Orca,
>>
There are, of course, a number of companies that are working on the true next wave of unmanned aircraft. Dont be surprised if you see horrible little
dictators and tyrants employ these more than we do at first.
>>
Not in this country. Not in a land where A-UAV weaponization of more than sailplanes is nothing less than a nightmare to be endlessly 'delayed' and
fought off by those interested only in the largest discretionary budget segment (/every/ year) as a federal dole.
>>
I know of atleast one company that is going beyond just stealthy unmanned reconnasance and fighter aircraft which seem to be the vogue. Fancy
aircraft are nice but theyre strategic value is inversely proportional to their unit price.
>>
If there are three most basic laws of Firepower-
1. Shoot, Shoot, Shoot.
With the cheapest, most enduring, platform. Because the more you are PRESENT to take shots, for any given SSPK, the more you will win.
2. Maneuver to Target, Not to Engage.
So that you may reserve your operational initiative by NOT coming into the briar patch as a predictably exposed ATO as much as force composite.
3. Never associate your Fires with your Targeting.
So that you do not compromise secure system databases or the bottom line with 'multirole' homogenization of performance and survivability beyond the
value of the mission left undone.
Then there truly is no place for manned platforms. Because the payload loft penalty, even on the most COE-centric systems (TAV skip bombers and the
like) is just so horrid for every 6X3ft 'hole' you put in the systems volume, that there is no point.
>>
Most UAV/UCAV projects are building on a very rough and early conception of these, almost as add-ons to existing military infrastructure. The key is
to reform the military around the new technology. This is the real next wave. I wish I could tell you a little more about this. It's quite
exciting.
>>
If you care to do so, leave me some kind of U2U and I will try to listen, objectively.
Realistic Patriot/Planeman,
>>
Great posts... you two sure know your missiles...I know this was brought up in another thread but i want to get your input CH on the AIM-54 Phoenix
Missile...I know its really old but I always thought it was the US's best missile platform.. when they retired it along with the only airframe that
carried it, i thought it was quite stupid. What are your thoughts?
>>
I like reach in more than fly in because I prefer wheels-in-well total control of an enemy baselane without having to come anywhere's near the target
defenses. Sparrow doesn't really give you enough trajectory control to keep from having to point the nose down to satisfy gimbal limits on a
conventional platform in the 15nm range. And while AMRAAM does better, it's longest ever shot was still a mere 21nm from a Dutch jet looking to bag
a Serb Galeb doing roundabout orbits rather than (say) flushing away from it's nest only to come back at you as the strike package tries to
egress.
This opinion will only get stronger as we move to glide-IAMs which no longer require us to cross much more than a 15nm BRL to get gliding impacts
without extended laser designation orbit lags.
In any case, if you are facing an S-300 or better threat with vastly superior kinematics and potentially (9M96) a similar degree of LOAL (ARH+INS)
allowing for a separate illuminator to use the battery as little more than a smart (landline LINK'd) launch box, you are better off not challenging
the threat to get even a transient blip track from some bizarre aspect (or low bandwidth) and subsequently fling a Mach 5 weapon along the bearing
from right under your ground track.
That said, see (below) my subsequent 'how I really feel' about the AIM-54 specifically and LRAAM in general to understand that if you make the
missile cost as much as the airframe you need to loft it so that one or both can SEE a target 300-500km downrange, you have gained little or nothing
when that (conventionally signatured) airframe is butchered coming into the F-22's turf.
Keep in mind folks, P3I is a /phased series of upgrade steps/ not any one variant of AMRAAM but many. In this, it is not unlike the 'MSIP' by which
F-15/16 gained capabilities within separate block numbers of the same 'model' (A or C)airframe. As such, when they repackaged the AIM-120 guidance
section and warhead using MMIC/VHSIC circuitry, along about the AIM-120C4, they effectively created _ELEVEN INCHES_ of dead space in the missile.
Five of those inches were immediately taken up by the AIM-120C5 motor extension. The remaining 7 are still spacered-out. According to what I read,
the AIM-120C6 is a USAF version which uses some of all of this area to support yet another 'enhanced' warhead system designed to accomodat the very
fast missile velocities of a Supercruise (F-22) launch scenario. It is essentially a directed warhead that fires forward, along the missile vector.
