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Originally posted by Travellar
I don't have a clue where you're getting the impression that AEGIS was an untested or unreliable system. nothing could be further from the truth.
The question that now remains is: How has the US Navy managed to conceal all its glaring faults, bad policies, and weaknesses for all these years? Part of the answer is that the Navy has a history of not telling the full truth to Congress. It is well known that senior US Navy officers have a tradition of omitting information about the Navy’s weaknesses and deficiencies during public testimony. For example, in the early 1980s, wrote Scammell, Navy officers tried to conceal the shortcomings of the new Aegis system by using unrealistically easy operational tests, then by classifying the poor results: “An amalgam of sophisticated seaborne radar, computers, and surface-to-air rockets ten years in development, Aegis was built to simultaneously track up to two hundred aerial targets and to control thirty killer missiles. But in sea tests against sixteen easy targets – easy because they were lobbed in one after another instead of all at the same time, as they would arrive in combat – the supershield missed all but five…” Consequently, “The results of the sea trials were immediately classified, ostensibly for reasons of national security, and it was announced that the tests had been successful. When Congressional overseers eventually learned they had been duped –a gain because not everyone in the fiasco interpreted ‘patriotic duty’ as ‘staying silent’—the Aegis program was very nearly scuttled.” According to Representative Denny Smith, a Republican from Oregon and former F-4 fighter pilot, Navy officers deliberately deleted key passages from their initial test reports on the Aegis system to keep him in the dark on its failings.
This attempted cover-up was certainly not an isolated incident. Indeed, attempts by the Center for Naval Analyses to evaluate the Navy’s way of doing things have been subjected to political pressure not to let on about any “implied weaknesses in current hardware or doctrine,” said Shuger. And I suppose by now no one should be shocked to hear that in the mid 1990s, during tests of a new guided missile, the missile “melted its on-board guidance system. ‘Incredibly,’ an Army review said, ‘the Navy ruled the test a success.’”