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Bush's Next War - North Korea: A War Scenario

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posted on May, 3 2005 @ 08:54 AM
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Perhaps it was I who wasn't clear enough. I never said or thought of Kim Jong Il as a "great leader." A country in the condition it's in is obviously not indicative of a good leader. Rather what I was saying was that Kim is someone who, to a certain degree, can be effectively handled and isn't completely out of our reach like many people think.


Originally posted by The Vagabond
I have to disagree. Progress shows the greatness of a leader, and so far Kim Jong Il, as good as he may or may not be, has not achieved progress towards his supposed goal of peaceful/normal/friendly relations with America. If I may steal a line from one of the bad guys in Braveheart, "Uncompromising men are easy to admire, but it is exactly our ability to compromise that makes us noble."


What exactly were you disagreeing with?

Also, I hate to say it, but next June, we're going to reach a crossroads with North Korea. If they truly go through with this nuclear test, the U.S. government's options on the matter will narrow very quickly to one or two things. One of them will be undoubtedly full-scale war.


If that happens, let's hope China shows major restraint.




posted on May, 3 2005 @ 11:11 AM
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Originally posted by sweatmonicaIdo
Perhaps it was I who wasn't clear enough. I never said or thought of Kim Jong Il as a "great leader."


Those are my words and if they do not accurately reflect the point you were trying to make then I appologize. The idea I was trying to convey with those words was the idea of a man who seeks progress, knows what he wants, knows how to get it, etc.
I think that Kim Jong Il is just a little too unyielding. What I was disagreeing with (as you ask in the quote I include below) is that he has shown that he is willing to compromise if handled properly. What I'm basically trying to say (albeit with less success than I'm accustomed to) is that if Kim Jong Il is too uncompromising, then even if "crazy" is too strong a word, he could at least be called irrational in that being too hardline can compromise his desire for peace and normalcy in relations with America.
So I'm not arguing that he is a complete psycho (I think I've used the term "loose cannon" in either this thread or another, and that may have been an overstatement, I conceede) but I am arguing that steadfastness in him which you admire is only separated from foolishness if he can eventually turn the corner and compromise just enough to finalize some kind of lasting understanding between his the DPRK and USA which ensures a peaceful future.




Originally posted by The Vagabond
I have to disagree. Progress shows the greatness of a leader, and so far Kim Jong Il, as good as he may or may not be, has not achieved progress towards his supposed goal of peaceful/normal/friendly relations with America.

What exactly were you disagreeing with?




Also, I hate to say it, but next June, we're going to reach a crossroads with North Korea. If they truly go through with this nuclear test, the U.S. government's options on the matter will narrow very quickly to one or two things. One of them will be undoubtedly full-scale war.


If that happens, let's hope China shows major restraint.


I think it's very important for America to use a careful mix of "carrot" and "stick". Offering incentives is OK, but only if those incentives are an alternative to consequences. If we want to avoid war, we must press him into situations where he must careful consider how to create an mutually acceptible compromise so that he can seize the reward rather than face the consequences.
For example we might say, "If you will stop building new nuclear weapons, we will sign a non-agression pact and sell you missile defense technology to ensure mutual peace, but if you keep building them, we're going to start a naval quarantine of your nation."
Now North Korea has two options other than being quarantined (and quite possibly ending up at war with us as a result). A. they can take our offer. B. They can make a good counter offer, which hopefully we will be able to accept. That would be ideal. The day that we make an offer, North Korea makes a counter offer, and we accept it, I will breathe a deep sigh of relief. Unfortunately I do not think that day will come on Bush's watch.



posted on May, 3 2005 @ 12:18 PM
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Glad we cleared that up. I gotcha.


Interesting point regarding Bush. What makes this situation so interesting is that both Kim and Bush are very unyielding men. My concern is that things will get to a point where neither side will want to yield at all. Then we got a big problem.

