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REGIONAL ISSUES
East Africa next target on terrorism: Reports from Washington and London
state that the United States and Britain may be planning to extend the war on terrorism to Somalia, Sudan and Yemen as soon as the campaign underway in Afghanistan is over.
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…For Somalia, however, concern is present. Reports state that the US is
conducting military reconnaissance in the country to identify al-Qaeda military basis and military camps on the Kenya-Somalia borders. The Somalia Transitional National Government, however, rejected US charges that Somalia Islamic group al-Itihad has links with al-Qaeda and affirmed to the US that there are no terrorist camps in Somalia and that Somalia does not support terrorism. In related news, the French Foreign ministry stressed the need for clear evidence of connections with the al-Qaeda terrorist group, as was the case with Afghanistan, before any such move. Furthermore, a team of observers consisting of nine senior UN officials, started an official mission to assess the current security and political situation in Somalia as part of the UN efforts to verify recent US administration accusations that Somalia is sheltering several banned terrorist organizations.
…Ethiopian allegations that Islamic extremists in Somalia have taken over
Somalia has inspired the thought of US attacks on Somalia.
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SUDAN
US gives ultimatum for Sudan fighting parties: US special envoy to Sudan
John Danforth said the United States will not spend "month after month, year after year of fruitless negotiations," trying to end Sudan's civil war and will drop its bid if the warring parties act against peace. During his visit to Sudan, Danforth listed four confidence-building proposals for the two sides to act upon, including a cessation of hostilities in the Nuba mountains in central Sudan, an end to attacks on civilians, "zones of tranquility" where
humanitarian agencies can do their work and an end to taking slaves.
Danforth said that unless the Sudanese government and the rebel Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) adhere to the proposals --- which he
described as a test of “good faith” --- by mid-January, he will tell U.S.
President George W. Bush there is nothing more the US can do. The
Sudanese government on the other hand said that the proposal puts
pressure on the government rather than on SPLM. Following the end of the
visit to Sudan, Ambassador Danforth told a news conference in Kenya that
he is not holding much hope that the two warring parties will come to an
agreement by mid-January. He said if the response to the proposal is
negative, it will not be possible to have a “…warm and fuzzy relationship with the US”.
… Government extended ceasefire for humanitarian reasons: In line with the four point proposal by the US special envoy John Danforth, the Government of Sudan extended its ceasefire for four weeks to enable the World Food Program (WFP) to complete its operation of airdropping 2,039 food aid provided by the US government to rebel-held areas in Nuba Mountains of central Sudan, on December 3. The government also announced that it has accepted the US proposals with respect to an indefinite cease-fire around the Nuba Mountains for objective reasons, including the flow of relief supplies from inside the Sudan, not from abroad.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), however, had accused the government in Khartoum of violating its pledge by continuing to bomb civilian targets in the area. SPLM said that government bombing continued 3 days after it declared a ceasefire on November 12 and while WFP planes were on the ground. In related news, US special envoy for Sudan, John Danforth, said US authorities would make food available for people in government-held areas in the Nuba Mountains if a survey, to be conducted by the United States, shows the people in the area are also in need of food aid.
Originally posted by Muaddib
BTW the US has been giving ultimatums to the government of Sudan and to the Arab militia that have been doing the job their government sent them to do.
Originally posted by AceOfBase
The rebel SPLM group referenced in your post is not an Arab Militia.
Originally posted by AceOfBase
They are made up of Christians and indiginous religions and the were armed and trained with the help of Israel and the US. The area discussed in your quoted text is also unrelated to the genocide in Darfur. It refers instead to the conflict in Southern Sudan. The genocide in Darfur didn't beging until 2003, following a rebel uprising against the Sudan government.
Here's some background on the Southern Sudan SPLA referred to in your post: www.fas.org...
The civil war resumed in 1983 when President Nimeiri imposed Shari'a law, and has resulted in the death of more than 1.5 million Sudanese since through 1997.
In other words, the 70,000 estimate from WHO was a fraction of a fraction of the full picture. The 60,000 number that Mr. Zoellick cited as low-but-possible is actually low-and-impossible.
