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Deterrence Theory is a Fraud

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posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 08:05 PM
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a command failure is not enough to cause a launch. Every general could die and the bombs would all stay put.


Yes but failure of the Command component does not have to be Generals dying and not being able to command. It also means Command failure due to rogue commander launch. The Command chain fails in either case. A thousand years is a long time to keep the Military in line.


Why would the other nuclear powers feel the need to act in a war between India and Pakistan only? It would be over after the nuclear exchange. There would be no incentive to get involved. There is no need to retaliate against a dead enemy that hasn't struck you.


Well, I don't presume to know all the underlying motives for war other than financial gain of the people making bullets which is obvious. There are emotional reasons as well, particularly if you (1) see the US as an empire, and (2) are aware of their history with Pakistan and India. Also, there would be lots and lots of important people from other countries killed in that exchange and it is my opinion that you cannot say how important some of those people would be or how their deaths will affect their home nations. The tsunami was a good example of this, I believe. Many nations were traumatized

All respect to you my friend, but I would prefer to change the world so that you can leave that job, go back to your farm and breed up a whole passle of Americans who'd live nice long lives. Nuclear weapons do not protect anybody, in the final analysis.




posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 08:10 PM
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M.A.D. rules the day and always will.


Well, okay. If you're right then we're all safe.

There are people who suggest otherwise, and I would suggest that the information I have provided is enough for the people in the middle to decide for themselves. Ignorance can wear many faces, but then I'm new here, so what do I know. :^)

The hard drive failure analogy is relevant though. If you want to visit nukefix.org and download the Nukefix program, you'll find the numbers very hard to argue with.



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 08:21 PM
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Its not a matter of me being right, smallpeeps. I actually agree with some of your premises, but I think you missed the overall larger scope of things: that M.A.D. was the final solution of Nuclear Deterrence. It's the factoid that M.A.D. has years (decades) to back its proven doctrine.

As such, M.A.D. is still applicable today. The problem was the creation of nukes in the first place. It was not for peaceful purposes, per se', but for utter destruction aimed at achieving a peaceful end (WWII). The two remaining superpowers determined or saw the inherent military value of obtaining and acquiring more explosive and deadlier nukes. It then progressed to a theoretical numbers game that then expaned into absurdity and the determination and doctrine of M.A.D.: If you blow my nation into the Stone Ages, then guess what? We'll blow yours into the Stone Ages, as well. Both powers later realized that such an exchange (magnitude) would ultimately not only destroy their respective nations, but would literally destroy the world from the fallout of that extensive exchange.

The problem to me is not accidents or not necessarily nations acquiring nukes (Iran, N.Korea, etc.). The problem is that now we have small and often times, non-tracable or non-detectable, groups that are bent on making absurd political statements, by acquiring and then detonating nukes, at any cost to lives, be it their own or innocent civilains. Thats the real problem of nuclear proliferation. In such a case, M.A.D. may still be applicable, but that in a way nuclear deterrence goes the way of the dinosaurs.


As for the "NukeFix" Program, I'll argue and contest it all day long. Bet.
Nuclear Wealons in an Uncertain World--National Security Implications
Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory
President Reagan, Nuclear War, and the Global Crusade against Soviet Communism
Medicine & Global Survival
The Effects of a Global Thermonuclear War 4th edition: escalation in 1988

Many, many more can be found. "Survivability" is an overblown unverified myth, no matter how 'rosey' a program wants to paint it.



seekerof

[edit on 4-2-2005 by Seekerof]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 08:51 PM
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Seekerof, Smallpeeps. MAD works if both players are rational. It still works if there are more than two rational players. When it fails to work is when there are players present who are irrational. Suicidal and psychopathic. Oops, I just dis'ed the Islamic Terrorists. The only way to maintain MAD with players like them trying to get in the game is to DENY IGNORANCE access to nuclear weapons.

Sigh. The world used to be so livable. Wild strawberries in the forest.



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 09:08 PM
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Nuclear war is survivable?


Well, I wrote a good response but had my posting priv's momentarily halted. Probably due to the topic and to my posting of offsite links.

