Fighter Aircraft Generations: A Reference..., page 3

Isn't it strange that, throughout the 1970's and 1980's, F-teens were labelled 'third generation'. And only when the RAM-K and M (MiG-29 and Su-27) prototypes became known (and then seen, in Finland and by the Swedes over Bothnia) that we began talking '4th generation'.

I think where most people screw up is in failing to give fighters the same qualifications of 'generation' as we do people. Usually around 14-20 years. Not 10.

While separating out the capabilities of said platforms as a function of those which provide _useful increases in performance_ to the designated mission role of the airframe.

Me-262 through F-100 are _all_ 'day fighters' (so is the F-104 for that matter though the F4D is not and the F-89/94/86D are not and all these served within the 14 year block between 1945 and 1959). Thus they are Generation-1 because they effectively require a human to directly intervene in the aiming/deployment of the weapons systems. So too are Mystere, Ouragon, MiG-15/17 and early 19.

Generation-2 is determined /somewhat/ by supersonic capabilities but more importantly by what those capabilities meant in terms of _requiring_ automation of the weapons system to engage targets. At which point every 'night fighter' became and 'all weather' fighter. If only because you could typically climb through the soup before it iced your airframe. And the reliance upon onboard radar made the use of the unaided eye (and thus time of day) unimportant.

Thus all F-4, MiG-21/23/25 and Mirage III aircraft are Gen-2. Whose _numeric block_ takes you to at least 1973. If not 1978. Ironically, among these would be the Kfir (Whose Elta-2001 is little more than a gunranger, akin to that of the F-86A) and at least the developmental period if not service entry of ALL the F-teens except the Hornet.

The F-teens however are characterized by their own specific performance improvements: digital FLCS (Flight Control Systems) as a function of handling a 1:1 thrust to weight ratio in EM or Energy Maneuver stabilized scenarios (this many G, times this many knot-seconds= this turn rate. Mix and match to beat the enemy 1 or 2 circle fight). Also important are the digital radars (LDSD + reliable EID onboard) and the incorporation of ALASCA seekers and at least the beginnings of PGM use through targeting pods (again, even accounting for the fact that the F-111 and F-4D/E used them long before).

Thus, even though they are technically still within Gen-2, these jets _define_ Gen-3. Including the JA-37 and Su-27/MiG-29/31 and the Mirage 2000 which all came a little later yet in the 1980's. The Tornado F.3 being a hybrid with piss poor aero performance and 'getting better' AI.24 radar, even though it too only entered service in the 80's.

Generation 4 is a mixed bag. As it /was/ envisioned, it was supposed to be everything that Gen-3 was (1:1+ and EM with carefree handling) in a 'no AOA restriction, much smaller, all smart munition' format. Thus you have the European canard clones which really are not that impressive in and of themselves but rather /conceptually dated/ by what was assumed about the F/A-22 that shared their mid-1980's development start date. For the 'ATF' was itself typically represented as a canard delta in early artwork and it's VLO and Supercruise downplayed greatly (even as it had virtually no PGM capability which was something supposedly covered by Agile Falcon and later the ATA).

As things have turned out, the definitions of Gen-4 are in fact split between the avionics/weapons side (netcentric datalink = 'big picture' all round. ARH weapons make much of the preconceived notion of dogfigthing performance irrelevant, LGB and expensive targeting pods largely replaced by offboard/radar cue for IAMs). And the purely physical elements of the resulting Raptor. Which is within 20% of the F-117's stealth performance. And for which _sustained_ supercruise has granted the ability to /get to/ targets as much as fight over them, on a vastly more efficient basis of sortie generation. Of course we have also slipped rightwards from a 1996-98 IOC to a 2005-7 equivalent and slashed procurement of these super-fighters because the Russian threat first went-hollow (technically, they could not match the engineering precision necessary for high quality VLO fabrication and manufacturing) and then collapsed entirely.

In the resultant slump in new production, most of the existing subsystem advances have been fitted to _new variants_ (often with singularly different roles: F-16C.50d and F-15E as well as the Bombcat) of existing airframes. Or developments of same (F/A-18E, a pig in bugs clothing).

The difference being that an F/A-22 with AMRAAM can probably beat a Eurofighter with BVRAAM. But an F-15E with BVRAAM can beat a Eurofighter with AMRAAM.

i.e. the 'physical improvements' COUNT, more than ever, in the absolute sense. But the weapons system/avionics trades make any jet less a function of the crate or the driver than the systems it is fitted with and supported by.