China's involvement is of concern too. If they would stay out of it and just concentrate on protecting their own interests, the situation would be so dire. Again, we have to hope China shows major, and I mean MAJOR restraint.



posted on May, 3 2005 @ 12:23 PM
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Originally posted by sweatmonicaIdo
China's involvement is of concern too. If they would stay out of it and just concentrate on protecting their own interests, the situation would be so dire. Again, we have to hope China shows major, and I mean MAJOR restraint.


I think China would if anything invade from the north just keep the refuge problem under control and maintain power in the area and a chip in the future of the country



posted on May, 4 2005 @ 08:18 AM
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I think Kim would have to be on the brink of starting a war for China to invade them. I wouldnt' be shocked if China arranged a coup after Kim Jong Il died to put a moderate in power. If China did that they could force reunification on at least semi-socialist terms and force America out of their backyard, since the conflict would be well on its way to resolution.

I don't know why that didn't hit me before, but reunification is the key to the nuclear problem. I can't believe it's only really registering now. We ought to drop the nuclear issue get in touch with the soft-liners in South Korea, and help them reunite with the North on whatever terms the South Koreans find acceptible. With the conflict out of the way there might be a real chance of getting Korea to cease new nuclear development.



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 08:23 PM
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I need some accurate information on NK's military capabilities, and special ops.
Any help would be thankful.



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 08:30 PM
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Originally posted by sweatmonicaIdo
China's involvement is of concern too. If they would stay out of it and just concentrate on protecting their own interests, the situation would be so dire. Again, we have to hope China shows major, and I mean MAJOR restraint.


Surely Korea is more their interest than it is America's?

It is next to them? Border and all? Power stations, etc?



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 08:41 PM
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Notes on North Korean SOF

In the early 1990s, the army was made up of a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare forces. By any consideration, however, North Korea has one of the world's largest special operations forces. Estimates of the size of the army's special operations forces ranged from 60,000 persons to over 100,000 persons. The uncertainty over the number derives from both the lack of information and the varying definitions of special operations forces. Organized into twenty-two brigades and at least seven independent battalions, the special operations forces are believed to be the best trained and to have the highest morale of all North Korean ground forces.

Special operations forces were developed to meet three basic requirements: to breach the flankless fixed defense of South Korea; to create a "second front" in the enemy's rear area, disrupting in-depth South Korean or United States reinforcements and logistical support during a conflict; and to conduct battlefield and strategic reconnaissance. The ultimate goal was to create strategic dislocation. The additional missions of countering opposing forces and internal security were added over time.

The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces controls the bulk of the special operations forces through one of two commands, the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. The Reconnaissance Bureau is the primary organization within the Ministry of People's Armed Forces for the collection of strategic and tactical intelligence. It also exercises operational control over agents engaged in collecting military intelligence and in the training and dispatch of unconventional warfare teams. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is directly subordinate to the General Staff Department. The party directly controls approximately 1,500 agents.

Operations are categorized on the basis of the echelon supported. Strategic special operations forces support national or Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives, operational supported corps operations, and tactical-supported maneuver divisions and brigades. Strategic missions of special operations forces in support of national and Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives involve reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations, but not light infantry operations, which primarily are tactical operations. The main objectives of these units are to secure information that cannot be achieved by other means, neutralize targets, and disrupt rear areas. In executing these operations, special operations troops may be disguised either as South Korean military personnel or as civilians.

Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advance of hostilities or in the initial stages by naval or air platforms. Based on available insertion platforms, North Korea has a one-time lift capability of 12,000 persons by sea and 6,000 persons by air. Most North Korea special operations forces infiltrate overland and are dedicated to operational and tactical missions, that is, reconnaissance and combat operations in concert with conventional operations in the forward corps. Although it is unknown how forces will be allocated, limits on North Korea's insertion capabilities constrain operational flexibility and determine the allocation of strategic, operational, and tactical missions.