Just to clarify, Nukefix.org is run by Ike Jeanes, author of the book "Forecast and Solution: Grappling With the Nuclear". His program, nukefix, presents the issue much better than I could. My honest goal in posting this thread is to get people talking about the issue of Deterrence as i do not believe it is as reliable as we have been told. My hope is that Mr. Jeanes writes a better version of this program someday (it's DOS based) but it's still a darn good tool for average Joe's like me who don't have personal think-tanks and have to find the truth on our own.

Yes, nuclear war will have survivors. Check out document H-20 from FEMA. The seven-ten rule says that for every seven-fold increase in time, the outside radiation drops ten-fold. If the surface radiation is 1000R per hour and you could be sheltered for just seven hours after detonation, the radiation would drop to 100R per hour. After 49 hours, the rate would be 10R per hour. You'd have increased your odds of survival a hundred-fold if you could arrange three days of shelter. After a nuke, the people who know to seek shelter will probably also have Iodine which will preserve their thyroid. Also those who know how to filter water so as to remove the irradiated particles will have an advantage.

Our leaders ferret away to their bunkers or high-altitudes via jet at any time of crisis. I am guessing this means they intend to survive.




[edit on 4-2-2005 by smallpeeps]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 09:35 PM
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So let me get this straight then smallpeeps, you are suggesting that survivability, though unverified because a program cannot not account for the real deal, no matter how vivid and factual the data is that is imput, is fact (which I have said) and that because there is "survivability", nuclear deterrence is a fraud? If that was so, then your premise on fallout shelters would be wrong?

Again, IMHO, unless one goes through such, probability does not account nor replace reality and the what ifs that would occur after such an nuclear exchange. That is why I asserted that "survivability" is a myth. Not that there would be no survivors. The devastation wrought by such a complete nuclear exchange would be world devastating and catastrophic. "Stone Ages" is not literal in that sense, but explicit and would be quite self-evident. And to think, we are only talking two nations doing a nuclear exchange. Lets consider such "survivability' ratios after a world exchange (ie: involving China, India, US, Russia, etc., etc.).



seekerof



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 10:11 PM
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Seeker: No, that's not what I'm saying. Deterrence Theory is fraudulent in the long run because in the event of accident (which, as you say is the nature of the game), the resulting retaliation will cause factorially more deaths than if the world did not subscribe to Deterrence Theory.

The part about survivability was in response to that particular question and has no connection to the subject of Deterrence.

Might I humbly suggest that Mutually Assured Destruction is not a theory whereas Deterrence is? Nobody's mutual-destruction can be assured so those words mean nothing. MAD is a somnambulistic lullabye which frees people to think about daily tasks while the big chiefs handle nuclear war.

Deterrence, however, can be broken down into its composite parts. Does a strong war face result in peacefulness? History says no. Irrationality (Nixon's Madman Theory) and Decision erode Deterrence over time. All systems tend toward entropy. Particularly those which are not thoroughly discussed and which remain dormant until used.

We are talking about the life or death of possibly more than a billion people here so hopefully the subject doesn't drive anybody away or get people's dander up. I think it's worth discussing. I am glad for the people like MadMissileer who take the subject seriously and live that daily. I just hope they realize that it would be a better world without nukes at all.

MM: You ask me to give Nuclear Warriors more credit, and I do have a certain amount of faith in the American leaders to think these things through, but what about the other countries? If failure in the system occurs, the system itslf is placed into a difficult position. Don't you agree that without the policy of Deterrence, the deaths would be far less, assuming a strike happens?

Will India be as quick as us (America) to correctly define the nature of a perceived launch against them? These new nuclear nations have to look to the published material on nuclear war and it is US who leads the way. If we are wrong, we doom these newborn nuclear nations. They have not travelled the same roads we have. Will they survive their version of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

My point is that for years, Deterrence Theory has kept some kind of peace but it does not serve us into the future. It needs to be exposed for what it is.

All discussion of this subject helps humans, IMO.



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 10:42 PM
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as posted by smallpeeps
Deterrence Theory is fraudulent in the long run because in the event of accident (which, as you say is the nature of the game), the resulting retaliation will cause factorially more deaths than if the world did not subscribe to Deterrence Theory.

Despite it being deemed "fraudulent" because it has the inherent ability to allow "a/an" accident, let me reiterate something here: for decades, despite some 'close calls', there have been no "accidents." Your applying a 'fear' and 'what if' to a doctrine/policy that has proven, beyond a shadow of a doubt, it's merit and worth: M.A.D.