Other authorities suggest that mortality is likely to be closer to 400,000 -- more than twice Mr. Zoellick's high number. The component of this estimate involving deaths by violence is based on a survey by the Coalition for International Justice, a nongovernmental organization operating under contract with the U.S.
In mid April 2004, the U.N. reported that 110,000 mostly Muslim Black African Sudanese refugees had fled into Chad from the western region of Darfur ("Homeland of the Fur People") to escape attacks by a horse mounted Muslim Arab militia known as the Janjaweed (Ar. jin (demon)+jawad (horse), thus "demon horses"), hired by the central Sudanese government to put down a rebellion in the area. Thousands more were reported to have been stranded along the border between Chad and the Sudan. Many of the refugees were reported to be close to starvation. Rape and mass execution were standard Janjaweed tactics of intimidation, and by October 70,000 were estimated to have been killed and more than one million displaced in the conflict. The root of the trouble was a rivalry of long-standing between nomadic Arab herders and sedentary Black farmers. The UN on July 30 ordered Sudan to stop the attacks by the Janjaweed and disarm them within thirty days. The government of Sudan countered that international criticism of its internal affairs amounted to an attack on Islam. On August 4, tens of thousands of demonstrators marched in Khartoum vowing jihad if foreign troops entered the country to try to enforce the UN resolution. In September, the United States officially accused Sudan of "genocide" in Darfur paving the way for tougher sanctions.
Originally posted by Muaddib
Here is an excerpt to how the latest genocide, or jihad started in Sudan.
New Yorker
At 5 a.m. on Friday, April 25, 2003, a blast shook a tiny, one-runway airport in El Fasher, the town of Amina’s birth. It was followed by six rapid detonations. Sleeping Sudanese soldiers, who were encamped in a nearby garrison, awoke and scrambled out of their barracks toward an ammunition depot across the street. Many of the soldiers, some still in their nightclothes, were picked off by machine-gun fire as they ran. Rebel Darfurian marksmen were perched high in the trees.
The attackers, members of a then obscure group, the Sudanese Liberation Army, did damage far greater than their numbers or their reputation. Employing two hundred and sixty men, forty Toyota Land Cruisers, four trucks, and mainly small-arms fire, they managed to take over a vital military outpost. Because the attack occurred on a Friday, the day of prayer in Sudan, when many soldiers are home with their families, the Sudanese military had mounted few patrols around the airport, and the rebels sneaked unchallenged onto the tarmac.
The raid, which lasted several hours, killed around a hundred soldiers. Five Antonov airplanes and two helicopter gunships were destroyed. (The government is said to have fewer than a hundred attack aircraft.) The rebels at first tried to disable the planes with haphazard gunfire; then someone shouted, “Hit the fuel tank,” and the aircraft erupted in flames. The rebels also seized nineteen Land Cruisers and six trucks, and emptied several warehouses that were filled with weapons. (They almost made away with eight tanks, but they couldn’t find the keys.) When the rebels left El Fasher, around midday, they had lost only nine men, and had kidnapped the head of the Sudanese Air Force, General Ibrahim Bushra Ismail, whom they released forty-five days later, after protracted negotiations with tribal leaders.
The rebel group, which was formed in February, 2003, had legitimate complaints. Darfur’s inhabitants felt that the region was being ignored. The Sudanese government rarely paid for road building and repair, schools, hospitals, civil servants, or communications facilities in Darfur. Those who considered themselves ethnically African were angered by the government’s practice of awarding most of the top posts in the region to local Arabs, even though they were thought to be the minority there. Disgruntled Darfurians had appealed to the government to include their concerns on the agenda of the U.S.-backed peace process. This effort failed, and many concluded that, if they ever wanted to see their needs met, they would have to do what John Garang had done in the South: take up arms against the Sudanese government and try to get the world’s attention
During the conflict with the rebels based in the South, the Sudanese military had honed a strategy for combatting insurgents: the Air Force bombed from the sky, while Arab tribesmen, armed by the government, launched raids on the ground. In Darfur, the Sudanese Army needed to rely even more heavily upon local Arab militias. A majority of the Army’s rank-and-file soldiers were from Darfur, and they could not be trusted to take up arms against their neighbors and kin. (Many Darfurians had served with the Army in the war against Garang’s rebels.) By July, 2003, the government was appealing to Darfur’s Arab tribal leaders to defend their homeland against rebels whom they branded as “tora bora” (an allusion to the terrorist fighters based in the caves of Afghanistan).
