A very interesting network IADS setup.
I would only comment that the strength of the system is never more than the least of it's component elements and in this case, any attempt at an AEW
airframe would have to be equally LO capable or alternatively _well_ protected in a sanctuary airspace system wherein longrange missiles protected the
sensor platform and goalkeepers protected the long range S2A. All of which layering tends to get /very/ expensive vs. the cost of the principle
'cure' which is not the manned strike system but the cruise missile.
In reference to which, it must also be noted that you still are associating your principle spear-tip capability and it's backing sensors with a
10,000ft runway which is not going to |ever| 'go away' as a principle system vulnerability. You just cannot protect or relocate that kind of asset
area and going to multiple dispersal fields leads to either zero terminal defenses or a certain 'activity indicator' inherent to MTI's and Emitter
Signatures moving around between active and inactive fields.
As an alternative consider:
Whether an aerostat or something with station keeping ability as a freeflier. These are NOT your father's football blimp. Modern lighter than air
platforms are now semi-rigid constructs with a shape more like a bedspring crossed with a wedge and can carry an amazing amount of sensor gear while
themselves retaining a low enough operating cost to be 24:7 capable even in peace time and somewhat amenable to shell-game decoy strategies (wherein
their lower baseline signature vulnerability to X-band is offset by increased surface area dipole ratios against lower wavelengths). Their principle
function in your system would be to take the simplest of sensors (IRST) up beyond the haze and polutant layer between 15-20,000ft. Under their own
power, they can of course go a lot further which also provides you with a reasonable ability to gain lookdown on VLO assets hot-side. In theory, you
could also 'rapid erect' a largely zero-footprint system using rocket launch to put the aerostats up as the raid comes inbound.
2. Range Tracking Cameras.
Systems akin to those which monitor weapons tests on fixed wing aircraft or the ones which tracked the reentry of the burning Columbia.
While some can be quite large, they tend (presently) to be used as optical 'adjunct' sensors on larger radars-
And so their baseline cost is usually quite cheap, ranging from 200-300 thousand dollars up to about 3-4 million. This compared to an
'anti-stealth' capable radar like the Russian 1R13 and 55Zh6, both of which run in the 10-12 million dollar range.
Again, IF you can /see/ the target at any of the shorter optical wavelengths from IR to UV, you can scale the image from both intensity and phase
change interferometry and actual stadiametric silouhette mapping. Weather will be a predominant factor but it should be noted that the average range
tracking system is fully roadmobile on a truckbed or trailer whereas your LPAR diagram is basically a CM target waiting to happen.
3. Lastly, look at networked Acoustic and mini IRST system to close the gaps and track particularly supersonic wakes in quite some depth of density.
The Brit ADADS is nominally an antihelicopter and CM cueing aid for SHORAD and MANPADS systems, it can be networked as a standalone system and only
costs about 50,000 dollars each.
When combined with the modern equivalent to these-
You quickly achieve a very high level of reliability at minimal cost. Note that the USAF has already shut down a windfarm because the ambient noise
interferred with passive acoustic tracking at Nellis and Edwards has a comprehensive acoustic tracking system in place as well. DO NOT BELIEVE what
is put out about the ineffectiveness of these system, they are in fact the way forward against VLO and the powers that be know it. As such, they
threaten /decades/ of radar dominant search methods for which the traditional advantage of RF based systems is no longer applicable: Namely the
ability to supply range/range-rate data overlaps within a volume updated bearing search while providing sideband or separate illuminatory updates to
weapons flying to a collision.
Today, it is _the bullets_ not the scope which is important. Because, provided you can supply a general acquisition cube, the missiles will quite
happily fly out on a strapdown/GPS updated IMU trajectory and look for the threat once there. As long as you treat space as a coordinate system (pin
tail on donkey) and provide enough continuing motor impulse (gel propellant or turbine) to reach it with a high residual search/pursuit margin, you
can fix the exact threat position /after/ launch.
This is the targeting model for the stealth fighter concept. It is basically a network-centric information model with various third party sensors
(AEW, various land radars etc) feeding their radar picture to a mobile control unit which forms a “whole picture” synergy and is able to delegate
relevant information to various concerns such as SAMs, military planners etc. One of these concerns is the Stealth fighter control unit which uses the
third parties data to form a virtual picture and enable lock-after-launch firing of BVR missiles (Meteor shown). This approach allows the stealth
fighter to remain almost completely passive throughout the mission, the only broadcast being datalink.
A key factor is that the AEW and or ground radars data could be used for mid-course targeting functions otherwise not available to the stealth fighter
–in essence it is giving the larger radars the ability to fire missiles, but through the stealth fighter’s systems.
Good in principle but you face some pretty stiff problems running the telecomms in such a way as to deny Infowarfare penetration of the network on the
basis of foreign companies having specs on systems and software for both physical and electronic attack vulnerability reasons.
This is why it is generally better to go small and dispersed with no SOC/IOC level integration nodes and to keep the 'there they are, there they go,
out!' levels of trackfile collation deep as much as simple.
