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DD(X) National Team Completes Radar Cross-Section Testing of DD(X) Deckhouse

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posted on Aug, 16 2005 @ 02:02 PM
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The DD(X) National Team, led by Northrop Grumman, has reached another significant milestone by completing fabrication and radar cross-section testing on the integrated deckhouse test article.
Built out of carbon fiber, the integrated deckhouse test article is a one-of-a-kind technology demonstrator consisting of the forward and aft sections of the deckhouse, including an aft face that is fully populated with antennas that were supplied by potential subcontractors.

"The radar cross section is a critical element in the stealth attributes of DD(X) and the excellent test results from this engineering development model confirm we continue to meet and exceed the planned targets and objectives," said Brian Cuccias, Northrop Grumman vice president and DD(X) program manager.
source

Wow good news, looks like the project is moving ahead!




posted on Aug, 16 2005 @ 02:52 PM
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Picture 1

Picture 2


Pretty cool.



posted on Aug, 16 2005 @ 06:08 PM
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Seeing deckhouse of a ship undergoing RCS testing in the desert isn't something you see everyday
Thanks for posting



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 05:58 AM
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Snicker, 'I just don't see it.'

I mean, who would want to cross breed the Sea Shadow with a Carnival Cruise Ship?

www.nachohat.org...
www.globalsecurity.org...

Even if they remove a few tons with the material change (and going from what I've seen of F/A-22 crashes and Falklands Footage, I think composite super structures are apt to be a huge step BACKWARDS from 'even aluminum' in terms of fire safety after a hit...), it makes little or no sense to stick a deckhouse that high out of the water atop a round bottom hull with inwards sloping sides on a low deck.

It just looks like a roll and slip nightmare waiting happen.

In terms of the deckhouse specifically, why populate a fixed structure with antennas that will almost certainly need to be changed repeatedly over the life of the hull? Even if you can band-isolate the total area and 'plug'n'play' to a common architecture backplane off the aperture itself; there is just no guarantee that a followon system won't need more power or a different lobe geometry or some kind of exotic A/D preprocessing 'massage' of the signal at the front face as to make a generic antenna suite suitable.

And that's not even talking about the idiocy of "Wull shucks, it has the RCS of a fishing trawler, 1,500 miles out to sea, and yet RF signature of a microwave lighthouse ten feet off the ferret antenna, does that mean it's NOT military?" inherent to SPY-3.

Forget taking the house so high, why not pull it further aft? I would, _by far_ prefer that they do SOMETHING USEFUL with the "It's The Ise!" styled deckpark-

smmlonline.com...


As a function of spreading out the systems (damage sensitivity) and providing more useful 'empty deck' internal volume?

I mean /jeeze/. Half the damn hull is a flight deck when the best they can do is put an SH-60 on it?! I might be more interested if this ship was supposed to be host to permanent platoon detachment of Marines and their V-22. But that's not going to happen.

While, as a purely fires oriented platform, if we are going to waste time and effort putting STOVL into a 100 millin dollar strike fighter, SURELY we can spare a bit more to take at least elements of it's SDLF into a no-cockpit PS&T/ASST/AAW 'sensor wing' diamond airfoil) as a useful CSA replacement AWAY FROM the carrier?

There is absolutely no need OR excuse for a navy that cannot provide it's own ISR thanks to fighter pilot LOMD obsession with tactical stealth strike at the expense of a enduring surveillance platforms and thei is particularly so of the DD(X) whose roles and mission justification take it well inshore.

Once you stop trying to pretend that an 6 story building atop the hull is going to dramatically increase your LOS horizon or enable 'littoral' targeting beyond the surf zone, about 60% of the platform price (1.7 BILLION with a B dollars per hull, last I heard) goes away and you can return to something more sensible like a MEMS styled (articulated/faceted spray shield) elevatable comms mast with a simple SPS-48 styled air search 'that could be anybody' (2D or 3D mode options).

I'm also not sure but that I don't like the designers sudden whim to put the PVLS on the rim of the deck. While it is volume efficient, it begs questions of inertial moment and deckwash in heavy seas while also setting up any waterline hit by AShM or even PCI/FIAC type attackers as being more dangerous for what your own ordnance brew-off does than the initial hit. It /may/ also complicate fast reloads and 'building block' (cell-size modularity) styled changes to fit new weapons without an independent station loader at each embrasure.

