It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
If Someone Proved one point Would Accept the rest?
page: 8share:
a reply to: skyeagle409
The E-4B was where it was supposed to be? How do you know this?
You're the only one talking about the C-130 and Flight 77. Just throwing stuff out you can counter doesn't address anything I am saying. It just makes you feel like you are provided correct knowledge and info when in fact you are just changing the subject to what you want it to be and then proving it wrong. You are effectively responding to me by having a debate with yourself.
You said ... "Not knowing the rest of the story is one good reason why unfounded conspiracy theories are hatched and the same can be said about the 9/11 hijackers."
If you believe that then you must also conclude that not knowing all the information can lead someone to an incorrect conclusion. So if I show you that you don't have all the information, will you then contemplate that your conclusion may be incorrect?
You said ... "The blunders are many, but I fail to see how they translate into an 9/11 inside government operation, and for what?I To attack Afghanistan? To attack Iraq? "
I don't recall saying 9/11 was an inside government operation. Again, that's was just something you threw out and then elaborated on. And again, just debating yourself.
You asked ... "How many government officials were sent to prison over Watergate? After 14 years in a country full of investigative reporters, how many government officials were sent to prison over a 9/11 False Flag operation?"
How many were sent to prison over Iran Contra? 1 ... for tax evasion. Does that mean Iran Contra wasn't a conspiracy either?
The E-4B was where it was supposed to be? How do you know this?
You're the only one talking about the C-130 and Flight 77. Just throwing stuff out you can counter doesn't address anything I am saying. It just makes you feel like you are provided correct knowledge and info when in fact you are just changing the subject to what you want it to be and then proving it wrong. You are effectively responding to me by having a debate with yourself.
You said ... "Not knowing the rest of the story is one good reason why unfounded conspiracy theories are hatched and the same can be said about the 9/11 hijackers."
If you believe that then you must also conclude that not knowing all the information can lead someone to an incorrect conclusion. So if I show you that you don't have all the information, will you then contemplate that your conclusion may be incorrect?
You said ... "The blunders are many, but I fail to see how they translate into an 9/11 inside government operation, and for what?I To attack Afghanistan? To attack Iraq? "
I don't recall saying 9/11 was an inside government operation. Again, that's was just something you threw out and then elaborated on. And again, just debating yourself.
You asked ... "How many government officials were sent to prison over Watergate? After 14 years in a country full of investigative reporters, how many government officials were sent to prison over a 9/11 False Flag operation?"
How many were sent to prison over Iran Contra? 1 ... for tax evasion. Does that mean Iran Contra wasn't a conspiracy either?
Ok skyeagle409, your position is that 9/11 happened because of intelligence blunders. I ask at what point to blunders start to seem deliberate. Here
is a list of the “blunders” that you refer to. If you, or anybody, have any questions about any of them, just ask. If you come across any and
wonder why it's important, just ask. This took me a lot of time to do, and I just ask that you, or anyone reading, give me the courtesy of reading
through it. I will be more than happy to elaborate on any of these points.
*May-December 1992: Alleged 9/11 Hijackers’ Associate Linked to Islamic Militant Organization
*October 17, 1992: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Hosts Party for ‘Blind Shiekh’; FBI Soon Finds Out but Fails to Investigate
*1993-1999: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for Al-Qaeda
*May 14, 1994: Future Hijackers’ Landlord in San Diego Becomes FBI Informant
*August 1994-July 2001: Possible Terrorist Front Man with Saudi Backing Settles in San Diego
*1995: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight in Bosnia
*May 1996: Al-Qaeda Begins Using Vital Communications Hub in Yemen
*1997: Future Hijackers Supposedly Watchlisted in Saudi Arabia for Failed Gunrunning Plot
*April 1998: Alleged Hijacker Associate Receives Money from Saudi Embassy
*June 1998: Saudi Benefactor Offers Funding for Mosque If Suspected Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Remains Building Mngr
*August 5-16, 1998: Hijacker Almihdhar Calls Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Before and After US Embassy Bombings, FBI Learns of This
*Late August 1998: US Intelligence Community Begins Joint Surveillance of Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*September 1998-July 1999: FBI Conducts Inquiry of Suspected Al-Qaeda Advance Man
*Late 1998-Early 2002: US Intelligence Maps Al-Qaeda Network Using Phone Records; Many Attacks Thwarted
*December 1998-December 2000: Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Stays in Contact with Saudi Consulate Official
*1999: CIA Launches Operation to Track Militants Passing through Dubai Airport
*Early 1999: NSA Monitoring Hears 9/11 Hijacker Names, This Information Is Not Shared with CIA or FBI
*March 21, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*April 3, 1999: Candidate Hijacker Denied US Visa in Yemen
*April 3-7, 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Obtain US Visas
*After Early April 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Leave Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*April 6, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*June 1999-March 2000: FBI Investigates Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam and Misses His Contacts with 9/11 Hijackers
*Summer 1999: NSA Intercepts More of Almihdhar’s Calls
*Late Summer 1999: NSA Intercepts Calls Mentioning 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, Does Not Disseminate Information
*November 1999: Hijackers Said to Lease Apartment in San Diego, Two Months Before Alleged First Arrival in US
*Late 1999-2000: Alleged CIA Informant Said to Train Six 9/11 Hijackers in Turkey
*Late 1999: 9/11 Hijackers Train with Cole Bomber and Other Militants
*Late 1999: Saudis Claim to Add Two 9/11 Hijackers to Watch List and Inform CIA
*December 1999-January 2000: FBI’s New York Office Receives NSA Information on Hijackers’ Travel to Malaysia Summit
*Early December 1999: KSM Trains Operatives for Hijackings
*Late 199: Hijacker Almihdar Has Foreknowledge Of Forthcoming Seaborne Attack
*November/December 1999: Almihdhar Returns to Yemen, Falls under US Surveillance
*December 4, 1999: Saudi Ambassador’s Wife Gives Funds that Are Possibly Passed to 9/11 Hijackers
*December 11, 1999: Watch List Importance Is Stressed but Procedures Are Not Followed
*December 1999: 9/11 Hijackers Meet to Discuss Operation; Indication Alhazmi Flew Flight 77
*December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers
*Shortly Before December 29, 1999: NSA Monitors 9/11 Hijackers Talking to Each Other about Upcoming Al-Qaeda Summit
*Early 2000: Hijackers Allegedly Tell Friend in San Diego of Plan to Crash Plane into Building
*January-May 2000: Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Frequently Calls Saudi Government Officials
*January-February 2000: Secret Military Unit Identifies Al-Qaeda ‘Brooklyn’ Cell; Four 9/11 Hijackers Are Named, Including Mohamed Atta
*Early January 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Given Mysterious Contact Address in US
*January 2-5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa as He Is Tracked to Al-Qaeda Summit
*January 2-4, 2000: US Intelligence Loses Track of 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi as He Travels to Malaysia
*(January 2-5, 2000): Al-Qaeda Operative Linked to 9/11 Hijackers Possibly Makes Quick Trip to US
*Early January 2000: KSM Spends Week with Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar at Site of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*January 5, 2000: Malaysian Intelligence Only Videotapes First Day of Al-Qaeda Summit, 9/11 Hijackers Videotaped with Hambali
*January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After: Malaysian Authorities Monitor Al-Qaeda Leaders at Kuala Lumpur Summit
*January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It
*January 5-9, 2000: Malaysian Authorities Send CIA Information about Al-Qaeda Summit
*January 5-6, 2000: CIA Liaison with FBI Who Just Learned about Almihdhar’s US Visa Twice Fails to Tell FBI about It
*January 5-15, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Fails to Draft Proper Report about Malaysia Summit
*(January 5-8, 2000): CIA Fails to Act on Triangle of Calls Linking Malaysia Summit, Cole Bomber’s House, and 9/11 Hijackers’ Hotel
*(January 5-8, 2000): Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Attendees Photographed
*9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Officer Sends out Cable with False Claim FBI Has Been Told of Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*January 6, 2000: Two Malaysia Summit Attendees Travel to Singapore and Thailand, But Agents Monitoring Them Fail to Get Their Names
*January 6, 2000: CIA Informs FBI Leaders about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but Fails to Mention One Attendee Has US Visa
*January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Says Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Cannot Be Shared with FBI Because Next Al-Qaeda Attack Will Be in Southeast Asia
*(After January 6, 2000): CIA Fails to Check FBI Has Been Notified of 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa, Although this Is ‘Routine Practice’
*January 8, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fly to Thailand
*January 8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit Ends; CIA Still Fails to Add Attendees to Watch List