AIM-120C7 is the USN response to a need for an AMRAAM with more positive control of it's kinematics inherent to a new digital autopilot and GPS/INS
navigator which provides more consistent downrange shot control (time of flight to Xnm) so that the F-18E/F are not completely outclassed by their
slug-bug low PS numbers and non-existance acceleration, over the Mach. That leaves the AIM-120C8, which has occasionally been called the
'AIM-120D', to incorporate what we are all looking for in these missiles:
1. Digital Datalinks.
Allowing separate 'Illuminator/Spear Chucker' tactics, (based on you shoot, I drive midcourse guidance support). These will more or less provide
robust time of flight parameters (as viewed on the pilots countdown clock) for any given shot conditions as well as allowing X to shoot closer than Y
before /immediately/ turning away from continued closure. i.e. Finally a reason to have a 300km capable radar.
2. ERAAM level biplateau/throttleable solid or gel impulse.
So that we can tailor each shot to the 'is he FQ closing or is he tail-chase running away' for pole separation and overtake without totally
compromising the missiles endgame performance. At the time (1993 or so) the U.S. was urgently lobbying Britain NOT to go with the BVRAAM, it was said
that Raytheon's ERAAM (extended range AAM) could achieve 80% of it's projected performance for about 50% of the development cost by essentially
sticking with the AIM-120 baseline and just using a new motor. The Brits wanted independent GCS/ECCM which we wouldn't yield on (they later got them
through the AD4A seeker on the MICA) and in the end, BVRAAM was just plain better for what they need to do (max standoff with a conventionally
signatured Typhoon that looks 'similar' to the F-22's BVR exchange ratio vs. other conventionally signatured threats like the Su-30. Without
raising the principle-threat spectre of S2A vulnerability). AIM-120D or 'whatever comes next' is likely this missile. And while it will not allow
a Super Horror to beat a Meteor equipped Eurofighter or Rafale, it will likely allow an F-22 to score 40-60nm wheel in well kills while playing
'sniper rifle in a shopping cart' (no supersonics to impale itself on the larger threat poles). Such being the case book definition of
look-in/reach-in, IMO.
>>
quote: Novator R-172 The R-172,previouslydesignated the KS-172, is adeparture from the establishedfocus of Novator, designers ofthe S-300V (SA-12)
system'slong range SAMs. Like the R-37,the R-172 was developed as an'AWACS killer'. The missile employs an active radar seeker and inertial
midcourseguidance.Two configurations are known, with and without a booster pack.With the boosterthe missile is claimed to achieve a range of 215 NMI,
without 160 NMI. Cited seekerperformance is similar to the R-37.While the R-172 is less mature than the R-37, India hasrecently negotiated an
arrangement to fund final development and licence produce theweapon, not unlike the extant deal to licence the Yakhont as the BrahMos
>>
First off, it really should be Ks-172 which, if strictly parsed to the /original/ Russian designation system would mean 'komplex' or complete
missile system including launcher and 'boosted' or 'plus stage'. This would be separate from an industry/MOD internal 'article' or Zdeliya
number which has about six total fields defining who-what-does-how-when-in-series. The appropriate designators now being put forward for the
'Rakete' (literally) Rocket (missile itself) are actually R-72 and R-90.
Also worthy of note, the Russians have blown completely their system of not applying an 'in service' designator to both aircraft and missiles in a
desparate attempt to 'promise the world' (you buy it, we'll call it real as we build it). Thus you have R-## weapons which are still testbeds and
S-## which are being given design bureau codes (S-37 vs. Su-47 etc.).
In any case, while I don't know what the purpose of discussing LRAAM is in an 'new generation dogfighting missiles' thread, it helps if you don't
screw things up anymore than the Russians already have: R-72 or R-90. NATO will of course remove the 'X' from the middle of the AA-13 or 14
designator as soon as it becomes clear whether this is both a production weapon and truly one of Russian intended service or merely technology coal
bed which the Indians are mining for their own system (much as their ASTRA is basically AA-12 tech without the stupid GDV fins).
www.johnstonsarchive.net...
www.designation-systems.net...
I also believe that the association of the Ks-172 with the S-300V is in error. As the missile most noteably near-identical (as a function of size and
performance envelope) to the AAM-L is in fact the (Almaz accredited but IMO, far more likely to be Novator) 9m96 weapon of the 'S-400' system. The
S-300V (Antey 2500) upgrade weapon is based around the 9M82M missile which is most likely the 'Big Missile' that everyone has been talking about for
the S-400.