Given these ships are supposed to run on two combat watches and one utility/ships services rotation worth of 150 men, what the heck are they doing inside the rest of the hull that they need that much more space anyway?

The answer, at least apparently, is the guns. 100nm on a new 6" AGS mount is nice, but no so much more so than 60nm on a 5" mount with a 62 caliber barrel which _already_ has soaked up about 4 billion bucks worth of development for ERGM. And for what?

1. You take a 'stealth ship' inshore and the primary threats are optical and contact aka gun boats and mines. All the RF stealth in the world doesn't mean diddly dip and with the rising sophistication of coastal defense missiles, this is only going to get worse as the threat can EASILY characterize both direct (ISAR/InSAR) and wake signatures, over long periods and aspects worth of exposure.
2. I get the idea of a common calibur and continued development effort with the Army 155 but not when even 100nm worth of beyond-the-surfzone is not enough. Forward From The Sea is a 400nm inland mechanized projection plan and indeed, the Marines did 700nm into OEFian Afghanistan. You dare not fool them and yourself into thinking that NGS is a viable option when a turreted AMS in the 120mm range on the back of a LAV or 113 could get the same effect for a tenth the cost from twice as close (to the engaged forces).
3. TWO guns, each able to fire 12 rounds per minute with potentially Excalibur (3m) levels of point accuracy? Oh, /I see/, it's the Ise aft and the Rodney forward is it?
4. WHY A GUN AT ALL?!? In the FOG-MPM and Polyphem as well as U.S. Netfires system, we see missiles capable of 100km without tube launch accelerative penalty on the guidance hardware and indeed, in the latter case with a _loitering_ seeker targeting option to peak over the local horizon as a precontact cue. Something I would think could also be extremely valuable when playing presence-mission inshore amidst fleets of fishing vessels and light commercial ships with boghammers inbetween.
Indeed, if you want to impress me with the conversion of the PVLS to a 'new generation' landattack missile, why not go for an ATACMS-as-ARRMD type round able to go TEN TIMES AS FAR without the weight and deck area penalty of the 'stealth gun mounts' at all?!? Guns make sense when they can reach 350nm inland after a 1.5-2 mile per second mv out an EML. Until you can do that much or better, don't bother me.

I'm not even going to touch the stupidity of a 40mm CIWs and a SARH inshore SAM pairing except to say that it's damn well time we started using all the power generation coming out of a naval plant to put THEL into Sea Light. That is the ONLY way to keep the AShM game from becoming just utterly ridiculous as a function of weapon speed vs. close horizon rate of engagement and stealth dynamics.

CONCLUSION:
There is simply too much wrong with the DDX to make me want to admire it for what it does (honestly) try to achieve in the switchover to civillian marine technology in as much of the ships services and propulsion areas as possible to provide a reduced crewing compliment.
When you add up it's tactical deficits in a new 'netcentric and forward from the sea' operating environment WELL beyond it's weapons/sensor systems ability to engage. What you are left with is an old fashioned ship that is too valuable to employ inshore even as the LCS is too light to take into the blue void.
It then becoming clear we would be better off with a new DD-21 approach that FIRST identified the number of classes due to retire in the existing FFG/DDG/CG fleet (all the OHPs and most of the early TICOs plus whatever is left of the Spruance and Kidds that haven't been upflighted).
As a function of sizing an intermediate hull-to-class size that acknowledged the political realities of a two-yard industrial base and a need to bring the inshore and SAG equivalent navy out from under the air fleet as a function of independent ISR and offboard targeting in particular.
Forget the scifi shapes. Keep it simple, low, wide beamed, heavy (or at least 'variable') drafted for sea keeping and size the weapons system envelope to protect the ship from all zoned threats while principally engaging only 1-2 _mission specific_ (sub class specialized rather than flighted) role threats beyond 100nm, especially overland.

As regards this thread, that means keeping as much of the $en$or$ and comms relay not only OFF the deckhouse but OFF the ship. Using it strictly as an arsenal platform and 'tasking' secure processing node off a theater wide styled relay.

Something which simple domes, pimples and even yagi/whip arrays can be readily strapped on to a conventional pole with MEMS panel selective fenestration in the TV through Cell Station range of 750MHz through 4GHz as a function of bandwidth pipe.


KPl.