*January 8, 2000: CIA Bangkok Station Informed 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has Departed for Thailand with Two Companions
*January 8-15, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Associate with ColeBombers in Thailand
*January 8-9, 2000: CIA Obtains More Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Companions on Bangkok Flight, Apparently Does Not Realize Nawaf Is Alhazmi’s First Name
*January 7, 2000 or Shortly After: Malaysian Authorities Search Computers Used by Malaysia Summit Attendees
*January 9, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Asks for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Associates to Be Identified in Thailand
*After January 8, 2000: US Apparently Does Not Realize Al-Qaeda Leader Has Applied for US Visa
*January 9, 2000: NSA Not Asked about Nawaf Alhazmi
*May-December 1992: Alleged 9/11 Hijackers’ Associate Linked to Islamic Militant Organization
*October 17, 1992: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Hosts Party for ‘Blind Shiekh’; FBI Soon Finds Out but Fails to Investigate
*1993-1999: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for Al-Qaeda
*May 14, 1994: Future Hijackers’ Landlord in San Diego Becomes FBI Informant
*August 1994-July 2001: Possible Terrorist Front Man with Saudi Backing Settles in San Diego
*1995: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight in Bosnia
*May 1996: Al-Qaeda Begins Using Vital Communications Hub in Yemen
*1997: Future Hijackers Supposedly Watchlisted in Saudi Arabia for Failed Gunrunning Plot
*April 1998: Alleged Hijacker Associate Receives Money from Saudi Embassy
*June 1998: Saudi Benefactor Offers Funding for Mosque If Suspected Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Remains Building Mngr
*August 5-16, 1998: Hijacker Almihdhar Calls Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Before and After US Embassy Bombings, FBI Learns of This
*Late August 1998: US Intelligence Community Begins Joint Surveillance of Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*September 1998-July 1999: FBI Conducts Inquiry of Suspected Al-Qaeda Advance Man
*Late 1998-Early 2002: US Intelligence Maps Al-Qaeda Network Using Phone Records; Many Attacks Thwarted
*December 1998-December 2000: Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Stays in Contact with Saudi Consulate Official
*1999: CIA Launches Operation to Track Militants Passing through Dubai Airport
*Early 1999: NSA Monitoring Hears 9/11 Hijacker Names, This Information Is Not Shared with CIA or FBI
*March 21, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*April 3, 1999: Candidate Hijacker Denied US Visa in Yemen
*April 3-7, 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Obtain US Visas
*After Early April 1999: Three 9/11 Hijackers Leave Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*April 6, 1999: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Receives Passport Containing Suspicious Indicator of Islamist Extremism, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*June 1999-March 2000: FBI Investigates Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam and Misses His Contacts with 9/11 Hijackers
*Summer 1999: NSA Intercepts More of Almihdhar’s Calls
*Late Summer 1999: NSA Intercepts Calls Mentioning 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, Does Not Disseminate Information
*November 1999: Hijackers Said to Lease Apartment in San Diego, Two Months Before Alleged First Arrival in US
*Late 1999-2000: Alleged CIA Informant Said to Train Six 9/11 Hijackers in Turkey
*Late 1999: 9/11 Hijackers Train with Cole Bomber and Other Militants
*Late 1999: Saudis Claim to Add Two 9/11 Hijackers to Watch List and Inform CIA
*December 1999-January 2000: FBI’s New York Office Receives NSA Information on Hijackers’ Travel to Malaysia Summit
*Early December 1999: KSM Trains Operatives for Hijackings
*Late 199: Hijacker Almihdar Has Foreknowledge Of Forthcoming Seaborne Attack
*November/December 1999: Almihdhar Returns to Yemen, Falls under US Surveillance
*December 4, 1999: Saudi Ambassador’s Wife Gives Funds that Are Possibly Passed to 9/11 Hijackers
*December 11, 1999: Watch List Importance Is Stressed but Procedures Are Not Followed
*December 1999: 9/11 Hijackers Meet to Discuss Operation; Indication Alhazmi Flew Flight 77
*December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers
*Shortly Before December 29, 1999: NSA Monitors 9/11 Hijackers Talking to Each Other about Upcoming Al-Qaeda Summit
*Early 2000: Hijackers Allegedly Tell Friend in San Diego of Plan to Crash Plane into Building
*January-May 2000: Hijacker Associate Al-Bayoumi Frequently Calls Saudi Government Officials
*January-February 2000: Secret Military Unit Identifies Al-Qaeda ‘Brooklyn’ Cell; Four 9/11 Hijackers Are Named, Including Mohamed Atta
*Early January 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Given Mysterious Contact Address in US
*January 2-5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa as He Is Tracked to Al-Qaeda Summit
*January 2-4, 2000: US Intelligence Loses Track of 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi as He Travels to Malaysia
*(January 2-5, 2000): Al-Qaeda Operative Linked to 9/11 Hijackers Possibly Makes Quick Trip to US
*Early January 2000: KSM Spends Week with Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar at Site of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*January 5, 2000: Malaysian Intelligence Only Videotapes First Day of Al-Qaeda Summit, 9/11 Hijackers Videotaped with Hambali
*January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After: Malaysian Authorities Monitor Al-Qaeda Leaders at Kuala Lumpur Summit
*January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It
*January 5-9, 2000: Malaysian Authorities Send CIA Information about Al-Qaeda Summit
*January 5-6, 2000: CIA Liaison with FBI Who Just Learned about Almihdhar’s US Visa Twice Fails to Tell FBI about It
*January 5-15, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Fails to Draft Proper Report about Malaysia Summit
*(January 5-8, 2000): CIA Fails to Act on Triangle of Calls Linking Malaysia Summit, Cole Bomber’s House, and 9/11 Hijackers’ Hotel
*(January 5-8, 2000): Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Attendees Photographed
*9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Officer Sends out Cable with False Claim FBI Has Been Told of Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*January 6, 2000: Two Malaysia Summit Attendees Travel to Singapore and Thailand, But Agents Monitoring Them Fail to Get Their Names
*January 6, 2000: CIA Informs FBI Leaders about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but Fails to Mention One Attendee Has US Visa
*January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Says Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Cannot Be Shared with FBI Because Next Al-Qaeda Attack Will Be in Southeast Asia
*(After January 6, 2000): CIA Fails to Check FBI Has Been Notified of 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa, Although this Is ‘Routine Practice’
*January 8, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fly to Thailand
*January 8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit Ends; CIA Still Fails to Add Attendees to Watch List
*January 8, 2000: CIA Bangkok Station Informed 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has Departed for Thailand with Two Companions
*January 8-15, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Associate with ColeBombers in Thailand
*January 8-9, 2000: CIA Obtains More Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Companions on Bangkok Flight, Apparently Does Not Realize Nawaf Is Alhazmi’s First Name
*January 7, 2000 or Shortly After: Malaysian Authorities Search Computers Used by Malaysia Summit Attendees
*January 9, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Asks for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Associates to Be Identified in Thailand
*After January 8, 2000: US Apparently Does Not Realize Al-Qaeda Leader Has Applied for US Visa
*January 9, 2000: NSA Not Asked about Nawaf Alhazmi
*January 10, 2000: NSA Receives CIA Report on 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, but Does Not Disseminate More Information about Him
*January 12, 2000: Iraqi Who Met 9/11 Hijacker in Malaysia Leaves Country
*January 12, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing
*January 13, 2000: Thai Intelligence Puts 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar and Al-Qaeda Leader’s Alias on Watch List
*January 13, 2000: CIA Says it Is Unable to Locate 9/11 Hijackers in Thailand
*January 13, 2000: CIA Officer Again Fails to Grant Permission to Inform FBI of Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*Mid-January 2000: CIA Asks NSA to Pass on New Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, but NSA Fails to Do So
*January 14, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Again Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing
*Early 2000-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Have Several Links to Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman
*January 15, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Arrive in US
*January 15, 2000: Thai Authorities Note 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Depart Bangkok for US, Unclear Whether CIA Informed
*January 15, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Stops Operations Linked to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*Mid-January-March 2000: ’50 to 60’ CIA Officers Learn of 9/11 Hijackers’ Travel, but They Are Not Watchlisted and FBI Not Told They Are in US
*January 15, 2000-August 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Bring Money into US
*January 15-February 2, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Allegedly Stay in Omar Al-Bayoumi’s Apartment
*January 15-February 2000: Suspected Advance Man Al-Bayoumi Helps 9/11 Hijackers Settle in San Diego
*(Mid-January 2000): CIA Officer Discusses 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar with FBI Counterpart, Fails to Mention His US Visa
