posted on Nov, 9 2020 @ 08:55 PM
The accident report on this one is particularly bad. The MP was a former C-17 loadmaster who had undergone pilot training, and had just short of 100
hours in the F-16. Despite guidance to the contrary, his first in flight refueling mission was at night, on a night when the weather was bad enough
that the tanker had to delay their initial rendezvous and change their refueling altitude due to cloud cover. The two instructor pilots were able to
refuel with no problem. The other student was able to take on fuel, but spent 10 minutes on the boom, and was unable to take on his planned fuel
load. The MP was unable to connect to the boom and take on any fuel.
As a result of the inability to refuel, the MP and his instructor returned to Shaw early. The MP was attempting to land, and impacted the localizer
antenna with his main landing gear, resulting in the gear suffering major damage, a hydraulic B system failure, and other problems. The SOF on duty
ran the LANDING WITH LG UNSAFE/UP checklist, despite the MP questioning twice if it was the correct checklist, and decided to have the MP take the
barrier. During the landing, the hook failed to engage the cable, and the left main, which had a broken drag brace failed. The pilot ejected as it
started to ground loop. During the ejection, there was a critical failure of the Digital Recover Sequencer built into the ejection seat. Six of the
seven pyrotechnic charges that should have fired during the ejection sequence failed to activate. This caused multiple seat systems to fail to
activate. The seat was airborne approximately 6.27 seconds, which would have given the MP 3.475 seconds to recognize that the DRS had failed, and
activate the emergency manual deployment handle in time for the chute to deploy fully. In 2014, an instructor pilot in Tulsa Air National Guard
performed a daytime, fair weather ejection in which there was a similar DRS failure. It took that pilot, who had 2600 hours and far more training
than the MP, four seconds to recognize the failure and pull the EMDH. If a controlled ejection had taken place in this accident, the pilot would have
had between 14 and 18 seconds to recognize the failure and pull the EMDH.