The reason a certain kind of 'visual common sense' is important is simple.
9M96
www.military.cz...
PAC-3 ERINT
pvo.guns.ru...
www.kojii.net...
Ks-172
www.military.cz...
img58.exs.cx...
www.mipagina.cantv.net...
The first two (S2A) weapons systems are classed as 120km and 15-45km weapons against aircraft and missiles respectively. Indeed, PAC-3 is ONLY
considered optimized for 'lower tier' ATBM work in support of the THAAD as a missile interceptor which is why it's range classification is
generally looked at disbelievingly (Even though some publications put it's achieved Mach point at 5.7, or faster than the 9M96, which would indicate
a very long loft). Yet there are two conditions here which are important.
1. Does it need to do better?
For S2A systems, it is actually quite hard to tailer an aeroballistic trajectory to get optimum downrange, time of flight and terminal behaviours from
one parabolic arc. Something we have repeatedly discoverred in trying to engineer the Navy Excalibur/CLGP round and the SM.4/4a among others.
Straight line trajectories are much easier to do, even though the achieved downrange distances are shorter, because they multiply weapon energy
tremendously which in turn lowers time of flight and simplifies 'dropout' (negative lead as an altitude cube and fuzing effect) on the missile
endgame kinematics compared to lofted rounds. When added to the tremendous Q penalty of low altitude firings the inevitable result is that a round
which flies twice as fast as AMRAAM may not be _required_ to fly any further (20-22nm downrange).
2. Radar Horizoning and TOF.
Even with Mountain Top and similar 'Illuminator' (offboard guidance) networking construct experiments, you are lucky if the missile+midcourse system
can see the target at more than about twice surface LOS or roughly 20nm for medium altitude targets and 40nm at high. Jamming effects aside, you are
looking at a 25 and 53 seconds to these ranges which is quite aways. IF THE WEAPON CAN SUSTAIN MACH. And if the target remains in the WEZ which
must, of necessity, include the tracking cube around the subject vehicle which is itself subject to various F-Pole maneuvers based on either detection
of uplink and high PRF/dwell based tracking 'activity' indications (TWS is not itself an immunity from track warning) by an advanced RWR. Or via
MAWS systems and indeed, even simple NVD on the helmet if the engagement is happening at night under suitable visibility conditions.
IMO, A2A has similar yet reversed conditional modifiers in that it's not how far downrange you can see them but how LONG they can see you. Where, to
be effective against HVA/ISR type threats, you may be looking at LOS ranges that may well exceed 500km at height. Yet the LRAAM launch aircraft does
not really provide significant improvement kinematics to overcome any range extension deficit (assuming the missile is itself capable of sustaining a
Mach 7-8 midcourse and snapdown from near-vac loft of 100,000ft or more) because it cannot assuredly provide (survivable) midcourse guidance over the
period of time required to 'get there', behind the missile. Indeed, with the /original/ (Ks-172) AAM-L spec'ing out to about 24ft long and
1,650lbs, it is questionable as to whether the launch aircraft could even function as a useful 'first stage' boost vehicle since carriage penalties
would be considerable-
www.aircraftresourcecenter.com...
It is worth of noting that the Indian AF ideal for 'Mixed Fighter Force Concepts' or 'Cooperative Fighter Ops' employment of LRAAM would have you
believe that even smaller aircraft (LCA= throwaway) would be the best choice for granting initial missile boost while the Su-30 remains 'firmly
subsonic and a decent (say discrete) distance' stood off behind the lot.
www.indiadefence.com...
This might work in the sense of providing the Su-30 a speedbump of defensive escorts. But it would not be possible if a larger motor is the sole way
to make the smaller fighter competitive in a netcentric engagement environment. And as soon as the Flanker commits to a sprint, there is not thing
any screen can do to keep it from impaling itself (or running out of gas for the return trip).
Why is this time vs. range modfier so important? Because a Mach 5 TOF to even just 300km (163nm) is on the order of 208 seconds or approximately
Three and a Half minutes. Three and a half minutes for even an E-3 AWACS is on the order of 24 miles worth of 'fall of shot' scatter adjustment on
a lofted round. And particularly if your weapon homing is ARM based (but even really if it is just INS+ARH without constant updates to at least
<30miles from the target cube), you are just plain screwed if you cut the tether much before 2 minutes 30 seconds. Elvis will leave the building and
your MILLION DOLLAR round will have less chance of hitting the VLA than a horseshoe.