Whatever the threat does to one sector ops center in terms of screwing the data input. They do not do to another because they are on separate
landline or microwave linkages.
Whatever the total IADS system is 'telling you' in the way of spoofed raid plots from individually tampered network elements, tends to level out as
the raid progresses inbound and different sector assigned sensors start feeding their own data.
And finally, because HUMANS are interpreting the direct datastream as visual monitor-presentations, making critical engagement decisions and
translating that to a /secondary/ (also moated-safe) command network up to the shooters on a "Salvo this many in this geometry on that bearing"
The only area of REAL effort on data security that must be made (2-way) is in the weapon datalinks as the wolves run out to meet the deer and then let
loose a single, definitive, howl when targets are acquired and must be sorted before morted.
In this model the Stealth fighter is more like an airborne missile launcher than a conventional interceptor. The airframe design advantage is that
speed and agility is less important, but the down side is that endurance and AAR is more important. The latter adds weight and complication to the
design and may compromise its position.
There is a strong argument that deployed like this, the stealth fighter might as well be a UAV.
Indeed, largely because you cannot avoid the /physical/ vulnerability of the DCA platform by simply relegating it's role to that of a missileer
weapons carrier. Even in war, 70% of a jet's time is spent on the ground. In peacetime, that number is probably closer to 90%.
OTOH, if you are going to do things this way (air vice surface launch and fly /out/ vs. -up- on turbine or ram prolonged impulse), then why not look
at an LTA which is nothing more or less than a weapons cabinet? Pilot time to practice the mission is critical to his ability ot perform it. And his
ability to perform it in the A2A role is even more dependent on both platform ground survival and his own fatigue. Either of which are bound to go up
if he is playing Me-262 games with the P-51's (aka Raptors) chasing him too and fro over his entirely predictable baselane association.
Yet the fact remains that numbers matter more than anything else. And so you _must_ be able to divide the number of AAMs available by the number of
kills achieved, per mission, per platform. Against the number of /critical hits/ your ground infrastructure (including the totality of the IADS/ADGE)
can hit before it becomes inoperable. As a first order downselect priority of choice between any platform choice.
Because if you can only afford 60 MRM/LRM (350 grand each) class weapons and 100 ISRM/SRMs (220 grande apiece) and you are facing 100+ enemy on the
first raid with only a total of 20-30 stealth jets. And each of those jets carries 2-4 missiles vs. the 2 JDAMs onboard a typical interdictor. Then,
even allowing for ZERO OCA sweep attrition with platforms like the Raptor and an absolute safety of RTB assurance to the basing mode, you will likely
only have 10 jets airborne (in the CAP cycle of rotating orbits) with 20 LRM shots. For a total of forty defensive kills _if none of your shots
And the effect, while stinging, will be shrugged off.
While the 120 GBU-31/32/35 JDAMs which impact (and soon this will be 480 GBU-39 SDB). Will utterly devastate your defensive network before moving on
to /shred/ your infrastructure on Raid 2. As blackmailed hostaging of the nation's future to its immediate submission.
OTOH, if that stealth interceptor itself costs 100 million dollars vs. a conventional 4th Gen platform which costs 45-60. And an LTA or endurance
UCAV costs 25-30 million. Then _in the difference between_ (LTA is .3 of the stealth interceptor, leaving 70 million per platform trade and .5 of
the conventional fighter, leaving 25 million) you can buy as many as 233 and never less than 83 _MORE MISSILES_.
For each and every manned platform which you trade off.
Used in combination with my multi layered, CHEAP, acousto-optic defensive networking, the result is the ability to put 10-20 shots on each and every
'just a bus' weapons cabinet and let the missiles themselves become BOTH the gun /and/ the bullet in taking kill mechanism to the fight whereby they
(whether ground launch or airborne) SATURATE the inbound threat.
10 LTA's cost 250 million. If they each carry 20 AIM-160 MALI class weapons, at a million apiece (three times that of current rocket based weapons,
leaving immense ammounts of R&D 'buy in' leveraging to the technology) that's 200 shots or another 200 million. If, in times of tension, every LTA
(unmanned and relatively invisible) is 'up' and /half/ of the ready-fire shots fail.
You will still kill the entire strike package of 100 raiders.
AND THAT IS HOW YOU WIN A DEFENSIVE WAR.
Stuff the enemy up so badly. Humiliating him in his inability to come at you again. That an alternative is diplomatically sought.
On a Bullets:Bodies basis of attrition, numbers always win. The only thing which delivery platforms do is carry the bullets to the point where they
can hit the enemy. And in this day and age, particularly given the foolish choice of a subsonic JSF; even the wagon-effect of a full-size (manned)
asset is likely not worth the offset in lost shots where you can let the kill vehicles motor on out from HUGE standoffs.
Before using pack-attack tactics that require little or no IFF or other sophisticated networking beyond an initial 'I'm here, this many are off my
nose!' howl of acquisition. Because there are no friendly air component forces to discriminate against. And the targeting is literally an 'as you
go' expectation of hitting /something/ with an optical seeker that is sweeping forward in 2-3 skirmish lines, 50-100 miles across.