Help ATS with a contribution via PayPal:
learn more

Who could effectively win in a nuclear war. US or Russia.

page: 11
0
<< 8  9  10    12  13  14 >>

log in

join

posted on Jan, 21 2006 @ 08:30 PM
link   
FredT, great comments. I did not know that Russia had an inactive ABM program now. Any more details?




posted on Jan, 22 2006 @ 03:33 PM
link   

Originally posted by mad scientist
Far from it. The USSR had massive warheads which were basically only good for city busting.



Quantitative Improvements: Deployment of the Soviets' first (SS-6) and second (SS-7 and SS-8) generation ICBMs began in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1966, deployment of third generation missiles (SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13) was underway. With this generation, the Soviets rapidly increased the number of ICBMs deployed. ICBM deployment reached its peak in themid-1970s at approximately 1,600 launchers. After this, the number of launchers gradually decreased to the current level of approximately 1,400 as the Soviets removed their less-capable second generation missiles from the force. (The first generation was phased out in the 1960s.) From 1975 to the present, however, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of deliverable nuclear warheads as the MIRVed versions of the fourth generation ICBMs (SS-17,SS-18, and SS-19) have been deployed. Since these missiles can carry up to 10 reentry vehicles(RVs), the number of deployed ICBM nuclear warheads has increased by a factor of four, notwithstanding the reduction in the number of SALT-accountable launchers.

Qualitative Improvements: The dramatic growth in nuclear warheads observed after 1975 could not have been possible without major qualitative improvements. The first two generations of Soviet ICBMs were inaccurate, carried relatively small payloads and required lengthy launch procedures. To make up for these deficiencies, reentry vehicles were fitted with high-yield nuclear weapons. With the third generation, both accuracy and payload capability were improved to some degree. However, it was not until the fourth generation that the technology became available to the Soviets allowing greater throwweight and greatly improved accuracy so that high-yield MIRVs could be carried by operational missiles. The most accurate versions of the SS-18 and SS-19are capable of destroying hard targets. Together, these systems have the capability to destroy most of the 1,000 US MINUTEMAN ICBMs, using only a portion of the warheads available. The Soviets follow an incremental improvement policy in the development of their forces. They improve those components of a weapon system that need improving and retain those portions that are satisfactory. In this manner, they have greatly improved the reliability and capability of their current ICBM force.

www.fas.org...



We predicted the SS-9 as specifically designed to attack MM Launch Control Centers (LCCs), which initially were the "Achilles heel" of the MM system--100 LCCs controlled all 1,000 MM missiles. This forecast was based upon four basic elements: the counterforce priority in Soviet nuclear targeting strategy; modernization of the SS-7 to carry a much larger payload; improvement in accuracy-- "circular error probable" (CEP) to about (0.5 nm or about 925 meters); and testing of nuclear warheads weighing around 10,000 lbs. with a yield of some 20-25 MT.(4) When we put it all together the SS-9 fell out.

www.fas.org...


Their strategy has always been counterforce whatever your books have led you to believe.


The US were the ones which originally designed their strategic forces to be able to pursue a counter-force strategy.They had a few reasonably accurate ICBM's which could attack buried targets, however their SLBM force was woefully inaccurate, which as we know are good for only one thing - city busting.



The SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs are at least as accurate and possibly more accurate and carry more Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) than the MINUTEMAN III, the most modern operational US ICBM. The SS-18 Mod 4 carries 10 MIRVs, and the SS-19 Mod 3 carries six whereas the MINUTEMAN III carries only three. The SS-18 Mod 4 was specifically designed to attack and destroy ICBM silos and other hardened targets in the United States. Each of its 10 warheads has more than 20 times the destructive power of the nuclear devices developed during World War II. The force of SS-18 Mod 4s currently deployed has the capability to destroy more than 80 percent of the US ICBM silo launchers using two nuclear warheads against each US silo. The SS-19 Mod 3 has nearly identical capabilities. In addition, the SS-19 Mod 3 could be used against targets in Eurasia. The SS-17 Mod 3 is somewhat less-capable ICBM than the SS-19 but it has similar targeting

www.fas.org...



Current Systems and Force Levels. The Soviets maintain the world's largest ballistic missile submarine force for strategic attack. As of March 1984, the force numbered 64 submarines fitted with some 936 nuclear-tipped missiles. Two of these submarines do not count toward the 62 SSBN limit established by SALT I. These totals also exclude 15 older submarines with 45 missiles assigned theater missions. Sixteen SSBNs are fitted with 264 MIRV-capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles. These 16 units have been built and deployed within the past 7 years. Two- thirds of the ballistic missile submarines, including those equipped with MIRV-capable missiles, are fitted with long-range SLBMs that enable the submarines to patrol in waters close to The Soviet Union. This affords protection from NATO ASW operations. Moreover, the long range missiles allow the Soviets to fire from home ports, if necessary, and still strike targets in the United States.

www.fas.org...


web.ukonline.co.uk...

en.wikipedia.org...

I have no problem with the general claim ( they were more accurate for same deployment era's) but the margin is not as large in the timeframe we have been talking about. 200 odd meters CEP ( 50% hit in area) difference is not large enough to gloat about in any strategic sense and the added accuracy was probably offset by widely dispersed and hardened Soviet Silo's.


Far deadlier in what way ? The average yield of Soviet warheads ? Soviet warheads were large simply because they were not that accurate - look up the CEP's of both sides missiles.


I have looked it up.Far deadlier as they could do what they were designed to do even with reduced accuracy wich were not in exsistence by the late 1970's or early 1980's anyways. Look at the data and tell me how much stock we should put in CEP anyways.


The US has always had more accurate missiles and were thus able to build smaller warheads and lighter missiles.



Current Systems and Force Levels. The operational Soviet ICBM force is made up of 1,398 silo launchers. Some 818 of these launchers have been rebuilt since 1972. Nearly half of these silos are new versions of the original designs and have been reconstructed or modified in the past 5 years. All of these 818 silos have been hardened, better to withstand attack by currently operational US ICBMs, and house the world's most modern deployed ICBMs - the SS-17 Mod 3 (150 silos), the SS-18 Mod 4 (308) and the SS-19 Mod 3 (360). Deployment of these ICBMs began only 5 years ago.

The SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs are at least as accurate and possibly more accurate and carry more Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) than the MINUTEMAN III, the most modern operational US ICBM.

www.fas.org...


Not in the timeframe we have been talking about here.Your bashing strawmen again.


Not to mention the US pioneered the use of solid propellants whereas the Soviet Union took years to move away from their liquid fuels and some of their ICBM's still use them ( SS-18 ).


There are advantages to that you might not be familiar wich may or may not have something to do with why their still being deployed


The disadvantages of solid propellants in space applications include:

* Slightly higher empty mass for the rocket stage

* Slightly lower performance than storable liquid propellants

* Transportability issues: Solid propellants are cast into the motor in the factory, unlike liquid fuel rockets which can be fuelled at the launch pad. This means they have to either be: 1) limited in size to be transportable (as for the Delta and Ariane strap-on motors); 2) cast in segments, with the segments assembled at the launch base (as for Titan and the Space Shuttle); or 3) cast in a factory near the launch site (actually done for large test motors intended for Saturn V upgrades).

* Once ignited, they cannot be easily shut down or throttled. Thereafter they have to be pre-cast or milled out for a specific mission.

* Often catastrophic results in the event of a failure

www.astronautix.com...