North Korean army special operations forces units are broken down into three categories based on mission and mode of operation: agent operations, reconnaissance, and light infantry and sniper. The Reconnaissance Bureau has four sniper brigades and at least seven independent reconnaissance battalions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau controls fourteen light infantry/sniper brigades: six "straight-leg" brigades, six airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. Four light infantry brigades of unknown subordination are under the operational control of the forward corps. In addition, each regular infantry division and mechanized brigade has an special operations forces battalion.

Reconnaissance units are employed in rear area, strategic intelligence collection, and target information acquisition. Light infantry units operate in company- or battalion-sized units against military, political, or economic targets. Sniper units are distinguished from light infantry units in that their basic operational unit is the team, rather than the larger company or battalion of the light infantry unit.

A reconnaissance brigade consists of between 3,600 and 4,200 personnel. It is organized into a headquarters, rear support units, a communications company, and ten reconnaissance battalions. The basic unit of operation is the reconnaissance team, which has from two to ten men. A light infantry brigade has between 3,300 and 3,600 personnel organized into between five and ten battalions. The brigade can fight as a unit or disperse its battalions for independent operations.

A sniper brigade's organization parallels that of the light infantry brigade. The unique special operations forces dedicated to strategic operations are the two amphibious light infantry/sniper brigades subordinate to the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau. These brigades are believed deployed to Wnsan on the east coast and Namp'o and Tasa-ri on the west coast. In organization and manpower, they are reduced versions of the regular light infantry brigades. The two brigades have a total strength of approximately 5,000 men in ten battalions. Each battalion has about 400 men organized into five companies each. Some amphibious brigade personnel are trained as frogmen.

In the 1970s, in support of overland insertion, North Korea began clandestine tunneling operations along the entire DMZ, with two tunnels per forward division. By 1990 four tunnels dug on historical invasion routes from the north had been discovered by South Korean and United States tunnel neutralization teams: three in the mid-1970s and the fourth in March 1990. The South Koreans suspect there were as many as twenty-five tunnels in the early 1990s, but the level of ongoing tunneling is unknown.

At the operational and tactical level, infiltration tactics are designed for the leading special operations forces brigades to probe and penetrate the weak points of the defense; disrupt the command, control, and communications nodes; and threaten lines of communication and supply. To achieve its goal of nearterm distraction and dislocation of the defender, at least one special operations forces brigade is assigned to each of the four regular army corps deployed along the DMZ.

www.specialoperations.com...

The Special Operation Force "...is the strongest elite force of the entire Korean People's Army and is the unique vanguard force of the Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

-- Kim Il-Sung (former North Korean leader)


Introduction
The Special Operations Force (SOF) of the Korean People's Army (KPA) is tasked to conduct raids in enemy rear areas and to perform reconnaissance and intelligence operations. Trained in unconventional warfare tactics, KPA SOF units will attempt to create a second front in the Republic of Korea (ROK) rear with clandestine infiltration and harassment tactics. In addition, raids on targets outside the Korean Peninsula possibly could be conducted.


Strength and Organization
The Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) divides SOF units into one of three categories: light infantry, reconnaissance, or sniper. Light infantry operations are combat operations conducted with company- or battalion-sized units against military, political, or economic targets. Team-sized elements conduct reconnaissance to collect intelligence or targeting information. Sniper operations (not to be confused with strictly sharpshooting missions) are basically the same as light infantry except they are conducted in team-sized units.

The MPAF controls two primary commands that make up the 70,000-member SOF: the Training Unit Guidance Bureau (TUGB) and the Reconnaissance Bureau (RB). The TUGB and RB, combined with SOF units of the forward and mechanized corps, consist of 23 SOF brigades and 18 independent SOF battalions.

Figure: Special Operations Forces Mission Planning

The TUGB is a central training and guidance command for all SOF units and also serves as a training command and a wartime controlling authority for strategic and corps-level SOF missions. Subordinate to the TUGB are eight light infantry brigades (including three airborne), two airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. The RB is the primary intelligence organization tasked to plan SOF infiltration and reconnaissance operations in the ROK. Subordinate to the RB are nine reconnaissance battalions (including a navy and air force battalion) and a sniper brigade.

