Possible TR-3A explanation

Another possible explanation of TR-3A phenomenon. Can you see similarities?

Hmmmm, Matej, I seriously doubt that this information can be taken seriously. The reason is that one of the images (reproduced below) is absolutely definitely NOT an advanced stealth concept as this article claims it to be.

It is, in fact, an artists concept dating from the 1950's from a book on how future planes 'might look by the year 2000'. It was also reproduced in Bill Gunstons 1984 book called 'Aircraft 2000' merely to show how speculating about the year 2000 has always fascinated us.

The only difference from the image I have is that the 1950's original was a full colour painting with a background in it and this line drawing has added three ventral fins to what was a completely flat design. Everything else is absolutely identical, including the perspective!



I have this book at the back of a very large cupboard but naturally if I can dig it out I will scan it for proof.

[edit on 19-1-2006 by waynos]

Here it is. Actually my memory has clearly played tricks with me because the image is black and white, not colour, and the author is Bill Sweetman, not Gunston! I didn't do too badly though considering this book has been packed away for 15 years! Clearly the drawing I highlighted is a reworking of this image and no secret stealth plane. Please excuse me as I have a cupboard to repack (but I'll leep the book out).

Ouha. And it looked so hopefully. Good work however

Some sites herecontaining black project stuff

www.aemann.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk...

www.nemontel.net...

www.flygplan.info...

There is another 'Black Manta' thing called General Dynamics(GD) Model 100 also known as 'sneaky pete'. The manta type of plane is a beast design too.





[edit on 19-1-2006 by Browno]

Mate,

No. AWCIT eventually led to at least one flying testbed known as Have Slick that effectively combined the carriage capabilities (2,500 submunitions) of the LAD and the conformal drag penalties of systems like the Boeing CFT.

The resulting shape was more of a half-cylinder than a mapleseed flat however and thus was /highly/ airframe-specific in terms of being tailored on a module-insert+adaptor basis for length and bodyform (getting it to rest flush under a fighter wing-chord would have been nearly impossible, though there is one interesting concept which shows them /over/ the wings of a purpose built delta wing interdictor).

Even so, Have Slick it was a good 14-15ft long and 3-4ft thick (I believe the final testbed was an F-111 fuselage where it was mounted somewhat like a Pave Tack pod) which argues against it being a longitudinal flying-wing-cum-lifting-body.

The other thing you folks need to keep in mind is that Sneaky Pete was itself an 'agile' (literally AIM-82) missileer response to then Colonel (IIRR) Chuck Myer's plea for a 'stealth by paint' optimized small _fighter_. Low frontal area, good installed thrust = good acceleration and turning radius plus range without supersonics in a tight package.

It was never more than a design concept that fiddled around with aerodynamic options (hence the very narrow sectional thickness') and was /much later/ added as one of the options along with the Battlecruiser (Mach 3 YF-12 clone), Bushwacker (F-5/Fang with LO) and SC&M (F-15 with LO and more gas) designs looked at for the ATF.

The problem with assigning the Sneaky Pete any relevance to a TR is that it was done in the period 1975-77 while the F-117 production development contract was not let until 1978.

GIVEN. Even the earliest PopMech or PopSci mentions of the 'TR-3' all alluded to it being a platform designed to _target for the F-117_.

And further GIVEN that the extant top-'tier' threat at the time was the SS-20, not SAM radars or Airbases (both of which had the radars and weapons options to pick up and deal with the Cockroach at considerable distances).

And further GIVEN that you can hardly lase a target from 50,000ft if the attack aircraft itself cannot see the target from 10-12K (low running scud is almost a daily occurence throughout Europe between 5-7,000ft, coupled with heavy surface mists at in the early mornings and at night.).

You can't have the chicken before the egg. Especially when the egg is of a Condor and you're looking to hatch an all weather Owl.

Indeed, IF such a concept existed, it stands to reason that any TR-whatever was more apt to use a combination of methods from the Tacit Blue (Stealth Pave Mover) and U-2 PLSS systems (Emitter Triangulation From 200miles out) to guide a GBU-xx (which would admittedly make for a good reason to have the GBU-15 short chord version if it's not too long for the Nighthawk bays) with a DME head to a point where an SUU-54 submunition bus could split to attack the missile troop with Terminally Guided Submunitions ala Assault-Breaker-Gone-Deep.

Indeed, just such a concept was trialed, along about _1988_ as _WAR BREAKER_. Using DARPA seeker characterization and terrain modeling to demo a prototype hunting CM.

Again, too late for the Tier.