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 07:22 AM
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I was wondering why USN would need land bombardment (read gun/artillery) capability of over 100NM?
To strategicaly attack land targets? Can't missiles or aircrafts do that more efficiently?
To support troops fighting inland? Don't most ground units from battalion up carry their own fire support (mortars at battalion level, field arty at brig. level and up) A howitzer or a Field gun battery can probably give better fire support to troops than ships placed 100-700NM away.

I admit that a Marine Landing might require a Naval firesupport, but that might be better achieved by smaller vessels equipped with Howitzers etc.

PS. If I have a flaw in my thinking, please correct me, i'm only a infantry cpl., So what do i know of naval things...



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 09:04 AM
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Originally posted by northwolf
I was wondering why USN would need land bombardment (read gun/artillery) capability of over 100NM?
To strategicaly attack land targets? Can't missiles or aircrafts do that more efficiently?
To support troops fighting inland? Don't most ground units from battalion up carry their own fire support (mortars at battalion level, field arty at brig. level and up) A howitzer or a Field gun battery can probably give better fire support to troops than ships placed 100-700NM away.

I admit that a Marine Landing might require a Naval firesupport, but that might be better achieved by smaller vessels equipped with Howitzers etc.

PS. If I have a flaw in my thinking, please correct me, i'm only a infantry cpl., So what do i know of naval things...



It would be cheaper and safer for pilots to bombard the area of concern.
To soften them up as to speak. Then send in the CAS and troops.



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 05:20 PM
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northwolf
I was wondering why USN would need land bombardment (read gun/artillery) capability of over 100NM?
To strategicaly attack land targets? Can't missiles or aircrafts do that more efficiently?

in short...no.

Having an aircraft take-off and bomb some targets and return home is not nearly as easy...or cheap, as just using the big gun to take em' out. It will have an electro-magnetic railgun, the ship will be able to move around its electricity, so it can be used for propulsion, then can be switched to be used for the gun, which fires projectiles up to 290 miles at over mach 7. Its high speed means it can take out the target without the need of a explosive, and since it uses elecrticity and magnets to fire it it doesn't need elposives uses then either, making it far safer for ship storage.



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 06:45 PM
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And since is all they have to carry is the actual projectile and no powder is needed they can carry much more ammunition



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 07:17 PM
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low cost, plus efficency, thats why the US Navy wants these vessels.



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 07:34 PM
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NW,

>>
I was wondering why USN would need land bombardment (read gun/artillery) capability of over 100NM?
>>

Traditionally, the USN has four legitimate roles:

1. Intimidation
Often called 'presence' or 'goodwill' missioning, this is the gunboat diplomacy threat by which hostile-to-U.S.-interests barbarians near to water but far from a friendly landbase are kept under thumb until 'negotiations' can either bring in the Air Force and Army. Or political/commercial elements can secure a safe transition of control over resources or key landmarks is required to ensure continuity of access as new replaces old punk dictators wherever, whenever. It is the true basis of the 'Fleet' system of putting at least one carrier in every major sea basin. The big difference being that it typically involves ZERO landed presence with only the threat of massive air strikes on infrastructure and transport (bridges, overpasses, rail lines etc.) targets by airpower to stop something from escalating.

2. Right Of Navigation
Basically the opposite of the above, this comes down to sailing through somebodies Mare Nostrum declared private pond and daring them to come out and get you. Libya is the obvious example but the Falklands and the Escort System in the PG (during the Iran/Iraq war) also qualify. As does the Suez war to an extent. In a major war this would also extend to an escort mission getting the heavy elements of a CONUS landforce across a SLOC to the designated combat theater.

3. Forced Entry/Amphibious Assault.
The 'Harbor Siezure' mission like unto what the Brits did up at Narvik in the early days of the Norwegian campaign. While there is little or no doubt that the capability is there, it often requires a lot of coordination time as carrier and amphibious force groups have to be brought to a local port or airfield to bring their PPME or parent unit strengths onboard and then brought together to execute a warplan. While it hasn't happened very often since WWII (Lebanon 1956 comes to mind) it is basically what would have happened if Saddam had had the insight to keep right on coming down the coastal highway into Saudi in 1991.