*After January 15, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Allegedly Suspects Omar Al-Bayoumi Is Saudi Spy
*Early 2000-Summer 2001: NSA Intercepts Communications between 9/11 Hijackers in US and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*February 2000: CIA Obtains Videotape from Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia, But Shows Little Interest in It
*February 2000: CIA Rejects Foreign Request for Involvement with 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Search Due to Own Investigation
*February-August 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Have Closed-Door Meetings with Al-Qaeda Imam in San Diego
*February 1, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Supposedly Meet Omar Al-Bayoumi by Accident, but Account Is Very Dubious
*February 4, 2000: Phone Calls Link 9/11 Hijackers, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Al-Awlaki in San Diego
*February 4, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Open San Diego Bank Account
*February 4-Mid-May 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Live Openly in San Diego Apartment Complex
*February 11, 2000: CIA Station in Malaysia Reminds CIA Station in Thailand about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Companions
*February 2000-Early September 2001: San Diego Neighbors to 9/11 Hijackers See Mysterious Late Night Visits and Car Rides
*(February 25, 2000): CIA Bangkok Station Falsely Claims It Does Not Have Information about 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*Spring 2000: Payments to Suspected Hijacker Associate Increase Significantly
*Spring 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Live Next Door to and Attend Same Mosque as Terrorism Suspect
*Spring 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Likely Use Al-Bayoumi’s Phone to Call Imam Al-Awlaki and Others
*Spring 2000: DIA Analyst Believes Malaysia Summit Attendees Have Connection to Iranian Embassy
*(Spring 2000): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Talk about Wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Alhazmi Praises Bin Laden
*Spring-Summer 2000: Calls between 9/11 Hijacker in San Diego and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Intercepted by NSA
*(Spring 2000): NSA Does Not Inform FBI that 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US, Reason Unclear
*March 5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Have Entered US, but Does Not Tell FBI or Other Agencies
*March 6, 2000 and After: Numerous CIA Officers Learn 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US; Fail to Inform FBI
*March 25, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy Car in San Diego
*Early April 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Talks to 9/11 Facilitator in Dubai, Possibly Using Phone Monitored by NSA
*April 4, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Looks Good in First US Flying Lesson
*April 16-18, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Receive First Wire Transfer from UAE; Almihdhar Suspected of Being Saudi Intelligence Operative
*May 5 and 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are ‘Dumb and Dumber’ as Pilot Students; Hanjour Possibly with Them
*May 10-Mid-December 2000: FBI Informant Fails to Share Valuable Information on 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*Mid-May-December 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi Receive Late Night Visits at FBI Informer’s House
*Mid-May-December 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Atta and Hanjour Reportedly Visit Fellow Hijackers at FBI Informer’s House
*Summer 2000: San Diego Hijackers Meet Atta and Al-Bayoumi
*June 9, 2000: On Trip to Los Angeles, 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Seem to Know Local Muslims Well, Meet Mysterious Associate
*June 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Flies from San Diego to Germany; Return Date Unclear
*June 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker and Associates Case Los Angeles Airport
*Summer 2000-September 11, 2001: Illegal FBI Activity Leads to Suspension of Surveillance of Al-Qaeda Suspects in US
*(Mid-June-Mid-July 2000): 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Stays in Yemen Hub House Closely Monitored by US Intelligence
*Summer 2000: NSA Continues to Intercept Calls between 9/11 Hijackers and Yemen Communications Hub
*July 12-27, 2000: FBI Informant Files Stay Extension for 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi; Filing Is Late
*Mid-July 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Reports to KSM; Claims He and Alhazmi Were Followed to US
*July 20-November 18, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Receives Overseas Calls from Man Linked to Al-Qaeda Safe House
*August 10-September 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Has New Roommate
*(Before September 2000-12 Months Later): 9/11 Hijacker Atta Has Long Term Stay in Wayne, New Jersey; Other Hijackers Seen There
*Autumn 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Predicts He Will Become Famous
*Autumn 2000: FBI Informant Learns 9/11 Hiacker Living with Him Is Working Illegally, Doesn’t Tell His FBI Handler
*Autumn 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Works at San Diego Gas Station that Is Linked to Other Possible Islamist Militants
*(Autumn 2000): San Diego Associate Helps 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Contact a Florida Flight School
*September 2000: Chart with Hijacker Atta’s Photo Presented by Able Danger at SOCOM Headquarters; Meetings with FBI Cancelled
*Early September 2000: FBI Informant Helps 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Open Bank Account
*September 5, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Helps Housemate Cash Checks? FBI Later Flubs Investigation
*October 2000: Almihdhar Visits Malaysia to Discuss Attack on US Interests in Singapore
*Between October 2000 and September 10, 2001: British Banking Company Profiles Fifteen 9/11 Hijackers as High-Risk Likely Terrorists
*Around October 12, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar in Yemen, Reportedly Involved in Cole Bombing
*Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001: NSA Intercepts Calls between Hijacker in US and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*October 14-Late November, 2000: Investigation Into USS ColeBombing Is Thwarted
*Late October 2000-July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Travels around Middle East and Asia
*January 12, 2000: Iraqi Who Met 9/11 Hijacker in Malaysia Leaves Country
*January 12, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing
*January 13, 2000: Thai Intelligence Puts 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar and Al-Qaeda Leader’s Alias on Watch List
*January 13, 2000: CIA Says it Is Unable to Locate 9/11 Hijackers in Thailand
*January 13, 2000: CIA Officer Again Fails to Grant Permission to Inform FBI of Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
*Mid-January 2000: CIA Asks NSA to Pass on New Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, but NSA Fails to Do So
*January 14, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Chief Again Falsely Claims Malaysia Surveillance Is Continuing
*Early 2000-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Have Several Links to Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman
*January 15, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Arrive in US
*January 15, 2000: Thai Authorities Note 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Depart Bangkok for US, Unclear Whether CIA Informed
*January 15, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Stops Operations Linked to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*Mid-January-March 2000: ’50 to 60’ CIA Officers Learn of 9/11 Hijackers’ Travel, but They Are Not Watchlisted and FBI Not Told They Are in US
*January 15, 2000-August 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Bring Money into US
*January 15-February 2, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Allegedly Stay in Omar Al-Bayoumi’s Apartment
*January 15-February 2000: Suspected Advance Man Al-Bayoumi Helps 9/11 Hijackers Settle in San Diego
*(Mid-January 2000): CIA Officer Discusses 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar with FBI Counterpart, Fails to Mention His US Visa
*After January 15, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Allegedly Suspects Omar Al-Bayoumi Is Saudi Spy
*Early 2000-Summer 2001: NSA Intercepts Communications between 9/11 Hijackers in US and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*February 2000: CIA Obtains Videotape from Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia, But Shows Little Interest in It
*February 2000: CIA Rejects Foreign Request for Involvement with 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Search Due to Own Investigation
*February-August 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Have Closed-Door Meetings with Al-Qaeda Imam in San Diego
*February 1, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Supposedly Meet Omar Al-Bayoumi by Accident, but Account Is Very Dubious
*February 4, 2000: Phone Calls Link 9/11 Hijackers, Omar Al-Bayoumi, and Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Al-Awlaki in San Diego
*February 4, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Open San Diego Bank Account
*February 4-Mid-May 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Live Openly in San Diego Apartment Complex
*February 11, 2000: CIA Station in Malaysia Reminds CIA Station in Thailand about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Companions
*February 2000-Early September 2001: San Diego Neighbors to 9/11 Hijackers See Mysterious Late Night Visits and Car Rides
*(February 25, 2000): CIA Bangkok Station Falsely Claims It Does Not Have Information about 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*Spring 2000: Payments to Suspected Hijacker Associate Increase Significantly
*Spring 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Live Next Door to and Attend Same Mosque as Terrorism Suspect
