Greatest Ground Attack Aircraft - Ever?

It seems to me that this is an invalid problem. The specification was which aircraft quantity of two would I want to take out the enemy. I don't know of two fighter bombers that would give me a snowball's chance in hell of winning this scenario. The closest that I've seen here would be Rogue1's BUFFs. Given that these have aparently been declared invalid, my choice would be 1 A-10 Warthog loaded with Rockeye and a Huey helicopter. The A-10 could lob toss the Rockeye to cover my escape in the Huey.

I understood everything that CH1466 said. Excellent information. Is this from experience or a book?

Originally posted by ch1466

>>
BTW, Mechanised infantry is M113s and Bradleys (or BMDs and BMPs or Stormers, Strikers, Spartans and Warriors) and grunts on the ground. A gatling gun will do plenty against grunts, leaving you to take the wheels and tracks with your Carl Gustav.
>>

That's a fallacy akin to saying that the 3rd and 4th _ID_ 'are not tank divisions'. Mech infantry is worthless on it's own because it lacks the ability to saturate an area with heavy MG and main gun fires, either in suppression of threats beyond the reach or armor of the IFV/APCs. Or when other tanks are known to be operating in the area.

Read the set-up. The set-up is you're facing a company of Mech Inf. The parameters are key to the answer. It doesn't matter what "real world" experience or doctrine or training or even history tells us. There is no mention of tanks in the question, therefore there are no tanks coming.


>>
Hell, at 6,000 rounds a minute you can take refuge inside an aluminium M113 if you want, I'll be digging a hole underneath it to hide in.
>>

And volume of firepower will defeat comparable armour. 2,000 rounds of .22 a minute will chop through concrete blocks that are proof against 9mm. 6,000 rounds of 7.62 NATO/.30in US will punch its way through the top and side walls of an M113. Which is the thinnest armour on the, venerable, APC. Which is made from compressed aluminium. Only its glacis is proof against .50in, and then only ball.

Indeed, when we /tried/ to send AC-47s into both Laos and Southern North Vietnam

Hold it right there, I've already made it clear I am NOT talking about Douglas DC3s.

Such is NOT apt to be the case if you are facing off with a motor rifle company.

Motorised Infantry is wheeled trucks, not tracks. That's the difference between Mechinised Infantry and Motorised Infantry, as defined by the Red Army, who invented the concepts.




The fact that you say it was not a "legitimate" nickname shows that it was/has been used as a moniker. And my first exposure to said term was through the book "Soldiers", companion to the BBC series of the same name, which if memory is correct dates to 1986, in which the terms "Puff the Magic Dragon" and "105mm Howitzer are used in, if not in the same sentence, the same paragraph.

Gatling Gun is an accepted civilian term for power-operated rotary guns. If you're going to get that technical then they're not even guns, they're rifles, as in they have rifled barrels. And when you get to 20 and 30mm they're not even rifles, they're cannon.


Of course a Bradley or Warrior can deal with a Scimitar/Scorpion. Just as the 30mm Rarden on Scimitar could deal with a Tiger. No-one races at Monaco in Jimmy Clark's Lotus Cosworth/Hewland package anymore because it has been superceded. Technology has moved ahead. The best tank in Vietnam was the Centurian, but you don't see people clamouring to buy them now, do you?

None of which changes the fact that the CVR(T) Scimitar and Scorpion are defined as light tanks, as opposed to Main Battle Tanks, and not IFVs. And when invented were armed so they could, if in desparate need, kill MBTs, through the side armour admittedly.

Either way, a man in a foxhole with an SLR or an Austeyr doesn't want a hulking peice of metal clanking towards him with a 30mm cannon pointed his way.

An M113, mounting a weapon of the same calibre as his, is, a little, less daunting.

Now, as to the real worldness of this scenario, just picture a group of blue helmets in a jungle in Africa or Asia or a mountain range in eastern Europe. Or even a desert mountain range on the roof of the world. Take a look at their likely opponents, not too many tanks to spare there, but a few armoured cars and a lot of technicals. In other words, a scratch motorised/mechanised infantry force.

Hmm, that's never happened before, has it?

Howlrunner,

>>
Read the set-up. The set-up is you're facing a company of Mech Inf. The parameters are key to the answer. It doesn't matter what "real world" experience or doctrine or training or even history tells us. There is no mention of tanks in the question, therefore there are no tanks coming.
>>

Fine.

---
Below you, you can see enemy **tanks and APCs.** You estimate the enemy are about 120 strong - roughly a reinforced motor rifle company and they are dismounting to sweep both sides of the valley.
---

Is precisely what Fritz said.

The Russians aren't stupid. They recognize the value of combined arms just as we do. As such, they know better than to send in IFV and APC on their own. Ignoring a superior ability to absorb 'Carl Gustav' 84mm recoilless rounds; tanks carry more GPMG/HMG rounds and generally have superior _stabilized sighting_ to employ them, even when engaging conventional infantry threats.

_And you just never know_ when your enemy is going to fly in 'tanks' of his own. Whether they be light scout vehicles which can be slung beneath a chopper or roadstripped off a C-130. Or full up MBT, it is up to the friendly unit commander to cover all bases and 'expect everything'.

The one exception to this rule is the rapid deployment force/CENTCOM pallet loading one whereby you have to fight the war you brung. But then again, the Russians have 60mph rail access to ANY EUROPEAN OR CENTRAL ASIAN THEATER THEY WANT. Typically from less than 1,200 miles away.

Whereas we have to fly or PPME our way in at 30-500 knots. But over distances approaching 12,000 miles.

OTOH, if you /must/ have no tanks, then /fine/. Because, as I said, the thing which makes the IFV in particular a _superior_ gunship killer is it's inherent ability to elevate the light cannon barrel up to engage at high rates an airborne threat. While disgorging infantry teams with their own MANPADS as well.

>>
And volume of firepower will defeat comparable armour. 2,000 rounds of .22 a minute will chop through concrete blocks that are proof against 9mm. 6,000 rounds of 7.62 NATO/.30in US will punch its way through the top and side walls of an M113. Which is the thinnest armour on the, venerable, APC. Which is made from compressed aluminium. Only its glacis is proof against .50in, and then only ball.
>>

No. Because dispersion due to precess of the target along the rapidly moving aircraft ground track, along with _intentional_ dispersion due to muzzle clamp variables on the minigun will scatter rounds to the extent that you are saturating maybe a 100X1,000ft box with 500rds per gun, per pass.

There is no 'mining effect' of rounds stacking right ontop of each other. Indeed, the rotary gun principle is designed to max _maximum use_ of inherent dispersion to cover WIDE areas. If it wasn't, it would be militarily ineffective because you would be getting 5-10-15 rds per individual target which, _in the antipersonell role_ (the only mission which the M134 is really good for, at least from an airborne application), is complete overkill.

>>
Hold it right there, I've already made it clear I am NOT talking about Douglas DC3s.
>>

Then you should have said Spectre or Spooky II or _gunship_. PTMD is a specific gunship platform. It's application is relevant only to it's effect on primitive guerilla (really, /civillian/) psychologic reaction to images like the following-

www.theaviationzone.com...

www.talkingproud.us...

www.talkingproud.us...

You pull this kind of crap on an organized (trained to take up defensive positions BEFORE the threat which justifies them arrives) military force with night vision and handheld homing missiles which can reach upwards of 12-15,000ft out on the slant (twice to three times an _AC-47s_ standoff with rifle caliber SUU-11/M134s) in the air.