Originally posted by Muaddib
Riiight, according to you and according to the government that is committing genocide upon civilians.
www.globalsecurity.org...
* he Sudanese Liberation Army is backed by Eritrea. Until 2003, the group was known as the Darfur Liberation Front. Rebels in Darfour emerged in February 2003 under the name of Darfour Liberation Front. The Darfour Liberation Army announced no connection with the southern rebels, but it called in the middle of March 2003 for "an understanding " with the opposition forces which fight the Islamist government in Khartoum. In March 2003 the Darfour Liberation Front announced it had downed a helicopter that was carrying an official in the province. On 14 March 2003 Darfur Liberation Front announced that the movement will be called the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/SLA). The Darfur Liberation Front was a secessionist organisation calling for the secession of the area from Sudan. The SLA, led by Mini Arkoi Minawi, says it wants to "create a united, democratic Sudan."
* The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) appears to have received support from Chad, and some captured rebels were found to have Chadian identification and arms. It is said to be backed by a Sudanese opposition leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Turabi, the former speaker of Sudan's parliament and the ideologist of its Islamist revolution, was removed from office in May 2000 and inprisoned by Sudan's military. During the late 1970s he had worked with Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Mahdist political party and grandson of The Mahdi.
The Sudanese Liberation Army is a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella opposition organisation grouping. The Justice and Equality Movement is not.
The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) continued to mount attacks in Darfur in April 2003. In response, the Government of Sudan [GOS] stepped up its military presence in Darfur, and according to some reports, had begun attacking local villages in an effort to stamp out the insurgency. Sudan's border area with Chad was declared a military zone by the GOS following a meeting between Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir and Chadian President Idriss Deby. On 25 April 2003, the SLM/A reported that it had seized the airport and Al-Fasher, the capital of Northern Darfur state, and destroyed GOS helicopters and equipment. The GOS refuted this claim, stating that Al-Fashar remained under government control. The authorities in the capital of Southern Darfur, Nyala, imposed a curfew on the city following the clashes in Al-Fashar.
The SLM/A issued statements that it does not seek independence, but demands greater political autonomy and a more equitable share of resources from the central Sudanese authorities. The GOS disputes the SLM/A's claims to be a political organization, labeling the rebels "bandits and armed gangs."
The International Criminal Court has announced an inquiry into alleged war crimes in west Sudan's Darfur region.
Despite 21 years of conflicts, more than 2 million dead, 6 million forced to flee their homes, thousands of women and children abducted and/or raped and hundreds of villages destroyed and relatives still missing, not one perpetrator of war crimes or crimes against humanity is known to have been brought to justice in Sudan.
Amnesty International
Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights
Because of Talisman’s successful exploration, by 1999 reserves in Blocks 1 and 2 were discovered to be much larger than previously thought—403.6 million barrels in 1998 and an increase to 528 million barrels in reserves in 1999. 8 In 2002, a breakthrough in exploration on Block 4 indicated that there might be an additional 160-240 million barrels of oil in the GNPOC concession.9 By April 2002, it was estimated that current proven plus probable ultimate recovery of the GNPOC concession would be one billion barrels of crude oil.
It seems obvious to me besides actually Stopping the killing and raping and pillaging of communities...what else have the big players got to gain? any Oil? any really buddy neighbours on the borders? do we need a pipeline there? any big business or money to protect?I bet If any of us to could say yes to the the above action would be underway now!
Jan Pronk, UN envoy to Sudan, blamed violence on underfunded humanitarian programs and on a failure by outside nations to provide money and peacekeepers