I would also contest that your mentioning that "a/an" accident, that never happened, would cause more deaths than if the world did not subscribe to the Deterrence doctrine/policy. IMHO, I think it quite the opposite. Without nuclear deterrence (ie: M.A.D.) there would have been military leaders who would have justified a/an real preemptive attack, be it against Russia or the US. With no regard or thought of M.A.D., there was nothing to prevent utter national destruction, no 'fear' of a retaliatory strike. Both sides made such plans but what prevented the fulfillment of those plans was one thing: M.A.D.



Does a strong war face result in peacefulness?

History may prove your point, as I well know, but in this applied case and doctrine, there is no denying that M.A.D. prevailed. There are exceptions to every rule, despite a/an historical pattern showing otherwise.



All systems tend toward entropy.

Of course they do. A better term usage would have been 'obsolete', 'redundant', 'outmodded', 'out-of-date'. That is within itself, the very nature of warfare. The lonbow was replaced by gunpowder. The musket replaced by the rifle. The cannon by the howitzer. The dreadnought/battleship by the aircraft carrier.



We are talking about the life or death of possibly more than a billion people here so hopefully the subject doesn't drive anybody away or get people's dander up.

If you had looked at my links, one of them was a 1998 scenerio of nuclear exchange. World population levels were 5 billion plus. After fallout and etc., the world population dropped to 3 billion. No, we are talking billions, not a billion. Again, this is but between two foes, not a world exchange.



My point is that for years, Deterrence Theory has kept some kind of peace but it does not serve us into the future. It needs to be exposed for what it is.

Its either did or did not, smallpeeps. Your contesting that it was a fraud, which implies that the doctrine and policy amounted to being a waste, for which it has proven that it was not. Now you are saying that it may have provided some sort of 'peace'. Ok.
As to it being exposed.
Exposed for what?
That it deterred?
That it prevented nuclear launches against another nation(s)?
That it kept the Russia and the US in checkmate?
That the spinoff of nuclear deterrence, M.A.D., is not applicable today?



All discussion of this subject helps humans, IMO.

Any type constructive, and hopefully productive, discussion on any matter is always a good thing.





seekerof

[edit on 4-2-2005 by Seekerof]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 10:56 PM
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I do not agree. True deterrence is where one power has it and holds it over the head of another who does not. The deterrence then is defined as the inferior power being afraid of the superior power and succumbs like the law of the jungle to the more powerful and therfore will not move to protect itself from a first strike.

Where countries armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons demand others not have them is nothing but intimidation, an intimidation without boundaries if the other natons acquiesce.

If one country wishes to threaten another with millions of lives then it is only fitting the threatening country be subject to the same right of destruction.

[edit on 2/4/05 by SomewhereinBetween]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:03 PM
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as posted by SomewhereinBetween
I do not agree. True deterrence is where one power has it and holds it over the head of another who does not.

And that may be plausible, also. But in the case of historical nuclear deterrence between Russia and the US, which one power had it and held it over the head of the other? Or for that matter, which, the US and Russia, held it over the heads of any other nation as an option and alternative to persuasion (ie: if you don't give me that, I'll simply nuke you)?




seekerof

[edit on 4-2-2005 by Seekerof]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:16 PM
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Originally posted by SeekerofAnd that may be plausible, also. But in the case of historical nuclear deterrence between Russia and the US, which one power had it and held it over the head of the other? Or for that matter, which, the US and Russia, held it over the heads of any other nation as an option and alternative to persuasion (ie: if you don't give me that, I'll simply nuke you)?
The deterrence as I lay it out is to state that the inferior state is humbled by the superior state, where the inferior would not not even think to challenge the superior. It is a one-sided deterrence, the ultimate deterrence.

We are actually on the same page, I just provide the viewpoint of being the sole nuclear power. Think Haiti suggesting it would defend itself and the USA threating Haiti to sign on to the republic or else sink under the sea.



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:20 PM
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Seeker: Yes, I see your point in that there has not been a launch, and so, for its intended purposes, Deterrence Theory did work, and so therefore was not fraudulent in the sense that fraud is intention to deceive. The theory is not propagated by people who wish to defraud anybody. Let's change the title of this thread to "Deterrence Theory is Obsolete". It is better.

