Lion Air 737 Max 8 fatal crash

Has Boeing admitted that the software wasn't up to snuff for that system?

a reply to: roadgravel

The software wasn't the issue. They didn't train the crews on how to deal with MCAS reacting to differential data.

a reply to: Zaphod58

Doesn't the severe changes made imply it is over reacting? I can see your point though. Get it right at first and it's OK.

a reply to: roadgravel

They developed MCAS because the larger engines changed the stall characteristics of the aircraft. Boeing is making changes ro the software to handle differences between the AoA sensors, which is what happened here. If the crew had flown the damn plane, it wouldn't have gone down. That was proven on the previous flight.

There's an interesting debate going on about the latest released on the investigation. Investigators said that the AoA sensor was replaced two days prior, and was miscalibrated after installation. Folks on Pprune are saying the FDR shows noise on the sensor channel, that seems to indicate a bad circuit or possibly a computer that the sensor went through. There was another Max about a week or two after 610 that lost the left side computer too.

Multiple sources are reporting that the CVR has been recovered.

According to reports the crew discussed airspeed, and altitude, but never mentioned elevator trim. The captain turned over control of the aircraft to the first officer and was looking for the correct procedure at impact.

The crew the night before figured out what was happening, and corrected for it, but that information was never passed on.

www.nbcnews.com...

Investigators found nine factors leading to the crash. They placed blame on Boeing, the airline, and the crew. They said if any one factor had been removed, the crash might not have occurred.

To begin with, the aircraft should have been grounded, but the problems on the previous flight weren't documented properly.

The replacement sensor, bought from a Florida company wasn't tested properly before being installed. The FAA has revoked the certification of the supplier.

Incorrect assumptions were made about how MCAS would react.

The FO, who was flying before the fatal dive, had struggled in training, and was struggling to get through checklists that should have been memorized.

The Captain didn't brief the FO properly as they began to fight the aircraft.

They also found 31 pages of the maintenance log missing.

www.bbc.com...

Seattle Times

I'm still reading, but from what I've seen so far, maintenance appears to have failed to run the calibration test after replacing the AoA sensor. The tech showed pictures of a completed test, but investigators couldn't confirm when it occurred, or in what aircraft.

The First Officer had multiple training write ups, as recently as 2018. They included becoming task saturated, failing to set instruments to the correct frequency on an instrument landing, resulting in an unstable approach, and more. He couldn't find the checklist for memory items on the airspeed disagree issue the computer was alerting them to.

The Captain was successfully dealing with the runaway trim situation, and had brought the nose back up over 20 times. Crew communication at times was not very good. Several instances of one pilot saying something and not getting an answer were recorded. The flaps were extended as far as flaps 5, then were returned to flaps 1 before being retracted fully. Both actions occurred without discussion in the cockpit.

The Captain turned control over to the First Officer, which is when control was lost and they impacted the ground.

Garbage in, garbage out.

Boeing cheats the system and delivers an inferior product to market, the FAA misses the scam, and people were killed.

It doesn't fly like a 737 because it's not a 737.

a reply to: Salander
You forgot to mention the other ultimately guilty parties in this. The airlines that want more from less, and a traveling public that are living in a selfish and naive unreality where ticket prices are ridiculous and cheaper for a 500-1000 mile sector than if you tried to drive your car. Despite the fact you are flying in a $90M aircraft that has to pay for fuel, landing fees, pilots, cabin crew, engineers, ground staff and the list goes on. Everybody is guilty here.

a reply to: thebozeian

I respectfully disagree. I do not think for a moment that any airline was aware that Boeing cheated in the certification process.

They have been buying Boeings for decades with no such issues. They assumed Boeing had been conscientious and professional in bringing the MAX to market, and they were wrong.

That is, they did not deliberately buy a product known to be defective.

originally posted by: Salander
Garbage in, garbage out.
Boeing cheats the system and delivers an inferior product to market, the FAA misses the scam, and people were killed.

It doesn't fly like a 737 because it's not a 737.

Often use the crude version at work dealing with systems that have had many hands involved.

Senators Hammer Boeing CEO For Crashes: I’d Walk Before Getting On A 737 Max

In a Tuesday hearing before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Muilenburg offered an apology to the families of the victims of two deadly crashes, including the 157 people who were aboard an Ethiopian Airlines flight that crashed in March.
Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) pointed to recently unveiled emails and instant messages between Boeing and the FAA. In one exchange, Mark Forkner, a former chief technical pilot at Boeing, boasted that he was “jedi-mind tricking regulators.”
“Can you see that this raises much concern about the level of coziness between Boeing personnel and FAA regulators?” Wicker asked.
Muilenburg, who claimed to have only seen the messages within the past couple of weeks, said that he “understands the concern” and that the sentiments of the remarks run “counter to our values.”
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who called the CEO’s testimony “quite dismaying,” read through a 2016 text exchange between Forkner and Patrick Gustavsson, another test pilot, in which Forkner said the Max’s maneuvering characteristics augmentation system, known as MCAS, was “running rampant.”
MCAS is a stabilization feature that was designed to force down the nose of the aircraft if its angle got too steep and thereby prevent the plane from stalling. It has been blamed as a factor in both crashes. Investigators have found that the system was triggered by faulty sensor data that erroneously indicated the planes were at risk of stalling.
But MCAS was not mentioned in the Max’s flight manuals. The decision to leave out the information was made just months after Forkner and Gustavsson’s text correspondence, which was given to the Justice Department in February.
Cruz slammed Muilenburg’s claim that he had only seen the conversation this month, asking “how in the hell did nobody bring this to your attention” earlier this year.
Muilenburg said that while he was “made aware of the existence of this kind of document,” he “counted on my counsel to handle that appropriately.”

Even Republicans who usually take the corporate side are slamming Boeing for this blatant, what I think is criminal, disregard for human life.

That’s because this issue is nonpartisan because everybody is at risk who flies and BOEING here probably should be facing criminal penalties.

This product IS NOT a computer game or consumer electronic product but is about the lives of hundreds who are dead because of these predatory business people.

a reply to: Willtell

Funny how when the FAA relationship with the airlines was brought up it was laughed off. Despite it being exactly the same as the Boeing-FAA relationship.

a reply to: RexKramerPRT

That's over my head