*Spring 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Likely Use Al-Bayoumi’s Phone to Call Imam Al-Awlaki and Others
*Spring 2000: DIA Analyst Believes Malaysia Summit Attendees Have Connection to Iranian Embassy
*(Spring 2000): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Talk about Wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Alhazmi Praises Bin Laden
*Spring-Summer 2000: Calls between 9/11 Hijacker in San Diego and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Intercepted by NSA
*(Spring 2000): NSA Does Not Inform FBI that 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US, Reason Unclear
*March 5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Have Entered US, but Does Not Tell FBI or Other Agencies
*March 6, 2000 and After: Numerous CIA Officers Learn 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US; Fail to Inform FBI
*March 25, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy Car in San Diego
*Early April 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Talks to 9/11 Facilitator in Dubai, Possibly Using Phone Monitored by NSA
*April 4, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Looks Good in First US Flying Lesson
*April 16-18, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Receive First Wire Transfer from UAE; Almihdhar Suspected of Being Saudi Intelligence Operative
*May 5 and 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are ‘Dumb and Dumber’ as Pilot Students; Hanjour Possibly with Them
*May 10-Mid-December 2000: FBI Informant Fails to Share Valuable Information on 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*Mid-May-December 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi Receive Late Night Visits at FBI Informer’s House
*Mid-May-December 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Atta and Hanjour Reportedly Visit Fellow Hijackers at FBI Informer’s House
*Summer 2000: San Diego Hijackers Meet Atta and Al-Bayoumi
*June 9, 2000: On Trip to Los Angeles, 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Seem to Know Local Muslims Well, Meet Mysterious Associate
*June 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Flies from San Diego to Germany; Return Date Unclear
*June 10, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker and Associates Case Los Angeles Airport
*Summer 2000-September 11, 2001: Illegal FBI Activity Leads to Suspension of Surveillance of Al-Qaeda Suspects in US
*(Mid-June-Mid-July 2000): 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Stays in Yemen Hub House Closely Monitored by US Intelligence
*Summer 2000: NSA Continues to Intercept Calls between 9/11 Hijackers and Yemen Communications Hub
*July 12-27, 2000: FBI Informant Files Stay Extension for 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi; Filing Is Late
*Mid-July 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Reports to KSM; Claims He and Alhazmi Were Followed to US
*July 20-November 18, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Receives Overseas Calls from Man Linked to Al-Qaeda Safe House
*August 10-September 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Has New Roommate
*(Before September 2000-12 Months Later): 9/11 Hijacker Atta Has Long Term Stay in Wayne, New Jersey; Other Hijackers Seen There
*Autumn 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Predicts He Will Become Famous
*Autumn 2000: FBI Informant Learns 9/11 Hiacker Living with Him Is Working Illegally, Doesn’t Tell His FBI Handler
*Autumn 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Works at San Diego Gas Station that Is Linked to Other Possible Islamist Militants
*(Autumn 2000): San Diego Associate Helps 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Contact a Florida Flight School
*September 2000: Chart with Hijacker Atta’s Photo Presented by Able Danger at SOCOM Headquarters; Meetings with FBI Cancelled
*Early September 2000: FBI Informant Helps 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Open Bank Account
*September 5, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Helps Housemate Cash Checks? FBI Later Flubs Investigation
*October 2000: Almihdhar Visits Malaysia to Discuss Attack on US Interests in Singapore
*Between October 2000 and September 10, 2001: British Banking Company Profiles Fifteen 9/11 Hijackers as High-Risk Likely Terrorists
*Around October 12, 2000: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar in Yemen, Reportedly Involved in Cole Bombing
*Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001: NSA Intercepts Calls between Hijacker in US and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub
*October 14-Late November, 2000: Investigation Into USS ColeBombing Is Thwarted
*Late October 2000-July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Travels around Middle East and Asia
*November 5, 2000-June 20, 2001: Atta, Alhazmi, and Moussaoui Purchase Equipment from Same Pilot Store
*Late November 2000: FBI Formally Asks CIA about Al-Qaeda Leader and Possible Meeting in Southeast Asia, but Gets No Answer
*(December 2000-January 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Tells Associates He Is in Flight Training
*Early December 2000: Confession Brings FBI Close to Learning about Hijackers Coming to US, but CIA Withholds Key Information Again
*Late 2000-February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Enters and Leaves Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*December 12, 2000-March 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Hanjour and Alhazmi Live in Arizona
*After December 16, 2000: US Misses Opportunity to Connect Alias to Al-Qaeda Leader
*Mid-Late December 2000: CIA Receives Additional Confirmation of 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Al-Qaeda Connection
*Mid-Late December 2000: Some CIA Officers Speculate 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar May Be Al-Qaeda Leader Bin Attash, FBI Not Informed
*December 30, 2000: Three 9/11 Hijackers Possibly in Eastern US, Despite Official Claims to the Contrary
*January 2001: CIA Report on USS Cole Bombing Only Finds Circumstantial Evidence of Bin Laden Link, Fails to Mention Some Connections
*Early January 2001: CIA Passes Photos of Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar for Source to Identify
*January 3, 2001: Yemen Authorities Receive Malaysia Photographs from CIA, but FBI Does Not
*January 4, 2001: Informer Sees Known Al-Qaeda Leader in Malaysia Summit Photos
*January 5, 2001 and After: CIA Does Not Tell FBI about Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader by Informer, but Allegedly Thinks It Has Done So
*After January 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Al-Qaeda Leader Not Watchlisted, Despite Connection to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*Shortly Before February 1, 2001: CIA Bin Laden Unit Asked to ‘Touch Base’ with Cole Investigators about Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader, but Key Information Leading to Two 9/11 Hijackers Is Not Passed
*February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Possibly Travels to Iran on Way to Afghanistan
*February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Stays in Closely Monitored Yemen Hub House Again
*Early 2001: CIA Reduces FBI Access to NSA’s Al-Qaeda Intercepts
*February 1, 2001: Cole Investigators Interview Source over Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader, CIA Conceals Key Information Leading to Two 9/11 Hijackers
*February 2001 and After: Al-Qaeda Communications Hub in Yemen Is Disclosed in Global Media, but 9/11 Hijackers Continue to Call It
*March 2001 and After: 9/11 Hijackers Continue to Associate with Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Al-Awlaki
*March 2001-September 1, 2001: Hanjour and Other 9/11 Hijackers Live in Paterson, New Jersey
*Mid-March 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Meet with ID Forger; Two Hijackers Supposedly Haven’t Entered US Yet
*March 23 2001: Hijacker Alhazmi Buys Aeronautical Chart
*April 2001: Cole Investigator Again Asks for Malaysia Information, CIA Again Reveals Nothing
*Early April-Early May, 2001: Associate of Suspicious Imam Al-Awlaki Helps 9/11 Hijackers Rent Flat
*April 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Gets Speeding Ticket, but His Illegal Status Is Not Noticed
*(Mid April 2001): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Hanjour Mention Jihad to Roommates
*May 2001: Five 9/11 Hijackers Take Advantage of New, Anonymous Visa Express Procedure
*May 2001: CIA Official Connected to Cases of Moussaoui and Two 9/11 Hijackers Tasked to Help FBI
*May 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Tells Virginia Police He Was Mugged
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Obtains More Information about USSCole Bombing
*May 15, 2001: CIA Officer Again Accesses Cables about Hijackers’ Travel in Asia and to US, Fails to Alert FBI or Check If They Are Still in US
*May 15, 2001: CIA Hides Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Information from FBI
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Assigns Officer to Examine Malaysia Summit in Her Free Time
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Manager Says Photo Identification Is Incorrect, Hinting He Has Greater Knowledge of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Figures
*Mid May 2001: CIA Withholds Photo of Al-Qaeda Leaders from FBI
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Misrepresents 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s Travel to US in E-mail Copied to FBI Agent
*(Late May-Early June): FBI Agent at CIA Searches Only One of Two Databases with Information about 9/11 Hijackers
*May 24-August 14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Make Several Unexplained Trips to Vegas
*Late May 2001: CIA Officer Passes Three Malaysia Summit Photographs to FBI, but Fails to Mention Some Important Details
*May 26, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Enters Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*(May 26, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Probably Stays in Closely Monitored Yemen Hub House Yet Again