The Soviet Union apparently took a long time to do way with liqued fuels and i suspect there were good reasons for not going with solid fuelds wich they could manage by the early 1970's. Both countries did away with non-storable liquid fuels long ago so it is hardly the problem you make it out to be.


In a major nuclear exchange and ABM defences would have been moot, the sheer weight of an attack would have devastated both countries and countries where the 2 protagonists have military bases.


I see you did not bother qualifying your point and just assumed it as obvious truth.


Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...


What do you mean by "devastated" anyways? Millions of dead people or both being unable to continue functioning as nation states?


"The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels, and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents, and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor, mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just no comparison between the two."

www.oism.org...


They were preparing to fight AND win by having enough workers and industry survive to win the nuclear exchange with enough capacity to force the other into surrender or worse.


I know Australia was targeted with no less than 100 Soviet strategic warheads during the Cold War.


Not sure what the point is beside admitting how the US holds other countries hostage by building bases all over them.


The US ballistic missile subs ensured that the Soviet Union would still be held at risk even if the land based weapons were knocked out, which wouldn't have happened anyway.



Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...



"At present, Jastrow said, our deterrent rests primarily upon our Trident submarines.
Soviet attack could destroy submarines in port (about 2/3 of our force), and the 200
Soviet killer subs could probably stalk and destroy some of those that were on station.
Because of difficulties in communications, about half the surviving submarines (maybe six)
would launch their missiles."

"US retaliation would also be blunted by Soviet strategic defenses, which absorb about $40 billion annually (five times the amount allocated to SDI).This includes $10 to $12 billion for air defenses, $3 to $5 billion for civil defense, and $15 billion for "Star Wars."According to CIA reports, production lines for manufacturing large numbers of radars and interceptors exist, and a nationwide system could be deployed within the next ten years. Jastrow believes that the components might even be stockpiled already."

www.oism.org...


The USSR prepared for a full scale nuclear war with all means it could. However effective , or ineffective, the passive defenses were they were there and could not be just ignored thus requiring extra commitment of warheads.


For a sizable part of the Cold War the US implemented Operation Roundhammer. This operation involved 1/3 of SAC bombers loaded with nuclear weapons constantly airborne waiting for a control order which would send them over the pole.So basically, the Soviets could never wipe out even half of the US nuclear arsenal in a surprise attack and that half was over 10 000 warheads.


By the mid 80's they would not have been able to penetrate Soviet air defenses according to the Dia.


The US force structure dates from the 1960s.The TITAN ICBMs and the B-52D-model bombers are being retired in view of their age and declining military effectiveness. The B-52Dis scheduled for retirement this year and the TITANs by 1987. The aging B-52G/H bombers will not be capable of effectively penetrating the Soviet air defenses in the mid-1980s. The MINUTEMAN force is increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet ICBM attack.

www.fas.org...


Now i have no idea what effective means in this instance but one can probably assume that not many bombs will arrive at critical strategic targets.

[wuote]The Soviets deployed more subs because they knew they were noisy and easily tracked by the Americans. Every time a Soviet sub entered the Atlantic or Pacific it was tracked by SOSUS.

By the 1980's two thirds did not have to leave Soviet home waters to launch their missiles at strategic targets in the US. By that time there were 200 soviet attack submarines to deal with American hunter Submarines that might have felt brave enough to risk the rather extensive ASW forces deployed by the soviet union.


Two-thirds of the ballistic missile submarines, including those equipped with MIRV-capable missiles, are fitted with long-range SLBMs that enable the submarines to patrol in waters close to The Soviet Union. This affords protection from NATO ASW operations. Moreover, the long range missiles allow the Soviets to fire from home ports, if necessary, and still strike targets in the United States.

www.fas.org...



Based in the Pacific Ocean and Northern Fleet areas, the Soviet ballistic missile submarine force is equipped with over 3,000 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In wartime, a portion of these forces is expected to serve as a survivable nuclear reserve. In the last decade, the deployment of multiple warhead SLBMs with ranges sufficient to reach the United States from waters near the USSR has allowed the Soviets to plan to operate the majority of their SSBNs in protected "bastions," or havens, near the Soviet Union. Mixed groups of naval air, surface, and submarine assets, along with fixed sensors and minefields, will operate in wartime to protect these SSBN bastion areas against US/NATO antisubmarine forces.

www.fas.org...



In the event of war, many would have been sunk before they could launch. As for the missiles being bigger, this was due to the fact that they used liquid fuel whereas the Americans had perfected solid fuel.


That being said i do not believe that tracking submarines ( Any type) is easy at all and that American hunter killer capability is very much overated. Either way they would not have been able to stalk Russian submarines in home ports or under the extensive soviet ASW forces. Would have had to deal with Soviet Diesel electric boats in coastal water wich is just not something you try do.


It also developed a third type of nuclear-powered submarine (called SSGNs) designed specifically to launch cruise missiles against American aircraft carrier task forces. At its peak in 1980, the Soviet submarine force numbered 480 boats, including 71 fast attacks and 94 cruise and ballistic missile submarines. Because the names of individual Soviet submarines are seldom known abroad, the usual practice is to refer to them only as a member of a submarine class. The most widely known class names are those assigned as code names by NATO, such as Alfa, Charlie, and Kilo

americanhistory.si.edu...


www.armscontrol.ru...
www.g2mil.com...

Their missiles were bigger because they had in 1980 on average far more range than US SLBM. The Poseidon was the mainstain of the SLBM stock in the 80's (70% even at end of decade) and it had a range of 4600 km where most( two thirds at least) Russian SLBM at the time had a range of 7000 km or more.

web.ukonline.co.uk...


BTW, Soviet SLBM's didn't out range US missiles - and US missiles were far far more accurate. As a matter of fact the deployment of the Trident II D-5 missile allowed the US navy for the first time to have the ability to hold counter-force targets at risk.


They did outrange American missiles ( check the links so far) and as i said earlier they were not more inaccurate by any wide margin. CEP numbers are in fact so open to manipulation that i would not put much stock in them myself. That being said most sources i found suggest a average difference of CEP of only a few hundred meters in the missiles deployed by both sides in the 1980's. Considering the size of the warheads that is not a large enough difference to talk about imo.

The trident in question was only deployed after the cold war ended so it's a moot point in this discussion


How would a layered defense help them with a preemptive strike ?


If you strike first you can also start certain evacuations earlier and that obviously helps. When you have so many different defensive measures the combination can be quite effective imo and the DIA's.


This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.

www.piedmontcommunities.us...=
page&GID=01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575



Industrial dispersal. The Soviets have been involved in an industrial dispersal program for more than 15 years ( since 1961). Their approach to the program has been and continues to be the siting of new industrial complexes in towns and settlements with populations of 100,000 people or less. The program has several advantages for the Soviets. First, it is of great economic importance from the standpoint of accelerating and expanding their economic development; this is especially true regarding growth of such sparsely developed areas as Siberia. Second, it prevents high concentrations of industry in a small number of large industrial centers and helps the Soviets make better use of their abundant natural resources. Third, dispersal creates a proliferation of aimpoints for U.S. strategic planners and greatly complicates targeting tasks.

Industrial hardening. The Soviets have an ongoing program designed to harden their industrial base. Included in this program are underground facilities, new plant construction techniques, construction of duplicate plants, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, and expedient techniques. The first three hardening methods can be productively utilized only for new facilities and require a long lead time for fruition. The fourth method, retrofit hardening of existing facilities, has near-term implications but is expensive. The fifth means, expedient techniques, is relatively inexpensive and has short-term implications; it will be the focus of this discussion.

