Originally posted by hankyone
they both lose, you can't win a nuclear war

Originally posted by rogue1
^^^ The Russian ABM systems only covers the Moscow area, big deal. I'd hardly call Moscow surviving and the rest of the cities being obliterated a victory. I doubt Moscow would survive anyway.[edit on 12-2-2006 by rogue1]

Originally posted by rogue1It is interesting that you say Russia accomplished this in the 70's when there newer missiles have no capability gainst ICBM's. Actually no missiles have any real capability against ICBM's.
Also, I'm curious - if the Russians have been so advanced for so long, why are they developing the S-400 system and the successor S-500 ( which is equivalent of the US NMD ) ?[edit on 12-2-2006 by rogue1]

Originally posted by rogue1 PS. Just because Putin says so, doesn't mean it's truthful. We all know Putin is an ex-KGB general prone to misinformation.[edit on 12-2-2006 by rogue1]

Originally posted by RSM55
Anyway, winning a nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.

As for the Russian ABM system, I don't really get all the fuss being made here about the SA-5 system.

"we don't see why we should do again something that we've already mastered in the 70s".

I'm not saying that the Russians have a inherent talent for designing SAM and ABM systems that makes them so different from the US (God forbid), it's simply a result of the Soviet military posture and post-WWII reality: the US are effectively shielded from massive air-land attacks by 2 oceans, mainland air and space defense was never a priority,

while the USSR faced scores of NATO squadrons and hundreds of potential missile launch vectors from any direction.

What is more, crucial C3I structure of the Soviet Union was highly centralised and mostly located in big cities like Moscow (for different and sometimes purely historical reasons) - therefore they feared more than everything a decapitation-like strike on the Moscow Military District, which provides a reason enough for designing something like a missile shield round it.

The US command structure was much more scattered, and the US posture relied more heavily on second strike capability at that time (that's why the original US ABM system was meant to defend missile silos rather than a city).

Nowadays, the Russians have a much more scattered C3I structure than before, but the posture hasn't changed much. The official doctrine is still that Russia has the right to launch its nukes first if it gets massively attacked (even if the attack is purely conventional).

PS: US ABL and SBL projects still are what they are: projects. And please remember that the first and only SBL demonstrator effectively put into orbit (albeit briefly - support engine and orientation failure, followed by descent Columbia-style) was the Skif-DM. An ABL platform based on the Il-76 airframe resumed flight tests last year. Just wonder where all the cash comes from

Originally posted by Sandman11
You know, counterforce -vs- countervalue means nothing. If one side is at a signinificant disadvantage in counterforce exchange then the disadvantaged side could just declare that a "launch on warning" counterstrike would end on cities from the outset.

Mutual suicide forced by the disadvantaged of the first attacked.

The limits of reason can be reached wihout being a terrorist, and the casualties of a "counterforce" strike could be enough to justify the total release of all restraint up to extreme "countervalue"..

Now you are back to the "Dr. Strangelove" suicide scenario, or MAD. You still want to invade Western Europe?

I can just about guarantee that 12,000 deliverable strategic warheads the US could deliver in 1986 would cause more than the Russians/Soviets ever experienced in casualties in all their history no matter how much they think they can prepare for it, and by several times.

You see, it isn't about fighting a nuclear war, it is about making any potential outcome too expensive to the instigator to ever seriously regard the idea of justifying one...

It reminds me of the cowboys around the saloon table, betting on a poker hand, raising, passing, and bluffing. Bottom line is until the cards are on the table you won't know who "wins" if that is even possible...

Originally posted by Harlequin
The russian ABM system is not designed to completely protect moscow - it can`t;

why? well moscow is the THE biggest target and has more nuclear weapons (french , american , british and chinese) aimed at it than any other few square miles on the planet - something like 1000 warheads are aimed at it - the next biggest target are the icbm fields in CONUS

the abm system will just slow down teh first wave of warheds - nothing else , and to give members of the politbereu time to get to the deep shelters.

Originally posted by rogue1
Well, seems Stellar, that we can discount all of your DIA intelligence reports, as you can clearly see they were chasing phantoms.

"Doubt everything or believe everything: these are two equally convenient strategies. With either we dispense with the need for reflection."

— Henri Poincare

Originally posted by rogue1
Hmm conventional strategic nuclear weapons, I'm not sure what you mean by this. You've contradicted yourself in the same sentence.

Ahem, 90% of your information is based on these DIA reports, you constsnatly quote them in your posts.

You should read the following article, detailing how the Soviet Military Power reports came about and how inaccurate they were.

But the Soviet colossus had feet of clay. In the mid-1980s, the intelligence community quietly halved their estimates of the accuracy of the most dangerous type of Soviet ICBMs, and with that, the window of vulnerability instantly disappeared.

In the late 1980s, military authorities described Soviet military spending as consuming 15-17 percent of GNP without achieving military superiority. It became harder to believe in the efficient, inexorable drive for Soviet strategic dominance.

Also in the 1990s, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of the necessity of reform in the Soviet economy, agreed to a series of arms control proposals, then unilaterally declared military withdrawals from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe--unprecedented Soviet actions. Gorbachev's reforms were too little to ease Soviet economic difficulties, however, and the government collapsed.

This is the same Gorbachev, who made the following statement, which was printed by Pravda on December 11, 1984: “In the struggle for peace and social progress the Communist Party of the Soviet Union pursues a consistent policy of rallying the forces of the international communist and working-class movement in every possible way. We uphold the historical justness of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and along with all the revolutionary and peace loving forces of mankind, stand for social progress, and peace and security for all nations. This is what should determine the resolute nature of our propaganda.”

Gorbachev said in November, 1987: “In our work and worries, we are motivated by those Leninist ideals and noble endeavors and goals which mobilized the workers of Russian seven decades ago to fight for the new and happy world of socialism. Perestroika (restructuring) is a continuation of the October Revolution.” He also said: “Gentlemen, Comrades, do not be concerned about all you hear about glasnost and perestroika and democracy in the coming years. These are primarily for outward consumption. There will be no significant internal change within the Soviet Union, other than for cosmetic purposes. Our purpose is to disarm the Americans and let them fall asleep.” On another occasion he said: “We are moving toward a new world, the world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road.”

Gorbachev said: “We are not going to change Soviet power, of course, or abandon its fundamental principles, but we acknowledge the need for changes that will strengthen socialism.” In October, 1989, Gorbachev said: “The concept, the main idea, lies in the fact that we want to give a new lease on life to socialism through perestroika and to reveal the potential of the socialist system.” Also in 1989, he said: “Through perestroika we want to give Socialism a second wind. To achieve this, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union returns to the origins and principles of the Bolshevik Revolution, to the Leninist ideas about the construction of a new society.” He said in December, 1989: “Today we have perestroika, the salvation of socialism, giving it a second breath, revealing everything good which is in the system.” He also said: “I am a Communist, a convinced Communist. For some that may be a fantasy. But for me, it is my main goal.” In June, 1990, he said: “I am now, just as I’ve always been, a convinced Communist. It’s useless to deny the enormous and unique contribution of Marx, Engels and Lenin to the history of social thought and to modern civilization as a whole.”

In short, the burden of Soviet military spending, which was much greater than U.S. intelligence projected (and completely discounted by Team B) caused such dislocation in the Russian economy that it brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union