And you will die to the sound of their laughter in your ears. Probably within two passes.

>>
Motorised Infantry is wheeled trucks, not tracks. That's the difference between Mechinised Infantry and Motorised Infantry, as defined by the Red Army, who invented the concepts.
>>

'And Fritz said...'

---
Below you, you can see enemy tanks and APCs. You estimate the enemy are about 120 strong - roughly a reinforced motor rifle company and they are dismounting to sweep both sides of the valley.
---

Motor Rifle Company is a /type/ designator.

Like saying 'Panzer Grenadier' or 'Mechanized Infantry' Company. It means mobile troops whose total formation size is relative to their designed mode of transport to and across the battlefield.

It's only relevance here is that, historically, U.S. truck manufacture (in WWII) was so high such all troops were 'mechanized' from a common pool, regardless of their 'pure' Infantry (boot) march status.

Whereas the war production of the more economically and strategically (materials and bombing) constrained European countries required specialized force designations to differentiate between what were effectively special mission (Mtn or Airborne) or occupational foot forces.

Vs. those which were designed specifically to accompany armor and secure critical point objectives at the end of a phaseline march that the armor could only provide supporting fires for.

BECAUSE OF THE LATTER REQUIREMENT (to accompany armor) mechanized or, if you prefer 'motorized' infantry in Category A Russian units are all stuffed, not into BTR-xx series wheeled APC. But into BMP or sometimes MT-LB _tracked vehicles_.

Because armored cars, however you care to mission-name them, don't have the ground pressure distribution, total traction or power:weight necessary to accompany tanks across country. And the latter mode of operation is the principle means by which armor 'takes the short cut' past AA linearized defenses.

From my 'historical outlook' on mid-70's to late-80's WARPAC configured units; Motor Rifle Brigades will often have secondary missions of ATGW, scout, chemical scout or S2A escort accomodated by BRD series wheeled vehicles if not trucks.

But the principle fighting units are all going to be in tracked vehicles and they will have attached armor support.

It should be noted that ALL forces which are not specifically 'motorized' are in fact special mission (which is to say completely worthless past a fixed objective they are virtually dropped on) these days. For, as OEF showed, airborne does nothing but sit in the muck and the mud. While 'Infantry Divisions' are all Mechanized/Motorized for the long haul.

>
The several Motor Rifle Brigades resemble the units formed during the Afghan war, although no two are exactly alike. Their organization tends to be as follows: 1 tank battalion (40-50 tanks, in 4-5 companies), 3-4 MRBs, 1 sp arty bn (12-24 2S1s, 2S3s or even 2S19s), a couple have 12-24 BM-21s. ADA and recon assets of some are similar to old-style MRDs, since many brigades have been formed by deactivating divisions. Most brigades are equipped with BMPs, while only a couple have BTRs, though some have one or two battalions of each. The brigades' MRBs tend to be larger than their equivalents assigned to MRR. The 166th Separate MRBde in Tver' (Moscow Military District) , for example, has 82 T-80s, 190 BMP-1/-2s, and 24 2S3s. The 205th which fought in Chechnya has 44 T-72s, 117 BMP-2s, 12 2S3s and 12 BM-21s. It appears to have a full-strength recon battalion as well.
>

www.geocities.com...

>>
The fact that you say it was not a "legitimate" nickname shows that it was/has been used as a moniker. And my first exposure to said term was through the book "Soldiers", companion to the BBC series of the same name, which if memory is correct dates to 1986, in which the terms "Puff the Magic Dragon" and "105mm Howitzer are used in, if not in the same sentence, the same paragraph.
>>

Then the narrator is a moron for the reasons I gave.

>>
Gatling Gun is an accepted civilian term for power-operated rotary guns. If you're going to get that technical then they're not even guns, they're rifles, as in they have rifled barrels. And when you get to 20 and 30mm they're not even rifles, they're cannon.
>>

Do they have lands and grooves?

>>
Of course a Bradley or Warrior can deal with a Scimitar/Scorpion. Just as the 30mm Rarden on Scimitar could deal with a Tiger. No-one races at Monaco in Jimmy Clark's Lotus Cosworth/Hewland package anymore because it has been superceded. Technology has moved ahead. The best tank in Vietnam was the Centurian, but you don't see people clamouring to buy them now, do you?

None of which changes the fact that the CVR(T) Scimitar and Scorpion are defined as light tanks, as opposed to Main Battle Tanks, and not IFVs. And when invented were armed so they could, if in desparate need, kill MBTs, through the side armour admittedly.
>>

I don't really care what you are tryng to state now. I think it mere an attempt to obfuscate your initial poor choice of words in the statement-

>>>
Mechanised Infantry is not MBTs. It's not even Scorpion and Scimitar light tanks.
>>>

MI is not 'light tanks' because the IFV already fills an equivalent role. The only thing you gain or lose from the difference between the vehicles is a few extra dead bodies when it's knocked out in trade for a little more armor or gas in a potentially (if rarely) lower hull profile.

In any case, I think I have covered the fact that Russian MBTs do indeed accompany their BMP's in a battalion strength attachable TOE unit architecture which puts the armor wherever Brigade objectives say it's needed.

I can only add that, AGAIN, Russian armor is often as much as 20 tons lighter than ours. And their RAIL NETWORK will _always_ beat our best sea or airborne ability to mass forces significantly. Whereever needed.

>>
Either way, a man in a foxhole with an SLR or an Austeyr doesn't want a hulking peice of metal clanking towards him with a 30mm cannon pointed his way.
>>

Then why the hell is he standing there? This is MY argument you're stealing. If you can only (foot) your way forward to play Cheyenne Dog Soldier _on the final threatfor objective_. Then you are completely useless as a military force.

Because the way you beat an enemy intent on having your head is not with a reach for the pistol in your nightstand as he comes through the bedroom door. It's as a function of creeping or massive attrition, as he leaves his own leapoff.

And for that _Contempt Of Engagement Mission_ there is no real need for a Carl Gustav or indeed /any/ heavy weapons. Because your sole job should be to provide G-FAC level targeting for air power or artillery. Something which can be accomplised in a Mutt or atop an ATV as a function of depositing a trailer-full of leave behind sensors (10-20" tall). Without ever once broaching the horizon with your opponent with your 6ft tall body.

>>
An M113, mounting a weapon of the same calibre as his, is, a little, less daunting.
>>

The tank will never have a Stinger team 'mounted' on it. Because if somebody fires a main tube round at it, they have no hope of surviving, even if the tank shrugs off the round. Yet a tank /cannot afford/ to close up with an infantry threat (nor why should it with Cannister and variable fuze MP-HEAT) due to simpler weapons like mines and defiladed LAW/ATGW. You again need infantry for that mission, grunts whose only superiority over the AFV is that they are throw-away cheap. And infestationally multiplized to the extent that anything which kills one only highlights it's own position to the supporting forces. Infantry are particularly important if you _don't want_ to level the objective because that too is the functional outcome of putting a TOW or a 120mm round through somebodies storefront window.

>>
Now, as to the real worldness of this scenario, just picture a group of blue helmets in a jungle in Africa or Asia or a mountain range in eastern Europe. Or even a desert mountain range on the roof of the world. Take a look at their likely opponents, not too many tanks to spare there, but a few armoured cars and a lot of technicals. In other words, a scratch motorised/mechanised infantry force.
>>

But not a Motor Rifle Company.

Like it or lump it, you somehow missed that portion of the scenario outline.

