posted on Jul, 18 2007 @ 10:09 PM
We hardly have enough info here to answer the question.
American/European hardware and doctrine have a fading edge but an edge none the less, but that's not the whole story.
It's been said that ameteurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. Logistics depend in large part on when and where the war is, who makes the
first move and how succesful they are in that.
China, Russia, India, etc don't have the naval power to logistically support a long war outside of Asia. If they moved on Europe a second front in
Central Asia would cut India and China at least partially out of the fight and force Russia to move any support from those nations across Sibera
without the benefit of intact rail lines and the US would be able to fight a primarily defensive campaign on good terrain there with an economy of
ground and air forces, and the Europeans would prove equal to the task in their theater.
Of course that's for armchair generals because Russia/China/(possibly)India wouldn't move on Europe.
A limited war to undermine US interest in Africa or Southern Asia or the Middle East would be concievable under extreme circumstances (they'd
probably just use proxies and stay out themselves in most realistic circumstances though).
They couldn't win it in Africa for lack of the Naval forces at present to support a large operation there.
They'd have a better chance in Iran/Iraq/NE Saudi Arabia. They start to lose the homecourt advantage if they get too close to the Red Sea or the Med,
or too far south on the Arabian peninsula.
On the flip side, while America could easily keep them in their corner of the world for the next 20 years or so, their corner of the world is slowly
growing, and the US can't do as it pleases in their corner of the world. If China it is a given that China will get involved, the US can't take the
offensive against North Korea anymore. The cost of defending Taiwan already outweighs the probable consequences for the US. US ability to defend South
Korea could be undeniably gone within a decade in my view, and Japan could follow within another 5 or 10 years.
This is because of advances in China's brown water capabilities and missile forces, which hinders our logistics and protects their artillery from our
airpower to a certain degree, meaning we can no long take good ground and expect to slaughter them at ratios in excess of 6:1, because they're gonna
be able to lay off and pound on us without fearing that we will create a hole and seize control of the operational tempo and we won't always be able
to provide enough munitions in a timely fashion to make a smaller force hold up against repeated efforts from a larger force.
When China develops a large nuclear submarine force, most of the world becomes a no-go zone for both sides whenever the other is willing to oppose-
they really have to go nuclear even if their diesels are good simply because a diesel sub has to present itself as a target whenever it needs more
fuel and intelligence is just too good to allow that anymore. That's the standoff point at which the hemispheres become divided and building up
strong allies in the third world becomes absolutely critical. Whoever has friends in North Africa and Central Asia who can hold their own for a couple
of months holds sway over the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, and Mexico and Brazil become the keys to to South America.
Of course, all that being said, it just plain won't happen. Soft power is in. Everybody gets it. I think even America gets it, but America thinks
that the key to softpower is to derive influence over many weak nations through hard power, and consolidate their soft power along with ours in the