A very informative and indepth academic historical journal entry, in the
Journal of Military History, related to this discussion that is
certainly well worth the read. Be warned, it is long--61 pages, but the amount of recorded, documented, and cited sources and references is
unmatched.
After reading this historical academic journal entry, one will come to see the US rational for making the decision that they did in dropping the 2
Atomic bombs on Japan.
CASUALTY PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. INVASIONS OF JAPAN, 1945-1946: PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Another historical journal article that coincides with the one linked above:
Evolving Methodologies in Casualty Reporting to the American Public During World War
II
Also, here:
“Spinning” the Casualties: Media Strategies During the Roosevelt
Administration
Kyle Palmer, the Los Angeles Times’ long-time political editor, had traded in his editorial desk for a position as the paper’s war correspondent
in the Pacific. Attached to the headquarters of Central Pacific Commander Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, he covered the first aircraft carrier strikes
against Japan and the costly U.S. invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, then made a brief return to Los Angeles for a medical checkup. Before he shipped
out again, Palmer hammered away at the theme that “it will take plenty of murderous combat before our soldiers, sailors and marines polish off the
fanatical enemy”[28] in both articles and appearances before civic groups. Under the headline “Palmer Warns No Easy Way Open to Beat Japs,” the
Los Angeles Times quoted one of his speeches: “We are yet to meet the major portion of the ground forces of the Jap empire. They have 5,000,000
or 6,000,000 under arms and it will cost 500,000 to 750,000, perhaps 1,000,000 lives of American boys to end this war.”[29]
At this point it is worthwhile to mention that veterans of World War II have been roundly dismissed when claiming they “remembered” being told
that the invasion of Japan might cost a half-million or even a million casualties. Although these men failed to take detailed notes for the
benefit of future historians on where they had seen the numbers, these reading-starved troops had, in fact, been regularly exposed to huge casualty
figures in Army organs and commercial newspapers since the middle of 1944, as the needs of both politics and maintaining morale led the War Department
to first inflate, then deflate, the number of casualties through statistical manipulation.
By early 1945, similar figures for the upcoming fighting in Japan were beginning to appear in daily newspapers, and although the Army stopped running
casualty figures in Yank, the paper nevertheless quoted a series of unnamed “War Department strategists” and “military experts” who warned
veteran troops and new draftees alike of prolonged fighting ahead. They repeatedly estimated a year and a half to two years as the minimum time it
would take to “get it over unless there is a sudden collapse.”(43) This was not good news. Many years later an old soldier named Paul Fussell
would need few words to sum up his feelings over the “sudden collapse,” which came unexpectedly in August 1945: “Thank God for the atom
bomb.”(44)
Another very, very,
very good and informative read can be found here:
CND: wrong again
Another mention worthy of looking at with some great academic links on Operation Downfall: the Invasion of Japan, etc can be found here:
Pacific Theater of Operations: "The Fat Lady Sings": Victory in the Pacific Air War, Surrender,
Occupation
Other notable mentions:
"To Bomb Or Not To Bomb"
Witnesses
Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Journal of American History, Vol. 84, no. 2
(September 1997)
Ethical Debates Concerning the Use of the Atomic Bomb
The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb
seekerof
[edit on 6-8-2005 by Seekerof]