4. Supplantation of Force.
Basically an attempt to replace destroyed or transit-compromised landbased air and ground forces.
Usually by putting the airwing ashore so that the carrier can itself move away from a high threat area while doubling the sortie generation and payload factors of the component aircraft.
Such is the traditional answer to what happens when infiltration and TBMs destroy USAFE.
Similarly, in conventional ground actions, it is inherent to the use of Marine forces to act as direct combattants _beyond the beachhead_ where conventional (USAr or Foreign) force elements cannot reach or are depleted. Lebanon 1982 and various stabilization efforts like The Mog come to mind here. As does OEF AfG.

ONLY in the last two missions does the ability to strike targets with 6" shells really mean much. And then only to the extent that the commited ground unit does not drive out from under the friendly arty.

The real question then being WHY. Waste BILLIONS of dollars developing a capability for indirect cluster fires when clearly, doctrine (FFTS) has taken the mission role (supporting marines) so deep inland that 100nm _is not enough_?

And that's not the only problem. ERGM in it's present mission configuration (5"/127mm round: 63nm reachin) takes upwards of SEVEN MINUTES to reach a target area. Marine standard for indirect fires responsiveness is _no more than_ 2.5 minutes FM:away:splash.

Take the distance down to 40nm and assume a five minute TOF. At 25-30mph which is pretty typical for battlefield formation rate of march, you are talking 2.5 miles worth of "They ran right over me sir!" delay of game.

Then there's the fact that the ERGM is going to run around 50,000 dollars per round. IF it stays within current 'FY' cost estimates. A conventional 5" round runs about 200 dollars. Even if the enemy obliges you in staying within converage to engage your forces, you aren't going to send just /showers/ of guided rounds downrange when you ALSO have to continue to support conventional solutions (air) to the same problem.

Which is where things really hit the fan.

>>
To strategicaly attack land targets? Can't missiles or aircrafts do that more efficiently?
>>

It depends on what kind of target group you are going for.

Theoretically an endurance UAV or even sufficiently dense Keyhole type satellite constellation which can 'reroute' TLAMs (Blk.IV and up have 15 presets, a holding pen and live retarget capability) is more than sufficient for kicking the crap out of fixed targets to the extent that, even if an enemy 'wins' as a function of not being dislodged from given leadership or policy position, their economy is so ruined that there is nothing left worth fighting for as a function of extant quality of life (clean water, sewage, power, food delivery). Ironically, this type of attack can kill hundreds of thousands of civillians in the aftermath, even if their is very little 'precision strike' initial loss of life involved.

OTOH, the /second/ a target gains the ability to displace itself from a fixed position and particularly the ability to sustain dynamic maneuver; you can only really FIND IT (TCS/FNC Time Critical Strike/Future Naval Capability) by putting a landed force into the the theater and basically forcing the enemy to contact or flight (maneuver phase).

At which point, a simple blown bridge can often give you the time you need to trap a threat behind the choke for that critical five minutes necessary to bring in whatever kind of air or remote/indirect fires you need.

The difference being that the hundreds of thousands of dollars required for fuel and PGMs and general lifing out on the airframe is usually more 'affordable' on a vested (builtup) inventory of aircraft than the -immediate- costs (insufficient VLS round count) of generating shot after shot of cruise launches. Because those missiles are _gone_ once they are fired. And their warheads (cluster or unitary penetrator or frag) are so mission tailored as to be useless against any but one target type. Whereas the plane can carry 2-4 pylons worth of 2-3 /types/ of munition and come back for more. This is what the inherent 'flexibility' myth is based on because you can not only remission an aircraft to an alternate target but also 'frag' (mented target list) it's sortie to a general stack of supporting missions as a function of a time block of airspace or a 'kill box' of terrain that can catch an enemy less than a minute away from any engaged ground forces giving a yell.

Because they are already 'continuously overhead present'.

Which is where the LIE of Marine airpower in particular becomes obvious.

Because the typical combat air detachment on any LHA/D is 8 Harriers and 8 Snakes. Each worth 42 and 17-21 million apiece. The snakes cannot reach more than about 100nm inland. The Harriers are good for about 250. Neither has the speed and altitude performance plus countermeasures to survive a strike warfare environment typical of F-16/18 type shooters. And if you divide 8 by 2 (lead and wingman) you are looking at the ability to hit two target groups on roughly a 45 minute basis of IN AND OUT radius between 'turns' of regeneration (fuel and bombs).