Just as you seemingly don't understand the sheer 'unreality' of a partisan scratch force being apt to come TO YOUR REMOTE POSITION as an organized unit of like-unto-Russian capability.

i.e. You are trying to Monday Morning QB adjust the scenario to justify your predisposition towards an AC-47 type effort. And I'm not going to let you. Because that was NOT the scenario that _I_ was given to work with.

>>
Hmm, that's never happened before, has it?
>>

Not really.

Because when you go into the enemies briar patch, you generally have the advantage of playing to your (prepared) strengths.

Assuming you are referring to The Mog, the difference between your scenario and that of history is that of say the Marine commitment (20,000 men, offshore NGS, control of the airport with flowin of further MEU Harrier and Cobra as well as Army elements all possible) and the followon Ranger/Delta _criminally stupid_ 'occupation' effort with a Company's worth of troops and not even 105 lightgun artillery to help hold off the screaming barbarian hordes after we climbed over THEIR WALL.

OTOH, if you refer to Vietnam, it should be noted that Tet was a military success turned into a media loss that the North capitalized on _beyond their own objective_ which was simply to kill off as much of the Viet Cong leadership as possible so that they could step in and replace/revamp the in-place resistance movment from the top down. Hanoi never once believed that they would get anywhere with the effort and so they never sent major armor and infantry units South to help out (there were some sightings of 'tank tracks' I believe...)

At best it was a non-commital (aborted) action similar to our own Bay Of Pigs debacle.

The ONLY TIME the NVA ever came close to overrunning a U.S. held or 'supported' position was when they brought T-54/55 in to attack Kontum. The ARVN, sent to do battle with a 100mm main battle tank in what was (at the time) a 76mm 'scout tank' (the times do change...) typically lost their nerve and ran and ONLY the presence of AH-1G cobras using FFAR on the top decks of the vehicles was sufficient to keep them from running down the main road to the regional governors palace.

Such _ABF_ or Advance By Fire techniques always characterizes the 'why' of main forces defeating, consistently, an enemy used to 'meeting=fleeting' and desultory (probing) attacks. Because their very guerilla mindset makes them unable to psychologically encompass the notion of putting up enough of a fight to get the enemy into a killsac from which a lateral attack by 'win or die' dedicated antitank teams can be made to work.

And thus, when _technologically advanced_ warfighting is introduced to a theater, the ONLY way to beat it is with more advanced equivalents able to **flexibly** (we don't hold ground, we deny your maneuver through it) engage themselves. i.e. Airpower.

JQ Civillian mistakes, quite often to the chagrin of those who actually do the fighting, exactly what modeals decide the outcome of a war. And guerilla actions rarely do more than sap the will of conventional forces to the extent that _conventional attack_ is met with halfhearted defense. Not the other way around.

To use a 'real world' context more along the lines of Fritz's original scenario, along with elements of the above 'what ifs' (we are the popup threat in X's midst); if The Bear had ever decided to meander over 'another mountain' (into Iran from both Afghan and Turkmenistan axes) forcing us to RDF into a hostile nation that didn't want EITHER of us there and were themselves busy butchering their fellow Islamic Idiots, things would have been 'very complicated'.

Because, at the start, we would be hard pressed to reach them with carrier air (only the pre-bombcat F-14s and the 10 plane A-6 squadrons could get to the border and they would have next to no SEAD as they flew over an active IADS inbetween, thanks to the 190nm Bug range).

And for every meter further south and west they came, you could add ten months worth of dislodging them on a Rail vs. RORO logistical escalation basis.

As the situation 'went Polish' (1939) for the Iranians as they saw they were literally taking it from all sides, it would probably have resulted in a negotiated permission slip for U.S. Airpower to do it's best to interdict the progress of Soviet units advancing along the restricted border access routes (Iran, is a flat coastal plain ringed with high mountains, thus you beat them at the edge or you have a helluva time getting them out of the soft center), while 'negotiations' occured as to whether an APOD/SPOD was necessary to bring in a full armored countermaneuver force. The Iranian's obviously wanting neither infidel among them but willing to accept the most effort from the least threatening force mode.

In such a scenario, the fewer active ground forces you have making an obvious mockery of 'U.S. Shaitan!' official Iranian policy, the easier it is to get local Iranian country boys to accept help openly. That of course means dressed-in-mufti SOFies Choice boys. Sitting atop a ridge that they horsed or motorcyled or helo'd their way into. Calling down airpower while other Snake Eaters did their best to provide a 2-day training course and base of fires 'stiffening' support to LAW and Mine equipped Iranian zealots 'standing in the road' (blocking force) just long enough to let the bombers come in.

Now, admittedly, this kind of 1980's scenario completely devalidates the UCAV. But it _also_ rules out the majority of the BUFF (no smart munitions or active target folder datalink, not to mention a 'threatening' SIOP primary cruise delivery mission so close to Russian soil). And most of the F-16/18 alternatives (no or very limited targeting pods, limited PGMs and no IAMs). Even as the nature of 'CAS' becomes that of almost interdiction class radii with a potential need to face an opfor that are themselves massing airpower to support their own advances (and may well have a basic IADS S2A setup in place as well).

Such is the 'REALITY' of Fritz's scenario. However dated. If you just /insist/ on taking AC-xxx or indeed, A-10's, into that kind of a meatgrinder. You be my guest. But don't cry when a flood of body bags comes back, 2 years after the armistice that normalized a permanent Russian Presence in the Persian Gulf.


KPl.

Oh come on ch.......do I have to read all that?

Seriously, thats harsh...

Originally posted by Raideur
Oh come on ch.......do I have to read all that?

Seriously, thats harsh...

he wrote a book for us yey
lol

i wonder how long it took to write all that

Well, of coursse the A-10 Cos' it's amde for taht kind of battle... A bomber could possible make damage to your platoon... And a smaller plane couldn't make any damage at all... A-10 would be the best one...

Did anyone get the "jist" of ch1466's post??..
IMO he's saying that the A-10 ain't so good in ALL scenarios as most ppl. believe??

Beats me...

Say, why dont you be a good trooper and summarize it for us lackeys?

Or at least try..

Daedalus,

>>
Did anyone get the "jist" of ch1466's post??..
IMO he's saying that the A-10 ain't so good in ALL scenarios as most ppl. believe??
>>

No. I'm saying it's not /any/ good at CAS. Which is the only role ('scenario') it was designed to accomplish to begin with.

This is not entirely fair in the context of this thread because too many people have reduced 'ground attack' to the most blatantly visible and _difficult_ of air to ground mission sets.

But I would argue that the A-10 is not particularly adept at CSAR/FAC-A coordination nor direct RESCAP/airmobile escort either while any other (deep interdiction etc.) mission set is quite simply beyond it's ken.

We continue to exploit the A-10 because 'it is there' (love the chicken even if the road is now a six lane super highway).

In some part, this is due to the fact that the A-10 had a Desert Storm performance hyped beyond all reasonably measured level of actual performance. And in part to the fact that it's competitors for many of those missions where F-16A.15 and F-16C.25/.30 which were, themselves without targeting pods and smart munitions to compete with 'even a Warthogs' "Both Mavericks today I tell'ya" smart load.

Add to this bare-base capabilities and reasonable engine efficiencies which let the Hogs 'go deep' at medium altitudes (12-19,000ft) in a more or less non-radar defense environment.