*May 29, 2001: CIA and FBI Possibly Have Meeting about Coleand Malaysia Summit, but Nobody Will Later Remember Anything about It
*June 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almidhar Visits Malaysia Again, Requests More Information About Planned Attack on US Warship
*June 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Said to Receive Money from Plot Facilitator
*Between June 1 and July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Allegedly Tells Cousin about Upcoming 9/11 Attacks, Says There Will Be Five
*June 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Acquires New Saudi Passport Despite Presence on Saudi Watchlist
*June 11, 2001: FBI and CIA Hold Shouting Match over Information on Al-Qaeda; CIA Still Withholds Information
*June 12-September 11, 2001: Cole Investigator Repeatedly Asks FBI Headquarters for Information Leading to 9/11 Hijackers, but Gets Nothing
*June 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Obtains US Visa despite Incorrect Passport and Lies on Application; US Intelligence Knows He Is an Al-Qaeda Operative
*June 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s US Stay Renewed despite Expiration, Late Filing, Unlawful Presence, and Indicator of Islamic Extremism in Passport
*June 19-25, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Flies to Miami to Meet Other 9/11 Hijackers
*June 27-August 23, 2001: Hijackers Open Bank Accounts in New Jersey, Information Sufficient to Roll Up Plot
*July 2001: CIA Rejects Third FBI Request for Malaysia Summit Information
*July 2001: Seven 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Obtain IDs in New Jersey
*(July-August 2001): Some 9/11 Hijackers Obtain Fake IDs
*July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Leaves Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Who Should Have Been on Watch List Re-enters US Without Difficulty on Invalid Passport, Lists WTC as Destination
*July 5, 2001: CIA Officer Says Malaysia Summit Attendees May Be Linked to Current Threat Reporting
*July 7, 2001: Random Police Check Almost Uncovers 9/11 Hijacker Meeting Near New York City
*July 8-August 30, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Purchase Knives
*July 13, 2001: CIA Reexamines Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but ‘Major League Killer’ Is Not Put on Watch List
*July 13, 2001: CIA Manager Says Extra Person to Be Allocated to Malaysia Summit Re-evaluation, Unclear If this Happens
*July 20, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Hanjour and Possibly Alhazmi Fly Near Washington
*July 23, 2001: CIA Officer Says Al-Qaeda Leader’s Associates like 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Are of ‘Very High Interest,’ Mentions Mysterious Almihdhar Connection
*Late July 2001: FBI Agent Possibly Confused by Error in CIA Cable, Fails to Tell FBI that 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa
*August 2001: Six 9/11 Hijackers Live Near Entrance to NSA
*Late November 2000: FBI Formally Asks CIA about Al-Qaeda Leader and Possible Meeting in Southeast Asia, but Gets No Answer
*(December 2000-January 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Tells Associates He Is in Flight Training
*Early December 2000: Confession Brings FBI Close to Learning about Hijackers Coming to US, but CIA Withholds Key Information Again
*Late 2000-February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Enters and Leaves Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*December 12, 2000-March 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Hanjour and Alhazmi Live in Arizona
*After December 16, 2000: US Misses Opportunity to Connect Alias to Al-Qaeda Leader
*Mid-Late December 2000: CIA Receives Additional Confirmation of 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Al-Qaeda Connection
*Mid-Late December 2000: Some CIA Officers Speculate 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar May Be Al-Qaeda Leader Bin Attash, FBI Not Informed
*December 30, 2000: Three 9/11 Hijackers Possibly in Eastern US, Despite Official Claims to the Contrary
*January 2001: CIA Report on USS Cole Bombing Only Finds Circumstantial Evidence of Bin Laden Link, Fails to Mention Some Connections
*Early January 2001: CIA Passes Photos of Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar for Source to Identify
*January 3, 2001: Yemen Authorities Receive Malaysia Photographs from CIA, but FBI Does Not
*January 4, 2001: Informer Sees Known Al-Qaeda Leader in Malaysia Summit Photos
*January 5, 2001 and After: CIA Does Not Tell FBI about Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader by Informer, but Allegedly Thinks It Has Done So
*After January 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and Al-Qaeda Leader Not Watchlisted, Despite Connection to Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
*Shortly Before February 1, 2001: CIA Bin Laden Unit Asked to ‘Touch Base’ with Cole Investigators about Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader, but Key Information Leading to Two 9/11 Hijackers Is Not Passed
*February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Possibly Travels to Iran on Way to Afghanistan
*February 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Stays in Closely Monitored Yemen Hub House Again
*Early 2001: CIA Reduces FBI Access to NSA’s Al-Qaeda Intercepts
*February 1, 2001: Cole Investigators Interview Source over Identification of Al-Qaeda Leader, CIA Conceals Key Information Leading to Two 9/11 Hijackers
*February 2001 and After: Al-Qaeda Communications Hub in Yemen Is Disclosed in Global Media, but 9/11 Hijackers Continue to Call It
*March 2001 and After: 9/11 Hijackers Continue to Associate with Al-Qaeda-Linked Imam Al-Awlaki
*March 2001-September 1, 2001: Hanjour and Other 9/11 Hijackers Live in Paterson, New Jersey
*Mid-March 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Meet with ID Forger; Two Hijackers Supposedly Haven’t Entered US Yet
*March 23 2001: Hijacker Alhazmi Buys Aeronautical Chart
*April 2001: Cole Investigator Again Asks for Malaysia Information, CIA Again Reveals Nothing
*Early April-Early May, 2001: Associate of Suspicious Imam Al-Awlaki Helps 9/11 Hijackers Rent Flat
*April 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi Gets Speeding Ticket, but His Illegal Status Is Not Noticed
*(Mid April 2001): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Hanjour Mention Jihad to Roommates
*May 2001: Five 9/11 Hijackers Take Advantage of New, Anonymous Visa Express Procedure
*May 2001: CIA Official Connected to Cases of Moussaoui and Two 9/11 Hijackers Tasked to Help FBI
*May 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Tells Virginia Police He Was Mugged
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Obtains More Information about USSCole Bombing
*May 15, 2001: CIA Officer Again Accesses Cables about Hijackers’ Travel in Asia and to US, Fails to Alert FBI or Check If They Are Still in US
*May 15, 2001: CIA Hides Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Information from FBI
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Assigns Officer to Examine Malaysia Summit in Her Free Time
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Manager Says Photo Identification Is Incorrect, Hinting He Has Greater Knowledge of Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit Figures
*Mid May 2001: CIA Withholds Photo of Al-Qaeda Leaders from FBI
*Mid-May 2001: CIA Officer Misrepresents 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s Travel to US in E-mail Copied to FBI Agent
*(Late May-Early June): FBI Agent at CIA Searches Only One of Two Databases with Information about 9/11 Hijackers
*May 24-August 14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Make Several Unexplained Trips to Vegas
*Late May 2001: CIA Officer Passes Three Malaysia Summit Photographs to FBI, but Fails to Mention Some Important Details
*May 26, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Enters Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*(May 26, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Probably Stays in Closely Monitored Yemen Hub House Yet Again
*May 29, 2001: CIA and FBI Possibly Have Meeting about Coleand Malaysia Summit, but Nobody Will Later Remember Anything about It
*June 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almidhar Visits Malaysia Again, Requests More Information About Planned Attack on US Warship
*June 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Said to Receive Money from Plot Facilitator
*Between June 1 and July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Allegedly Tells Cousin about Upcoming 9/11 Attacks, Says There Will Be Five
*June 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Acquires New Saudi Passport Despite Presence on Saudi Watchlist
*June 11, 2001: FBI and CIA Hold Shouting Match over Information on Al-Qaeda; CIA Still Withholds Information
*June 12-September 11, 2001: Cole Investigator Repeatedly Asks FBI Headquarters for Information Leading to 9/11 Hijackers, but Gets Nothing
*June 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Obtains US Visa despite Incorrect Passport and Lies on Application; US Intelligence Knows He Is an Al-Qaeda Operative
*June 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s US Stay Renewed despite Expiration, Late Filing, Unlawful Presence, and Indicator of Islamic Extremism in Passport
*June 19-25, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Flies to Miami to Meet Other 9/11 Hijackers
*June 27-August 23, 2001: Hijackers Open Bank Accounts in New Jersey, Information Sufficient to Roll Up Plot
*July 2001: CIA Rejects Third FBI Request for Malaysia Summit Information
*July 2001: Seven 9/11 Hijackers Allegedly Obtain IDs in New Jersey
*(July-August 2001): Some 9/11 Hijackers Obtain Fake IDs
*July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Leaves Saudi Arabia, Reportedly Tracked by Saudi Authorities
*July 4, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Who Should Have Been on Watch List Re-enters US Without Difficulty on Invalid Passport, Lists WTC as Destination