In any case, you MUST have an overhead LPI + MTI + SAR _radar_ platform to effectively look for TELs deep in the ugly and that effectively is going to put a helluva crimp, both in the technology base of the time. And any loitering-LO capacity on the flying wing itself (we didn't have and indeed still don't have anything close to 'smart skin' conformal arrays in the proper size/bandwidths for a LO compatible installation).

Something that always interested me was the idea of an unmanned (possibly throwaway) LTA being so designed as some of the early TR flying-wedge concepts look /just/ thick enough to have a large emitter array 'mattressed' under a partial-rigid airbag structure with perhaps a small propulsion unit (and no man) behind or above.

If so, this implies that the USAF was looking at Bistatic targeting in the mid-80s (again most likely as coherent-on-receive element of ASARS with the U-2) which is indeed 'impressive' given the processing capabilities of the period.

As is, the most likely TR-as-not-Onyx (Tier-3) option is probably something based on the later General Dynamics 'Cold Pigeon/Model 100' efforts a known model of which resembles Tom Clancy's 'Frisbee' concept with a wingspan in the 35-45ft range (scaled to canopy).

While this can also most likely be attributed to a set of rapid-concept ('paper airplane') workups done as GD became aware of the ATB competition between Lockheed and Northrop; it MIGHT fit the timeline of an early 80's (_The Five Billion Dollar Misunderstanding_ labels the Model 100 'indvertant admission' as being sometime around 1980 IIRC) Tier prestudy.

One of the key arguments in the A-12 litigation being that GD was 'never given' the VLO data Northrop was generating for the ATB (as promised by the AF) to minimize costs at a time that they could either solve for weight/carrier compatibility issues OR Low Observables. But not both.

If a prototype CP/M-100 was built and tested, one can only ask what it did, (aerodynamically or structurally (that it didn't inform GD of the difficulties inherent to making the Dorito boat compatible) or as a LO platform (that it didn't highlight things like the exhaust temp restrictors on materials).

Indeed 'According to several sources' (which I can't name because I don't have the damn book to hand), the Model 100 DID fly. 'On time and within the specified target area' (hiya Mitchell!;-).

Something which GD management (now Lunchmeat Ft. Worth) adamantly denies.

If it was not a blatant "Here we are!" attempt to break into the ATB competition as a dark horse (again, by dates, as ATB was contractually wrapped up no later than 1981-82); it MUST HAVE BEEN as a 'not an N-1M') intentionally tactical and not scaled-strategic proof of concept prototype for /something/.

You just don't throw away money on a flying testbed otherwise.

This in turn implies that Ben Rich is lying about 'what GD knew' (on the A-12/ATA) regarding LO design in the wooden signature model, inlets and exhaust and that's a bit of a leap given the amount of money lost in the Avenger II program and his own hard feelings towards GD's contract services.

Yet the implication is that a derivative (tactical flying wing) could be out there which The Fed chose not to reveal in the giant lawsuit as cause-mortis for their putting Lockheed in default of contract.

A rather perverse interpretation of a 'for the convenience of the Government' argument to say the least. I hope it was worth it.


KPl.

Well ch166 you get a way above award for another great post,even if i have to get a dictionary for some of the words
Was the original mission of the B2 not towards taking out Soviet Mobile ICBMs ? Just wondering how it was supposed to identify these targets ie on boards systems or via satellite....

BMD,

Thanks. I should point out that that last comment should be 'General Dynamics (and MacDac) _not_ Lockheed. As the buyout had not yet been made and so Lockheed was not a part of the lawsuit which followed the A-12 disaster.

>>
Was the original mission of the B2 not towards taking out Soviet Mobile ICBMs?
>>

Yeah, and if the B-2 had been available in time, it still could not have survived in a layered IADS as dense as that covering Eastern Europe 'just' to hunt SS-20. Even as I doubt if doctrine would have let a SIOP asset be risked (wrong signal, too few airframes to make ballistic-delivery count on widely dispersed TEL units).

That said, for much the same reasons, the B-2, to me, is more of a decapitation asset designed to exploit (unsupported) the massive holes in the Soviet radar coverage along their northern and southern borders as any system specifically intended to suppress-on-demand SS-24/25 based intercontinentals.

1. If, in an already tense situation, the Soviets start seeing MULTIPLE atomic dets reported across the heart of their deepest homeland strategic assets, they are going to 'assume the worst'. And flush every silo they have on a use-or-lose basis of proven effect as much as intent retaliatory strikes.

2. If you are out there getting 20-50, still operational, road or rail based TELs as a second-strike reserve, AFTER you have more or less allowed all the hardened silo systems to launch (because, again, you cannot get enough stealth platforms and cruise over the fence to cap every hole without being caught). You have both ensured that the U.S. is a radiologic wasteland, win-lose-or-last-man-standing 'drawn'.
And guaranteed there is so much EMP and hardkill (rollback as a 100nm wide corridor clearance effect) in play that the threat IADS is going to be virtually non existent.

