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originally posted by: KansasGirl
But...it's the pilots' faults, right? Wasn't that the consensus from the experts, the last I checked the last thead on it? The pilots didn't know how to shut off the auto-pilot and do a manual trim with that wheel thing. Not the plane's fault.
Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system — and indeed that they didn’t even need to know about it. It was not mentioned in their flight manuals.
That stance allowed the new jet to earn a common “type rating” with existing 737 models, allowing airlines to minimize training of pilots moving to the MAX.
Minimizing MAX pilot transition training was an important cost saving for Boeing’s airline customers, a key selling point for the jet, which has racked up more than 5,000 orders.
The company’s website pitched the jet to airlines with a promise that “as you build your 737 MAX fleet, millions of dollars will be saved because of its commonality with the Next-Generation 737.”
Going against a long Boeing tradition of giving the pilot complete control of the aircraft, the MAX’s new MCAS automatic flight control system was designed to act in the background, without pilot input. It was needed because the MAX’s much larger engines had to be placed farther forward on the wing, changing the airframe’s aerodynamic lift.
Designed to activate automatically only in the extreme flight situation of a high-speed stall, this extra kick downward of the nose would make the plane feel the same to a pilot as the older-model 737s.
After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.
That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.
So no one even knew about MCAS until after the Lion Air incident, and even the FAA got blindsided by the change in the amount of control MCAS had on the stabilizer.
originally posted by: Flyingclaydisk
a reply to: AugustusMasonicus
But at least when you're on a CRJ-200 you know your pilot is only 12 years old and and getting paid enough to live in used Dodge van in the airport parking lot. A pilot whose total flight time is probably in the double digits. And you know the plane has never been caressed by the wrench of an actual mechanic, only banged on and buggered up by a pair of channel lock pliers in the hands of some ramp rat. And that the airport in Casper, WY only has one vending machine.