Obsolesence, however, implies a harmlessness like an old steam locomotive. I am saying that DT has now gone beyond the phase of being benignly obsolete and has become downright dangerous.


Exposed for what?

Exposed for the actual workings underneath. It should be dissected as to its usefulness to humans in the long term.

I am speaking generally in this thread about nukes. I am saying

-- Accidental launch is VERY possible by some nuclear player in a 10 nuclear-nation world.

-- When that accidental launch happens, Deterrence Theory becomes active. Not before.

-- Depending on the time of missile flight, our leaders will evaluate the threat and put Deterrence Theory into effect by retaliation.

-- Retaliation will kill twice as many people if not ten times as many people. If Deterrence Theory were rejected in the moment of truth, less humans would die.

I also talked a little about survivability because somebody asked.

When retaliation has occurred, Deterrence Theory will have exposed its own worthlessness. I want to expose it now, before that moment happens. That's what I mean by exposed.

I invite all opinions on this subject. I am open to persuasion.



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:21 PM
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SomewhereinBetween

I understand.
Sorry if I may have misinterpreted what you were implying. My apologies.





seekerof

[edit on 4-2-2005 by Seekerof]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:42 PM
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Seekerof and smallpeeps are both making arguments for the same solution. One argument is based on the fear of accidents and the other based on the resolution of the MAD principle.

As seekerof has so eloquently pointed out, both sides in a nuclear exchange know there is only self-destruction for the instigator. And nobody wants that right? So why have nuclear arms programs at all? They just become a source of proliferation 'know-how' and material.

Total nuclear disarmament and monitoring of treaty terms is what's needed... but unfortunately you can never unlearn certain scientific discoveries.

So where does that leave us?

edit spelling


[edit on 2/4/2005 by Gools]



posted on Feb, 4 2005 @ 11:59 PM
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smallpeeps:


-- Accidental launch is VERY possible by some nuclear player in a 10 nuclear-nation world.

"Very" implies "if" and "probability", just as the link to your nukefile program is nothing but a 'educated guess', a "probability".
Could and would are not the same. One is a non-absolute, whereas the other is an absolute.
The threat of an "accident" has always been a fear, there is no denying this, but to say that an "accident" is more probable now then in the past is simply pushing aside and ignoring the reality of the doctrine and policy of nuclear deterrence. It has worked for decades, with no "accidents." Time will only tell on this matter, and I guess one could say that the odds are growing in favor of an impending "accident". I would simply say that the probability is there.



-- When that accidental launch happens, Deterrence Theory becomes active. Not before.

Not necessarily. You assuming that once a launch occurs, that retaliation is a must or is the only alternative. In the process of determination, virtually all factors of the launch are known or being processed. Let us say for a moment that the US "accidentally" launched an ICBM on Russia. Russia will detect such a launch. The US will undoubtedly call Moscow and let them know what happened and how. The launch will either be intercepted, if applicable, or might be detonated/terminated in flight, if applicable, or will go to its intended target. The Russian response will be dependent on a number of unknown factors. This kind of reminds me of Dr. Strangelove and/or a Twilight Zone episode that I saw where strategic nuke equipped bombers were sent against Russia mistakenly. Attempts were made to contact the bomber pilots...to no avail. Russia tried to intercept them all....to no avail. Moscow is vaporized and Russia demands a like response and cost. The US vaporizes New York City. As such, it all depends, smallpeeps.



-- Depending on the time of missile flight, our leaders will evaluate the threat and put Deterrence Theory into effect by retaliation.

Correct. The only exception to this would be a launch/detonation done by a terrorist organization, or like type group making a world political statement. The process of determining retaliation would still be processed, but could be thwarted by what I mention above. In that applied case, circumstances would be reviewed and considered.



-- Retaliation will kill twice as many people if not ten times as many people. If Deterrence Theory were rejected in the moment of truth, less humans would die.

The moment of "truth" is what, exactly. Give a circumstance or situation. Otherwise, your mentioning of a retaliation is redundant, being known as a well established factoid. Are you suggesting that when any nation, having nukes and a retaliatory capability, gets struck by another nation by way of a nuke, that they should not respond? Deterrence is only good by preventing such an action. If the action happens, deterrence has not failed, it simply becomes null-in-void. Again, M.A.D. is applied.