If current Soviet expedient hardening preparations for protection of their industrial base are implemented on a large scale, the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory capability could be significantly degraded. By utilizing relatively inexpensive and simple expedient techniques such as packing machinery in sandbags, the Soviets could make their industry relatively invulnerable to overpressures of a few pounds per square inch (psi). Depending on the specific precautions taken in mounting and protecting machines, they can be made to survive overpressures in the range of 40 to 300 psi. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate specific hardening techniques.7

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...


IF one takes into account passive and active ( SAM/ABM) measures employed by the USSR it is not only clear that they tried but also clear that they largely succeeded in preparing as best they could to survive a first strike.


I don't understand the logic.As for reloading silo's, that was more a pipe dream than reality. Many silos wouldn't be there and the storage bunkers for any reloads would be taken out.


Soviet ICBM Silos were widely dispersed ( far far more so than America's) and hardened as much as anyone could in practical terms. It is obviously a open question wether they were all located by Us intelligence and if such knowledge could have ensured their destruction. I do not know but to ensure a reasonable chance ( if they were located) most of the US ICBM's would have had to be used in just his effort. The USSR also deployed mobile launchers and their SSBN's were reloadable at sea. It is certainly not a pipe dream that all soviet Silo's were reloadable as they were designed with that in mind.


All R-36 variants were designed to be launched from silos in dispersed and hardened locations. The R-36M is placed into its 39 m deep silo in a tubular storage/launch container. Upon launch the missile is shot out of the tube, mortar-fashion, by a piston, driven by the expansion of gases from a slow-burning black powder charge inside the piston. The missile's main engine is ignited tens of metres above the ground, preventing any damage to the internal equipment of the silo itself from the rocket engine fiery efflux. This "cold start" enables to remove quickly the empty launch tube from the silo, to reload a second missile in its container and launch it before the anticipated retaliatory strike arrives. This second salvo capability brings extreme advantage in getting twice the number of own missiles on the enemy targets before the opposing counter-silo warheads can arrive at the launch site of the R-36M.

en.wikipedia.org...


So if they can reload them in 20 or 25 missiles that nearly double's their firepower allready wether American counterforce takes out the silo's or not. Now in all honesty i have not checked wether that is a credbile claim so feel free to go disprove it and correct it. What's living without a risk here and there!


[quoteAlso it would take time to denominate an areas devastated by large yield weapons.

Well one expects they would plan for this and according to my information they regularly train to reload silo's in full protective gear. It will obviously go slower but unless destroyed these silo's could likely keep firing missiles for some time.


Quite simply, there were enough warheads to destroy the USSR several times over, there was no defence against it.



The Soviets have a first strike arsenal: at least 5000 warheads of sufficient yield and
accuracy to destroy any US military target.The US has 900 comparable warheads.
(Although the total number of US warheads is impressive, Jastrow pointed out that the
majority are carried by the "air-breathing" part of our strategic triad -- B-52s and
cruise missiles -- which would be unable to penetrate Soviet air defenses.)

www.oism.org...


You can not compare US delivery methods with SOviet delivery methods and certainly not with Soviet capacity to reload their launchers.

On average in the 1980's the US deployed 2100 ICBM warheads against the USSR average of 6700 ICBM warheads not even mentioning the apparent quick reload capacity. The massive numbers of warheads ( bombers,cruise missiles and SLBM) would have run into thousands of dual use sam/abm missiles according to the sources i posted earlier so their effectiveness is at the very least suspect if not largely negated according to the DIA.

www.nrdc.org...


Thinking otherwise is shear folly and completely unrealistic.


Not according to sources i cited so far. If you have a more reliable source of information that the DIA please provide me with links to suggest why and what exactly they disagree on.


After the Cold War it was leaked that in large tracks of the Eastern USSR a nuclear warhead couldn't be tracked, there were huge holes in their early warning system.



Early Warning

Current Systems and Force Levels. The Soviets maintain the world's most extensive early warning system for both ballistic missile and air defense. Their operational ballistic missile early-warning system includes a launch detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars and a series of large phased-array radars located primarily on the periphery of the USSR. Their early-warning air surveillance system is composed of an extensive network of ground-based radars linked operationally with those of their Warsaw Pact Allies.

The current Soviet launch detection satellite network is capable of providing about 30 minutes warning of any US ICBM launch, and of determining the area from which it originated. The two over-the-horizon radars The Soviets have directed at the US ICBM fields also could provide them with 30 minutes warning of an ICBM strike launched from the United States, but with somewhat less precision than the satellite network. Working together, these two early-warning systems can provide more reliable warning than either working alone.

The next layer of operational ballistic missile early warning consists of 11 large HENHOUSE detection and tracking radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems and provide some target-tracking data in support of ABM deployments.

Current Soviet air surveillance radar deployments include more than 7,000 radars of various types located at about 1,200 sites. These deployments provide virtually complete coverage at medium to high altitudes over the USSR and in some areas extends hundreds of kilometers beyond the borders. Limited coverage against low-altitude targets is concentrated in the western USSR and in high-priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983, The Soviets have begun to deploy two new air surveillance radars. These radars assist in the early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks and enhance air defense electronic warfare capabilities.

www.fas.org...


Not so according to the DIA.Where they chose not to defend their probably did so because of low priority and limited ranged of US SLBM/ cruise missiles.


Would it have worked, no way. SLBM's fired from the North Atlantic or even the Barents Sea on depressed trajectories wouldn't have given no more than a few minutes warning time. Not enough time to react. The Soviets knew this which is exactly why they never tried anything.


Well not according to the sources i have posted so far. The Soviets never tried anything because their main aim was trying to survive Nato agression and encirclement and not to start a nuclear war unless to pre-empt a expected NATO assault.


Far less capacity doesn't mean squat when, each side has enough overkill to wipe out everything 10 times. Besides with the disintegration of the USSR after an attack would allow the Chinese to move north, probably with US acquiescence.


By the 1970's the US had largely lost control of the Chinese "card' and would not have been able to deploy them to bleed in allied interest. I for one do not think they ever had much control to start with. The overkill concept has never been proven and the facts if evaluated with bias does not show that everything would have been wiped out "10 times" even if all US or Soviet missiles struck their intended targets.


Are you seriously trying to make a comparison here. Counter-value would destroy the Soviet Union as country.


Not imo and i guess you will have to look at the sources and see if you want to go on believing that contrary to all evidence.


Let's see every city wiped out, almost all industry destroyed - that means a hell of a lot strategically - you're blind if you can't see it.


The US did not have enough warheads to wipe out dispersed Soviet industrial capacity and certainly not enough warheads to wipe out the highly critical industries wich the USSR probably took deep underground. They are in fact still spending money on massive underground structures.

The Cold War with Russia is not over.
Yamantau
A Huge Anthill?

Now they managed to hide 200 ICBM's from uS spy satellites wich were only discovered after the cold war ended so it's a open question what else they managed to sneak underground. If the Germans could do it in wartime under constant allied bombardment what could a country like the USSR manage with it's massive resources?


20 million dead is acceptable when you still have a massive industrial capacity and most of your population shielded deep inside the USSR. There are no safe havens from US nuclear warheads. There is no strategic retreat - there also isn't massive aid from allied countries


You just keep repeating that and i will keep bringing you more and more sources telling you differently. If you must respond to this post do admit your many factual mistakes before bothering to repeat your unsourced claims and base speculation. I did my part now i expect you do yours.