OTOH, a Raptor, at full honk, (Say Mach 1.93) in those same 2 minutes 30 seconds, is going to move just shy of 20nm itself. And that will be atop
whatever time interval it has while you launch and get oriented.
Which means that if you loft an LRAAM system, whether 'illuminator' or 'sprint chucker' or 'missileer' combined, you had bloody well better pray
that the VLO Predators are not in amongst you already. Or they will stick a spike in the base of your skull as you drive by. Alternatively, if you
somehow use sacrificial sprint shooters to attack the strike package as it comes up just behind the fence of a national border or feet-wet barrier,
the question becomes why pay for the missiles to be airlaunched when you can presumably use the BARS (No-11M is a monster radar) to simply illuminate
from deep within the country on a truly 'big' missile class like the 48N6E.
Of course the notional best choice is a Missileer or 'flying SAM site' that combines both the multicarriage and picket roles while sacrificing any
and all followon fighter combat capabilities for lower cost and great endurance. In the F6D (6-8 AAM-N-10 with 300km max flyout, 5ft wide APQ-81
radar with 300-500km tracking range) the requirements implied an airframe which looked like this-
www.geocities.jp...
Not this-
airbase.ru...
img189.exs.cx...
(I laugh at the number of pole overlaps this plane expects to see /before/ getting to 'boot knife' WVR but at least I respect the need for a very
large degree of EW capacity as represented by the Sorbitsaya pods in the otherwise 'Yea Compleat Warrior' loadout.).
And while potentially effective in an isolated naval FADF mission (no ability to select specific aimpoints for cruise on a mobile target, multiple
hundreds of nm of space between the carrier and any landwards fighter threat) the 50-60,000lbs, 70ft wingspan, giant has little or no ability to
displace from conventional airbases or to 'outrun' penetrating OCA.
Thus, IMO, the entire concept is faulted based on the need for high-value/large-force-numbers on /everything/. All for a fleeting shot that you may
not live to see go home. God help you if you miss. Because a /miss/ is not just another flyout. It is a shoot-shoot-look -extension- (insurance
policy) of the first one. So that your torpedo spread has an additive effect inherent to falling curtain of trajectory variable missile arcs and
intercept windows this can mean upwards of a 38-45 second long firing window /before/ you factor in final TOF.
If you take the range down to the 60-100km of the rest of the (Meteor etc. though I've seen as high as 180-220km for that one too) LRAAMs, you can
probably dump the booster section and get weapon carriage boxes down to a more manageable 12-14ft and 600-800lb category (still a very big solid
motor) vice the 450lbs of a VFDR airbreather. And it will almost certainly get there quicker for most rangepoints by virtue of a faster loft. Yet,
especially, if it is a true hypersonic-all-the-way weapon, it will also pay a penalty for things like PifPaf shunt-motor controls and long-body flex
dynamics on the terminal tracking (which will almost certainly mean a bigger warhead). Compared to the airbreather which will be more flexible by
virtue of being /slower/ to rundown targets with more variance in it's total thrust curve and cruise vs. terminal Mach point tracking behaviors.
M3.5 against a strongly opening target in the 700 knot/30km range arena is going to play out at about 45km and 50 seconds. As the missile steams
right up his tailpipe, defeating any range or altitude 'stagger', in plane, as it chases.
It's useless against the HVA but it is /survivable/ against the F-teen+AMRAAM. Leaving the Turbo-SAM to more enduringly push-off the HVA-ISRs by
literally walking-pace going out to sit on their SENSCAP orbits.
Which brings me to the AIM-54. Called the Phoenix but known as the Buffalo, despite a 'Mach 4 class' (Mach 3.8, AIM-54A Rocketdyne Mk.47 motor) and
even 'Mach 5 class' (Mach 4.5, AIM-54C, Aerojet Mk.60 motor) what you have in this weapon is a 'trainwreck' (or a thundering herd of buffalo,
driven off a cliff) mechanic in which a very slow start and midcourse also employs terminal dive attacks that (though greatly complicating endgame
intercept geometry for the missile) reenergize it's final approach.