When retaliation has occurred, Deterrence Theory will have exposed its own worthlessness. I want to expose it now, before that moment happens. That's what I mean by exposed.

I just explained above that nuclear deterrence holds up to the point of an actual nuclear strike. Nuclear deterrence is meant to cause rational thought and to give time consideration based on "if you strike another nation, there is the probability that a response will be coming." Once a strike takes place, nuclear deterrence is not "exposed" as being worthless. Nuclear deterrence simply becomes null-in-void. Detterrence is simply what it means: the attempt to deter, buy time, give an attempt to prevent, to consider your actions, to think twice, etc. It inherently works as long as no strike takes place. It is pushed to the side when the strike takes place, then M.A.D. comes into play and takes over the show.





seekerof



posted on Feb, 5 2005 @ 01:03 AM
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but to say that an "accident" is more probable now then in the past is simply pushing aside and ignoring the reality of the doctrine and policy of nuclear deterrence.

I disagree. Deterrence will fail at some point. That is a mathematical certainty. Statistical tools just help us to define the issue. I am not ignoring reality. Nuclear bombs are reality.


In the process of determination, virtually all factors of the launch are known or being processed.

Are you sure? Fourteen minutes from a sub launch gives how much time to analyze the situation? Are you certain other nations C3I structure will be robust enough to have planned for all the things that can go wrong in such a situation? I realize that a rogue launch from a nuclear sub is remote, but a thousand years is a long time. Couldn't it happen once in a thousand years? You are familiar with the Alexander Haig "I'm in command here." moment, I assume. The phones did not work. You are placing a lot of faith in your leaders and their systems if you think accidental launch will not happen at some point.


Are you suggesting that when any nation, having nukes and a retaliatory capability, gets struck by another nation by way of a nuke, that they should not respond?

Yes, that's what I'm saying, in effect. I'm saying we should work toward an understanding that if the enemy is allowed to live on, it would be better for humanity. We cannot presume to always know the reason for a launch, even if lighted panels tell us so.


The moment of "truth" is what, exactly

It is the moment between detected launch and when time for analysis is ended. In the case of an ICBM, it's the thirtieth minute. In the case of an SLBM, it's around 12 to 14 minutes. At the end of that time period, the Moment of Truth arises. Will the key-turner follow through on Deterrence Theory? That's the moment of truth. His desire to win nuclear war will doom the opposition (and possibly the world) to death.


nuclear deterrence holds up to the point of an actual nuclear strike. Nuclear deterrence is meant to cause rational thought and to give time consideration

If a strike occurs, Deterrence has failed because somebody initiated that strike. What was that person thinking? Deterrence did not deter them.

A failure of C3I can come when one of the C's (namely, Command) fails and a rogue commander launches his missiles. This is possible and there are quotes available in the published literature to back this up. In one of my books there's a Russian sub commander who said he would certainly launch his missiles the moment nukes were placed under international control. He felt that strongly about it so I guess it's worth us discussing it.

Can a nation like India hope to maintain C3I such that each component (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) will fail only once in a thousand years? Even if this herculean task were met, that one failure per thousand years would mean that a ten-nation world could roughly plan for a C3I failure once every 25 years.

Did you look at the numbers I posted? Do you have any comment about my hard drive analogy? Words like Absolute and Non-Absolute are way above my ability to comprehend. I was never too good at philosophy. :^)



[edit on 5-2-2005 by smallpeeps]



posted on Feb, 5 2005 @ 01:39 AM
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Total nuclear disarmament and monitoring of treaty terms is what's needed... but unfortunately you can never unlearn certain scientific discoveries.

Gools, I agree with you. We must disarm eventually, but in the meantime I think it is crucial for us to figure out a way to have nukes be controlled by the common folk and not the warmongers or the administrators.

EXAMPLE: We could tie our propensity to launch to our ATM banking machines and have a REAL democracy of power. Whenever you go to your bank and use the ATM, a screen will pop up, "Please enter your desire for nuclear first strike today." and then have a scale of 1 to 100 that a person could enter. A simple system like this would take nukes out of the hands of guys like Haig and Nixon and put them in the hands of the people. Such a mechanism could easily and regularly produce a minute-to-minute fact-based evaluation of a people's willingness to strike.