And you have a platform which performed some missions which it should NEVER have been tasked to. Simply becasue no other platforms were spareable from conventional INT based missions.

i.e. Home Depot and The Villas and various (often lethal) encounters with Republican Guard units happened because the A-10 was hunting SCUDS more than 400nm behind the front lines. And none among the Iraqis were able to object.

Times have changed.

It no longer matters how slow you can go but how long you can stay _at altitude_. It no longer matters how hardy you are in the face of enemy fire, but rather how long a sensor and munitions reach you have to avoid, entirely.

Without sensors, with minimal networking capability (SADL is not fitted and without the BUG-E gear there is no universal connectivity between EPLRS and JTIDS/L16 type networks) the A-10 can only find targets with the soda straw of Maverick or LITENING. And without a large, thin, wing. It cannot even /reach/ the 30-40,000ft needed to hover for hours over a battlefield, waiting for the enemy to make move that kills him.

For these plus a host of other reasons, the A-10 is not the jet needed. The sadness being that people assume 'if not the A-10, we will be stuck with fighters!'. When the truth is that F-15E/16C.40/18DNA and 35 are just as crippled (albeit for often opposite reasons) as the Hog is.

I would still rather have multiple pairs of F-16s with radar and LANTIRN or Sniper cueing GBU-12, 38 or SDB on a 'fast track' basis of burner sprint off a high altitude tanker to any given target area. Than an A-10 which takes 40 minutes or more to RTB back to Bagram or Kandahar and begin the regeneration process with dumb Mk.82 and another pair of AGM-65s.


Raideur,

>>
Say, why dont you be a good trooper and summarize it for us lackeys?

Or at least try...
>>

A lackey is a manservant or, in the more modern context, a toady or sycophant.

I don't consider you to be my lackey, 'nuf said.

CAS or Close Air Support is, by definition, a dated concept.

Because 'close', whether you take that to mean troops on the ground in close contact with the enemy (you see them, they see you at tank vs. tank if not rifle vs. handgrenade separations).

Or as a function of airframe proximity in the direct delivery of fires.

Is _reactionary_ to enemy presence within detection range of your troops.

And thus admitting FAILURE in the targeting process by which _you chose_ where and when to begin the engagement. Preferrably as a function detecting them in the maneuver phase.

Whether the latter is as a meeting engagement where both forces are 'fluid' or some kind of fixed battlefield, usually by ambush. You should always see them coming, first. BEFORE the need to shoot only goats from among intermingled sheep is a problem.

The way to get past this is twofold:

COE and COP.

Contempt Of Engagement, at least from the aircraft's perspective, means the ability to outright /avoid/ the greatest by-numbers threat. There are MILLIONS of potentially hostile bullets and shells that could be pointed at U.S. forces out there. But probably fewer than 2,500 SA-10s in the world threat catalog.

Better to rollback the radar SAM so that you can fly _over_ the trashfire. Ideally, Stealth lets you do both without X-before-Y prejudice in guaranteeing airspace access through SEAD prior to (or mixed with) CAS.

COP. But what good is COE if it only happens as a 'response measure' to the 10% of the time that the enemy makes his presence known by firing up a friendly ground unit?

As I have already said, you want to kill the enemy when he is NOT directly proximal to your forces. If for no other reason that bolt from the blue psychology reasons.

And you want to be able to do this, irrespective of altitude or weather restrictions upon the Mk.1 Eyeball. Which is all the 80% of the A-10 fleet /continues/ to have available to do target search with.


SHORT FORM:
There is no Cliff Notes version of this concept but if you understand the guiding principles behind COP and COE (shoot them from a position they can't shoot you, for long periods). You get the basic principles by which you lock a threat down so that he can be dealt with or bypassed at YOUR discretionary convenience.

Never able to mass. Never able to maneuver. Never able to fade. Always looking up to wonder if he's already dead.

I would add one last comment. People have been indoctrinated to the notion that ground must be present to win wars. This is true. But the REASON they must be present is to force an enemy to make himself known that he might be butchered from the skies. As such, the correlary theory that "Air Supports Ground Through The Process Of Shaping The Battlefield and Securing Maneuver" is equally a 180` diametric fallacy.

'Close Air _Support_' thus being further eroded as a conceptually flawed ideal.


KPl.

Originally posted by ch1466
Howlrunner,

>>
Read the set-up. The set-up is you're facing a company of Mech Inf. The parameters are key to the answer. It doesn't matter what "real world" experience or doctrine or training or even history tells us. There is no mention of tanks in the question, therefore there are no tanks coming.
>>

Fine.

---
Below you, you can see enemy **tanks and APCs.** You estimate the enemy are about 120 strong - roughly a reinforced motor rifle company and they are dismounting to sweep both sides of the valley.
---

My double plus ungood.

Originally posted by ch1466

>>
The fact that you say it was not a "legitimate" nickname shows that it was/has been used as a moniker. And my first exposure to said term was through the book "Soldiers", companion to the BBC series of the same name, which if memory is correct dates to 1986, in which the terms "Puff the Magic Dragon" and "105mm Howitzer are used in, if not in the same sentence, the same paragraph.
>>

Then the narrator is a moron for the reasons I gave.

Now who isn't looking?

I say again, the BOOK "Soldiers", COMPANION to the BBC series. In which case we have an AUTHOR. And I am clear that I am NOT quoting anything. The best I can recall is that the book mentions the invention of the Gunship, name it as Puff and say that by the end of Vietnam gunships had been adapted to mount a 105mm.

Just because I can't give you the correct name, I am being unhelpful to you and it's my fault.

Look at your own posts. How many of those on this thread are conversant in all astpects of USAF doctrine and tactics and jargon? We are expected to know what the hell you're talking about but you can't exptrapolate? There's such a thing as being too precise. Or is it that you've just chosen to baffle us with b.s?

Originally posted by ch1466
Howlrunner,
>>
Of course a Bradley or Warrior can deal with a Scimitar/Scorpion. Just as the 30mm Rarden on Scimitar could deal with a Tiger. No-one races at Monaco in Jimmy Clark's Lotus Cosworth/Hewland package anymore because it has been superceded. Technology has moved ahead. The best tank in Vietnam was the Centurian, but you don't see people clamouring to buy them now, do you?

None of which changes the fact that the CVR(T) Scimitar and Scorpion are defined as light tanks, as opposed to Main Battle Tanks, and not IFVs. And when invented were armed so they could, if in desparate need, kill MBTs, through the side armour admittedly.
>>

I don't really care what you are tryng to state now. I think it mere an attempt to obfuscate your initial poor choice of words in the statement-

I'm not really sure where this one is going, either. Best to let it end there. Before it gets so wildly off-topic it can't be rescued.

>>>
Mechanised Infantry is not MBTs. It's not even Scorpion and Scimitar light tanks.
>>>

MI is not 'light tanks' because the IFV already fills an equivalent role. The only thing you gain or lose from the difference between the vehicles is a few extra dead bodies when it's knocked out in trade for a little more armor or gas in a potentially (if rarely) lower hull profile.

No. CRV(T) and IFV do not fill equivalent roles. One is transport, the other, surprisingly for a reconnaisance vehicle, is recon. And the point is that MI is most often supported by machine guns on APCs, not cannon on light tanks. That is changing as M113s and equivalent vintage APCs are retired and replaced with vehicles mounting chainguns and cannon, but neither the Russians nor the Chinese can muster a completely cannon-armed MI force and who else is likely to be the opponent in the scenario you are envisioning.

I can only add that, AGAIN, Russian armor is often as much as 20 tons lighter than ours. And their RAIL NETWORK will _always_ beat our best sea or airborne ability to mass forces significantly. Whereever needed.