That's for a 250nm range target. Take the distance up to 700nm to hit a target up around Kabul from the Pakistani coast and the numbers start to go towards 10 HOURS or more. Even as the ability to stay IN the target area goes down to 20 minutes without AAR and 40 minutes with.

i.e. The Harrier and Cobra are never going to make it. And the USN which _has to big-deck be there_ to provide anything /like/ reasonable (timely) air support, is itself going to be looking at 2-4 planes with 8-16 bombs worth of CAS munitions every 2hrs or so.

Under such conditions, without USAF support (B-52's flying 15-17hr missions out of Diego Garcia, 5-7 of which are overhead) your Marines are going to be DEAD.

But at the same time, the ERGM shooting cruiser is ALSO worthless because it's guns won't reach and no theater commander will ever authorize streaming cruise missile launches to support 'maybe needed' (un pretargeted) CAS.

>>
To support troops fighting inland? Don't most ground units from battalion up carry their own fire support (mortars at battalion level, field arty at brig. level and up) A howitzer or a Field gun battery can probably give better fire support to troops than ships placed 100-700NM away.
>>

Most definitely. Which is why the USMC needs to get off their dead butts and redefine their doctrine to INCLUDE such capabilities. Right now, they don't. Because the official attitude is one of airpower replacing self propelled artillery and the residual fires capability (M198 155mm guns) 'keeping up as best they can'.

In OIF, yet another 300+nm run inland, the latter towed guns proved utterly unable to _maintain roadmarch pacing_, let alone set up and shoot in a fashion fit to engage popup targets.

While the Marine compliment of light (89-106mm) mortars is itself compromised by the ability of LAV (8 wheel armored car type APCs) to handle the floor stress of firing from within the carrier. Not that these systems could engage an opposing mechanize threat /anyway/. Because the standard for guided antiarmor rounds is 120mm in the Eryx and Merlin range.

>>
I admit that a Marine Landing might require a Naval firesupport, but that might be better achieved by smaller vessels equipped with Howitzers etc.
>>

Ignoring range, the big problem with ERGM, other than a whacky trajectory for GPS capture is that it brings a 19lb submunition warhead capacity to a fight which would otherwise be dominated by 29lb 120mm AMS (turreted breach loading mortars) or 71lb 155mm towed mortars. All of them mechanized and thus a lot better able to maintain maneuver pacing in staying close to the fight, _no matter_ how far it was from the shoreline. Or what it's target/mission requirement (FIBUA might mean smoke and gas vice cluster bus or even unitary frag, let alone 'smart' rounds).

>>
PS. If I have a flaw in my thinking, please correct me, i'm only a infantry cpl., So what do i know of naval things...
>>

Insofar as I can tell, you've got the basics. I would simply add that, by 2015 the Tactical High Energy Laser will be in field trials. By 2020 it will be copied, around the world, as 'digital' (diode pumped) replacements for COIL are standardized. WHEN THAT HAPPENS. You may well be stuck with saturating an enemy with so many rounds that you defeat the lase-cool-repoint capability of individual SPAAG type shooters.

Such is not possible with conventional PGMs in the range of 17-21,000 dollars like a GBU-31 JDAM or GBU-12 LGB. Even as it puts the launch aircraft at /incredible/ 'random' risk should an IP or CAS stack be placed too close to an unsuppressed IADS unit.

IF ONLY FOR THIS REASON ALONE, the day of Marines relying on airpower as an indirect fires replacement should end.

Whether you believe in scramjet rounds or EMLs as being viable alternatives (certainly I would not design an entire class of vessels without a working prototype mount to make sure that the forward guns can be replaced with truly useful followup) for NGS depends a great deal on how directly you expect to engage with what amount of lead time.

During OIF, a Marine cavalry/scout team made contact with an advancing Iraqi tank brigade and faded while calling down a B-52 with WCMD/SFW. From 30-40,000ft and some 8 miles downrange, that platform delivered an 5 minute DMPI attack which Skeet-killed some 12-15 vehicles, including the commander's vehicle, in the lead van of the unit. The rest of the Iraqis piled out and started running for Baghdad.

If that is your standard for tripwire-to-standoff attack, then the question is why waste money bringing M1A1 type systems along for the ride when you can put the AMS into an M113A4/A5 type vehicle (it has similar lading metric, mpg road economics and is far hardier, structurally, than the LAV).