Under the control of the Forward Corps (1st, 2d, 4th, 5th) are four reconnaissance battalions, three sniper brigades, and three light infantry brigades. Subordinate to mechanized corps are five reconnaissance battalions and four light infantry brigades.

Figure: SOF Disposition


Missions
Strategic/Operational/Tactical. Strategic SOF units support national objectives with reconnaissance and raid missions. Specifically, these units develop targeting information, report ROK civilian and military actions, conduct post-strike assessments, and verify enemy intentions. Typical missions would involve the location and destruction of national-level artillery; airfields; storage facilities; air defense locations; and command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) assets in ROK/US rear areas. In addition, strategic units also may conduct operations that include the kidnap and assassination of key enemy personnel.



Operational SOF units support corps objectives with light infantry and reconnaissance missions. Operational light infantry units will target critical terrain and C3I assets, delay ROK/US reserve forces, and attack division (and higher) command posts. In addition, these units ascertain enemy intentions, develop targeting information for SCUDs/FROGs and long-range artillery, conduct post-strike assessments, and determine locations of ROK/US reserve forces.

Tactical SOF units support maneuver division and brigade objectives with light infantry operations. Light infantry units attack brigade and division command posts, capture key terrain to assist in maneuvering divisions and brigades, and destroy ROK/US reserve forces. The organic reconnaissance company of the maneuver unit performs tactical reconnaissance. The reconnaissance company and light infantry battalion develop targets for destruction. These targets include air defense sites, force concentrations, artillery positions, and C3I assets.


Ground Force Operations
12 to 24 Hours Prior to Attack. Under limited visibility or the cover of darkness, operational- and tactical-level SOF units will attempt to infiltrate the DMZ attired as ROK civilians or ROK military personnel. This will be done over land and through preconstructed tunnels, led by reconnaissance teams of five to ten men.



Figure: 10-man Reconnaissance Team

Because the DMZ is primarily mountainous, the SOF will use this terrain to provide cover, concealment, safe areas, and numerous routes for escape and evasion. Lowlands will be used for their thick weeds, tall grass, and woods to provide cover and concealment.

Figure: SOF Team Traverses Rugged Terrain

Once past the main ROK defenses, operational- and tactical-level units will attempt to arrive undetected at pre-selected target sites that are critical to ROK/US military operations. Typical targets include: ports, airfields, logistical points, avenues of approach, rail lines, C3I assets, and other reinforcement areas.

Most SOF units under the KPA with strategic missions will attempt to infiltrate ROK/US rear areas by air and water. By air, this will be conducted with the Antonov An-2 COLT, and the MD 500E helicopter (modified and painted to resemble those of the ROKAF). Rubber rafts, midget subs, high-speed boats, and merchant ships reflect only a few of the many water infiltration possibilities.

Figure: Airborne Assault on an Airfield

In the time remaining prior to a target assault, reconnaissance patrols will attempt to gather detailed information on the target and clear any obstacles (mines, barbed wire, etc.) that might slow or deter an attack. Unit personnel will then receive a detailed briefing on the mission objective, conduct equipment inspections, and wait for the main invasion across the DMZ (H-hour).

Figure: Covert SOF Activities

H-hour. At H-Hour, pre-positioned SOF units within ROK/US rear areas will attack targets as massive artillery and rocket attacks are initiated from north of the DMZ. This is intended to weaken critical defense areas and create optimum confusion for ROK/US forces. Simultaneously, additional SOF units will slip through the DMZ, be inserted by air, and land on South Korean beaches.

As soon as the artillery fire ceases, first echelon SOF reconnaissance units will move forward to probe ROK/US lines for weak resistance. Where holes are found, penetration is attempted. If successful, light infantry SOF assets will proceed engage critical enemy targets. When possession or destruction of a target is obtained, SOF units quickly pass possession to follow-on infantry and mechanized forces to consolidate gains and deny ROK/US usage.