As an example of how bad this 'getting there' deficit can be- In April 1973, a single Tomcat, flying a standard loiter at about Mach .67 and
25,000ft (i.e. a preplaced FORCAP orbit), with one AIM-54 Phoenix aboard (minimum weight and drag) was turned to intercept a BQM-34E which was
_itself_ closing at Mach 1.5 and 50,000ft. Starting from initial detection at 132nm, the F-14 flew an additional 20nm (1 minute) to achieve firing
parameters of Mach 1.5 and 44,000ft. The missile then flew for 2.62 minutes or 157 seconds. To achieve a downrange intercept at a mere 72.5nm.
DURING THIS TIME, average /missile/ velocity, including the parent boost and a specially tailored (engineers spent all night tweaking the analogue
autopilot gains, something which would never happen in the fleet) profile of 103,500ft altitude (as near zero-drag vacuum as you can get) was no more
than 1,656 knots. Or roughly Mach 2.93.
What happens if, the target turns away? If the target is going slower? If the target performs a beaming or 'notch' maneuver? If the target
postholes down into the clutter where the Hi-PRF looses it in the clutter? The missile misses that's what.
In another 'miracle mile' event, an F-14, firing at a BQM-34A with an initial setup of 10,000ft and Mach .72 vs 50ft and Mach .75 at 22nm separation
showed the weapon intercepted at around 16nm in 54 seconds. DESPITE being a SARH-PDSTT all the way (no firing lag to account for time share TWS on
multiple missiles) in nominally 'snap down' assisted conditions for acceleration, where there was no time spent climbing to the loft. DESPITE the
fact that the missile was indeed /powered throughout the flight/. Average Missile Mach was only 1.88.
In the 'so impressive' 6v.6 engagement, the aircraft _could not_ achieve 'maximum kinetic assist' because, with six Phoenix aboard, it didn't
have the gusto to do more than about Mach 1.2 and could not achieve even this _in the time available_ to initiate TWS tracking on 'fighter sized'
(3-5m augmented drones) targets. And the crew were pressed so hard already (in retaining adequate radar scan volume overlay) that, instead of a wall
or conventional shelf, the UT-33 and BQM-34 were arranged in an 'extended card' type formation with azimuth spacings on the order of 5nm in frontage
(three sets of two for 15nm) and with upwards of 35nm in trail (83 vs. 110nm) yet only 5,000ft of altitude separation. What this allowed the F-14 to
do was generate a maximum X minimum scan of 120` X 2 bars in a giant pie-slice sectoring of sky that kept everybody visible with missiles in the air
and with no AWS-27 (E-2) uplink.
Even so, at the outset of engagement, a completely bogus 'orchestration' of formation behaviors had to occur so that none of the targets drifted out
of the scan volume or steamed right through it so that the initial drones flew at Mach .6 and the trailing aircraft at Mach .8 while the last was a
'sprinter' coming in at about Mach 1.2 to play catchup. The F-14 initiated firing at a mere 31nm and continued to do so over a steady-flight period
of 38 seconds, opening up on the closest targets /last/ (exposing itself to their weapons systems) to ensure that 'all missiles impacted within a few
seconds of each other' for a virtual simultaneous seeming engagement. As a part of this exercise in idiocy, it 'maxxed the dot' (ASE starboard) so
that it could bias it's TWS volume into the target lane while setting the geometry physically to engage the final AQM-37 (sprint) target coming up
the far right side of the engagement.
/Conveniently/, not only did the drones all arrive at co-pole distance with the missiles due to their careful range distribution, but they actually
/curved inwards/ to follow the Tomcat (like a drunk crossing lanes into oncoming traffic) so as to better stay in-volume.
'And So', over a total period of 3.92 minutes (235 seconds, 33 miles at Mach .9, 55 miles at Mach 1.5, a /veritable eternity/ in fighter vs. fighter
ops) the Tomcat killed all but the furthest-out (lefthand biased) 2 targets, thereby proving that multi-on-multi _did not_ work. Because even with
all this grooming of the engagement variables, the AWG could not keep everybody under track long enough to get a missile out to each of them, dumping
one target completely before the AIM-54 could hand off. While the other drone had its FQ augmentation now so far out of field that the AIM-54 itself
could not maintain the target track at the severe crossing angle.
Keep in mind that NONE of these were 'valid kills' because despite the nominally /enormous/ LAR or 'Launch Acceptability Region' of the Phoenix
itself, the combination of scan lag and limited PRF ability to handle various low closure/high crossing angle targets through the Hi/Lo interleave
ensured that TWS was unavailable until a point (roughly 50nm) at which the structured missile flyout sequencing necessary to get all six targets
challenged the assumption of killing before being killed. And so, regardless of supposed simultaneity, the entire raid behavior was suspect, not only
for being designed to bring the targets into the Phoenix envelope ONLY as the weapons came to bear. But rather for what it did NOT require the Tomcat
crew to do so as to avoid threat bypass or direct engagement of the F-14 itself.