Not sure what Russian trains have to do with mudthumpers and why you would choose one for support. Also not sure why we're discussing weight differences between MBTs. Obviously by "ours" you don't mean the Leapard 1 or the Italians' 40 tonne MBT, only 60 tonne-range Challengers and M1s. (sorry, to be specific, Challenger 2 and M1A1).

>>
Either way, a man in a foxhole with an SLR or an Austeyr doesn't want a hulking peice of metal clanking towards him with a 30mm cannon pointed his way.
>>

Then why the hell is he standing there? This is MY argument you're stealing. If you can only (foot) your way forward to play Cheyenne Dog Soldier _on the final threatfor objective_. Then you are completely useless as a military force.

Because he is holding a hill as ordered? Because he jumped out of a 'plane as ordered and now occupies that hill? Because he's waiting for XXX corps to come down the road and relieve him, and would you look at that, Captain Grabner's about to come across a bridge at him with an SS Panzer recon squadron! Because he's sitting at the mouth of the Mitla Pass and the Egyptians have dug their T64s in and are waiting, maybe preparing to counter-attack?

And when I say same calibre, I'm referring to the .30cal Browning to be found fitted to the turrets of a number of M113s, surprisingly the same calibre as the 7.62 NATO L1A1 Self Loading Rifle (FN FAL).

Blue Helmets. Were there any Blue Helmets in VN?

There were in Cambodia and there were times when it looked like they might have had to face off against the KR.

There were blue helmets in Congo (Katanga days).

There were blue helmets is Bosnia.

There aren't any in the Hindu Kush, but there were a hell of a lot of "technicals" employed by the Taliban.

As for Somalia, stop telling us everything that was wrong with the mission and why it shouldn't have been that way. The fact is it happened. It's a historical fact and whether you personally approve of the tactics or not doesn't matter. In said situation, what would your choice of CAS have been?
Try answering the questions, instead of disproving the tactical doctrine. Justify your choice through tactical doctrine (you will anyway), but don't try and render the question invalid. You can put all your caveats at the end.

Howlrunner,

>>
Now who isn't looking?

I say again, the BOOK "Soldiers", COMPANION to the BBC series. In which case we have an AUTHOR. And I am clear that I am NOT quoting anything. The best I can recall is that the book mentions the invention of the Gunship, name it as Puff and say that by the end of Vietnam gunships had been adapted to mount a 105mm.
>>

If the book is an accurate adaptation of the TV series, it quotes the narrator rather than the author's voice. Unless they are one and the same in which case your argument falls even further hindwards.

>>
Just because I can't give you the correct name, I am being unhelpful to you and it's my fault.
>>

It's not unhelpful, it's just wrong.

Regardless of how you name it, the fixed wing Gunship is designed to attack largely helpless civillian or irregular foreces targets as almost more of a psyop weapon than a real warfighter.

This is why the AC's were, for a long time, part of the 'Air Commando' units at Hurlburt and are indeed now SOCOM assets. Snakeeaters don't do main force. A Motor Rifle Company is mainforce.

An AC-47 would in any case be _eaten alive_ by almost any threat these days, as indeed it often was when the term 'Puff The Magic Dragon' was coined for it in SEA. I swear it sounds like you are too in love with the name to see the weakness' of it's bearer. I doubt if you would have similar problems with say...Stuka. Or Roc.

I would go so far as to classify said _specific_ gunship type as a purely defensive system intended for security missions ONLY (and only over friendly territory). And even that presupposes the enemy's inability to bring man-portables to the battlefield to replace 1 ton (23-37mm) towed AAA.

>>
Look at your own posts. How many of those on this thread are conversant in all astpects of USAF doctrine and tactics and jargon? We are expected to know what the hell you're talking about but you can't exptrapolate? There's such a thing as being too precise. Or is it that you've just chosen to baffle us with b.s?
>>

Pick a word. Or a Paragraph. I will attempt to reexplain in simpler English. You can't call out an entire piece based on sentences you don't admit to failing to understand and not find your own credibility in question. The implication being that you DO 'get it' and the negative-proof of B.S. factoring is thus yours.


KPl.

ahh... enlightenment!...the ch1466 way..

Originally posted by ch1466
Howlrunner,

>>
Now who isn't looking?

I say again, the BOOK "Soldiers", COMPANION to the BBC series. In which case we have an AUTHOR. And I am clear that I am NOT quoting anything. The best I can recall is that the book mentions the invention of the Gunship, name it as Puff and say that by the end of Vietnam gunships had been adapted to mount a 105mm.
>>

If the book is an accurate adaptation of the TV series, it quotes the narrator rather than the author's voice. Unless they are one and the same in which case your argument falls even further hindwards.

Companion piece. Not the book of the series, the companion piece. Different things.

>>
Just because I can't give you the correct name, I am being unhelpful to you and it's my fault.
>>

It's not unhelpful, it's just wrong.

Regardless of how you name it, the fixed wing Gunship is designed to attack largely helpless civillian or irregular foreces targets as almost more of a psyop weapon than a real warfighter.

This is why the AC's were...

This is going to get me warning, but...

Stop repeating yourself. I have in no way said you were wrong since my initial objection. I pointed out why I used said term. I also clearly pointed out that I was not talking about Douglas DC3/C47 Skytrain/Dakota/AC47 airframes. If they did not carry a 105mm then I clearly was not referring to them. Do the same. Talk about the operational incapabilities of C130 Spectres or Spookies, as you have pointed out to me are the correct terms.

I'll admit Puff has stuck in my memory, far more than "Spectre", to me that's a guy in white wearing a green cloak. However, I've also made it obvious which gunship I was referring to and why.

I agree Stuka is crap. Blackburn Roc also missed the boat, but not by as much (and certainly not literally!). The best divebomber of the war was Val. Although Douglas Dauntless (have I got the right name, or was it Devastator?) wasn't bad either.

The implication being that you DO 'get it' and the negative-proof of B.S. factoring is thus yours.

I might "get it" but I'm not the only one complaining about your posts. I might also get CAS, but I've never heard of COP before. And for the most part I'm skimming your posts because they're as irrelevant as mine. We're no longer talking about which graound attack aircraft should be chosen, we're arguing ala Monty Python.

And as for CAS, I had an army Major explain to me why grunts get all warm and fuzzy at the idea of CAS, no matter how outdated/outmoded or plain wrong you may think it is. It's called Welfare of Troops. You show them the support they will have and they're willing to go to dangerous places and do stupid things, in fact they're motivated to do so.

After Dunkirk all the BEF could do was complain that the RAF were never in evidence, depsite the fact that were engaging the Luftwaffe well-forward of the front lines, exactly as you prescribe, because the troops couldn't see them in action, all they could see were the bombs exploding around them that certainly weren't coming from friendly 'planes.

You have voted ch1466 for the Way Above Top Secret award. You have two more votes this month.

Its great to see someone argue their point soo techically and ACCURATE. I'm sure half the people in this thread were googling away while they were reading your posts. But it's all english to me. Top stuff ch1466!

>>>
MI is not 'light tanks' because the IFV already fills an equivalent role. The only thing you gain or lose from the difference between the vehicles is a few extra dead bodies when it's knocked out in trade for a little more armor or gas in a potentially (if rarely) lower hull profile.
>>>

>>
No. CRV(T) and IFV do not fill equivalent roles. One is transport, the other, surprisingly for a reconnaisance vehicle, is recon. And the point is that MI is most often supported by machine guns on APCs, not cannon on light tanks. That is changing as M113s and equivalent vintage APCs are retired and replaced with vehicles mounting chainguns and cannon, but neither the Russians nor the Chinese can muster a completely cannon-armed MI force and who else is likely to be the opponent in the scenario you are envisioning.
>>

Which is of course why the Bradley was originally spec'd to a scouting mission?

