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Originally posted by Dallas
Originally posted by Daedalus3
The RVs are not "real-time" guided post boost phase..their scatter paths are pre-plotted and embedded into the mechanical timer release which is also responsible for initiating the core chain reaction...
Its nothing but a complex projectile physics system, hugely intricate, agreed, but core projectile physics nonetheless..
There is NOTHING guided about ICBMs...especially post-re-entry...
That is why tracking and building missile defences for ballistics is tough..
And also more importnatly thats why numerous procedures are implemented in the govt hierarchy for preventing accidental launch..
this is because even though once launched an ICBM takes a 'long' 30 mts.(approx) to semi-circumnavigate the planet, nothing can be done by the launching party itself to alter its destiny, post-boost phase..
I am not too familiar with the Minuteman-I tech..What are the highlights?
India does not research ICBM tech because it does not perceive any threat at that range...so the military aspect of ICBMs is not a relevant criterion for gauging India's tech level..
IMO India's tech level can be considered to be highlighted by :
1. Basic Cryogenics
2. Re-entry capability
3. GSLV launch capability
4. Lunar orbital insertion capability
Originally posted by fritz
Cruise missiles on the other hand, are not fire and forget weapons. They need constant updating electronically, they need guiding electronically and they need to seek their target electronically.
The most effective method is to wholly contain the equipment in an electrically conductive enclosure, termed a Faraday cage, which prevents the electromagnetic field from gaining access to the protected equipment. However, most such equipment must communicate with and be fed with power from the outside world, and this can provide entry points via which electrical transients may enter the enclosure and effect damage. While optical fibres address this requirement for transferring data in and out, electrical power feeds remain an ongoing vulnerability.
Where an electrically conductive channel must enter the enclosure, electromagnetic arresting devices must be fitted. A range of devices exist, however care must be taken in determining their parameters to ensure that they can deal with the rise time and strength of electrical transients produced by electromagnetic devices. Reports from the US indicate that hardening measures attuned to the behaviour of nuclear EMP bombs do not perform well when dealing with some conventional microwave electromagnetic device designs.
HPM weapons would be single-use and could be delivered on almost any a cruise missile or unmanned aircraft. Future devices are likely to be re-usable.
Military planners will be particularly interested in claimed ability of HPM weapon's to penetrate bunkers buried deep underground by using service pipes, cables or ducts to transmit the spike. Insulating equipment from such spikes, for example by using Faraday cages, is believed to be very difficult and expensive.