Because that BUFF and the 350,000 dollar brilliant can _will not_ always be there. And Marines have traditionally been more flexible than to rely on joint service multiforce to accomplish their missions.


KPl.


LINKS-
ERGM
www.designation-systems.net...

ERGM Con
www.g2mil.com...

AGS and DDX
www.globalsecurity.org...

EXCALIBUR as the real (Keeping Up With Asters) reason for a 155mm caliber upgrade
www.acq.osd.mil...



posted on Aug, 17 2005 @ 10:38 PM
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wow!, ch1466...I come to this site for 2 reasons: Teach & Learn
Not read a book.



posted on Aug, 18 2005 @ 12:22 AM
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Good post ch1466...
Adding a small (offtopic) opinion, there isn't much better way to support advancing infantry/marine unit than an AMOS platoon following few miles behind..



2*120mm breechloading mortars
From march to fireready ~10sec
scoot in 30sec
12rounds can be fired in a burst (they hit the target at the same time)

My battalion has 3 of these as dedicated fire support, and each comppany has 2 81mm mortars.

(i believe US bought the manufacturing rights for these turrets from Finnish comppany Patria...?)

[edit on 18-8-2005 by northwolf]



posted on Aug, 18 2005 @ 02:24 AM
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NW,

Thanks!

>>
Adding a small (offtopic) opinion, there isn't much better way to support advancing infantry/marine unit than an AMOS platoon following few miles behind..
>>

Indeed, I just hope that the ground forces are able to continue to modernize in the wake of a largely unsuccessful (perception) of their low intensity arms capabilities. I'm afraid that the likely outcome will be more emphasis on (exportable) airshow toy airpower and a 'condensed' medium/objective ground force which is little more than a UN traffic cop with attachable Guard heavy MBT units.

Such does NOTHING to challenge the USAF/USN/USMC CAS doctrine of 'when we can, maybe.' (OEF averaged between 17 and 26 minutes to get everybody to agree on a DMPI in Afghanistan. 'Visual' CAS in OIF was much better but only to the extent that entire battalion sized units would slow to a halt so that the USAF could come in and strafe a guntruck or bomb a fixed obstacle to pieces).

>>
2*120mm breechloading mortars
From march to fireready ~10sec
scoot in 30sec
12rounds can be fired in a burst (they hit the target at the same time)
>>

To me, the question is the mix of these systems and their loadouts and targeting in a forced entry team situation which may well see airmech deplaning off a C-17 landed on some roadway in the hinterlands of Iran or Pakistan.

IIRR, Patria is anywhere from 14-25 tons, depending on which turret systems you outfit it with and the AMOS twin tends towards the high end of the spectrum. Two AMOS = One Abrahms = One Globemaster.

i.e. You're not gaining an awful lot on the team count over conventional systems.

Now, if you have a Hummer or Shadow type vehicle, you can pull perhaps five-ten NETFIRES CLU trailers out the back of your C-17. Or even (a pair) off an Osprey.

THAT being a significant mechanized force both in total number of driveaway (force attritable) vehicles able to scatter from the APOD and begin independent ops. And the overall ability to maintain a 360` _air_ screen (LAM gives you 200km of range and a 2hr loiter) as a function of a single line of march towards a fixed objective.

www.designation-systems.net...

I would _vastly_ rather my advancing Infantry/Marine unit not in fact be anything more than a drone that I can afford to lose.

If you can drive in from an edge of theater condition such as OIF then the mobile mortar system makes MUCH more sense. If only because the difference between an XM8 or similar (LAV with 105) 'MGS' platform and an AMOS vs. T-xx is that the latter can engage from 10-12km and _run_.

The Marine mission is iffy. I see them as vastly better shock forces the the USAr with better elan and superior integrated (combined arms as a single unit TOE with clean communications lines across individual platform/missions) operating capability. At the same time, I _don't_ agree with the notion of taking a defended harbor as being at all relevant in the post-Inchon world.

i.e. The team is okay but the objective employment doctrine is not.

STOM ops and the deep attack RAP type mission are probably more representative of what is needed but they bring too little to the heavy-fires mission set, especially if you intend to keep the ship over the local horizon (at least 100nm).