This is something which no halfway competent (threat) fighter pilot would 'step into' as he:
1. Doubled the altitude separation so as to force the F-14 RIO to compress his azimuth scan field to deepen the bar search.
2. Transited the combat area at a MINIMUM 550 knots or Mach .95 to compress the flyout vs. SARH timeshare problem even more.
3. Maximized his formation frontage densities to make sure the Tomcat had to open fire at closer to maximum (TWS interleave) of 50-60nm to have a
hope of killing all targets in a very tight separation of missile guidance updates. For which sudden, drastic, formation changes would leave little
or no ability to adjust final missile update steering into handoff conditions.
All of which leads to the generalized sarcasm of "Ignoring the Phoenix shots..." among those AF pilots in particular who sparred with the USN Tomcat
community off Rota Spain during the late 70's and early 80's when the AIM-54/AWG-9 was at the height of it's 'mystical' powers (achievement is
the inverse of expectation, the Pentagon Paradox).
Indeed, the saddest element of this story is that no Tomcat has ever flown a Fleet Defense Bravo loadout of six missiles in active (cruise) service.
They cannot safely recover or (single engine ROC) launch with that much weight. And further they cannot themselves maintain adequate smash to
aggressively maneuver at altitude to set the geometry vs. fighter targets without going supersonic which both eats fuel and instantly compresses the
fight. Indeed, most of the squadrons did even not deploy (before 1988 anyway) with the outboard horn rails because they were draggy as hell and a
pain to mount/dismount in trade for the more common Sparrow or even Sidewinder (6X2 or 4X4) alternate loadouts. Lastly, the USN only produced about
5,000 AIM-54s and of those, only about half were the AIM-54C+ 'ECCM/Sealed' (either as new or by conversion) which had the seeker, warhead fuzing
and autopilot upgrades to be any good against more than the dumbest threats. The /total/ number is only sufficient to allow every Tomcat a Fleet
Defense Alpha loadout of 4 missiles. One time. And the actual magazine count during cruise was never more than a fraction of even this (back when
there were actually two squadrons of 12 Tomcats on every deck).
CONCLUSION:
There are many modifiers to the basic shortcomings of the AIM-54 system now. AESA technology greatly expands the number of useful pinbeam and PRF
options available across what is effectively the full 120X70` of most fighter coverage arcs. With almost instantaneous refresh. Bigger missiles
don't suffer particularly the AIM-54A's 'slow burn' single-plateau impulse effects on loft vs. direct shot mechanics. Air breathers do even
better because they need make no such trajectory accomodation. Two way datalinks and 'digital' missile IMU's (GPS enhanced) provide much better
indication of shot clock variables on actual vs. modeled missile flyout. Allowing midcourse guidance and even basic track via missile overlays to be
much more positve in overlaying the seeker cube on the target volume.
But the fact remains that if you attempt to pull any of this crap against a fighter force which has the inherent advantage of _making you come through
them_ on a predictable (Airbase Here, E-3 There) lane corridor, you had better count on making it your best, first and last, shot. Because you're
only real hope is to put the airframe in burner at launch from a roadbase and never take it out during a one way flight to put as many rounds as your
airframe can still acheive a median (1.4 or better) supersprint with. And even in this, the likelihood that you will live long enough to provide MCG
through to handoff on the missile vs. a rapidly retrograding standoff asset is nearly zero. So that you are almost better off taking an approach like
that of the Sunburn or late Kingfisher with organic network-search by the missiles themselves. Against smaller ISR assets like the Predators and U-2
or GHawk, this capability is actually even /less/ valuable because while they are precious assets in terms of inventory numbers, they are nowhere's
near the asset value (50+2) of the Su-30 which is the sole system able to loft both the R-72 and the No-11M far and fast enough to even get the shot
off.
Westpoint,
>>
Maybe he was talking about the ADM-160 MALI, below is an excerpt from your source.
>>
Thanks for the catch. I was indeed referring the the MALI though I think it would most likely get a FIM or MIM designator in the ground launch role
(ADM = literally Air Launched Decoy Missile I believe). Sorry I didn't make that more clear.
KPl.