posted on Nov, 6 2005 @ 07:32 PM
As an element of anti-PCI/FIAC drill, every ship should trail twin cables with explosive or gas-generation facilities sufficient to swamp or overturn
any vessel up to 100 tons. If a threat vessel persists in 'close formation' work, he will get his bottom scraped and his props fouled and that will
get the message across.
OTOH, there should never be a vessel of equivalent (OHP or better) class that close to /any/ fleet because the launch window for even subsonic AShM
goes to zero and there is no way to order a mid/inner zone overlap.
You chase them off with the equivalent of 'this is a warning, next time will be lethal' COEA exclusioning.
The USN warships - churchill and mcfaul collided causing over 1.25 million dollars damage , while on exercise - read the link :
Most people /dream/ about 1.25 million dollars. To make light of it in this manner-
No one among the 325 crew members on each ship was injured in the Aug. 22 collision and relatively light $1.3 million in damage was sustained to the
Norfolk-based Arleigh Burke-class ships.
Is an insult to every taxpayer out there.
Especially when you see, in a further statement-
“Shouldering is a relic of the Cold War era,” Spicer said in his own endorsement of the investigation’s findings and recommendations. “In the
new millennium, we do not want to shoulder a boat that could be manned with suicide bombers and loaded with high explosives.”
Even the United States and the Soviets, after a series of dangerous incidents between ships and planes, formally agreed in 1972 to stop the
The USN now has specific FIAC (Fast Inshore Attack Craft) class vessels for defending ports where busy traffic, low turns and tight channel boundaries
make this likely. Out to sea, the use of operational exclusion zones is the ONLY viable solution and is something best not done with hulls but with
risk free military training is worthless in many instances
Nonsense. We have full up bridge simulators which show exactly what happens when you lose positive seaway thanks to an unwanted collision.
If the MAGTF are spread out to cover the horizon against /real/ threats (1,000-2,000fps inbounds), every time you lose a ship, you open up a quadrant
to the battlegroup center and risk both the capital and it's goalkeeper (who is 'next up').
Furthermore, if you lose way and the nearest ocean going tug is out with the fleet train or even further, you are INSTANTLY looking at a scenario like
unto both the Liberty and Pueblo.
Because now you cannot stay with the fleet, you may well have a signature problem (something which will only become worse in the next generation of
LCS and DDX vessels with low, wet, decks and specific materials and shaping compromises to general seakeeping) that cues any subsequent attack from
'real' threats' and 'oh yes', whatever mission they are on, if it is littoral, they now have pinned themselves to PROTECT YOU.
the cost of such mishaps are negligable compared to the potential losses in combat - if a manouver fails because it wasnt drilled for
On December 7, 1941, standing orders prevented the dispersion of aircraft from central base ramps because the General In Charge was afraid of Japanese
American insurgents and an inability to protect all assets with a central control system.
This did not prevent him from a typical peacetime 'Sunday light duty' dismissal of all non essential security personnel. Personnel who never
succeeded in dispersing the aircraft even as they were attacked by IJN carrier aircraft on Ford Island and Hickam Field.
A situation which remained 'clustered aimpoint' RIDICULOUS even as much as 3 days later on /Clarke Field/ 6,000 miles away.
And you want to know the true idiocy? On September 11, 2001, at Buckley ANG field, I could drive down Alameda where it curves and STILL see neatly
clustered aircraft, easily within range of sniper or mortar fire.
Doctrine doesn't need a lack of training to be stupid. It only needs to insist that the old way doesn't need to be replaced because nothing better
or cheaper remains to 'guard what is'.
lastly a bugbear of mine - armchair admirals are first to wade in condemind actions and calling for " something to be done "
War works on a psychologic basis. Always has, always 'will'. The purpose of air in a naval interdiction/blockade mission for which 'shouldering'
is most likely, is to provide a second axis of potential threat from which the enemy cannot damn the torpedoes press on.
Because he cannot just bludgeon his way like a bull in a china shop against it. And if he doesn't deal with it, it can attack him from behind or the
quarters, effectively opening 'a second front'. If he DOES go to hard AAW tactics to eliminate it, he preempts the escalation variable and thus
gives those he is trying to bum rush justification to switch to their own hardkill options. On Him.
The questions then must be:
1. Why is the Nassau, a Marine ASSAULT carrier with all of 8 AV-8Bs and 8 Skids (at best) is so close inshore that a destroyer based action group can
pin their location and stage a harrassing/intervention attack?
ANS: Haze Grey Admirals, in love with their effectively worthless tin can navy, don't want to admit that the USN should NEVER be less than 400nm
offshore while naval warfare ops are ongoing (i.e. the enemy fleet is not pinned down and/or sunk). Because then the bad guys would have to come so
far to get to you, that 'conventional' threats like surface action groups would not be able to sortie and come to you without multiple engagement
2. Why, if the Nassau's air elements are 'otherwise commited' (as if force protection is not THE MOST critical 'mission' of the MAGTF trying to
sustain ops ashore) is there nothing on the destroyer deck with the performance, cheapness and to make the opfor declare his intent in a way that is
irrevocable for dead-or-aggressive?
ANS: The Brown Shoe (Air) Admirals are too pretentious to admit that their 40 million dollar airframes and 2 billion dollar carriers are too few and
too timidly 'busy' elsewhere to provide useful overhead FORCAP cover to anything but their own CVSFs. For to admit that would be to admit that not
only is Naval ops doctrine /seriously/ ***ked. But that the very CONCEPT of airpower has gone too-macro to be _available_ for the small fights that
the USN gets into, every day. And you cannot fight your best-vested (mega-$$$ for squid air) asset where you are not present with it. Which is of
course implicit to the notion of small Destroyer groups going into places like the South China Sea to begin with.
Nobody who cares anything about the utter corruption that plagues our armed forces are still in uniform because they know it's career suicide to
change the same'ol'same'ol. And those who are left are either too stupid to care or too busy playing the game themselves to want to try.
And so we have million dollar writeoffs that never should have happened. And never would have, if our doctrine matched our intent. And we
illustrated intent /early enough/ in the engagement to make it clear that there _would be no_ approach to dangerously close-aboard distances. Because
we would finish the fight with anyone that chose to press their luck, several MILES sooner.