OTOH, if you are truly 'wired in' to the enemy C3 at it's highest levels, peeking into his his undersea cable traffic as much as head, the notion that the Russians can make another Cuba/Berlin incident happen without your knowing about the planning stage precursors is much less severe.

At which point, you are left with madman or palace coup (highly isolated actions begun without the participation of the whole Soviet military as much as Politburo 'process of execution' activity cue) scenarios in which release of the strategic forces can occur but only on more limited level.

In these conditions, the 'targeting' is entirely diplomatic. As in do we decapitate X, Y and Z before or after they can get into secure bunkers so deep that it takes a Titan or BUFF (W/B-53) combination to shake them down?

If the answer is before, then just a few B-2 with AGM-131 as much as B-83 can drop on Moscow and a couple other key C3 routing centers, from far enough away, to possibly score the headshot and let us deal with the aftermath, /quickly/ in a mass publicity/media campaign (Think UN and Adlai Stevenson with the U-2 photos). While the Russians try to find a replacement head of state and a locksmith to cut new keys for their reserve football.

The final alternative being some kind of 'we see it coming' crisis not unlike that described in Clancy's _RSR_. Wherein someone gets desperate and the 1,001 analysts at Langley _do their job_ in time to realize why. Yet are still powerless to do a damn thing about it, /before/ the meltdown.

Indeed, under these conditions, the whole premise of _RSR_ and the _WWIII_ novels is not so much faulted as backwards, because they assume that the threat to the ME would come as a function of lost rather than gained oil.

And that they would need to take NATO out of the picture first. When in fact, nuclear tripwire brinksmanship works the other way around to secure their WARPAC satellite safety belt specifically with the intent of making a charge into the PG happen without worrying about forces (or rems) in place on their own border.

i.e. If you want to hostage your faltering Glasnost/Perestroika'd economic fate to that of the world overall, steal their oil and dare them to pull a Desert Storm (300 days on) action with 6,000 mile RORO logistics in 20 knot competition with your by-rail ability to shift entire divisions 2,500 miles at 60mph.

In this case point, the B-2 forms a valid ability to single-strike 'impress' the threat force (coming through Iranian and Afghan mountain pass chokes) with your bloody minded intent: "If I can't own it, neither will you."

Even if only once.

Whether the Spirit is better than a cruise carrier or naval launch system is probably only relative to how much dial-a-yield you promise the locals "Better a B61 than a W88." to show fallout restraint with. Responsiveness would be critical and we didn't have cruise with the ability to do even holding orbit or throttle-up/down targeting updates back then.

>>
Just wondering how it was supposed to identify these targets ie on boards systems or via satellite....
>>

Me too. I personally believe that, while the Batarang has a fairly sophisticated ELS system (sufficient to micro-bearing 'tip toe around' escort threat bubbles as large as the S-300V WEZ) based on a tape-threatlist, it is /nothing close/ to the ESM/ELINT suite of a true ferret like the RC-135 or some of the Rhyolite followons. And yet that ability to mouse-squeaks-in-an-etherous-field sneak into your spectrum use (discrete strategic comms) -as they happen- on a first encounter basis is the only way I can think of that you could guarantee tracking the GRU missile troops in their individual scramble areas after they had left the shed.

I suppose it's possible that one of the 'black' constellation in HEO or GEO exists solely to 'theater wide' track regional Russian mobile strategic flush deployments but frankly, I don't think they have the optical resolution that a LEO reccer does and you could never guarantee or even /test/ them if they are a radar platform.

In terms of the B-2 itself, actively, the APQ-181 is a Ku-band system and while it is powerful, by bandwidth choice, it is no JSTARS. Very high vertical resolution in spot mode means you can probably see and maybe even auto-classify the vehicle if you can find it.

But very poor area (range resolution) coverage in sector, along with NO rapid-downrange response capability (SRAMs raison detre`) means you are effectively 'Hunting Taller Trees In The Taiga'.

With an axe. At a walking pace.

CONCLUSION:
It should probably be said that I am not a great fan of the B-2. I appreciate it's symbolic role as a strategic 'guilty conscience = paranoid discretion' intimidation platform but as a real world weapons system, it was and remains a tremendous waste of resources without enough sortie depth of microforce, CONUS radius, to justify it's presence in the OOB.

Tactical flying wings offer a lot more, but only because they are small and cheap enough to restrict the number of things you can expect them to do while still being range+loiter PRESENT as a 'many vultures circle the soon to be carrion corpse' mechanism for wide area threat coverage.

'In God we trust, everyone else we keep an eye on.'


KPl.