Disengagement/Retreat. When SOF units are forced to leave a position, they can be expected to act as a delaying, or covering force. SOF units will attempt to occupy terrain where approaches and attack options are limited, thereby greatly increasing firepower against a pursuing superior force.


Conclusion
The KPA SOF possess extensive experience in unconventional warfare tactics. Based on precedence set by the Korean War, the North Korean SOF soldier can be expected to utilize inhospitable terrain, infiltrate ROK/US lines, establish a second front, and operate within the allied rear with little logistical support. Depending on the mission, SOF units will endeavor to neutralize critical ROK/US military targets.


www.specialoperations.com...



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 09:12 PM
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LiquidationOfDiscrepency

I don't have the numbers handy although I believe they are available on GlobalSecurity.org.

North Korea's capabilities on paper are pretty good, especially in terms of artillery, which is very important in Korea's difficult geography. At the onset of hostilies North Korean artillery can be expected to take an heavy toll, however this threat diminishes once the front begins to move. To undertake an offensive against North Korea in the most practical manner, it would be necessary to do extensive recon before initiating hostilies and undertake a massive air campaign and artillery barrage against their batteries as quickly as possible, to facilitate armored infiltration missions into their rear area.

Their critical weakness is definately logistics, as a natural result of their dire economic condition. Their military units engage in subsistence farming. It is probable that they would face food shortages early on in an offensive if an effective air campaign was mounted against their supply lines. Also 100% of their fuel is imported.

Most of their stuff is cloned soviet and chinese hardware (of course cloned chinese hardware is just a 2nd hand cloned soviet hardware). Mostly T-55 and 62 knockoffs, but they have their own version of the T-62 that carries a T-72 style 125mm cannon.
The weakness of these tanks is primarily their auto-loaders. A well drilled 4 man crew can acquire and fire 2-4 times faster in a target rich environment. Their armor is obsolete compared to the composite armor matrices used on 4th generation MBTs and their thermal imaging is inferior, although there are limited numbers of improved products out there which have been equiped with armor upgrades not unlike Iraqi T-55 Enigma, as well as thermal imaging and even laser range finding in some cases. I wish I knew the numbers on these improved products but I just don't know how many they have.

In a straight armor-on-armor battle it can safely be assumed that an American tank company or combat team of Abrams and Bradleys could defeat a Korean armored force up to 3 or 4 times their numbers (battalion strength)

Creative use of geography, weather conditions, and infantry could however make the Korean force more effective on defense once their offensive stalled out. If Korea retained sufficient artillery units this would increase their defense against tanks significantly.
The gist effective tactics for Korea would be to conceal armored positions carefully and heavily entrench infantry positions, allowing for American forces to be engaged by Korean armor from the flanks at close range.

This is somewhat in line with the Soviet doctrine which the Koreans subscribe to. Infantry form the front line while armored units are held in reserve to counter attack. The danger in this is that if an American force is not drawn in close enough, is allowed to bypass the infantry and thus stay out of the trap, or is not kept under pressure by artillery, the Korean armor gets slaughtered. This means that Koreans can only defend the most favorable of terrain effectively- natural bottle necks such as bridge heads, mountain passes, or otherwise untraversable terrain.

American strategists in recent years normally assume that a North Korean invasion of the South would begin with infiltration missions carried out through an extensive network of tunels and a major artillery barrage, followed by an extremely aggressive drive South towards Pusan, sparing no casualties to achieve breakthroughs. Their hope would be to get American forces entirely off of the peninsula and destroy South Korean logistics to make an American incurision as daunting as possible.

Their nuclear development has created an additional danger that after they had taken the Peninsula they might use the threat of nuclear weapons against an invasion force at sea. This is more politically acceptable than using them on land and an American counterstrike against Korea, which would also affect China, because of proximity, would be widely criticized in all likelihood.

