Originally posted by alternateheaven
I hate to do this cause it looks like nitpicking but the so-called 'invulnerable to decryption' algos are not pefect and not flawless, therefore
they cannot be invulnerable no matter how much someone wants to believe it. Having a huge keysize of say 1024 or 2048 or even larger 4096 (which is
slow as can be) doesn't mean its going to be uncrackable. The algos are written by humans and we are all prone to error therefore in every such
invulnerable algo there probably flaws which will eventually present themselves after enough scrutiny and render the algo useless. The point is
nothing is totallly safe, so to enterain such a mindset is dangerous in terms of security.
You appear to be fixated on the concept that complex encryption keys simply involve more integers to create longer and more complex keys. That is not
how modern cryptographic systems work. Not since during the Vietnam War has that been the case. Modern cryptography uses many novel techniques and
processes, above and beyond simplex key complexity.
For example, one process commonly used today by numberous systems is the generation of a discreet electronic key, or traffic encryption code,
each
time a secure communication is generated and transmitted. This encryption code only exists in electronic format, is only known between the two
discreet encryptors, and is destroyed at the termination of the communication session. Since this code did not exist prior to the communication
session and disappears immediately thereafter, it is highly unlikely that an enemy would be able to obtain the code and then decrypt the signal. And
even if an enemy were to successfully pull that off, they woul only be limited to the information contained within that one, signle communication
session. This type of system has been in use for over thirty years, and NSA has yet to report a signle credible example of a successful intercept of
this system.
In fact, I personally once heard (at a security seminar) an ex-Soviet Intelligence Official repeatedly cite the effectiveness of this system - how the
KGB and GRU could not break its encryption. It was only the fact that "lazy Amercian officials" refused to take the time to go into their safe,
retrieve the key, insert it into their phone, and then engage the "secure voice" system that allowed the Soviet ELINT teams to continue to obtain
useful intelligence over open telephone circuits.