Stellar

General Disclaimer: I am not suggesting all the sources employed are gods truth on earth but that they are serving at least partly as basis for the claims and my point of view on given topic . If i have one source i have more and if you do not like them please specify why and introduce the source that serves as basis for your issue with mine. I reserve the right to change my mind at any point in time when it becomes obvious to me that my current point of view is not defensible or otherwise invalid. Suitable apologies should be expected and will be made in these ( extremely rare; not my fault
) instances.

[edit on 22-1-2006 by StellarX]



posted on Jan, 22 2006 @ 09:27 PM
link   
^^^ That's all well and good, but do you have any other sources than theones you've been quoting all through this thread. US sources fom the early to mid 80's are highly speculative and not so much fact but intelligence summaries.

I mean these 1984 DIA reports have been done to death and are specualtion.

BTW, you still haven't shown anything to support your claim of 10 000 ABM interceptors. Which is one of your main contentions as to why the SOviets would win a war.

Also, all these shelters you talk about, how long would it take to move people into them, a lot longer than the 30 minutes it takes an ICBM to hit. Besides what are they going to be left when they come out ? Absolutely nothing all their cities would be destroyed, their infrastructure, their agriculture etc. All it means is that they would die a slow death in a devastated country.


The first used the warheads aboard just a single Trident submarine to
attack Russian cities, and this attack resulted in 30 to 45 million casualties.
The second scenario used 150 Minuteman III ICBMs in a similar attack on Russian cities with 40 to 60 million casualties. In both instances, the majority of the casualties were fatalities. The Trident attack produced fewer casualties, with more warheads, because the targeting “footprint” is more limited. The bottom line is that approximately one-third of Russia’s citizenry become casualties from an attack with only 150–200 warheads. Obviously, through the choice of targets, the United States can hold at risk any number of Russian citizens from zero up to these egregiously high levels with only a few hundred strategic nuclear warheads.

www.nrdc.org...


[edit on 22-1-2006 by mad scientist]



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 11:44 AM
link   
I don't doubt that if there were ever an open "window of vulnerability" that "Soviet Military power" expressed, it was in the early 1980s following the weak kneed Carter years, however that document was also used for propaganda purposes by the DIA for defense funding politics. (I bought that book when it came out in the early 1980s, and many consider it today to be a little optomistic on soviet capabilities, but a good description of systems and numbers) Stellar has some excellent information, much of which I have seen before, but also some new. I also don't doubt that the Soviets planned on such a conflict just as is described in his post. It is logical and seems to meet the strategy and doctrine of the Soviets. I also have mentioned the SA-5 "dual use" SAMS and the CIA analyist William T Lee and that controversy. I do however respectfully disagree with the overall conclusion of any sort usable advantage in nuclear war capability. Similarly, the conclusions in "Soviet Military Power" were a little complicated, particularly in hindsite.
---// It also assumes a perfect world for the Soviets, near perfect weapons performance, and average performance for US forces at best. It also ignores some things the US does/did were spectacular compared to the Soviets of the late 1970s/1980s.
-ASW was a Western art form, not a Soviet. For example, in the book "blind man's bluff", it became necessary for Reagan to make a political point to the Soviets about Soviet Submarine technology/inferiority, and all at the exact moment around the world every Soviet sub being tracked by US subs and ASW forces were "pinged". Evidently it was a lot of them, maybe most because the repurcussions within the Soviet Navy were quite heavy. It evidently suprised them. US anti-Submarine forces did quite significantly outnumber Russian equivelant forces. The US had 400 plus P-3s alone. (and still has about 250)
-US tank technology was also a suprise to the Russians. The tank battles of both Persian Gulf wars clearly were more one sided than anyone thought it could be. Also suppose to have made quite an impression on the Russian military.
-Anti aircraft supression and stealth technology clearly has been a US advantage, also with dramatic one sided results on heavily defended targets in both gulf wars, against an opponant heavily supplied with Soviet technology. Even in your above posts Stellar, it claims radar coverage of the Soviet Union was only complete at medium to high altitudes, and probably only along the boarders. Low altitude is another story, and the 400 or so B-52s we had at the time were quite capable of flying low enough to get within the 100 mile range of their 150 kiloton SRAMs. The age of the bomber is irrelevent, it is still 'young' airframe wise today, and constantly upgraded elecronics. Add to this a 1500 mile range to 2300 mile range cruise missile and you have an air defence problem that is not easy for a huge country like the Soviets had to defend. Then add to this the Advanced cruise missile which added stealth to the picture. Then the B-2. The F-117. And sea launched cruise missiles from submarines. Soviet SAMS have allways been taken seroiusly by the US, and as evidenced by the recent conflicts anti-SAM technology has kept up with SAM technology. These forces would be brought to bear some dozen hours after the first ballistic waves were over. Soviet fighters were very short ranged, and if their bases were not hit then the radars in strategic places would have been. The Russians also didn't practice mid-air refueling as the US did with fighters, nor did they have the aircraft in the numbers to carry out mid air refueling other than a very limited basis. The claim that no bombers would penetrate is not universal. Soviet air defenses were impressive, but far from perfect. Bombers can also be reloaded.
-SLBMs of the Poseidon version, were not extremely accurate, and relatively small warheads of 50 kt, but they could load 14 of them a missile, and its range was close to 3000 miles, but most impressive was it's capability for a "depressed trajectory" which would at the cost of closer range, give extremely short warning time. (US bomber pilots had to actually sit in the cockpit ready to go when Soviet SLBM subs came close to the US coast) A few minutes at best. This would complicate any SA-5 defense even more. In any event, with the introduction of the 4000 mile range Trident 1, the kinematics favor the SLBM. Trident 2, forget it. Kiss it goodbye. And the US planned on reloading SLBMs at sea.
-MX was a "cold launch" system. Why do you think they would do that? Why bother? Reload maybe?
-Soviet/Russian fighters are good, if they are fighting themselves. It has taken the Russians 30 years to catch up with something worthy against the F-15, and even then having superior training may still trump any advantage of the Russians.
In the 1980s when all the scare talk of inferiority was the rage, I too was very impressed with the Soviets and their very impressive arsenal. Hindsite, recent history, world events, and weapons performance by proxy states have given a different view of Soviet equipment. Some of it is very good, and as reliable and worthy as "Soviet Military Power" claims,,, some not. And a lot is not. (Did you know the Soviets came out with the counter; "US Military Power" which did close to the same thing?) In general though I cannot avoid one conclusion; for the Russians/Soviets, appearances are almost more important. It looks good on paper, real good, and real scary which plays well with international politics, but has yet to really prove itself as other than scrap metal on a battlefield.





[edit on 23-1-2006 by Sandman11]



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 12:33 PM
link   

Originally posted by Sandman11
-ASW was a Western art form, not a Soviet. For example, in the book "blind man's bluff", it became necessary for Reagan to make a political point to the Soviets about Soviet Submarine technology/inferiority, and all at the exact moment around the world every Soviet sub being tracked by US subs and ASW forces were "pinged". Evidently it was a lot of them, maybe most because the repurcussions within the Soviet Navy were quite heavy. It evidently suprised them.


I too have read Blind Man's Bluff and don't remember reading anything about Soviets subs being pinged at the same time. If anything that displays the advantage the US have and would be kept secret not trumpeted. I doubt it would have been done to make a political point.