*July 5, 2001: CIA Officer Says Malaysia Summit Attendees May Be Linked to Current Threat Reporting
*July 7, 2001: Random Police Check Almost Uncovers 9/11 Hijacker Meeting Near New York City
*July 8-August 30, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Purchase Knives
*July 13, 2001: CIA Reexamines Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but ‘Major League Killer’ Is Not Put on Watch List
*July 13, 2001: CIA Manager Says Extra Person to Be Allocated to Malaysia Summit Re-evaluation, Unclear If this Happens
*July 20, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Hanjour and Possibly Alhazmi Fly Near Washington
*July 23, 2001: CIA Officer Says Al-Qaeda Leader’s Associates like 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Are of ‘Very High Interest,’ Mentions Mysterious Almihdhar Connection
*Late July 2001: FBI Agent Possibly Confused by Error in CIA Cable, Fails to Tell FBI that 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa
*August 2001: Six 9/11 Hijackers Live Near Entrance to NSA
*(August 2001): NSA Intercepts Another Call between Yemen Hub and 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar in US
*Early August 2001: San Diego Imam to 9/11 Hijackers Seems to Show Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks
*August 1, 2001: Actor Communicates Concerns to Stewardess that Airplane Will Be Hijacked; Warning Forwarded to the FAA
*August 1-2, 2001: Hijackers Illegally Purchase Virginia Identity Cards
*August 13-14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Meet in Las Vegas for Summit
*August 16, 2001: Moussaoui’s Belongings Possess Information Sufficient to Roll Up 9/11 Plot
*August 16-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Make Series of Deposits to Bank Accounts
*Before August 22, 2001: Threat Information about ‘Khalid’ Increases Interest in 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 21-22, 2001: FBI Agents Finally Realize 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US
*August 21, 2001: FBI Fails to Ask Al-Qaeda Operative in Custody about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*Before August 22, 2001: FBI Headquarters Agent Learns Al-Qaeda Leader Attended Malaysia Summit with 9/11 Hijackers, Investigation Fails to Discover How
*August 22, 2001: CIA Officer Who Already Knows of Almihdhar and Alhazmi’s US Travel Is Informed of it by FBI, Agrees Investigation Should Start
*August 22, 2001: FBI Team Returns to Yemen to Investigate ColeBombing
*August 22-September 10, 2001: Unclear If Bin Laden Unit Briefs Top CIA Management about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Presence in US; Unit Chief Knows He Is Likely Attacker
*August 23, 2001: FBI Manager Informed of Hunt for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, Realizes Seriousness of Situation
*August 23, 2001: FBI Headquarters Gives New York Field Office Heads Up Over 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, but Investigation Is Not Considered Urgent
*August 23, 2001: FBI Agent Discusses Opening of Intelligence Investigation with CIA Officer, Notes 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has Stronger Link to USS Cole Bombing
*August 23, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are Finally Added to Terrorist Watch List
*August 23, 2001: FBI Field Agent Tells FBI Headquarters Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation
*(August 23-September 10, 2001): Flight 77 Hijackers Stay at Valencia Motel
*After August 23, 2001: US Intelligence Again Fails to Connect Al-Qaeda Leader to Alias
*(Shortly After August 23, 2001): Top FBI Official Possibly Notified of Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*(August 25, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Possibly Calls Associate in San Diego and Tells Him of 9/11 Attacks Date
*August 25-27, 2001: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets Despite Presence on Watch List
*August 25-September 5, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Spend Over $30,000 on 9/11 Tickets
*Late August-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers’ San Diego Associates Appear to Have Foreknowledge of Attacks
*August 27, 2001: INS Given Non-Urgent Request to Determine Visa Status of 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*August 27-September 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Stay at Maryland Motel at Different Times
*August 27-28, 2001: NSA Approves Passage of Key Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar to Cole Investigators, but FBI Headquarters Continues to Withhold It
*August 28, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s Rental Car Is Checked by Police in New Jersey
*(August 28, 2001): FBI Supervisor Says Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation
*August 28, 2001: FBI Headquarters Asks New York Office to Open Intelligence Investigation into 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 28, 2001: USS Cole Investigator Receives Almihdhar Memo, FBI Headquarters Forces Him to Delete It
*August 28, 2001: Cole Agent Argues with FBI Headquarters over Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 28-29, 2001: FBI Headquarters Allegedly Misrepresents Attorney’s Advice, Ensuring Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is Intelligence Investigation
*August 29, 2001: FBI Does Not Fully Realize 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Entered US Illegally
*August 29, 2001: Inexperienced FBI Agent Is Assigned to Search for Almihdhar
*August 29, 2001: CIA Officer Possibly Tells FBI Agent Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Must Be Intelligence Investigation
*August 29, 2001: FBI Wrongly Opens Intelligence Investigation to Find 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, despite Protests that ‘Someday Somebody Will Die’ as a Result
*August 30, 2001: CIA Finally Tells FBI Al-Qaeda Leader Met 9/11 Hijackers in Malaysia, but Information Is Withheld from Investigators
*August 31, 2001: US Watch List Calls 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar ‘Armed and Dangerous’
*Around August 31, 2001: Saudi Intelligence Chief’s Replacement Reportedly Makes CIA Nervous about 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi
*Early September 2001: Accounts Place Three 9/11 Hijackers on East and West Coasts at the Same Time
*(Early September 2001): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Practice Using Flight Simulator Software
*September 1-8, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefs President Bush Six More Times, Fails to Mention Moussaoui, Alhazmi, or Almihdhar
*September 4, 2001: FBI Agent Fails to Search for 9/11 Hijacker Data Present in Private Database
*September 4-5, 2001: FBI Agent Fails to Conduct Simple Credit Card Check that Could Have Stopped 9/11 Attacks
*September 4-5, 2001: FBI Search for 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi Finally Begins, but the Search Is Incomplete or Faulty
*September 4-5, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Visa Is Revoked, but Inspectors Are Told Not to Detain Him
*September 5, 2001: Hijacker Alhazmi Is in Police and Motor Vehicle Databases, but FBI Agent Fails to Find His Records
*(September 5, 2001): FBI Headquarters Prevents Credit Card Check that Could Help Locate 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*September 5-10, 2001: Last-Minute Money Transfers Between 9/11 Hijackers and United Arab Emirates
*September 9, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Drop Duffle Bag in Front of Mosque, Leave Evidence of Flight Training from 2000
*September 10, 2001: Los Angeles FBI Office Search Assistance Comes Too Late, San Diego FBI Office Not Contacted at All
*September 10, 2001: Three 9/11 Hijackers Stay at Same Hotel as Senior Saudi Official
*Around 8:15 p.m. September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Apparently Attempt to Penetrate Secure Area at Dulles Airport
*Before September 11, 2001: Some 9/11 Hijackers Have Same Mailing Address as ‘Blind Sheikh’ and His Associate Did
*(7:15 a.m.-7:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Two 9/11 Hijackers Set Off Alarms at Dulles Airport; Allowed to Board Anyway
*(7:25 a.m.-7:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Remaining Three Flight 77 Hijackers Check in at Airport; Allowed to Board despite Security Checkpoint Problems
*September 11, 2001: The 9/11 Attack: 3,000 Die in New York City and Washington, D.C.
*9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Crashes into Reinforced Section of the Pentagon, Killing 189
*(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Immediately Identifies Hijackers on Dulles Security Video
*Afternoon September 11, 2001: Several Hijackers Have Tickets for Afternoon 9/11 Flights
*Afternoon September 11 2001: FBI Fails To Help Security Guard Identify 9/11 Hijackers
*September 11, 2001: FBI Agents Able to Quickly Find Alhazmi and Almihdhar Once 9/11 Attacks Are Over
*9:53 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s Assistant Notes that Three 9/11 Hijackers Were Followed by CIA since 2000
*Early August 2001: San Diego Imam to 9/11 Hijackers Seems to Show Foreknowledge of 9/11 Attacks
*August 1, 2001: Actor Communicates Concerns to Stewardess that Airplane Will Be Hijacked; Warning Forwarded to the FAA
*August 1-2, 2001: Hijackers Illegally Purchase Virginia Identity Cards
*August 13-14, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Meet in Las Vegas for Summit
*August 16, 2001: Moussaoui’s Belongings Possess Information Sufficient to Roll Up 9/11 Plot
*August 16-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Make Series of Deposits to Bank Accounts
*Before August 22, 2001: Threat Information about ‘Khalid’ Increases Interest in 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 21-22, 2001: FBI Agents Finally Realize 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US
*August 21, 2001: FBI Fails to Ask Al-Qaeda Operative in Custody about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*Before August 22, 2001: FBI Headquarters Agent Learns Al-Qaeda Leader Attended Malaysia Summit with 9/11 Hijackers, Investigation Fails to Discover How