Why it has hull so tall it can clear the same sight obstacles as the M901 does (another optics based 'scout' as much as ATGW platform in actual use by he way). Itself is possessed of an ATGW option which outranges the pure-gun light tanks? While carrying additional fires in the form of Javelin/Dragon teams and _cavalry scouts_ inside?

Which is why armored cavalry units use the M3 version as a 'scouting' vehicle to this day? Scouting and Light Tank are synonomous to the extent that you have the on-vehicle flexibility to engage point-hard targets (bunkers and mobile armor) and the assets to go MOUT with forces that are completely passive-invisible within structures.

IFV's can do both missions. Tankettes fail at each. The closest to a useful role that the light tank fulfills today is that of Stug/assault gun, directly aiding troops in penetrating a defensive belt. Given the prevalence and simplicity of LAWs, and the ultimate restrictions on RHA equivalency inherent to air transport, that mission can only be achieved through a system like a robotic Wiesel which is not only smaller (cheaper) than an IFV. But can afford to be lost in the same numbers it is produced. Such a system is NOT represented by the Brit style of light tanks. Or their Franco/German wheeled equivalents.

Speaking of which (the prevalence and superiority if tracked IFVs) the Soviets beat everybody to the game with their mid-60's debut of the BMP/BMD. The West Germans were next with the Marder 1 which I believe came online in about 1969-70.

www.globalsecurity.org...

The Russian vehicles mounted 73mm guns and external Sagger from the start. The Marders initially only had 20mm but later added Milan and a remote firing station 7.62.

In the Russian inventory in particular, the arrival of the BMP/BMD allowed in-place supplantation of PT-76 and ASU-85 series assault guns.

It doesn't get much more 'light tankish' than that.

The only reason the M113 was not itself upgraded as a direct IFV-is-APC-with-turret counter was because our defense establishment was at first busy recovering from Vietnam and then all hot and bothered to truck out the largely inferior Bradley. And so did not give the Gavin the kinds of strengthened hull and horsepower/transmission improvements needed to keep up with the M1 in a supposed Euro-mechanized environment where it (and derivatives) had previosly accompanied the M60's 'just fine'.

I frankly don't know what the Chicoms are doing. That was never my area. This-

www.sinodefence.com...

Would suggest that they are following the 'New Russian Model' of heavy autocannon and a utility munition tube on a BMP-like chassis.

OTOH, your knowledge of WARPAC tactics and organizational structures is lacking if you don't understand the basic realities as I outlined them in the above LINK'd text.

Tracks in the A class, Wheeleds as auxilliaries and non firstline division placeholders. Always.

>>
Not sure what Russian trains have to do with mudthumpers and why you would choose one for support. Also not sure why we're discussing weight differences between MBTs. Obviously by "ours" you don't mean the Leapard 1 or the Italians' 40 tonne MBT, only 60 tonne-range Challengers and M1s. (sorry, to be specific, Challenger 2 and M1A1).
>>

Nothing under 60 tons has the armor to survive 120-125mm exchanges at any realistic line of sight fighting distance. This basically means every Russian tank is going to either score a first shot, first time of flight kill and survive. Or score a mutual kill and die. Or just die. There being no chance to 'slug it out', armor to armor. Which means that they need to have MORE such vehicles so that they can use pin and maneuver tactics to absorb losses while either overrunning an Allied force. Or holding them in place to go around. Russian 'pincer' envelopements with elite tank units being a specialty that they refined from the German blitzkrieg to include MASSIVELY separated (300-500km) operational axes completely beyond any one frontal level commander's ability to mass forces to counter.

The only way you can bring such massive maneuver forces to battle in a timely fashion is by rail. The only way to do that is to keep them light, narrow and cheap enough to exploit existing carriage limits on older Russian lines. But if you can keep yourself small enough to exploit rail _tanks will be everywhere_ you need armor. Including as standard operational elements of Motor Rifle Divisions. Where they will do 'just fine' against foot infantry.

It should also be noted that the 'best tank' in terms of armor protection and firepower is probably the Leo-2A6, not the Abrahms, not the Challenger. Leo-1 is a junk (German M60) tank maintained by 'peripheral' NATO nations and a few residual export clients like Oz. Too poor or facing too few armor threats to do more than cosmetic upgrades. The AMX-30 and the Italian GIAT export vehicles are equally largely 1960's designs. On a real battlefield, they would suffer roughly equal attrition with a late model T59 or T72, with outcomes largely based on sighting upgrades and stabilization (where present) below 800m. Outside 1,200m, first round hits go markedly down on the Russian vehicles and lower pressure tubes require a switch to guided rounds. Here, a decent 105 APFSDS will still win. But you'd damn well better be hulldown behind a berm if you want to be sure of seeing your kids.

i.e. For us, a switch to MBT-lite (let alone junk like the XM8 Buford) tactics still doesn't do much because we /still/ cannot beat them, logistically for rate of introduction and sustainability of forces to theater.

>>
Because he is holding a hill as ordered?
>>

We don't send troops to 'hold' objectives that have no tactical or strategic value. We send them to destroy or slow the fielded forces which might want to take that hill for their own use. The difference being _TIME_ to determine where the engagement will be as well as how long you are stuck in some kind of whacked disengagement and maneuver phase to break contact and get to the next ambush point.

If the enemy is 'already there', we blow them up in place (OIF) and /then/ occupy. Yet even then, only as needed. Better it is to invest them so they cannot leave and then let them rot or encourage them to come to us so as to be out from under any fixed air defense umbrella and away from C3D.

Perfectly well trained soldiers throughout history have suffered mud-fever as a function of becoming mistakenly obsessed with hill-xxx 'label values' so I don't particularly hold you to blame but ever since the invention of reverse slope attack by both mobile RT and airpower, there is no point in trying to hold the higher ground. Even as a (manned) OP.

The last time we did anything remotely that stupid was at Khe Sahn and you need only ask the NVA who was the real sucker there.

_Never Bleed For Dirt_.

Certainly never bleed for dirt as a threat magnet without a helluva lot more support for your people than a parachutist can swing.

>>
Because he jumped out of a plane as ordered and now occupies that hill?
>>

When the 173rd Brigade 'jumped out of a plane' in Northern Iraq, it didn't do so ANYWHERE'S NEAR an enemy capable of knocking them out at the airhead. Indeed the entire 'Northern Front' activities were completely political in nature and basically came down to-

1. Ensuring that the 82nd got to run the ball at least once and so would be guaranteed funding for another decade.
2. Keeping the wheedling little opportunist 'NATO Ally' Turks on their own damn side of the border.
3. Restraining the bloodyminded Khurds from thinking we 'didn't need them' in a fashion that insulted or incited their fragmented leadership into starting their own little war as a function of settling scores around Kirkuk's oil fields.
4. Initimidating the Iraqi leadership into thinking that we /might/ come from their north, which in turn locked down substantial armor units, in city until the 3rd ID could close up and make the alternatives untenable. (It may have also been intended to prevent any NCA flight towards a border/redoubt/hideout but it obviously failed there as we failed to lock down transport throughout the country, as we should have.).