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 01:00 PM
link   
OK, now I have to dig out that book and try to find it. I'm pretty sure it is in there...

I am not home right now and not even near the book, but here is another quote from the period and it's source ( thanks to google).

"When the British intelligence
saw how the Soviets were reacting to some of the scare tactics, they
notified Thatcher who tried to convince Reagan to tone down. (I mean
there's another incident not in this CIA official history, but in the
folklore among Navy sub community that at a given moment all the US hunter
subs pinged the Soviet missile subs around the globe simultaneously thereby
letting them know that we can sink all their submarine deterrent. I suppose
this will come out at some point, but it's just a folklore at Groton). This
was just a part of an overall strategy by Reagan administration to convey to
the Soviet Union that we were willing and able to wage a nuclear war. "

groups.google.ca...

-about a third down into it.

[edit on 23-1-2006 by Sandman11]

[edit on 23-1-2006 by Sandman11]



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 01:34 PM
link   
Cheers for the information Sandman. Have you read this book " The Silent War "
by John Pina Craven, A great book, if you liked Blind Man's Bluff you'll like this one.



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 01:59 PM
link   

Originally posted by mad scientist
Cheers for the information Sandman. Have you read this book " The Silent War "
by John Pina Craven, A great book, if you liked Blind Man's Bluff you'll like this one.


Thanks,
I don't remember, it has been a while if I have. I'll check it out. I also subscribed to "Proceedings" for many years (but not for many years now), I highly recommend that magazine, USNI.
Here is another google;

"In the late '80s the Russian Navy started to expand their areas of
> operation. The US Navy countered by
> finding every Russian ballistic
> missile sub in the world! At a preset time, all US subs trailing Russian
> boomers pinged them! This was a message to the Russian admirals, "we
> can get you at any time"

users3.cgiforme.com...



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 02:17 PM
link   
It may have been this book I read about this event, Tom Clancy non fiction;

www.amazon.com...=1138047168/sr=1-7/ref=sr_1_7/104-0971658-7477511?s=books&v=glance&n=283155

Russian/Soviet Submarine construction was hidious in quality. Some designs and engineering are quite impressive, but like much Soviet equipment, manufacturing quality was horrible. "you can tell a north sea submariner because he glows in the dark" or something like that.

Norman Polmer is real good, I want this book.

www.amazon.com...=1138047168/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-0971658-7477511?s=books&v=glance&n=283155

[edit on 23-1-2006 by Sandman11]



posted on Jan, 23 2006 @ 03:50 PM
link   

Originally posted by mad scientist
^^^ That's all well and good, but do you have any other sources than theones you've been quoting all through this thread.


Plenty so if specific one's will not do for you name them and state the reason why so i can find something more to your liking.


US sources fom the early to mid 80's are highly speculative and not so much fact but intelligence summaries.


Why are they highly speculative and what evidence is there to assume that? I for one think they are trying to dimish the Soviet threat as that is what many of my other sources would indicate.Name any bit of information in the DIA reports that is stated as fact wich is according to you speculation. I can then look into the claim and address it as best i can.


I mean these 1984 DIA reports have been done to death and are specualtion.


The range of articles is from 1983-1989 and i have quoted from all over it. One can actually track their estimates in 1983 and see how it turns out to be pretty accurate later on. I posted many other sources so once again you will have to provide me with reasons for why you doubt the claims. So far your technical claims have not been accurate at all so i do not see why i should change my sources just yet.


BTW, you still haven't shown anything to support your claim of 10 000 ABM interceptors. Which is one of your main contentions as to why the SOviets would win a war.


It's just one part of the Soviet/Russian scheme to make American strategic targetting far more difficult however effective those Sams/Abms really are in a full scale nuclear war.


The Gammon is a 'highly refined' version of the Griffin ( wich was succesfully tested at the Russian ABM testing grounds against SS-4)wich the DIA and CIA in their wisdom decided to call a SAM system when all the evidence suggested that it was a dual use system at worse and a full blown ABM system, under the guise of a SAM system, at worse.

"Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...



"To the best of my knowledge, reports of Kosygin's remarks lumping Moscow and Tallinn (the SA-5) together as ABM systems never reached DIA. Whether it was reported elsewhere I do not know. In any case, it did not deter McNamara from telling Congress six months later that U.S. intelligence, i.e. the CIA, was now confident that
the system was only a SAM, not a dual purpose SAM/ABM although such systems could have some marginal ABM capabilities."

www.fas.org...


The ABM Treaty was quite a different matter; it had to be violated from the beginning. The infamous Krasnoyarsk radar was the sixth in the LPAR series, constructed in that location by a Politburo decision in deliberate violation of the ABM Treaty. However, the really serious Soviet violation was nationwide deployment of the dual purpose SA-5/10s and the battle management radars in violation of article 1 of the ABM Treaty.

When CIA concluded in 1967 that the SA-5 was just an anti-aircraft (SAM) system, and that the Hen House radars were just for early warning (and space tracking), a majority of the U.S. intelligence comunity joined the CIA choir. Subsequently ClAts analysis of the SA-5 and the Hen House radars was extended to the SA-10 and the LPARS. Once enshrined, CIAls erroneous analysis was not challenged even when "hard" evidence to the contrary appeared.(31)

By the time the Empire collapsed, more than 10, 000 dual purpose SAM/ABM interceptor missiles were deployed at SA-5/10 complexes. Yet the U.S. officially counts only the l00 interceptors of the "ABM X-3" system at Moscow, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. ABM X-3 is a scaled up model of the NIKE-X system, vintage late

www.fas.org...


Construction of the dual-purpose SAM/ABM system began in 1960 but was abandoned in 1963 to be replaced by SA-5s. Between 1970 and 1975 the SA-5 was modernized with two-missile models and new electronic circuitry.

Ironically, the development of the upgraded ground-based battle-management radars, which can track MIRVed RVs, was carried out during the ABM Treaty negotiations. Construction of these facilities could hardly have gone unnoticed by the West, for they resemble several Manhattan skyscrapers joined together in one unit. Construction began in 1972, and the first units became operational in the1980s. The well-known Krasnoyarsk Radar-the sixth of nine such radars--was a deliberate treaty violation by the Soviet leadership. Is it possible that United States and NATO spy satellites did not detect these massive structures? If not, then why are these flagrant treaty violations being ignored?

In total the U.S.S.R. deployed two generations of national missile defenses, consisting of 18 large radars and 12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors at 280 complexes. Moscow itself is protected not only by 100 ABM missiles, as permitted by the treaty, but also by several thousand SAM/ABM interceptors.

newsmax.com.../4/24/53247

Many more if you want them but from your response to my previous post it seems the volume of links prevents you from reading them as you should be.


Also, all these shelters you talk about, how long would it take to move people into them, a lot longer than the 30 minutes it takes an ICBM to hit.


There were shelters in every factory and under every school but the main aim of the Soviet strategy was to build their cities in a way that made evacuation possible in 30 minutes or less.


This dispersal plan had a huge impact on city planning in the Soviet Union. When new cities were built, they were planned as dispersed cities with suburban populations instead of centralized towns (see above).
Changes to existing cities included constructing wide streets, artificial reservoirs, and a network of highways around the city, as well as reducing building density to reduce the possibility of blast and fire damage.
The Soviets, therefore, assumed that they would have enough advance warning of an American attack to implement the aforementioned evacuation and dispersal exercises. Through the use of these removals, pre-attack warning systems, and improved city planning, Soviet military leaders hoped to reduce the number of civilian and economic (industrial) losses.

www.piedmontcommunities.us...=
page&GID=01303001151018293682662999&PG=01304001151018318529636575



Besides what are they going to be left when they come out ? Absolutely nothing all their cities would be destroyed, their infrastructure, their agriculture etc. All it means is that they would die a slow death in a devastated country.