I do not believe that North Korea can take the peninsula however. I believe their offensive would stall shortly after taking Seoul as they were forced to advance their artillery, and that at that point a South Korean and American counter attack, though risky and costly could possibly end the war, to say nothing of what a one-sided beating the war would become once additional American divisions arrived.
I'm not sure of our full deployment capability but I know that 2 airborne brigades can be on the ground in 18 hours with the DRB from a mechanized infantry division and the whole of the 82nd and 101st airborne following in 72 hours. That in and of itself is a formidable force, and is not even the whole of what we could throw at them- only the rapidly deployable forces of which I am aware off the top of my head.
All told, I doubt that the North Koreans can sustain a healthy offensive tempo for more than 72 hours, and after 72 hours American divisions start arriving and the danger of an American counter attack grows exponentially by the day.

If what you were really looking for is numbers then I appologize. Since I started school I just can't devote the same time that I used to, so I have to pick and choose which threads I research heavily- when i really go on a roll I've been known to spend 2 hours researching a single post.
Maybe later I'll search through my old Korea posts though. i know I've done this subject to death in the past.



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 09:15 PM
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Hey do you know instead of sweetmonicaiddo you have sweatmonicaido?
Sweat as in wet and smelly.



posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 09:16 PM
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posted on Sep, 4 2005 @ 09:20 PM
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Originally posted by Rikimaru
Hey do you know instead of sweetmonicaiddo you have sweatmonicaido?
Sweat as in wet and smelly.


There's nothing actually wrong with that, except of course that he forgot the comma before "ido".


Everyone makes mistakes though- my posts are often chock full o' mixed up hominems, and sometimes its too late to change it when you finally realize.



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 09:43 AM
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Very good input The Vagabond, but do you seriously think we could over throw NK under a 72 hour time frame?



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 10:24 AM
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Originally posted by LiquidationOfDiscrepancy
Very good input The Vagabond, but do you seriously think we could over throw NK under a 72 hour time frame?


I'd worry more about China's involvment.

I would not put it passed them to go for an old school land grab and help America during the invasion as long as they got to Police it.



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 10:38 AM
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Originally posted by AlanSmithee
North Korea does not have the ability to attack the united states

Sure they do, they fired a long-range test missile to Alaska. They've probably/possibly improved their missile technology since then.
times.hankooki.com...



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 10:44 AM
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The last time these two sides met.. the 50's i think... the US left them with a little parting gift: the total annihilation of their water system and rice-paddy fields leaving N.Korea with a huge famine.

Thanks America you're the greatest!! YEAH!



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 12:36 PM
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Originally posted by SwearBear

Originally posted by AlanSmithee
North Korea does not have the ability to attack the united states

Sure they do, they fired a long-range test missile to Alaska. They've probably/possibly improved their missile technology since then.
times.hankooki.com...


While NK can reach Alaska and perhaps Hawaii, they can not do so accurately. For a ICBM to be effective for NK, they would need to hit either an important military base chalk full of soldiers equipment and logistical infrastructure or they would need to hit a major US city.

Probably can NOT reach the United States west coast, thus I think if they were to use a nuke against us it would have to be a naval base in Hawaii or Japan.



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 12:46 PM
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Any allied invasion into North Korea, it would make Iraq look like a cake walk. You have to remember that 4 generations have programmed to hate the west, that's a hell of a motivated force. That being said any conflict would be confined to the Korean Peninsula with maybe a few IRBM's shot at Japan or the Western US.

Just to give you some idea, of what the US would be faing in North Kore

Seventy percent of their active force, including approximately 700,000 troops, over 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is postured within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. This percentage continues to rise despite the June 2000 summit. Most of this force in the forward area is protected in over 4,000 underground facilities, out of over 11,000 nationwide....

....According to remarks made by General LaPorte, commander USFK, during congressional testimony in March 2003 North Korea has for the past 10 or 12 years adapted its military on what the military leadership perceives as the strengths of the United States military. The KPA has adapted in several ways. First in terms of communications the North Korean military has developed an indigenous, frequency-hopping radio that allows soldiers to communicate in a secure mode. Fiber optics have been installed between fixed facilities. And in attempt to protect its forces from US surveillance and air capabilities, the North Koreans have built a tremendous number of underground facilities throughout North Korea to protect leadership and critical forces....

