posted on Jan, 3 2006 @ 10:15 PM
I've been hearing a of lines about America being too bogged won to mess with Iran.
I believe this may ignore a few mitigating concerns.
1. There is no really understandable reason why stopping the Iranian nuclear program involves an occupation, even if Iran does force us into a ground
2. My map, which I admit is a few years old, says that Iraq and Iran are right next to eachother, so we're not talking about separate, stand-alone
forces. It's not as if we have to deploy an additional 200,000 men to deal with Iran. Much of what is already in Iraq can be temporarily retasked
with minimal effect on the security of US forces in the region- it's not as if a monsterous insurgency is going to crawl out of the Sunni Triangle
and bite the US' head off if we stop running psyops for a few weeks. The insurgents can't come out of the cities and project a viable force, they
can't take a significant toll on forces in the field operating against Iran, they can only minimally even obstruct major movements. They are a minor
threat organic to the activity of regularly sending small forces into unfriendly districts, not much else.
3. Not all wars are desert storm. There are a lot of assumptions floating around about what happens when the United States is not in complete
over-kill mode. Some assume that when it's not a picture-perfect, made-to-order smack down that it necessarily has to be a messy WWII style campaign.
On the other hand some just take it for granted that the US can take a big steaming you-know-what on any enemy in absolutely any conditions. The fact
of the matter is that we haven't seen it in a long time and we can't be certain.
If history is any indicator, our tactical and technical edge is sufficient to ensure impressive victories in less one-sided matchups, especially when
the initiative and control of tempo are siezed quickly but also in situations where these must be wrestled from an agressor. The Six Days War and Yom
Kippur War provide some evidence to this effect.
I believe the prudent assessment is that while Iran will not be found toothless that the superior doctrine, superior training, and superior hardware
capabilities of the United States can be relied upon to out-pace the Iranians, stall out their offense, and cut their attacking forces off from home,
thus making for an impressive rout not entirely dissimilar to the Six Days War in the Sinai. The one qualifier which seems only prudent to include
here though is that if the Iranian Army behaves impressively enough in the early war to achieve certain criticical objectives, most noteably the
crossing of the Tigiris at Mosul and thereby perhaps convincing Syria to get involved, that things do become more difficult in terms of regaining the
If I get really ambitious tomorrow (no promises because this looks like it will take an hour or more) perhaps I can go through Global Security and map
out exactly what our lines in Iraq would look like if Iran moved tomorrow, what our reinforcement timetable should look like, and with a lot of luck,
maybe even what the Iranian Order of Battle would look like.
I'd have to be pretty bored though- looks like a lot of reading.