They built redundant strategic manufaturing so that they may have possible have been able to avoid strategic bottlenecks.

How big were those undeground complexes for the 170 000+ critical officials all over the Soviet union? Where there factory space in them aswell as food and water storage for many months? Your just making 101 assumptions and not even bothering to justify them with sourced material.


The vast Soviet network of shelters and command facilities, under construction for four decades, was recently described in detail by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci.The shelters are designed to house the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, and the key leadership of the Ministryof Defense and the KGB. Some are located hundreds of yards beneath the surface, and are connected by secret subway lines,tunnels, and sophisticated communications systems. "These facilities contradict in steel and concrete Soviet protestations that they share President Reagan's view that nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought,"Carlucci said (Ariwna Republic, April 3, 1988). These
facilities reveal that they are preparing themselves for just the opposite." The shelters are also protected against chemical warfare agents, and stocked with sufficient supplies to allow the leadership to survive and wage war for months.In contrast, the limited US shelter system begun in the 1950s has mostly been abandoned."To have something comparable, we'd have to have facilities where we could put every governor, mayor, every Cabinet official, and our whole command structure underground with subways running here and there," Carlucci said. "There's just no comparison between the two."

www.oism.org...



At the end of the briefing McNamara accepted the cost-exchange ratios as being no more than 4: 1 in favor of the offense (down from 100:1), which made NIKE-X cost-effective by the standards he had prescribed. (12) However, in an emotional outburst during the briefing McNamara rejected the evidence that the Soviets put first priority on destroying MM silos in order to limit damage to the USSR, saying that as a Soviet Marshal he would target the entire arsenal on U.S. cities. Hence he refused to approve NIKE-X deployment to protect U.S. citizens from the FSU on the grounds of MAD theology--U. S. ABM defenses would be "destabilizing" by forcing the Soviets to respond with a massive MIRVed ICBM buildup.

The Joint Chiefs used a version of that 1966 NIKE-X briefing to ambush McNamara when they met with President Johnson at his ranch in December 1966, persuading Johnson to overrule McNamara and order deployment of U.S. national ABM, although not the defense against the FSU that the Chiefs proposed.(13) While the Chief's briefing is not available, a memo for the record prepared by W. W. Rostow, then President Johnson's national security adviser, is.(14)

According to Mr. Rostow's memo, the Chiefs recommended MIKE-X deployment at 25 cities to save the lives of 30 to 50 million U.S. citizens, if attacked. McMamara opposed the Chiefs' proposal on the grounds of MAD theology and simplistic "action-reaction":

* it was "inconceivable" that the Soviets would react in any other way but to restore the status quo ante, i.e. 120 million U.S. population fatalities;
* both sides would spend a lot of money and end up where they started, but we would waste the most because offensive weapons were so much cheaper than ABM systems;
* the danger of war would not be reduced;
* the FSU had "been wrong in its nuclear defense policy for a decade" because everything spent on all types of defenses (air and missile) had been wasted.(15)

The Chiefs saw it quite differently:

* NIKE-X would save tens of millions of lives against a Soviet population attack, and that was a worthwhile objective;
* while they could not predict with confidence how the Soviets would react, all likely reactions had a substantial price and would divert funds from other military programs--no free lunches;
* the risk of nuclear attack would be reduced

www.fas.org...


Well your last sources is certainly classical Cold war propaganda but one expects the Soviet Union would not have built up their passive defenses if it would not save lives overall. It's all a question of how much they were willing to lose in reaching their objectives. Calling the effectiveness in question is assuming American generals and their intelligence communities were also wasting their time as they planned to do exactly the same as the Soviet union but were prevented by politicians who did not want to "upset" the SU into a arms race.

Stellar

[edit on 23-1-2006 by StellarX]



posted on Jan, 25 2006 @ 06:14 PM
link   
Take a look at what katrina did and after that think of how one nuke would be compared to that, worse or ??????
Plus in a nuclear war there is no limitation you launch them all and you wait to blow up.
I wonder how many nukes does russia and the u.s has.



posted on Jan, 26 2006 @ 11:53 AM
link   

Originally posted by pepsi78
Take a look at what katrina did and after that think of how one nuke would be compared to that, worse or ??????
Plus in a nuclear war there is no limitation you launch them all and you wait to blow up.
I wonder how many nukes does russia and the u.s has.


Well katrina was surely a disaster in terms of economic damage and it showed just how unprepared the United States is for disasters of any scale. Nukes are far far worse but if you prepare for worse case scenarious and ensure that your enemy is suffers more relative to you you can still win by reaching your own objectives. Assuming that your opponent will not do a certain thing based on your own inability or choices not to do it, is hardly a qualification for ruling out the action. Suicide bombing anyone?

You can have a house filled with ammunition but if you have no guns they are not usefull. The same is true for nuclear warheads and the US delivery systems in the timeframe in question, were just not up to to the task of getting the large numbers of warheads where they could inflict damage.

Hope that helped and i do suggest you read some of posts as you will have many if not most of your questions answered in detail.

Stellar



posted on Jan, 26 2006 @ 02:53 PM
link   
I agree with a winning condition, the condition would be limitation to nuclear weapons.
Let's say U.S VS IRAN they lauch 1 U.S launches 100 or even less to win.
I would wish to get in to details cause i really dont know what will one
modern nuke do.
Let's say 100 nukes falls on a country bigest us or russia.
And what would the radiation efect be after the impact from a single nuke.
The radiation from a nuclear strike is gamma radiation.
Gamma rays are known to be the worse and i hapen to know about gamma rays simply cause i had a debate about them on the forum for almost a month.
Over 700 rads and it can be dedlly.
Just over 200 rads and you get sick
The penetration level of gamma is very high and can penetrate anithing.
You need a cover of thick metal to shield from it and even then it can penatrate.
Gamma radiation will penetrate bunkers if it's stong enough.
Droping a nuke will level a hole city like new york and will spread radiation
beyond new york.
Radioactive clouds will form and it would rain with radioactive rain, there is also radioactive dust storms.The cernobal incident caused radioactive clouds and from russia it afected all the coutrys around them Romania, hungary, poland all were forced to stay inside and take medicine.
I know this cause i expiriaced it i was a kid i was not alowed to go out side.
People died and this wasent hapening in russia.
It lasted almost an year.
I dont live in russia but i do live in eastern europe, people died from the dedly rain, it made the trees look funny and this wasnt russia, rusia is far away from us.
Green was not green anymore and the fatality pole increased esecialy for old people.
One nuke will mess up a big area imagine 100
I dont think you are being realistic
I will come up with radiation details from scientific sites.
In a nuclear war there are no winers only loosers.


