and cannot be said in China.
1) Chinese ownership of both ends of the Panama Canal.
2) China building the largest cargo facility on the face of the planet in the Bahamas, which is only several hundred miles off the coast of the US.
3) The fact that the Chinese control so much of the US currency which is a different animal entirely.
4) The buildup of the Chinese military weaponry.
5) The Chinese continued efforts to gain control, or build alliances with governments of much of the worlds Oil reserves.
6) The fact that the Chinese several years back captured, and held one of the US military aircraft, and dissected all of the top secret, cutting edge technologies on board.
Personally, I think more attention should go towards China than Iran.
The growing influence of China, regional security, the Iraq war and tensions on the Korean peninsula are also on the agenda.
The Federal Government has tried to soothe Chinese concerns that Saturday's meeting between the three allies is aimed at containing China's growing regional power.
Dr Rice was to return to Sydney tonight before trilateral security talks with Mr Downer and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on Saturday.