In this the Amos is going to bring some interesting capabilities (use H-1upgrade Skids or Hawks to put Force Recon or similar units to put down a screening/escort force in the 'embassy evac' mission. Have them drive to a join up the principle MAGTF recovery team using V-22 at something like a soccer stadium or docks and support the lot with callable mortar fires from units deployed 'waaaaaay the heck over there...' outside the city.) But ONLY to the extent that you have CH-53 able to carry a 28,000lb vehicle any distance.

>>
My battalion has 3 of these as dedicated fire support, and each comppany has 2 81mm mortars.
>>

Again, sticking with the toughest of the U.S. mission sets, muzzle loaded mortars are simply not something you want to play with because the second you debus infantry to make a fixed objective attack (with or without prior reduction of target) you are costing yourself /at least/ 30 minutes to get them all back aboard and out of there again and that is dangerous if you are operating deep in indian country with effectively no force security beyond speed and RANGED firepower.

If you put the tubes in dedicated carriers, you are messing up your unit OOB with two systems that cannot function as assault guns (which the turreted breach loaders can) in direct support. But whose ammo load and reinforced flooring make them iffy APCs at best.

>>
(I believe US bought the manufacturing rights for these turrets from Finnish comppany Patria...?)
>>

AAI Corp has picked up the rights to license manufacture.

www.aaicorp.com...
[edit on 18-8-2005 by northwolf]

ARGUMENT:
My attitudes are generally based on the following conditions-

1. If we /never/ fight a direct-LOS confrontation with MGV/MCS type followons to Buford, it won't hurt my feelings a single bit. Sure, there will be times when somebodies old-Russian or new-Chinese tank rolls out of a house or back alley and takes out soft vehicle unit like a knife through butter. The difference being that /the rest of the time/ those units will be engaged from upwards of 40-60km out and so can be hit and hit again _endlessly_ in the maneuver rather than horizon-breached combat phases.

2. Especially with the rise of DEWS, a large part of getting to an independent combat brigade capability is going to rest on either mandating that fast-UCAV recce be tasked EXCLUSIVELY to supporting maneuver units. ERMB is not enough, it doesn't fly high enough, it doesn't have the sensors to look far enough and it is too slow to look over at X and then rapidly overtake a ground force displacing down the road towards Y at 60mph.
The alternative to forcing the blue suiters to not only purchase but give up a significant portion of the only loitering fast jet capability that makes sense for ground maneuver phase (OBAS) targeting ops is bypassing Key West 'the other way' as a function of putting all the unit Recce into drones like LAM (which is effectively LOCAAS out of a VLS box). It's not fixed wing. It's not /slow than molasses/ like helicopter or prop-UAV like Shadow or Predator.

3. If you accept both of the above conditions as defining the majority of your precision point-kills as coming from well beyond what even 155 RT can do (thus killing Excalibur and AGS/DDX with one stone) and consequentially that you NEVER 'accept' a direct fire battle with heavy threat forces; it becomes simpler to see Amos or some other AMS as being a singular support mission capability in which the same kind of INS/GPS round guidance is incorporated in an ERMC/PGMM type (unitary) round to compliment low angle (dumb ballistic) direct fire capabilities when and ONLY WHEN the objective force (allied) gets to a city for which conventional PGM attack is too overpowering (GBU-12 and 38, the best 'CAS' weapons available at the moment still have a 500lb warhead). slow to react or _expensive_ for the target set being engaged.

i.e. 10 Netfires teams and 2 AMOS complimenting a platoon level occupational force of four FCS followons to Bradley (45mm+Javelin/CKEM remote firing station plus 10-15 troops in the compartment) suddenly looks like a viable means of effecting both a special mission force and a deep maneuver 'drive in' self supporting team such as _DOES NOT NEED_ CS/CSS units. And can get by with an absolute minimum of vertrep or paradrop support by an active Air Force presence (bladders and ammo pallets basically).

CONCLUSION:
Iraq is going to hurt the U.S. Armed Forces more than anybody currently realizes. Because it is Vietnam 'after we knew better'. And because the very PRESENCE of U.S. heavy forces required such a huge commitment of supporting footprint that all the CS/CSS and MP units which had been shoved over into the guard were just _butchered_ for want of coequivalent exposure without half the armor protection.

Such is a large part of why the Guard/Rez unit uptakes are still a good 15-20% below par while the actives are largely stabilizing on the promise of a 2006 pullout.