[edit on 26-1-2006 by pepsi78]



posted on Jan, 26 2006 @ 06:53 PM
link   
You know, counterforce -vs- countervalue means nothing. If one side is at a signinificant disadvantage in counterforce exchange then the disadvantaged side could just declare that a "launch on warning" counterstrike would end on cities from the outset. Mutual suicide forced by the disadvantaged of the first attacked. The limits of reason can be reached wihout being a terrorist, and the casualties of a "counterforce" strike could be enough to justify the total release of all restraint up to extreme "countervalue".. Now you are back to the "Dr. Strangelove" suicide scenario, or MAD. You still want to invade Western Europe? I can just about guarantee that 12,000 deliverable strategic warheads the US could deliver in 1986 would cause more than the Russians/Soviets ever experienced in casualties in all their history no matter how much they think they can prepare for it, and by several times. You see, it isn't about fighting a nuclear war, it is about making any potential outcome too expensive to the instigator to ever seriously regard the idea of justifying one...
It reminds me of the cowboys around the saloon table, betting on a poker hand, raising, passing, and bluffing. Bottom line is until the cards are on the table you won't know who "wins" if that is even possible...



posted on Feb, 4 2006 @ 08:46 PM
link   
For the Pepsi guy,gamma rays cant penetrate a halfinch of lead.
Why are we talking about a Soviet-Us exchange if theres no Soviet UNion?
The Area of nothern asia lost all nuclear capabilities after the fall of the USSR and there are no other countries apart from the western civilizations whoo have the capabilities to lunch a ICBM



posted on Feb, 4 2006 @ 09:59 PM
link   

Originally posted by Jakobx
For the Pepsi guy,gamma rays cant penetrate a halfinch of lead.
Why are we talking about a Soviet-Us exchange if theres no Soviet UNion?
The Area of nothern asia lost all nuclear capabilities after the fall of the USSR and there are no other countries apart from the western civilizations whoo have the capabilities to lunch a ICBM

Yes i dont see a conflict with russia now since russia is a democratic country now.
North Corea sounds bad, China seems to be mixed inbetwen democracy and comunism, exept that the liders are comunism they can pretty much
do what ever they want travel, iternet, tehnology, lisen to what ever tipe of music they want etc...

SO the real danger remains in North Corea i dont think they would hesitate
to use it their fanatics.



posted on Feb, 11 2006 @ 04:31 AM
link   

Originally posted by StellarX

Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...




Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.37 Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.38"

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil...



About the SA-5/S-200 as you like to use it as an example of impenetrable Soviet ABM defence, seems it never interecepted a ballistic target.


In 1975, the Soviets completed an upgrade of the S-200, which featured a longer range of 250 kilometers and a modernized fire-control radar. The Soviets hoped that the upgraded S-200 would be able to engage short-range attack missiles in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. These attempts failed. Nevertheless, the system was deployed in large numbers during the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

missilethreat.com...



posted on Feb, 11 2006 @ 11:33 AM
link   

Originally posted by mad scientist
About the SA-5/S-200 as you like to use it as an example of impenetrable Soviet ABM defence, seems it never interecepted a ballistic target.


Then you must have missed the posts where i made it clear that the missile it was based on did intercept IRBM. You really should read what i post before going off in search of some little evidence to dismiss it.

Thanks for deciding to give me at least one link to work with. I know it's hard work to back your claims and i just want to thank you for going to the trouble.

That being said i never claimed they had a impenetrable ABM system as nothing ever works nearly as well as it should in theory. What i suggested was that it makes strategic planning a real headache given the fact that you have to work with probabilities and now have to assign more warheads to priority targets just in case the defenses do work.

You really should read everything in the following articles but since i know your lazy when it comes to investigation other people's "crazy" beliefs here is bits from each.


immediately prior to the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviets had developed a surface-to-air missile, the SA-5, which was observed to have a peculiar trajectory. The SA-5 was fired high above the atmosphere and then would descend to intercept and destroy enemy bombers. While

technically such a trajectory could not be ruled out, logically, however, it could not be accepted as this type of trajectory represents the least efficient way to shoot down enemy aircraft. On the other hand, the SA-5�s trajectory would be just the ticket for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles which themselves travel above the atmosphere. Taking this into account, the SA-5 had to be an ABM weapon. But with the ABM treaty almost in hand, this fact was ignored and the treaty went into effect. The treaty remains in effect, limiting development of a U.S. ABM system. Meanwhile, Russian dual-purpose (anti-aircraft/anti-missile) missile systems like the SA-5 continue to exist.

www.thenewamerican.com...



Prior to 1967 there was a consensus that the SA-5 could be a SAM/ABM, with the Hen Houses as the battle-management radars. After 1967, however, the CIA argued that the SA-5 was only a SAM, and that the Hen Houses provided only early warning of a missile attack. By about 1970 the majority agreed. Subsequently only a handful of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts, plus occasionally the Air Force and a few Department of Defense officials, made the case for Soviet national ABM defenses based on the SA-5/SA-10 SAM/ABMs and the Hen House/LPARs as battle-management radars.

The CIA relied almost exclusively on the "hard evidence" from U.S. technical collection systems despite the fact that such evidence was inconclusive and plagued by major "intelligence gaps." Now Russian sources have filled in most of the intelligence gaps, thus refuting the CIA's analysis on every critical issue.

www.security-policy.org...



However, Soviet and Russian sources, including former Premier Alexei Kosygin and the Chief Designer of the original Moscow ABM system,

confirm that: the SA-5 and SA-10 were dual purpose antiaircraft/missile systems (SAM/ABMs), and that the Hen House and LPAR radars provided

the requisite battle management target tracking data. These and other sources cited in The ABM Treaty Charade are not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, CIA has not revised its position on this issue, nor have the U.S. Congress and the public been informed that the ABM Treaty was

a valid contract from beginning to end.

In the late 1960s the U.S. sacrificed its 20-year technological advantage in ABM defenses on the altar of "arms control." As Russian sources

now admit, the Soviet General Staff was in total control of Soviet "arms control" proposals and negotiations, subject to Politburo review,

which was largely pro forma. The Soviet military's objective was to gain as much advantage as possible from "arms control" agreements (SALT).

www.jinsa.org...



Along the way, having pieced together information from memoirs and recently declassified material, Mr. Lee says he has discovered hard evidence of something the U.S. long suspected but was never able to prove: Russia already has a national missile defense. Started by the Soviets even before the ABM Treaty took effect, the original defense was pretty rough. But as Mr. Lee says, unlike the Americans, the Soviets realized that "some defense is better than none," and kept upgrading its NMD even after it signed the ABM Treaty. Russia has continued to modernize the NMD system over the past decade, he adds.

www.opinionjournal.com...



The real opening gun of the SAM upgrade affair was fired in the spring of 1969 at Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque. Analysts at Sandia

had looked at the problem for the first time in what proved to be the proper fashion. Using well-accepted models of the SA-2 system and all

the characteristics of U.S. ICBM reentry vehicles, they were able to show, through simple engagement simulation that the SA-2 could, in fact,

engage a large portion of the U.S. missile force if the interceptor were equipped with a nuclear warhead. Reports of Sandia's results were

circulated throughout Washington and within the CIA but were not taken seriously. Sandia's concern with the problem was attributed to its

increasing nervousness about the vulnerability of U.S. weapons to nuclear weapons effects and to a desire to get on with the Mark-12 reentry

vehicle program. Finally, in the summer of 1969 Sandia persistence resulted in a briefing of analysts working in the defensive weapons field

in the CIA. The Sandia argument was simple and impressive. We looked hard for obvious errors; we made

www.cia.gov...




some corrections to their SA-2 model; we questioned some of the characteristics ascribed to the Mark-11 reentry vehicle carried by the

Minuteman ICBM force. But we could not shake the basic validity of Sandia's study. Moreover, we were impressed with the importance of a

detailed understanding of U.S. weapons when assessing the capabilities of foreign weapon systems to counter them. For example, the Mark-11 RV

has an extremely small radar cross-section that poses an almost impossible target for air defense radars. What we had failed to realize was

that the nose shield which provides this low cross-section burns off at about 90 thousand feet so that the reentry vehicle then "blooms" as a

target. The effect of this characteristic-along with others-was to make incoming RVs far easier targets for SAM systems than we had

previously realized. If nothing else, the intelligence community was forced to abandon its consideration of foreign weapons systems largely

in vacuo and to accommodate its analysis to the need to answer very specific questions arising from the net technical assessment of U.S. and

opposing weaponry.

