>>
Waynos - i allways thought that one of the key features of the ALARM was it *remembered* the location of the transmitter and could attack it
anyway?
>>
Secondary inertial homing has been a feature of heavy ARMs since the AGM-78 Standard (which also had a smoke marker and, in some versions, a radiolink
wardet indication.
The problem with both HARM and ALARM is that they were designed in an era of electromechanical gyros and no GPS while operating with a seeker that is
effectively one giant twist-spiral antenna into which various wavelength subreceiver elements are plugged.
With only a limited quality autopilot IMU facility and no gimballed antenna (no room in a 10" missile body diameter with severe taper) to measure
changing off angle inflight, conventional ARMs suffer increasing aimpoint error relative to launch distance and trajectory program as much as the time
the Emitter wises up and dummy loads.
Now, having said that, IF the ARM arrives after a 50-70nm loft (25-35 in the case of the ALARM, another sign of 'badi ideaism' in a supposedly
lightweight missile that is in fact less than 150lbs under the 785lb HARM) a smart proximity fuze can often shower the entire area with a
laser-characterized height profile selection/optimization relative to manmade objects fitting the signature type.
This too is a characteristic of BOTH weapons, since the HARM C at least, and is a function of the need to structurally damage (shred) rather than
simply 'poke holes in' the aperture face and any command van which may or may not be underneath it.
It doesn't change the reality that the ARM may have a target footprint expectation zone of more than a mile across and if there are no signatures (or
if another decoy or secondary emitter comes up, often MORE than a mile away, hence the HARM flight into Albania) the chances of your actually
shotgunning anything on a mumbledepeg basis remain /incredibly/ small.
Which is why a highspeed system with a GPS/INS _coordinate_ tag taken from offboard (20ft long) SAR aperture patch 10m patch map is better. And if
you can, improving the (high value) targeting yet further by adding a seeker which can flush decoys and select among multiple possible (similar
chassis vehicles as with the SA-10/19) targets to find the engagement radar is even better.
The alternative is to take one of the Israeli approaches and use long range (artillery class= Nimrod or Popeye) missiles fired from heavy helos or
ground sites and cue them on with ground teams and UAV.
As opposed to a TRUE (half hour or more) loitering/lethal decoy system like Delilah, MALD and LOCAAS.
Both of which offer independent and datalink (MITL) search options that make the ALARM look /pathetic/.
Waynos,
You may or may not care to believe me. But the look of the AST-103 (in between the precursors changed dramatically when influenced by TKF90 and that
'data' came out of cooperation with Northrop on a light-fighter in the Gripen/Bushwacker class.
Anybody with an ounce of know-how realized that the route to stealth was simplification and canards are so far from being that as to be moronic.
At best the canard lets you cut the aft end off a jet which is okay if you can trade trim drag and CG shift fundamentals without blowing out the
ruling. But you can't. And you end up paying through the nose for 'wide shoulders' worth of structural frame loading and longerons to connect.
And that's before the signature trades.
Canards are worthwhile when you have huge ones for a pure turn machine like the Lavi. Or large coupling separation with a tail effector like the
X-31. Both of which lack the fuel to be more than PDI 'dogfighters' (your ninja moves, my sniper rifle).
But for a _cruise_ (sub or super, with correct IFF and motor/radar technology BVR will always win so long as the enemy cannot effectively /shoot down/
the missile) platform, foreplanes are not worth the hassle on a jet which has effective TVC and the European industry didn't even /try/ to pioneer
the technology base until after they had fixed the FEFA configuration in stone. Something they gleefully chose to do based on the driving U.S.
airpower model.
Only fools try to compete in a sled race for which only the lead dog cuts fresh snow. That's stupid, because not only 'does the view never
change', but the ability to take shortcuts and trade the Iditarod for the Indy 500 never enters into the equation.
The Flubber is an F-15 shaped like an ATF paper plane concept jet. The Rafale is not even that and FOAS is shaping up to be 'half a Raptor' in the
F-35.
All very poor choices which synergistically perform ineffectively in the fighter mission against any true optimized A2A asset. And are less than
worthless in the strike role because they don't carry enough, far enough, long enough, to make a difference vs. a pure missile or bomber concept.
And that's just sad. Most especially for Saudi which /no one/ will allow to fold and whose air force (at least relative to it's participation in
1991) is thus little more than a show piece.
If Saudi buys anything, it's market standing will increase (150-200 F-16C.50+ to replace the F-5E a few years back drove Lunchmeat's stocks through
the roof). But such is hardly a mark of excellence with either contender in this case.
KPl.