....As of 1996 major combat units consisted of 153 divisions and brigades, including 60 infantry divisions/brigades, 25 mechanized infantry brigades, 13 tank brigades, 25 Special Operation Force (SOF) brigades and 30 artillery brigades. North Korea deployed ten corps including sixty divisions and brigades in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line....

....North Korea has organized a grand total of seven million men and women into reserve units. Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker-Peasant Militia, and the Young Red Guards make up most of the number. The units are managed by the Party Civil Defense Department in peacetime, but are placed under the Ministry of Defense in contingencies. War mobilization measures usually assign Reserve Military Training Unit to the front or regional defense in war, while the other two units are assigned to maintain security in the rear, guard duty for important facilities, etc. About 30% of all North Koreans between the ages fifteen to sixty are mobilized for reserve units

www.globalsecurity.org...


By any consideration North Korea has one of the world's largest special operations forces. Estimates of the size of the army's special operations forces ranged from 60,000 persons to over 100,000 persons. The uncertainty over the number derives from both the lack of information and the varying definitions of special operations forces. Organized into twenty-two brigades and at least seven independent battalions, the special operations forces are believed to be the best trained and to have the highest morale of all North Korean ground forces....

....North Korean army special operations forces units are broken down into three categories based on mission and mode of operation: agent operations, reconnaissance, and light infantry and sniper. The Reconnaissance Bureau has four sniper brigades and at least seven independent reconnaissance battalions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau controls fourteen light infantry/sniper brigades: six "straight-leg" brigades, six airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. Four light infantry brigades of unknown subordination are under the operational control of the forward corps. In addition, each regular infantry division and mechanized brigade has an special operations forces battalion.

www.globalsecurity.org...


Anyone thinking an US/SK invasion would be a walk over, knows nothing about the realities of war.



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 04:30 PM
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I did leave out the China factor, which I have mentioned before. If North Korea invades the South and America refuses to forgoe retaliation, China will go to the UN and get permission to unilaterally invade North Korea and end the war, as well as a UN resolution forbidding the United States from interfering in any way with China's mandate. They also may seek a mandate to preempt nuclear attack on their nation by hitting NK's missiles. That keeps North Korea out of American hands and averts a potentially very costly war.

I would like to clarify that the US can't destroy Korea in 72 hours. I believe their forward progress will begin to falter after 72 hours, and American reinforcements will begin to arrive about that same time. I think the American offensive could be expected to begin somewhere between week 1 and week 2, with the majority of the Korean military being out of action somewhere between week 4 and week 8. Depending on the accuracy of Korean artillery, the number of US troops on the border, the amount of US airpower there, and the performance of American artillery, our losses could range from 5,000 in a dream world to 50,000 in a nightmare, but that's a semi-educated guess- not really that reliable. I haven't invested the time I wish I could to mull over the numbers.


Originally posted by rogue1
Any allied invasion into North Korea, it would make Iraq look like a cake walk. You have to remember that 4 generations have programmed to hate the west, that's a hell of a motivated force.


It doesn't matter how much your enemy hates you. If you haven't got the tactics and the logistics you're going to get the snot kicked out of you. I hate the hell out of Mike Tyson, but all the motivation in the world wouldn't help me put up a respectable fight against him.


That being said any conflict would be confined to the Korean Peninsula with maybe a few IRBM's shot at Japan or the Western US.


If memory serves they have 55 missiles with the range to hit all of Japan. Minus a few shot down by THAAD, minus a few destroyed by airpower, unless it's NBC warheads it wont mean spit, and if it is NBC America will kinda be happy about that from a certain perspective because then we can just glass the whole northern half of the peninsula and the war is over.


Seventy percent of their active force, including approximately 700,000 troops, over 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is postured within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone.


