posted on Jun, 21 2005 @ 07:14 PM
In response to the original post, I think you've got it the wrong way around. The Soviets had the Americans vastly outnumbered in terms of troops and
tanks. The U.S. response was to vastly build up its nuclear arsenal and forward position nukes in Europe, as it was only with nukes that they could
halt a massive Soviet conventional offensive.
However, for the average man on the street, as opposed to the generals and think-tanks, the fear in the *United States* (as opposed to Europe) was of
course of being nuked by the USSR. This was for the simple reason that the Soviets would not really be able to mount a ground invasion of the U.S.,
while they could easily roll through Europe despite a conventional American forward presence there.
This was all in the 50s and 60s, though, when military planners on both sides hadn't yet completely come to terms with the new strategic dynamic
brought on by the atomic weapon. Eventually the focus became less on nuclear and conventional strategies combined and more on the very real
possibility of a solely nuclear confrontation. The "new" thinking gave rise to the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in the 70s and 80s and
the use of nuclear weapons as a static deterrent, rather than a front-line tool.