posted on Nov, 29 2005 @ 05:42 PM
Ch1466, what do you think is an effective manner to retain our power projection, naval superiority, and budget since the new CV project "is a
Look up SWATH (Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull) and STAC (Stealth Trimaran Aircraft Carrier) and then REREAD my post.
I basically told you what the superior hull design is. Even as I outlined what a commercial diesel-electric propulsion system would do to provide
reduced cost decks in the kinds of numbers to once again have two carriers in every ocean basin without 'gappage'. And without plummeting retention
thanks to overlong cruises.
As for the concept that naval superiority is going bye-bye, the question is when it was it ever necessary?
In WWII, the Allies lost some 300,000 men in the Pacific due to a desparate desire to own islands that they would not hold for more than a few months
after war's end. Never mind the superiority of mine and submarine action in decisively decapitating Japans naval and merchant marine force,
isolating her almost completely. Never mind that if we had retaken Guam or Wake, we could have had the ability to reach the mainland AND forced the
traditional 'Warplan Orange' fight which /also/ would have required the Japanese to commit to a fight that they _could not win_ in the mid Pacific
Never mind that the /overwhelming/ number of sorties flown in support of both Vietnam AND Korea were landbased in a mix of tactical and strategic
platforms. Never mind that REFORGER was a hoax that would _NEVER_ have worked because 20 knot RORO'ing your boat vs. a threat that outnumbers you on
the ground 7:1 with _in theater_ forces and has 60mph rail lines going back 2,500 miles to other TVD military districts is going to force the nuclear
ceiling threshold breach regardless (Imagine Desert Storm in a builtup highway network, courtesy of old Adolph).
The same holds true of Desert Storm and the Balkans and all the non-sense over Iraq since. Indeed, the SOLE time the USN 'contributed greatly' to a
U.S. warplan was when they did Prarie Fire and Eldorado Canyon and that was only because we refused to use Team 117 and had no Secret Squirrels to
avoid the Alpha Strike option altogether (even here it should be noted that most of the USN assets never 'went downtown').
And finally, YOU TELL ME: Where the hell was the USN from 9/11 when WE were 'bombed'. And 10/10 when festivities officially began?
The Sixth Fleet has the Atlantic and the Med. The 5th fleet has the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf and IO. The Seventh Fleet has the Pac and IO overlap. And
in the THIRTY DAMN DAYS it took them to get their sh*t in one sock UBL and Co. could and probably /did/ _roller blade_ out of AfG.
Patriotic Duty that arrives too late is _worthless_, even in the 'OOTW' which effectively is what OEF was and OIF remains.
Build more old style carriers? (Cost to service them goes through the roof)
No it doesn't. 'Cost to service' is relative to the USN preference of using ancient maritime technologies rather than converting completely to
modern day civil marine systems for ships services. A very large crude carrier gets by with as few as 80 men. Never more than 200. And though they
don't have an airwing with all of /it's/ massive inefficiencies; the ability to switch out Blue:Gold styled crews at levels of half a thousand
rather than 2,500-3,200 is both a laudable and _achievable_ goal. As soon as you switch from the ludicrously expensive (ask Hanford what the 'next
1,000 years' worth of CVN disposal is going to run U.S.) and COMPLETELY UNNECESSARY.
Because a modern diesel electric/azipod system can get you a sustained cruise of 17-19 knots over 6-9,000 miles ('there and back again' for a
container ship transiting the Pacific between slave labour in the Far East and Consumers in the USA). And you don't NEED thirty knots in an age of
satellite overhead (can't escape it). Nor to launch aircraft with WOD requirements in the 20-30 area (the wind blows all the damn time out to
Do nothing? (Kiss naval superiority goodbye.)
The USN is a dated and anachronistic power projector which has an /incredibly/ hard time taking airpower more than about 120 miles inland. The reason
is largely to do with inefficient subsonic cruise aircraft and the inability to self-target without the Blue Suit controlled heavy E-jets.
Until they can take the fight 1,000nm inland with at least 10 on-station S-CAPs (Sensor Orbits) WITH bombs onboard, available at least 15hrs out of
every day. THEY ARE WORTHLESS.
That said, the basics of COP (Continuous Overhead Presence) in a theater is having decks able to support the activity and in turn airwings large
enough to sustain the sortie rates. Decks cannot survive inside 'Littoral Bounds' of white water and as soon as you take them deep blue you have
added another 200-400nm to their radius penalty for survival.
I frankly doubt if, even with UCAVs, we have the technology to survive in a Chinese Threat of 2050. Because they will come at us with maneuvering
aeroballistics at Mach 8-12. And Supersonic Cruise AShM under 200ft AGL.
And moored CAPTOR type mines. And hunting minisubs using AIP and pack attack kamikaze-supercav technologies. Guided on by ROTHR and Overhead and
endurance ASST drones and picket buoys (longline low-F capable) of their own. Targeting will be continuous and the /lag/ between acquisition and
fires release will be minutes rather hours if not days.
Which means that ALL THE EFFORT put into making the Air Navy the /only/ Navy will be for nought in a 'real war'.
At the same time, we have YET to prove we have what it takes to fireman-fights-sudden-blaze STOMP on an MRC or SSC/LIC action with less than a
fortnight of deliberation. Hell, we can't even do rescue ops in our own waters under a week.
Which means 'you might as well' negotiate for the really capable forces (the ones with all the budget dominance and sensor horizon control) to come
in and do the job right, while saving Americans wasted tax dollars.
Learn to read before you criticize my alternative to a nuke-happy navy that isn't THERE to do the job. Then start to THINK about the 20-30 years
down the road scenarios where those boats might actually have to FIGHT against an enemy that may well be our match or even superior as a technologic
warfighter. And realize that, even with my systems, you may be at a level of /sophisticated intensity/ whereby you are reduced to WWII levels of
'Stalin Was Right' acknowledgment. In that he who wishes to win must be willing (and able) to lose more assets than his enemy can kill. Something
which does not, cannot, WILL NOT, /ever/ apply to a big deck force construct.