reply posted on 21-7-2003 @ 10:14 PM by MaskedAvatar
No new evidence on Iraq since 1998 UN inspections
PTI[ MONDAY, JULY 21, 2003 12:28:58 PM ]
NEW YORK: American intelligence officials and senior members of the administration now acknowledge that there was little new evidence flowing into US
agencies in the five years since United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998, creating an intelligence vacuum.
"Once the inspectors were gone, it was like losing your GPS guidance," a Pentagon official said, invoking as a metaphor the initials of the
military's navigational satellites. "We were reduced to dead reckoning. We had to go back to our last fixed position, what we knew in '98, and plot
a course from there. With dead reckoning, you're heading generally in the right direction, but you can swing way off to one side or the other," the
official told the New York Times.
The officials' remarks come after the United States failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Prior to war, senior American officials had been insisting they had compelling evidence about Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes and belittled the
inspectors for what they called failure to find the weapons despite intrusive searches.
"Even as they were conducting the most intrusive system of arms control in history, the inspectors missed a great deal," Vice President Dick Cheney
had said last August, before the inspections resumed.
In a series of recent interviews with the Times, intelligence and other officials described the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House as
essentially blinded after the UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998. They were left grasping for whatever slivers they could obtain, like
unconfirmed reports of attempts to buy uranium, or fragmentary reports about movements of suspected terrorists.
Richard Kerr, who headed a four-member team of retired CIA officials that reviewed pre-war intelligence about Iraq, said analysts at the CIA and other
agencies were forced to rely heavily on evidence that was five years old at least.
Intelligence analysts drew heavily "on a base of hard evidence growing out of the lead-up to the first war, the first war itself and then the
inspections process". "We had a rich base of information," he said, and, after the inspectors left, "we drew on that earlier base."
"There were pieces of new information, but not a lot of hard information, and so the products that dealt with WMD were based heavily on analysis
drawn out of that earlier period," Kerr said.
Even so, the Times says, just days before President Bush's State of the Union address in January, Paul D Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence,
described the intelligence as not only convincing but up-to-date.
"It is a case grounded in current intelligence," he told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, "current intelligence that comes not only
from sophisticated overhead satellites ....but from brave people who told us the truth at the risk of their lives. We have that; it is very
convincing."
The paper said it was Cheney who, last September, was clearest about the fact that the US had only incomplete information. But he said that should not
deter the country from taking action.
But the Times says within the White House, the shortage of fresh evidence touched off a struggle explaining the confusion about how the administration
assembled its case.