Sandia's work was followed by a study by the General Research Corporation for the DDR&E and a hurried look at the problem by the Strategic

Military Panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee.

on performing the study, we required that all the elements of the system be employed in very nearly the same way that they were used in an

air defense role, but allowed the introduction of operational doctrine and procedures specifically tailored for an ABM role. We assumed the

interceptors to be armed with nuclear warheads-a sine qua non for ABM capabilities. This approach later became known as the "mini-mod system"

when many more imaginative modifications to the system were introduced in response to the identification of its specific shortcomings when

used for missile defense.

The study was completed and published in December 1969. It generally confirmed the basic results of the Sandia analysis: the nature of the

ballistic missile defense problem and the characteristics of the existing U.S. missile threat allowed the SA-2 system-under restricted

circumstances-to defend portions of the USSR against a part of the U.S. Minuteman force. To provide

www.cia.gov...



It is not my purpose here to deal at length with the technicalities of SAM upgrade, but these analytical results shed light on some

important considerations. Any ABM capability that might be ascribed to the SA-2 system was highly qualified and conditional. But those who

took the possibility seriously noted that some capability could indeed be shown to exist. Those who denigrated the possibility emphasized

that such capabilities were "technical" or "theoretical" and not "real," though no means for giving meaning to those characterizations ever

emerged. It was also pointed out that no country would rely upon a defense which depended upon the attacker's behaving in a certain way which

made him peculiarly vulnerable; on the other hand, it was noted that the approaching strategic arms limitations negotiations might freeze the

offense so that pre

www.cia.gov...



precisely such a situation might occur. Discussions about the possibilities of changing reentry angles or burst heights quickly showed

that it could be accomplished only with great difficulty.

The report we prepared was not enthusiastically received. In several parts of the Agency and elsewhere in the community, we were charged with

having added fuel to a destructive fire by not rejecting out of hand a palpably ridiculous suggestion. Within the defense technology

community, we were ridiculed as delicate flowers unwilling to go the whole way in addressing the possibilities of upgrading SAMs. Throughout

the rest of the debate-through the SALT considerations and the preparation of NIE 11-3-71-CIA's defensive weapons systems analysts

alternately defended the possibilities of SAM upgrade or argued against its likelihood depending upon the particular protagonist being

encountered.

www.cia.gov...


I never suggested it was a missile proof system but only that given the total Russian strategic plan it played it's part and would as imo ( and theirs) have helped them win a nuclear exchange and full blown nuclear war.

It's pretty arrogant of you to assume that you can dismiss my entire argument with three lines of typing... I have plenty more where that came from but I guess that's how you deal with everyone who has the audacity to disagree with you.

Stellar



posted on Feb, 11 2006 @ 12:02 PM
link   
^^^ Yes, none of the information above said that the SA-5 was capable of intercepting a ballistic missile, just a load of waffle.
The source I provided, categorically states The Soviets hoped that the upgraded S-200 would be able to engage short-range attack missiles in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. These attempts failed.

Which is sourced from Fiszer and Gruszczynski, “Castles in the Sky.”

Now you posted alot of external sources citing that the SA-5 was the backbone of the Soviet ABM defence, when in fact it failed to shoot down even short range ballistic targets. You hvae absolutely no informtaion that it actually worked against ballistic targets.

Well no more needed to be said. You talk in circles too much and just repost the same information without actually proving anything.
Anyone can google, it's posting meaningful information that is the challenge.

Now find me some information that the SA-5 was successful in a test against a ballistic target.

[edit on 11-2-2006 by mad scientist]



posted on Feb, 11 2006 @ 03:05 PM
link   

Originally posted by mad scientist
^^^ Yes, none of the information above said that the SA-5 was capable of intercepting a ballistic missile, just a load of waffle.


So now you are going back to the start i guess? Were you not reading back then or do you just hope no one else remembers? I guess when you have no recourse you grasp at straws.


V-1000:First Soviet anti-ballistic missile system. Development began in 1956 and the system was tested at Sary Shagan 1960 to 1961. It was clear that enormous development work was needed to achieve an operational anti-ballistic missile system. Therefore work began on the successor A-35 system, although the Americans were led to believe that an operational system was deployed around Moscow. The System A anti-ballistic missile equipped with the V-1000 rocket made the first intercept and destruction in the world using a conventional warhead of an intermediate range ballistic missile warhead coming in at 3 km/s on 4 May 1961.

www.astronautix.com...



The V-1000 ABM was first seen in the public in 1963 when it was paraded on the Red Square and was retired from active service in the following year from yet undefined reasons, but It should be noted that the 5V28 "Volga" missile from the S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) SAM system, which was also developed by Grushin's OKB, is considered to be a highly modified version of it.

warfare.ru...


That is interception of a IRB missile travelling at nearly 11 000 Km/h, and the Sa-5 was a highly refined version of that missile, back in 1961 with a conventional warhead. In large part the Sa-5 are deployed with nuclear warheads they so your arguments are based on shear fantasy and denial of established facts.


The source I provided, categorically states The Soviets hoped that the upgraded S-200 would be able to engage short-range attack missiles in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. These attempts failed.


One source does. Please dont pretend that one sources makes for truth when i provide so many. Why did it fail ? Did they use the right tracking methods and had to deploy others? Did they in fact deploy the missiles anyways? Your just begging more questions and provinding no answers.


Which is sourced from Fiszer and Gruszczynski, “Castles in the Sky.”


Glad your willing to source your claims but it would be better if you could provide online sources so that everyone might see the context and full data provided. I have never hidden where i get my information from and i believe that open minded people can come to logical conclusions based on what i provided so far. If you cant find something that suggests the same online it's probably not a book worth sourcing.


Now you posted alot of external sources citing that the SA-5 was the backbone of the Soviet ABM defence, when in fact it failed to shoot down even short range ballistic targets.


So your just going to make it up as you go? Where is the evidence?


You hvae absolutely no informtaion that it actually worked against ballistic targets.


I do and i have repeatedly noted it. So your basically reducing this to claiming that the Soviets would use a tested BM design for this missile but still ended up deploying something that did not work? Go read about the Sa-2 and the evidence that even that missile could likely intercept ICBM's given enough tracking information.


Well no more needed to be said. You talk in circles too much and just repost the same information without actually proving anything.


It is impossible for me to prove anything when you refuse to give the sources a fair chance.


Anyone can google, it's posting meaningful information that is the challenge.


You have proved that even 30 year olds can fail at it so i guess your argument is moot. It's apparently very hard.


Now find me some information that the SA-5 was successful in a test against a ballistic target.


Do your own research or read the stuff i provide. It's hardly you who is doing the work here.

Stellar

[edit on 11-2-2006 by StellarX]





new topics

top topics



 
0
<< 8  9  10    12  13  14 >>

log in

join