Those troops will spend the entire war within 90 miles of the DMZ if you ask me. They can't aim their artillery as well, or concentrate it as effectively once the front starts moving. They won't be eating very well when they have to leave their farms- remember the Korean troops have to grow food for themselves to make ends meet, and with our air superiority we can shut down any bridge, destroy any fuel storage, and make a meet grinder out of any highway at a whim. No fuel, no food, and dramatically decreased artillery capability after the first day or two. Anyone who doesn't get killed in the first couple of days is probably going to live- provided of course that he isn't wearing a NK uniform.


....According to remarks made by General LaPorte, commander USFK,


I covered this before. It's LaPorte's job to take the North Koreans seriously. Saddam had underground facilities and fiberoptic communications systems as well. The problem is that forces hiding in a hole can't fight, and our special forces in Iraq were able to infiltrate Iraqi territory and tap into fiberoptic lines to compromise those communications. Frequency hopping isn't a very secure encryption either. All the Navy's cryptographers have to do is line up several radios and scan multiple frequencies at once to figure out the various algorithms being used, then with that knowledge in hand we can keep up with some of their radio traffic.


....North Korea has organized a grand total of seven million men and women into reserve units.

Seven million starving old men, women, and children with outdated equipment and limited logistical support. We won't even have to kill them. We'll bypass and surround them and if they don't surrender as their country crumbles around them we'll either starve them out or shell them at our leisure. Does Leningrad ring a bell?


By any consideration North Korea has one of the world's largest special operations forces.


The larger a "special force" is, the less special it is. I'm shaking in my boots at the thought of Kim Jong Il's version of the Republican Guard.


Anyone thinking an US/SK invasion would be a walk over, knows nothing about the realities of war.


On the contrary. You'll be hard pressed to find someone in this thread or on ATS for that matter who is better versed in modern warfare. Modern warfare is fought by manuever. The Koreans look good on paper because a lot of people still have their heads in WWII and Vietnam. That's attrition. That's the old way, and in an era where the mobility, logistical capabilities, and integration of combined arms power at the lowest levels of first world militaries has reached stunning levels, it just won't work.

What good are 2,000 antique tanks that can't recieve fuel, 8 million troops who can't get enough food and can't be rapidly moved to where they are needed, etc? There is just barely a front or a rear anymore. Modern mechanized forces can penetrate the lines and play hell with your artillery, air defense, communications, and logistics with perhaps 5 times the effectiveness of our already formidable airpower. To counter this, you must be able to do 3 things, and do them well. See, Move, and Coordinate. On a secondary level of course you also must be able to move and coordinate sufficient forces to actually defeat the raiders.

So here's your typical battle between NK and American forces. American tanks bypass Korean infantry positions under cover of darkness, with American artillery providing suppression against any Korean fire called in against the tanks. North Korea moves its tank and mechanized infantry forces into the breach, assuming that the Korean infantry's communications were not being disrupted. American tanks engage and destroy the Korean response and proceed into Korean territory to eliminate a supply depot or artillery battery, then come back through the lines, dealing out a few parting blows the the Korean front line.

Picture this happening countless times every night, and each time NK's ability to fight back decreases.

[edit on 5-9-2005 by The Vagabond]

[edit on 5-9-2005 by The Vagabond]



posted on Sep, 5 2005 @ 06:00 PM
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One thing is certain: a second war with north korea would not only be the messiest/bloodiest war in human history, it would be the last war in human history. Nuclear weapons if used on the scale necessary (by eather side) to win would cause so much destruction and death, alot of those numbers of military units would become moot points. The insuing chaos would throw military plans (again, by both sides) out the window.

The united states of course, would prevail, but at what cost?

I for one could never again trust my government if they nuked someone without just cause (and no, wmd is not just cause, 911 is not just cause). I would gladly (or sadly) rebel against my government if they started a nuclear war with north korea.

Sadly, these are the kinds of mental excercises that arise when the office of president of the united states is occupied by a serial killer.



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