Even so, the real 'airborne' effort came ONLY as a function of securing a largely uncontested APOD (Bashur) and /pouring in/ some 800 vehicles in 5 nights of activity such as simply doesn't happen in a real war because there are no NFZs in which to declare a 'safe zone' of Fed Ex delivery. Nor 30 day prep phases to reduce the surrounding IADS. You can enter early or by force but you had better not plan on having that much rinse&repeat freedom to build up a mechanized maneuver option in getting the heck away from the airhead.

One shot. Per staging area. That's it. If you think you are going to bring in heavy mech (in numbers or with fuel to be worth a damn) you're nuts. Better by far to use _much smaller_ UAs and go completely light-force within a overwatch (E-8 or RQ-4) or partisan system of absolute AVOIDANCE of direct contact with enemy forces. Vehicles make SOF viable main force killers. But only so long as the signature value of their presence doesn't exceed the armor capability to sustain a LOS fight.

>>
Because he's waiting for XXX corps to come down the road and relieve him, and would you look at that, Captain Grabner's about to come across a bridge at him with an SS Panzer recon squadron!
>>

While only a Brit would stop to make tea when he had airborne fighting armor 80 miles up the road, the fact remains that Monty's 'brilliant' idea of a northern endrun to bypass the Siegfried and Rhine crossing problems was compromised from the beginning due to German control of the dykes in Holland, deliberate misinformation about the 9th SS Panzer's presence, dispositions and strength and the general lack of forethought in sending CS+Combat arms up a single axis of advance without more leveraging of fires (we would have needed to redirect most of the 8th AF fighter assets into preemptive sterilization attacks to be sure of advancing that fast, IMO.).

NONE of which would have mattered if the Red Devils had had enough working radios or a leader with enough self-initiative to take his men OUT of Arnhem when his supporting armor failed to arrive and they couldn't even /secure/ their objective bridge fully (north but not south as I recall makes it impossible to keep sapping or direct fire from dropping the span).

In this case, /only a moron/ would 'assume' that things would work out all right when he didn't even have a working radio to find out what the 'latest delay of game' was.

Eh, Whot?

Which is alright in the end because a dead or captured Brit commando means nothing to me and at that point in the war, little to the overall prosecution effort. Yet you do conveniently make my point for me: Them's as commit to foolishness with forces not suited to the task, don't win by sheer bravado. They just die in place.

**NEVER BLEED FOR DIRT!!**

>>
Because he's sitting at the mouth of the Mitla Pass and the Egyptians have dug their T64s in and are waiting, maybe preparing to counter-attack?
>>

As I recall, Mitla was where Sharon went gloryhounding in an _established_ retreat with an **inferior force** and found the fight he was looking for.

Bled his unit white for nothing he did.

In any case, this too was an attempt to 'sieze the high ground' as a _Purely Political Move_ designed to initiate hostilities in a way that secured Israeli objectives in the south of the Sinai (lifting the blockade on Eilat) while giving the Brits and French an excuse to do the same with the 'globally important strategic navigation chokepoint that the Egyptians might blow up if they lost!' Suez.

The fact that Ike /could/ bring a screaming halt to that Imperialist Idea shows how 'necessary' it all was.

In this case, Mitla is a particularly bad example because the whole "Well, we're commited now, those paratroops won't last long if we don't get them relieved!" part of the action had been successfully completed when the 202nd reengaged for no real cause. But at least they were mechanized so they had a choice.

>>
As for Somalia, stop telling us everything that was wrong with the mission and why it shouldn't have been that way. The fact is it happened. It's a historical fact and whether you personally approve of the tactics or not doesn't matter. In said situation, what would your choice of CAS have been?
>>

Sigh, bad moments need clarification and definition to GENERATE good tactics from. In this case, The Battle Of The Black Sea happened because the dumbass Rangers let themselves be divided and nearly conquered on the assumption that going into the bad guys backyard with an inferior foot force was never going to be challenged because the skinny's weren't in the same league of unit 'elan-as-egotrip' that we were self deluded with.

A little weed leveled that playing field right well and proper now didn't it?

In point of truth and _Crede Be Hanged_, they should have let those three crewmen on Super 64 die while they got their s*** in one sock on the main mission or they should have had a full Mike Force, backed by quickly positioned light artillery (which also implies heavy lift as a more practical means to get a lot of grunts on the ground, quickly), ready to go in and secure each crash site, separate from the main action.

They should not have separated one third of their vehicle escort force to save Tom Blackburn either.

I don't know where in the world our military has gotten the knuckleheaded notion as to think 'all for one and one for all' means that every man risks everything for the weakest member. It simply means that every man's risk is shared, equally.

I would even say that the Ranger block-force mission was itself ill considered because they had no easy line of collapsible fires retreat to a shared lane of egress or reinforcement (somplace they could drop at least //supplies// by helo without getting all shot up) if things went south. While a single squad on the roof of the hotel could have controlled all access to the 10ft tall walled courtyard's _sole entry point_ and everybody could have come and gone the same way Delta did.

Off the roof in quick little MH-6's and perhaps a SINGLE MH-60 flight for the prisoners.

Overcommitment of a highly vulnerable force that has no hope in hell of defeating a much larger one. A continuing theme I hold in utter contempt.

Because the military value of the mission was compromised by needless 'group heroics' (lemmings over the cliff) by General Garrison and because indeed, General Garrison 'refused to refuse' a mission scenario where he was denied necessary basic support; BOTH the tactical -and- the political theater objectives failed to be met.

Had /only/ four men died on October 3rd 1993, we might have won thru anyway in the effort to bring Somalia out of the Shadowed Valley that was killing a 1,000 people a day at one point.

As things instead played out, _EIGHTEEN_ men died and 80 were wounded, some crippled for life.

For Nothing.

As a soldier what sucks worse than bleeding for dirt and he will tell you it's bleeding for a victory that is taken from you, not by your inability to keep fighting. But because your own leadership's incompetence pull you into a needless contest you should never have been there to be forced into fighting.

By failing to provide _COE_ (contempt of engagement) doctrine as a baseline to fewest risked, best standoff support, incentive force structuring, The Mog does indeed have value as a 'what not to do' emphasis for why my system is better.

>>
Try answering the questions, instead of disproving the tactical doctrine. Justify your choice through tactical doctrine (you will anyway), but don't try and render the question invalid. You can put all your caveats at the end.
>>

Fine.

If (A-45CN styled) UCAVs are present for The Mog, they will have the ability to release 250lb GBU-39 small diameter bombs onto any point target with less than 1ft CEP from 10-12,000ft and 300-400 knots. Too high and too fast for any 'RPG' threat to come close to bagging one (and who cares if they do?).

Each jet will have eight such weapons which further means that, even if they are sortieing from Egypt or Israel, to avoid the danger of mortar attack on local airfields or for purposes of political inconspicuity; they can both stay on station (2hrs at 1,100nm radii) for quite a while and have sufficient combat persistence to make a useful contribution to the insert team's defense. A single aerial refueling taking this up to 10-15hrs. More than any manned platform, including the AC-130 will likely manage.

Some options that come to mind include the ability to shred any mobbed Somalia crowd with such instantaneous shock value (100 screaming morons 1 second. 100 dead bodies the next) as to 'hard psyop' intimidate them completely and prevent them from attacking en-masse. Something which ultimately cost 'more innocents' than my approach.

This alone will allow elite infantry to do better on a round:round exchange basis of _aimed_ pointfires. Meaning you can commit fewer of them. Or deploy them differently.