*August 22, 2001: CIA Officer Who Already Knows of Almihdhar and Alhazmi’s US Travel Is Informed of it by FBI, Agrees Investigation Should Start
*August 22, 2001: FBI Team Returns to Yemen to Investigate ColeBombing
*August 22-September 10, 2001: Unclear If Bin Laden Unit Briefs Top CIA Management about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Presence in US; Unit Chief Knows He Is Likely Attacker
*August 23, 2001: FBI Manager Informed of Hunt for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, Realizes Seriousness of Situation
*August 23, 2001: FBI Headquarters Gives New York Field Office Heads Up Over 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, but Investigation Is Not Considered Urgent
*August 23, 2001: FBI Agent Discusses Opening of Intelligence Investigation with CIA Officer, Notes 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has Stronger Link to USS Cole Bombing
*August 23, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are Finally Added to Terrorist Watch List
*August 23, 2001: FBI Field Agent Tells FBI Headquarters Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation
*(August 23-September 10, 2001): Flight 77 Hijackers Stay at Valencia Motel
*After August 23, 2001: US Intelligence Again Fails to Connect Al-Qaeda Leader to Alias
*(Shortly After August 23, 2001): Top FBI Official Possibly Notified of Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*(August 25, 2001): 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi Possibly Calls Associate in San Diego and Tells Him of 9/11 Attacks Date
*August 25-27, 2001: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets Despite Presence on Watch List
*August 25-September 5, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Spend Over $30,000 on 9/11 Tickets
*Late August-September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers’ San Diego Associates Appear to Have Foreknowledge of Attacks
*August 27, 2001: INS Given Non-Urgent Request to Determine Visa Status of 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
*August 27-September 1, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Stay at Maryland Motel at Different Times
*August 27-28, 2001: NSA Approves Passage of Key Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar to Cole Investigators, but FBI Headquarters Continues to Withhold It
*August 28, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alhazmi’s Rental Car Is Checked by Police in New Jersey
*(August 28, 2001): FBI Supervisor Says Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Should Be Criminal, Not Intelligence Investigation
*August 28, 2001: FBI Headquarters Asks New York Office to Open Intelligence Investigation into 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 28, 2001: USS Cole Investigator Receives Almihdhar Memo, FBI Headquarters Forces Him to Delete It
*August 28, 2001: Cole Agent Argues with FBI Headquarters over Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 28-29, 2001: FBI Headquarters Allegedly Misrepresents Attorney’s Advice, Ensuring Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is Intelligence Investigation
*August 29, 2001: FBI Does Not Fully Realize 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Entered US Illegally
*August 29, 2001: Inexperienced FBI Agent Is Assigned to Search for Almihdhar
*August 29, 2001: CIA Officer Possibly Tells FBI Agent Search for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Must Be Intelligence Investigation
*August 29, 2001: FBI Wrongly Opens Intelligence Investigation to Find 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar, despite Protests that ‘Someday Somebody Will Die’ as a Result
*August 30, 2001: CIA Finally Tells FBI Al-Qaeda Leader Met 9/11 Hijackers in Malaysia, but Information Is Withheld from Investigators
*August 31, 2001: US Watch List Calls 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar ‘Armed and Dangerous’
*Around August 31, 2001: Saudi Intelligence Chief’s Replacement Reportedly Makes CIA Nervous about 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi
*Early September 2001: Accounts Place Three 9/11 Hijackers on East and West Coasts at the Same Time
*(Early September 2001): 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Practice Using Flight Simulator Software
*September 1-8, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefs President Bush Six More Times, Fails to Mention Moussaoui, Alhazmi, or Almihdhar
*September 4, 2001: FBI Agent Fails to Search for 9/11 Hijacker Data Present in Private Database
*September 4-5, 2001: FBI Agent Fails to Conduct Simple Credit Card Check that Could Have Stopped 9/11 Attacks
*September 4-5, 2001: FBI Search for 9/11 Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi Finally Begins, but the Search Is Incomplete or Faulty
*September 4-5, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Visa Is Revoked, but Inspectors Are Told Not to Detain Him
*September 5, 2001: Hijacker Alhazmi Is in Police and Motor Vehicle Databases, but FBI Agent Fails to Find His Records
*(September 5, 2001): FBI Headquarters Prevents Credit Card Check that Could Help Locate 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar
*September 5-10, 2001: Last-Minute Money Transfers Between 9/11 Hijackers and United Arab Emirates
*September 9, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Drop Duffle Bag in Front of Mosque, Leave Evidence of Flight Training from 2000
*September 10, 2001: Los Angeles FBI Office Search Assistance Comes Too Late, San Diego FBI Office Not Contacted at All
*September 10, 2001: Three 9/11 Hijackers Stay at Same Hotel as Senior Saudi Official
*Around 8:15 p.m. September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Apparently Attempt to Penetrate Secure Area at Dulles Airport
*Before September 11, 2001: Some 9/11 Hijackers Have Same Mailing Address as ‘Blind Sheikh’ and His Associate Did
*(7:15 a.m.-7:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Two 9/11 Hijackers Set Off Alarms at Dulles Airport; Allowed to Board Anyway
*(7:25 a.m.-7:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Remaining Three Flight 77 Hijackers Check in at Airport; Allowed to Board despite Security Checkpoint Problems
*September 11, 2001: The 9/11 Attack: 3,000 Die in New York City and Washington, D.C.
*9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Crashes into Reinforced Section of the Pentagon, Killing 189
*(After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FBI Immediately Identifies Hijackers on Dulles Security Video
*Afternoon September 11, 2001: Several Hijackers Have Tickets for Afternoon 9/11 Flights
*Afternoon September 11 2001: FBI Fails To Help Security Guard Identify 9/11 Hijackers
*September 11, 2001: FBI Agents Able to Quickly Find Alhazmi and Almihdhar Once 9/11 Attacks Are Over
*9:53 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s Assistant Notes that Three 9/11 Hijackers Were Followed by CIA since 2000
*September 11-13, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Leave a Clear Trail of Evidence
*Between September 12, 2001 and October 17, 2002: CIA Officer Gives Conflicting Accounts of His Conduct at Crucial Meeting with FBI
*September 21-28, 2001: Suspected Hijacker Associate Is Arrested in Britain, Then Released After Pressure from Saudi Government
*Early October 2001: Former Prime Minister of Yemen Says 9/11 Hijacker, Khalid Almihdhar, Was Involved in Attacks on USS Cole
*April 24-25, 2002: Saudi Prince Said to Meet Suspected Hijacker Associate while Visiting Bush; Three Figures in Saudi Crown Prince’s Entourage Are Wanted by FBI
*May 16, 2002: Pakistan Raid Shows Son of Saudi Official Is Associated with 9/11 Hijackers
*Summer-Winter 2002: CIA Employee Allegedly Lies to Congressional Inquiry over Notification about Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 2, 2002: CIA Memo Says Evidence of Saudi Government Support for Hijackers Is ‘Incontrovertible’
*August 22-November 2002: Possible Hijacker Associate Is Arrested, Then Deported
*October 5, 2002: FBI Refuses to Allow FBI Informant Who Was Landlord to Two 9/11 HIjackers to Testify before 9/11 Inquiry
*Before October 17, 2002: CIA Officer Apparently Lies to Director about Withholding of Hijacker Information before 9/11
*October 17, 2002: Tenet Misinforms Congressional Inquiry about CIA Knowledge of Hijackers’ Entry into US
*November 18, 2002: Letter Shows that White House Leads Effort to Keep FBI Informant Quiet
*2003-2004: Key FBI Agents Eager to Testify to 9/11 Commission, but Are Not Subpoenaed
*April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
*April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
*(April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from 9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from Congressional Inquiry
*(Summer 2003): 9/11 Commissioner Tells White House of Saudi Links to 9/11 Plotters, White House Uninterested
*(Summer 2003): FBI Reluctance over Saudi Connection Leads to Complaint from 9/11 Commissioner
*August 6, 2003: Two Investigative Journalists Say Almihdhar and Alhazmi Worked for Saudi Intelligence and Were Protected by CIA
*December 2003: FBI Agent Says deliberately hid 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from the FBI, allowing 9/11 to happen … Officers in CIA’s Bin Laden Unit ‘Have Blood on Their Hands’ over 9/11
*February 2004: CIA Officer Lies to Justice Department Inspector General about Passage of Information about Almihdhar’s US Visa
*(February 12, 2004): Two FBI Agents Lie to Justice Department Inspector General about Withholding of 9/11 Information from Bureau
*February 23, 2004: Saudi Official Lies to 9/11 Commission about Ties to Hijackers’ Associate
*March 24, 2004-May 2004: FBI Says Saudi Associates of Hijackers Not Involved in Plot; This Conclusion Is Disputed
*April 2, 2004: CIA Officer Involved in Failed Watchlisting Interviewed by 9/11 Commission, Misrepresents His Understanding Before Attacks
*April 13, 2004: Attorney General Ashcroft Blames ‘Wall’ for 9/11 Failures, but 9/11 Commission Believes He Is Exaggerating
