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a command failure is not enough to cause a launch. Every general could die and the bombs would all stay put.
Why would the other nuclear powers feel the need to act in a war between India and Pakistan only? It would be over after the nuclear exchange. There would be no incentive to get involved. There is no need to retaliate against a dead enemy that hasn't struck you.
M.A.D. rules the day and always will.
Nuclear war is survivable?
as posted by smallpeeps
Deterrence Theory is fraudulent in the long run because in the event of accident (which, as you say is the nature of the game), the resulting retaliation will cause factorially more deaths than if the world did not subscribe to Deterrence Theory.
Does a strong war face result in peacefulness?
All systems tend toward entropy.
We are talking about the life or death of possibly more than a billion people here so hopefully the subject doesn't drive anybody away or get people's dander up.
My point is that for years, Deterrence Theory has kept some kind of peace but it does not serve us into the future. It needs to be exposed for what it is.
All discussion of this subject helps humans, IMO.
as posted by SomewhereinBetween
I do not agree. True deterrence is where one power has it and holds it over the head of another who does not.
The deterrence as I lay it out is to state that the inferior state is humbled by the superior state, where the inferior would not not even think to challenge the superior. It is a one-sided deterrence, the ultimate deterrence.
Originally posted by SeekerofAnd that may be plausible, also. But in the case of historical nuclear deterrence between Russia and the US, which one power had it and held it over the head of the other? Or for that matter, which, the US and Russia, held it over the heads of any other nation as an option and alternative to persuasion (ie: if you don't give me that, I'll simply nuke you)?
Exposed for what?
-- Accidental launch is VERY possible by some nuclear player in a 10 nuclear-nation world.
-- When that accidental launch happens, Deterrence Theory becomes active. Not before.
-- Depending on the time of missile flight, our leaders will evaluate the threat and put Deterrence Theory into effect by retaliation.
-- Retaliation will kill twice as many people if not ten times as many people. If Deterrence Theory were rejected in the moment of truth, less humans would die.
When retaliation has occurred, Deterrence Theory will have exposed its own worthlessness. I want to expose it now, before that moment happens. That's what I mean by exposed.
but to say that an "accident" is more probable now then in the past is simply pushing aside and ignoring the reality of the doctrine and policy of nuclear deterrence.
In the process of determination, virtually all factors of the launch are known or being processed.
Are you suggesting that when any nation, having nukes and a retaliatory capability, gets struck by another nation by way of a nuke, that they should not respond?
The moment of "truth" is what, exactly
nuclear deterrence holds up to the point of an actual nuclear strike. Nuclear deterrence is meant to cause rational thought and to give time consideration
Total nuclear disarmament and monitoring of treaty terms is what's needed... but unfortunately you can never unlearn certain scientific discoveries.
I disagree. Deterrence will fail at some point. That is a mathematical certainty. Statistical tools just help us to define the issue. I am not ignoring reality. Nuclear bombs are reality.
It has worked for decades, with no "accidents." Time will only tell on this matter, and I guess one could say that the odds are growing in favor of an impending "accident". I would simply say that the probability is there.
You are placing a lot of faith in your leaders and their systems if you think accidental launch will not happen at some point.
Yes, that's what I'm saying, in effect. I'm saying we should work toward an understanding that if the enemy is allowed to live on, it would be better for humanity. We cannot presume to always know the reason for a launch, even if lighted panels tell us so.
It is the moment between detected launch and when time for analysis is ended. In the case of an ICBM, it's the thirtieth minute. In the case of an SLBM, it's around 12 to 14 minutes. At the end of that time period, the Moment of Truth arises. Will the key-turner follow through on Deterrence Theory? That's the moment of truth. His desire to win nuclear war will doom the opposition (and possibly the world) to death.
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict by the threat of retaliation. Deterrence should credibly demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would be too great and would outweigh any potential gains.
....but in the meantime I think it is crucial for us to figure out a way to have nukes be controlled by the common folk and not the warmongers or the administrators.
"Deterrence theory alone is not a reliable means for sustaining nuclear peace into the distant future for three reasons:
1:Deterrence theory presupposes that the use of a nuclear weapon would result from a willfull descision by the leadership of an adversary nation. Deterrence theory falls to pieces as a guarantor of long-term nuclear peace if there is even a very low probability of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon in any of the more than eight present nuclear nations, for example due to a rogue commander or electronic failure.
2:Deterrence theory presupposes accurate decision making in the adversary nation when planning to attack. [...] even when miscalculations are extraordinarily infrequent, nuclear deterrence provides only limited protection.
3:The present view of deterrence as developed by game theory is myopic. [...] the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the civility of nations. Nuclear peacefulness is clearly a function of the civility of nations[, ] a variable which can be measured.
Deterrence does offer protection, but simply not at the levels which can be expected to extend nuclear peace into the indefinite future. A disproportionate reliance on deterrence predisposes the world to unnecessary nuclear danger. In sum, deterrence theory is not impressive. It is intellectually weak and based on very narrow views of optimization and game theory." - Ike Jeanes, F&S 1996