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Another 737 MAX-8 down

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posted on Apr, 5 2019 @ 08:34 AM
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a reply to: Flyingclaydisk

I'd start with 3D flow modeling. Not that hard at all. The tricky part is feeding the model real world data. GIGO works here too.

I do flow modeling as a side business and I wouldn't take this job for any amount of money.




posted on Apr, 5 2019 @ 02:26 PM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

That's what I meant!



posted on Apr, 5 2019 @ 02:44 PM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

I'd really like to see a transcript from JT610 and the flight just prior. It's interesting that this basically started with a heat warning. They had several CNDs as well that could be related to either the sensor or left side ADC.



posted on Apr, 5 2019 @ 04:04 PM
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Prior to impact the aircraft exceeded Vmo, which led to the trim no longer being effective. Boeing deliberately limited the ability of the thumb switch to trim the aircraft in the range of Vmo as a supplemental safety measure. EASA certification requires the aircraft to maintain longitudinal stability up to Vmo. They certified the aircraft subject to an equivalent safety finding regarding trim stability. The aircraft reached 340 knots according to the captain's instruments, and 360 knots according to the first officers. They impacted the ground at 500 knots.

www.flightglobal.com...



posted on Apr, 5 2019 @ 04:48 PM
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originally posted by: JesperA

originally posted by: JIMC5499
The AOA sensors were all over the place. Why am I thinking counterfeit or defective sensors?


I wonder how far the inlet vortex can reach under certain conditions: powersetting, airspeed, air density, due point, wind, etc etc etc etc. I can only find data from an aircraft simulated sitting on the tarmac with split vortexes, i wonder how powerful a single vortex that has become attached to the airplane body could become and how far forward it can reach.

So, with the new more powerful engines that had to be mounted more forward and up (closer to the AoA sensor), could the inlet vortex reach all the way to the AoA sensor at certain extreme conditions, i doubt it but, yeah



You only have an inlet votex when the aircraft is on the fround. For such a votex to form. There must be a solid boundary (the ground) near the stagnation point. See arc.aiaa.org...



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 08:15 AM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

Thanks, yes I do.

Have you any thoughts on the apparent lack of efficacy of the ASRS?



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 08:19 AM
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a reply to: KansasGirl

IMO, that is the point regarding the Aviation Safety Reporting System as operated by NASA.

In this case, reporting the faults to NASA accomplished nothing at all, prevented nothing at all.



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 09:43 AM
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you mean Vne?
a reply to: Zaphod58



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 10:14 AM
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a reply to: Hyperboles

No, Vmo.


With the engines delivering high thrust the aircraft accelerated to at least 340kt, according to the captain’s airspeed indicator, or 360kt according to the first officer’s – exceeding the maximum operating limit speed, known as Vmo. The aircraft sounded an overspeed warning



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 03:49 PM
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originally posted by: Hyperboles
you mean Vne?
a reply to: Zaphod58



Part 25 jets don't use Vne. The basic equivalent is Vmo, and then Mmo, meaning Velocity, maximum operating and Mach, maximum operating, respectively. On the 737-800, for example, Vmo is 340 knots, Mmo is .82M. I've never flown the Max, so I don't know those.
edit on 6-4-2019 by F4guy because: I can fly a million pound jet but can't spell for snip.



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 08:37 PM
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originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: Hyperboles

No, Vmo.


With the engines delivering high thrust the aircraft accelerated to at least 340kt, according to the captain’s airspeed indicator, or 360kt according to the first officer’s – exceeding the maximum operating limit speed, known as Vmo. The aircraft sounded an overspeed warning


At least the overspeed warning worked.



posted on Apr, 6 2019 @ 11:39 PM
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originally posted by: F4guy

originally posted by: Hyperboles
you mean Vne?
a reply to: Zaphod58



Part 25 jets don't use Vne. The basic equivalent is Vmo, and then Mmo, meaning Velocity, maximum operating and Mach, maximum operating, respectively. On the 737-800, for example, Vmo is 340 knots, Mmo is .82M. I've never flown the Max, so I don't know those.
Its the terminology that's different. wonder why the pilots didn't kill the throttles. or I wonder if the elevators jammed



posted on Apr, 7 2019 @ 03:26 AM
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a reply to: Hyperboles

There's no indication that they jammed.



posted on Apr, 11 2019 @ 03:16 PM
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A little more detail is being revealed. The left AoA vane separated from the aircraft just after the weight on wheels switch showed the aircraft becoming airborne. The crew followed the procedure, but didn't follow them correctly, and became task saturated attempting to deal with the aircraft.

Aviation Week.



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 08:15 AM
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a reply to: Zaphod58

I read the article. I'll go along with everything that it says except for two things.

One. Do you expect me to believe that a bird scored a direct hit on the AOA vane? That means that they should have been able to find the vane near the airport.

Two. There is nothing in the AOA sensor that would indicate the loss of a vane? Talk about Mickey Mouse.



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 08:42 AM
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originally posted by: Zaphod58
A little more detail is being revealed. The left AoA vane separated from the aircraft just after the weight on wheels switch showed the aircraft becoming airborne. The crew followed the procedure, but didn't follow them correctly, and became task saturated attempting to deal with the aircraft.

Aviation Week.
It would be more like when the gear is retracted



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 09:02 AM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

A hit near the vane, or a hit that slid along the fuselage could have done it.



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 10:46 AM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

How many times in your career have you seen something and said to yourself or out loud, "there's no way that happened-- what the hell just happened?" or " million-to-one shot. We couldn't make that happen if we tried" or "I'm glad you were here two. Noone will believe this story"

Maybe it's just the nature of some of the testing I've been involved in, but I've seen a lot of strange stuff happen over the years. A golden-finch (instead of BB) to a particular vane barely moves my "weird" meter.



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 11:38 AM
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originally posted by: RadioRobert
Maybe it's just the nature of some of the testing I've been involved in, but I've seen a lot of strange stuff happen over the years. A golden-finch (instead of BB) to a particular vane barely moves my "weird" meter.


I'm familiar with the "golden BB". I can maybe buy the bird strike. What I can't buy is how the AOA sensor became a single point of failure and the cascade of events after.



posted on Apr, 12 2019 @ 12:46 PM
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a reply to: JIMC5499

I don't think anyone expected the events to cascade. If MCAS goes tits up, you expect crews to disable it. The decision to only use one input is related the that first assumption. The decision to not have a fault indicator in the cockpit is a dumbone, BUT since this does already exist as an option, they already saw the use -- that dumb decision was made by carriers, not Boeing, to save a buck. The same with the decision for the MCAS in the first place -- the desire to keep type training commonality is driven by customers, not Boeing.

How many times have we faced a customer and said, "I can make it last twice as long, perform better, weigh less for an extra $50 on the $500 thingamajig, " and have the customer say "yeah, but I want five thousand of them -- that's an extra quarter of a million dollars! No way!"

My biggest two take aways in the whole shebang is that carriers care only about cost (no new revelation), and that someone(s) in Boeing is an idiot to accept the FAA's offer for self-certification. Not because I think they'd deliberately cut corners on certification to endanger their $100Billion company, but because the optics and liability concerns.







 
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