The banks will track every penny in our account and they harden these systems against fraud, but they will never allow such democratic control of nukes to be realized. They think we are too stupid to decide our own fates.




[edit on 5-2-2005 by smallpeeps]



posted on Feb, 5 2005 @ 08:31 PM
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smallpeeps:


I disagree. Deterrence will fail at some point. That is a mathematical certainty. Statistical tools just help us to define the issue. I am not ignoring reality. Nuclear bombs are reality.

You really should haveincluded what I said after that.


It has worked for decades, with no "accidents." Time will only tell on this matter, and I guess one could say that the odds are growing in favor of an impending "accident". I would simply say that the probability is there.

Reads like something that in a sense, we both agree upon?



You are placing a lot of faith in your leaders and their systems if you think accidental launch will not happen at some point.

Sadly, smallpeeps, you and I have no choice but to have faith in them. I will explain more on this when I quote something else you mentioned.




Yes, that's what I'm saying, in effect. I'm saying we should work toward an understanding that if the enemy is allowed to live on, it would be better for humanity. We cannot presume to always know the reason for a launch, even if lighted panels tell us so.

Remember my comment on you simply pushing aside and ignoring reality? This comment of yours is prime example why I eluded what I did. There is no nation, who has nuclear retaliatory capability, on the face of this planet that will not 9 times out of 10, respond with some degree of a/an retaliatory nuclear strike/response. IMHO, you presume incorrectly in thinking that a nation that has nuclear retaliatory capabilities will just simply sit back and take/accept a/an nuclear strike. I think the problem in our communication is that your talking 'before' strike and I am talking 'after' strike. The only nations that will not respond to a/an nuclear strike is one that has no nuclear allies willing to launch a retaliatory strike for them and no nuclear capabilities. Other than that, virtually every nation with nuclear retaliatory capabilities will 9 times out of 10 return the favor or expect a like favor.



It is the moment between detected launch and when time for analysis is ended. In the case of an ICBM, it's the thirtieth minute. In the case of an SLBM, it's around 12 to 14 minutes. At the end of that time period, the Moment of Truth arises. Will the key-turner follow through on Deterrence Theory? That's the moment of truth. His desire to win nuclear war will doom the opposition (and possibly the world) to death.

smallpeeps, thanks for explaining that, but again, the deterence doctrine and policy is to prevent a/an nuclear strike. Once an inbound is confirmed or is detonated on its intended target, there is no more deterrence doctrine or policy anymore. What now comes into play is M.A.D.
The "key-turner" has no desire to win. There are no "winners" in an extensive nuclear exchange. Both the US and the Russian planned extensively on multiple "winner scenerio's" for many years, but as I mentioned previously, they soon realized that in reality, there are/is no real "winners," no "winner scenerio". Nuclear war is not a "win scenerio" unless your using nukes on a nation that has none and no one comes to their rescue/aid and decides to respond with a retaliatroy strike against the one who initially attacked with them. I do believe that no matter the nation or country, that no matter the military, no matter the "key-turner," and more importantly, no matter the ones giving the orders to turn that key(s), they will submit in virtual agreement that there is no "winner" in a nuclear exchange. Of course, there will be a minority that will insist otherwise....


What was that person thinking? Deterrence did not deter them.

Lets clarify deterrence here and now:
Dictionary: deterrence:


The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict by the threat of retaliation. Deterrence should credibly demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would be too great and would outweigh any potential gains.

You see, the key to a nuclear deterrence doctrine and policy is that its only intended purpose was/is to guarentee that a potential attacker fears retaliation. Question: how long have Russia and the US had nuclear capabilities? Nearly 50 years plus with no accidential launches, no nuclear exchanges. Seems that those fail safes have worked nearly full-proof for half a century, eh? As such, the deterrence doctrine and policy was and is still viable and successful. You have mentioned that when and "if" a strike does take place, deterrence has failed. Perhaps, depends on how those who survive after a nuclear exchange want/wish to interpret thus after deterrence has ceased to be a viable and successful doctrine and policy. Till then, all hypotheticals aside, deterrence still rules the day in the nuclear arena.



....but in the meantime I think it is crucial for us to figure out a way to have nukes be controlled by the common folk and not the warmongers or the administrators.