When you realize that the 'greater war' of GWOT has also largely been abandoned for this foolish foray into the bryar patch, without either pursuit of UBL -or- fair apportionment of money to homeland defense; it is inevitable that 2008 will bring with it, not only a new president with a largely retranchist (if not isolationist) reversal of foreign policy.

But also deep cuts in funding for ANY unit which could be perceived able to repeat the mistake by Congress in letting Bush play LBJ. Anti-BRAC debates will be the only saving grace (keep my base means keeping my assigned unit role) and even that will not save the Guard and Rez if the folks just aren't joining up to flesh out the logistics units needed to support main forces.

As such, it is likely that the plan that took us into AfG, flawed as it was (SOF 'engagement' teams going in to negotiate for merc levvies in trade for a drug-trade peace), will likely be the model which is used for a followon-to-objective force as BOTH the Army and Marines struggle to see what is budgetarily possible in the period 2012-2015 when manning levels and payoff of the Gulf Obscenity both flatten out even as equipment retirements become service wide.

In such an era, at least as a ground force we will probably have to 'choose to ignore' threats like India and China and look increasingly to winning peripheral (colonial) war efforts that stabilize mini anarchial environments by providing core-cadre beefup to 'local heroes' such as the Northern Alliance.

The BIG KEY to making this operation happen being the ability to put forces at least 1,000km inland _no more than_ 10 days from an NCA green light.

Not the 120 days it took from September 11 to January 1. Not even the 30 days required from September 11 to October 10. Nor certainly the BOGUS claims of 72nd hours to activate a Medium Brigade as now claimed. But rather 10 days. Into theater and on the ground. No matter the negotiated posture or Access Denial politics.

Provided you take some risks with the airhead delivery system (paradrop being especially risky), my system can get you there. And DDX has nothing whatsoever to do with it except for the 1.7 billion dollars it steals for no particular increase in capabilities over Flt.III Burke.


KPl.



posted on Jan, 22 2006 @ 05:15 PM
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on this site there seem to be a lot of people who have half an idea at most about whats going on but kpl, you have it all worked out. you are one of the few people on this site that i would consider quoting without checking your info. You should try for a job as the presidnets millitary advisor (im english so im not sure the proper title), id vote for you if i had a chance.

However you seem to have a major problem with the american millitary, the us has the best army, air force and navy in the world. the us wouldnt have spent billions develouping these ddx's if they werent going to be any use. the ddx's arent goign to replace war planes but supplement them, there are many situtations a plane cant go into but a shell can. so long as they are upgraded constantly and kept at the cutting edge of technology they will be very useful and will fulfil a specific task that is currently empty or partially covered by ships not designed for that task.

justin



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 04:23 AM
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In defence of the DD(X),
A low radar cross section is a good idea, because there are times where the best option is NOT to be blasting away with every bit of RF available. There are times where low RCS is useful, and you want it available then.

Naval radars tend to be purchased for the life of a ship, so don't worrey too much about "how are we going to upgrade them?".

The SPS-48 is, well...
not a very good radar.


I do however agree with ch1466's comment about the neccesity of warships being fire-reistant. Unfortunately, lessons from as little as 20 years ago are already forgotten when it comes to designing ships. (The LCS is ALUMINUM for crying out loud!)

Quit saying AGS! It's not the advanced gun system, that was the backup plan. The railguns they wanted are working, so there will be no AGS on this ship.

As for NGFS (Naval Gun Fire Support), there are 4 missions for it. Harrasing, Destructive, Illumination, and Suppressing. As mentioned, the role of destructive fire at long range against a mobile force is challenging, and I don't think anyone's going to be shooting flares out of a railgun. However, Supressing fire means they don't get to spend enough time in any one location long enough to set-up/fire/correct artillery at our own troops. The goal of suppressing fire is to make the enemy keep thier heads down and allow the free movement of our own troops. Lastly we have Harrassing fire. Simply put, no unit will be combat effective after three days of no sleep because they have to take cover from enemy fire every five to ten minutes.

A 100 NM range on a naval gun effectively means that a defending force cannot deploy thier forces within 80NM of thier own coast prior to the start of actual combat. This is an 80 NM beachhead available to the Marines, who still retain the option of showing up whenever they want, wherever they want.



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 11:42 PM
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Here is a new picture of the AESD a mini DD(X) propulsion demonstrator on Lake Pend Oreille in Bayview, Idaho.

Picture



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