Another obvious mini-PGM 'solution' is in the reduction of any and all roadblocks. Though frankly the ones depicted in the movie were pathetic (well within the ability of a 2.5 ton truck to shift out of the way at low gear), there is no reason not to use the UCAVs high gain optics to snapshot map out transmit via Gold Strike imagery datalink and composite together on a ground station some kind of a route through ALL streets, blowing each roadblock as the convoy approached.

Did the 13th Hussars stop in the middle of the goddamn road at Balaclava? No. They galloped the gauntlet with surprisingly few casualties until they reached their objectives and tried to /come back/.

Where a sniping threat is present, a Shadow/Outrider or even Predator can be used, lower and slower (but still not below 170knots and 5,000ft) with Viper sniper finding gear and Viper Strike laser guided BATs. Even though these weapons have only a 20lb warhead more suited for rooftop cleaning, they are quite capable of penetrating a floor or two and thus defeating an embrasured shooter nest. They may also be useful in engaging technicals and small bands trying to flank (moving targets, shorter TOF, less blast effect on narrow streets).

Clearly such a 'CAS by remote control' option doesn't excuse the theater commander from DEMANDING 'real gunships' (powered optics and turreted heavy gun attack helicopters, able to fire down from 1,500ft or more, while carrying as many as 76 70mm FFAR, all vastly more efficacious than an armed LOACH which is all that SOAR was 'pretending' with).

Nor does it mean you can get away without at least a heavy mortar squad and a busload of smoke and incapacitants (if frag is forbidden). 105s Light Guns are even better.

Even as it requires the availability of LAW and satchel charges to, if need be, get INTO houses and blow holes /thru/ walls to get to or from a battle without being pinned by secondary threats. It being SOP for FIBUA (since Stalingrad at least) to transit the urban fight behind walls or behind armor. Never on a Hogan's Alley basis of moronic run and gun.

NONE OF THE ABOVE applies to the scenario supplied by Fritz.

Because his casepoint is that of infantry engaging a mobile mech force coming to them with tanks and IFV at a fixed combat position. Which is the same thing as saying they have already lost the initiative or indeed, any real hope of defeating the threat unit as a whole.

And so their speedbump action had better damn well be critical for the blood about to be spilled.

Given mechanized units are probably the hardest of conventional point-hard, dispersed, organically air defended, 30-40mph fast march target sets to kill. It really doesn't make sense to make the defense of a single unit '10 minutes later as the CAS crow flies' the SOLE opportunity by which you hope to kill them as they further widen combat spacings, deploy ground troops with missile systems not available during march and the literal and FOW 'haze' of battle denies what little options you have for a frictionless engagement.

If for no other reason than that the Russkies /love/ mortars and it would not be at all unreasonable for them to combine a section or even platoon of them some 3-5km back from the main force as a substitute or companion to main tube fires from the AFV and probably SPH under divisional control. The infantry unit which tries to 'hold' anything will likely not even be able to serve as ETACs to the very air sent to save them. As the Russian method of assault takes their position behind a rolling arty screen which overruns in almost a single bound.

If you want a better way to do it, read Colonel Bucky Burruss' _Clash Of Steel_. Though some of the concepts are now dated (anybody with two synaptic gaps to rub together knows how worthless helicopters are at open field interdiction under a hostile air supremacy operating condition and with minimal logistic support), the overall presentation is accurate for what it says about the ground team segment of the fight which basically comes down to using a high powered drill to rapid-emplace an Unattended Ground Sensor on a directional microwave or landline relay out to a remote team position (or even to a satellite and out of theater completely).

Before getting on your ATV and _riding the hell away_.

Nothing which adds to a remote apertures signature value (multipe 6ft tall humans and their 500lb hot motorbikes) is useful to said senor's mission. And nobody will cry if it dies.

Even as certainly there is NO REASON to stick around for Mk.1 Eyeball sighting from 'high ground' when Russian airmobile sweep teams put VDV vertical envelopement on every likely ambush position minutes if not hours before the armor passes through (i.e. if you are sitting on flat dirt with 5km optics, you are 'less likely to be seen', provided it's a periscope and not a puptent worth of far-hazey signature).

Again, GET IN. GET OUT. Displace and fade laterally out and away from the enemy line of march so that there is NEVER any contact.

The idea being that you use the leave behind sensors to make THE BAD GUYS bleed. The time needed to regroup from random seeming attacks cued onto them _from the rear_ using UGS masted optics or (REMBASS) seismic nets that enable the accurate generation of passage-rate, geopoint or offset prelased DMPI coordinates.

The latter method is especially is effective as GPS presurvey tells you where sensor post A is. While prelasing a couple landmarks along the line of advance gives you distance to A to B plus C and D. And the optics themselves, knowing the trig of each leg of the triangle, can use angular measurement to get a rate of travel index which sets the impact or airburst fuzing lane for munitions like JDAM/JSOW/WCMD. i.e. Once you know some basic survey distances, you need never make another active (linear across) battlefield emission which might cue laser warners on the armor. But can engage completely passively while compensating for time of flight over some pretty wide engagement lanes.

In the army way of looking at things, such microteam actions kicking the crap out of at least the enemy van units then buys you a delivery and staging interval for a maneuver force to get into the field and deliver decisive direct fires as the depleted enemy makes their final phaseline push.

In reality, especially with modern standoff multikill weapons like JSOW-SFW and the VLO to deliver them from long standoffs (glide requires altitude which means radar exposure), air dominance fades as a viable option to secure local airspace over a road marching threat and a UCAV will most likely deal with an MRD sized unit as represented in _COS_ in as few as 1-2 attacks with Skeet based munitions.

Indeed, this has already been proven as the Marines showed on their march up to Baghdad, there being no reason for USMC LAVs to trial the theory of 25mm DU vs. 100mm Dolly armored T-55. Let alone home team, 'Real Russian,' equivalents. Not when they can simply act as the tripwire screening force to bring in air delivered multikills.

A _modern_ tripwire unit's key ability lying not in the process of 'running over' a preset enemy ambush. But in keeping the battlefield so cav-force fluid and well swept that the only way for an enemy to get at the main force train (itself operating at speed behind them) is to bring it in. Thus you ensure that every contact is a meeting engagement between units in road march and _airpower_.


KPl.

Originally posted by ch1466

**NEVER BLEED FOR DIRT!!**

I will quote one example where men have bled for dirt and done it successfully. However, dirt equalled time.

In April 1915 a young Colonel by the name of Mustapha sent his troops into a frontal attack with the sole intention of bleeding for dirt. He even told his men that he wasn't expecting them to fight, but to die. Because the time it took the ANZACS to kill them, and the dirt they thus denied the enemy gave him time to bring up adequate reinforcements and put them into already prepared defences, instead of having to create new ones on the go to retreat to. Of course this scenario involves exactly ZERO aircraft.

As I recall, Mitla was where Sharon went gloryhounding in an _established_ retreat with an **inferior force** and found the fight he was looking for.

Bled his unit white for nothing he did.

I was under the impression he was authorised to carry out a reconnaissance and disobeyed Dayan's orders by attacking in force.

A little weed leveled that playing field right well and proper now didn't it?

Not sure what you mean by this one. Are you referring to Caq?

NONE OF THE ABOVE applies to the scenario supplied by Fritz.

That's true.


Alright. Exactly the kind of answer I was after. My knowledge of CAS-capable aircraft does not go beyond the late eighties and consequently did not include UAVs. Now it does.