Not going to happen in your lifetime or mine, smallpeeps. Simple as that. Amounts to wishful thinking. Any nation today that has nuclear capabilites have "warmongers" and political administrators saying 'yea' or 'nay'. Not going to change and even if you were advocating total revolution, it wouldn't change after. "Common folk" is defined as what? A vote of the masses on when or if a nuclear strike is to be initiated or responded to? Not going to happen and it matters not which political structure you want or wish to place this topic matter under. Thats the truth, and thats the simple reality. You can contest that, you can advocate to the contrary, but my guess is that it won't change anything. If you want to do anything that will amount to be more productive to and for humanity, then get with some semi-political groups who are advocating total nuclear disarmament. And to be honest, there will be no total and full nuclear disarmament. The nuclear Genie is out of the bottle and the bottle is broke. There is no return to a time where there were no nukes.




seekerof

[edit on 5-2-2005 by Seekerof]



posted on Feb, 6 2005 @ 12:33 AM
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Seeker, again, did you look at the numbers? Simple statistical analysis of mean time before failure of an internally reliant system is not very difficult. Every year that passes draws us closer to the point where one of the nuclear components fails.

Notice how a missile commander replied to this thread and also mentioned C3I? It's a known method for controlling nukes and you haven't mentioned it once. Do you know anything about it? Do you understand the four components involved? Have you done any research about the odds of their failure and the consequences?

You are arguing for a continuation of our reliance upon Deterrence Theory simply because it hasn't failed yet. This is similar to a a person who thinks their hard drive will not fail because it hasn't failed before. The more time a system does not fail, the closer its failure is, particularly in a world of nuclear proliferation. Imagine a hard drive that's not only old but suddenly it has ten times more moving parts in it. It will fail quicker, as any engineer can tell you. What could possibly be so hard to understand about that? Two nations is much different from ten nations.

I would call Deterrence Theory, at best, first-generation nuclear thought. Yes, you're right, there was no exchange between the US and USSR, but we were very lucky, in this regard. With multiple nuclear players, DT becomes a dangerous relic.

DT, as mentioned, is a zero-sum game. Do you really want our attitude toward nukes based on a theory which, the minute it fails, is proved dead-wrong? Do you want these newest nuclear nations to put DT into practice and hope for the same luck we had during the Cold War? How close did we come during the Cold War? Will Deterrence work for them when their 'Bay of Pigs' moment comes?

Are you so convinced that we cannot devise a better way to save our own lives? I have suggested a system which would work if we could get the cooperation of the banks. They have all our money, how hard could it be to get them to put nukes into our control? We're the basis of their livelihood, aren't we?

Wouldn't you like to contribute something to the discussion of nukes rather than repeating the stuff everyone has already been told in school and on television? Are you just irritated by my position? I am curious.

[edit on 6-2-2005 by smallpeeps]



posted on Feb, 6 2005 @ 01:59 PM
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Ike Jeanes' book, "Forecast and Solution: Grappling With the Nuclear" is an easy to understand explanation of the numbers involved in our continued blind reliance on Deterrence Theory. You will enjoy reading it. Here's a quote:


"Deterrence theory alone is not a reliable means for sustaining nuclear peace into the distant future for three reasons:

1:Deterrence theory presupposes that the use of a nuclear weapon would result from a willfull descision by the leadership of an adversary nation. Deterrence theory falls to pieces as a guarantor of long-term nuclear peace if there is even a very low probability of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon in any of the more than eight present nuclear nations, for example due to a rogue commander or electronic failure.

2:Deterrence theory presupposes accurate decision making in the adversary nation when planning to attack. [...] even when miscalculations are extraordinarily infrequent, nuclear deterrence provides only limited protection.

3:The present view of deterrence as developed by game theory is myopic. [...] the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the civility of nations. Nuclear peacefulness is clearly a function of the civility of nations[, ] a variable which can be measured.

Deterrence does offer protection, but simply not at the levels which can be expected to extend nuclear peace into the indefinite future. A disproportionate reliance on deterrence predisposes the world to unnecessary nuclear danger. In sum, deterrence theory is not impressive. It is intellectually weak and based on very narrow views of optimization and game theory." - Ike Jeanes, F&S 1996

[bold and italics mine -sp]



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