Once you realize that the Europeans were merely suffering penile envy over the F-teens (having self-sabotaged their own fighter development through much of the 50's and 60's). It becomes easy to realize Generation 4 as less a '.5' system. Than simply a 'Tier I/II' separation of the Raptor and everything else.

Only the Super Ho-net is really out of place for timeline or technology scale in being a 'new' (produced) jet. Of a physical design which would never have been accepted even if it had been available in the 1980's.

Generation 5 is composed of one jet only. That being the F-35A. Which seeks to make a /fighter bomber/ that is _cheap_. Nothing more or less. VLO is less and of less quality than the F/A-22 (or at least it was, until the Raptor died a PBD's death). Performance is /vastly/ less for both combat and cruise. And even ease of construction is questionable compared to the superior X-32 alternative (simpler all-from-wing structural dependency rather than an open ended boxframe onto which conventional wing, nose and tail auxilliaries are attached). In this, you are looking less at a technical marvel than what happens when not only the Russians but also the Europeans admit they missed the mark in what was necessary to defeat a modern IADS (S2A defense, above all). And thus any 'success' of the jet is less that of technical superiority than simple plea to buy into the U.S. technology base overall and lever up the relative national means by which 'next generation!' (we will beat you) have parity.
Such is certainly the basis of the 'cheap' factoring in that the F-35 is not a terribly advanced design perse (it's avoinics are nice) and it's structural primitiveness and genuine B-17-with-AMRAAM shift -away from- 'Fightering' can only be justified (on a threat level defined by 2-way missile datalinks and hunting AAM) by making sure that everyone buys some so that both production scalars and threat levels stabilize at one common LCD mean.

i.e. Most of what defines Gen-5 could still be fitted to Gen-4 (faster datalinks, cheaper AESA) but MIB and international trade _politics_ is the definition of it's driving need.

Generation 6.
This is the important one. Because it will most likely invalidate the F-35 (and PAK-FA or J-12, if they ever get here). Not as a function of being a superior fighter. But because they are easier to sustain losses on. As UCAVs. By 2015, most people are saying that THEL and M-THEL will be fielded. And within 5 years of that happening, fighters will cease to be important in most theaters as flash-of-light weapons vaporize airpower from tens of kilometers away.
At which point a 27-30 million Euro EADS-UCAV.
And a 20-25 million dollar A-45. May be the only acceptable means by which you can afford to reenter the trashfire envelope while new standoff weapons (no glide, all boost) and/or optical stealth are created on the basis of not 'fightering' so much as avoiding the ultimate threat to airpower posed by high power DEWs.

CONCLUSION:
Every fighter out there is a piss poor excuse for engineering. Because if you want to kill an enemy, numbers of _losses sustainable_ are the only metric that really counts. And in this, inventing a missile that was based on a high energy target/recce drone (Mirach 600 or BQM-149 Scarab or similar) and which used turbine propulsion to augment a rocket VLS or catapult launch to sit on station for 30 minutes to 2hrs would be /vastly/ more intelligent a use of funds than assuming that 1/50th as many purchaseable Su-27's could -possibly- facedown the 400-700 jets which the U.S. typically brings to theater.

Indeed, ass-u-me'ing you could even SEE such small threats on radar, it is likely that they would cost little more than an AIM-120C. While, through the use of a hunting datalink (OVER HERE!), formating kill (Cooperative Wolfpack target sort) and parachute recovery (Once is Not Enough) augments; you could simultaneously avoid the worst problems of conventional Miss-ile based defenses. And the COSTS OF TRAINING AND OWNERSHIP which plague manned systems.

For about 500 grande to 1 million dollars per 'generation' (20 year wooden round shelf life) of weapons able to kill ANY attacker using a volume-defense like a sweeping curtain of optical seekers. Some 20-60 miles wide and cruising for perhaps 300-400nm with a 30 minute hold reserve and 10 minute fast dash.

It is when you consider this approach to the PROPER WAY (slaughtering piloted airframes as you would murderously rabid animals, not knights-errants deserving 'honorable' combat) to kill airpower. That you realize the whole generational justification for 'best fighter of it's era, please buy some!' is indeed purely commercial hype.

Designed to rape our society of the cash abd scientific resources it could better expend at home, for peaceful means.

Kurt Plummer