*June 2004: Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Team Leader Delete Passages about Apparent Saudi Support for Hijackers from Main Text of Final Report
*July 22, 2004: Saudi Embassy Says 9/11 Commission Report Exonerates Saudi Arabia
*September 7, 2004: Senator Bob Graham Claims Cover up of Saudi Connection to Two 9/11 Hijackers
*2006 and After: Some FBI Agents Believe CIA and Saudi Intelligence Attempted to Recruit Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi
*January 28, 2007: Chief of CIA’s Bin Laden Unit on 9/11 Said to Be Son of ‘Controversial’ Former CIA Figure
*Shortly Before April 30, 2007: CIA Officer Reportedly Makes False Claims to Former Agency Director about Failure to Pass Information to FBI
*November 25, 2007: Al-Qaeda Leader Claims Alhazmi Was Pilot of Flight 77
*February 2008: Considerable Video Footage of 9/11 Hijackers Remains Unreleased
*Shortly Before October 1, 2008: FBI Denies Permission for Television Interview of Agents about Key Failure before 9/11
*Between September 12, 2001 and October 17, 2002: CIA Officer Gives Conflicting Accounts of His Conduct at Crucial Meeting with FBI
*September 21-28, 2001: Suspected Hijacker Associate Is Arrested in Britain, Then Released After Pressure from Saudi Government
*Early October 2001: Former Prime Minister of Yemen Says 9/11 Hijacker, Khalid Almihdhar, Was Involved in Attacks on USS Cole
*April 24-25, 2002: Saudi Prince Said to Meet Suspected Hijacker Associate while Visiting Bush; Three Figures in Saudi Crown Prince’s Entourage Are Wanted by FBI
*May 16, 2002: Pakistan Raid Shows Son of Saudi Official Is Associated with 9/11 Hijackers
*Summer-Winter 2002: CIA Employee Allegedly Lies to Congressional Inquiry over Notification about Hijacker Almihdhar
*August 2, 2002: CIA Memo Says Evidence of Saudi Government Support for Hijackers Is ‘Incontrovertible’
*August 22-November 2002: Possible Hijacker Associate Is Arrested, Then Deported
*October 5, 2002: FBI Refuses to Allow FBI Informant Who Was Landlord to Two 9/11 HIjackers to Testify before 9/11 Inquiry
*Before October 17, 2002: CIA Officer Apparently Lies to Director about Withholding of Hijacker Information before 9/11
*October 17, 2002: Tenet Misinforms Congressional Inquiry about CIA Knowledge of Hijackers’ Entry into US
*November 18, 2002: Letter Shows that White House Leads Effort to Keep FBI Informant Quiet
*2003-2004: Key FBI Agents Eager to Testify to 9/11 Commission, but Are Not Subpoenaed
*April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Refuses to Approve Half of Interview Requests for ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
*April 2003: 9/11 Commission’s Zelikow Blocks Access to Key Document by ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigators
*(April 2003): Zelikow Fires ‘Saudi Connection’ Investigator from 9/11 Commission in Dispute over 28 Redacted Pages from Congressional Inquiry
*(Summer 2003): 9/11 Commissioner Tells White House of Saudi Links to 9/11 Plotters, White House Uninterested
*(Summer 2003): FBI Reluctance over Saudi Connection Leads to Complaint from 9/11 Commissioner
*August 6, 2003: Two Investigative Journalists Say Almihdhar and Alhazmi Worked for Saudi Intelligence and Were Protected by CIA
*December 2003: FBI Agent Says deliberately hid 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from the FBI, allowing 9/11 to happen … Officers in CIA’s Bin Laden Unit ‘Have Blood on Their Hands’ over 9/11
*February 2004: CIA Officer Lies to Justice Department Inspector General about Passage of Information about Almihdhar’s US Visa
*(February 12, 2004): Two FBI Agents Lie to Justice Department Inspector General about Withholding of 9/11 Information from Bureau
*February 23, 2004: Saudi Official Lies to 9/11 Commission about Ties to Hijackers’ Associate
*March 24, 2004-May 2004: FBI Says Saudi Associates of Hijackers Not Involved in Plot; This Conclusion Is Disputed
*April 2, 2004: CIA Officer Involved in Failed Watchlisting Interviewed by 9/11 Commission, Misrepresents His Understanding Before Attacks
*April 13, 2004: Attorney General Ashcroft Blames ‘Wall’ for 9/11 Failures, but 9/11 Commission Believes He Is Exaggerating
*June 2004: Zelikow, 9/11 Commission Team Leader Delete Passages about Apparent Saudi Support for Hijackers from Main Text of Final Report
*July 22, 2004: Saudi Embassy Says 9/11 Commission Report Exonerates Saudi Arabia
*September 7, 2004: Senator Bob Graham Claims Cover up of Saudi Connection to Two 9/11 Hijackers
*2006 and After: Some FBI Agents Believe CIA and Saudi Intelligence Attempted to Recruit Hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi
*January 28, 2007: Chief of CIA’s Bin Laden Unit on 9/11 Said to Be Son of ‘Controversial’ Former CIA Figure
*Shortly Before April 30, 2007: CIA Officer Reportedly Makes False Claims to Former Agency Director about Failure to Pass Information to FBI
*November 25, 2007: Al-Qaeda Leader Claims Alhazmi Was Pilot of Flight 77
*February 2008: Considerable Video Footage of 9/11 Hijackers Remains Unreleased
*Shortly Before October 1, 2008: FBI Denies Permission for Television Interview of Agents about Key Failure before 9/11
a reply to: RomanMaroni
The E-4B was participating in a training exercise at the time of the attack, but on another note, when there is a national emergency, it is to take to the sky as quickly as possible, which is why they are round-the-clock alert.
I want to make a point, because there were conspiracy theorist claiming that the C-130 had a hand in controlling American 77 as it crashed into the Pentagon. This is just another example of how I had to debunk each conspiracy theory, one step at a time.
One example of many is when conspiracy theorist were claiming that United 93 landed at Cleveland Airport. Afterward, they claimed that passengers from United 93 was seen loading on a bus, which I knew was incorrect because United 93 was tracked to its crash site by radar and communication tapes proved that United 93 was hijacked. After checking, I determined that the the aircraft they confused with United 93 was Delta 1989.
I decided to check even further in regard to reports that passengers of United 93 were seen boarding a bus and found that they confused a team of scientists from the Johnson Space Center in Houston who had flown to Cleveland on an KC-135 to conduct micro-gravity experiments.
Simply amazing because conspiracy theorist were unaware of the rest of the story, which is why they concocted another unfounded conspiracy theory surrounding United 93 and Cleveland Airport.
Not sure how many, but the slaughter of thousands during the 9/11 attack and billions of dollars in damage, does not even remotely compare to Iran/Contra and government officials tax evasion. In a country full of investigative reporters looking for a sensational story, ever wondered why after 14 years, they have yet to uncover a single shred of evidence pointing to a False Flag operation in regard to the 9/11 attack?
If it was proven that explosives brought down any of the WTC buildings, there would be a flood of breaking news all over the news channels, but as it is, warnings flowing in from around the world that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were in the final stages of carrying out their terrorist attack on America was a clue that 9/11 had nothing to do with a False Flag operation. Underline that when bin Laden claimed responsibility for 9/11 and al-Qaeda's release of those martyr videos.
To sum that up, warnings issued from around the world pointed their fingers at Osama bin Landen and al-Qaeda, not the United States government.
The E-4B was where it was supposed to be? How do you know this?
The E-4B was participating in a training exercise at the time of the attack, but on another note, when there is a national emergency, it is to take to the sky as quickly as possible, which is why they are round-the-clock alert.
You're the only one talking about the C-130 and Flight 77. Just throwing stuff out you can counter doesn't address anything I am saying. It just makes you feel like you are provided correct knowledge and info when in fact you are just changing the subject to what you want it to be and then proving it wrong. You are effectively responding to me by having a debate with yourself.
I want to make a point, because there were conspiracy theorist claiming that the C-130 had a hand in controlling American 77 as it crashed into the Pentagon. This is just another example of how I had to debunk each conspiracy theory, one step at a time.
If you believe that then you must also conclude that not knowing all the information can lead someone to an incorrect conclusion. So if I show you that you don't have all the information, will you then contemplate that your conclusion may be incorrect?
One example of many is when conspiracy theorist were claiming that United 93 landed at Cleveland Airport. Afterward, they claimed that passengers from United 93 was seen loading on a bus, which I knew was incorrect because United 93 was tracked to its crash site by radar and communication tapes proved that United 93 was hijacked. After checking, I determined that the the aircraft they confused with United 93 was Delta 1989.
I decided to check even further in regard to reports that passengers of United 93 were seen boarding a bus and found that they confused a team of scientists from the Johnson Space Center in Houston who had flown to Cleveland on an KC-135 to conduct micro-gravity experiments.
Simply amazing because conspiracy theorist were unaware of the rest of the story, which is why they concocted another unfounded conspiracy theory surrounding United 93 and Cleveland Airport.
How many were sent to prison over Iran Contra? 1 ... for tax evasion. Does that mean Iran Contra wasn't a conspiracy either?
Not sure how many, but the slaughter of thousands during the 9/11 attack and billions of dollars in damage, does not even remotely compare to Iran/Contra and government officials tax evasion. In a country full of investigative reporters looking for a sensational story, ever wondered why after 14 years, they have yet to uncover a single shred of evidence pointing to a False Flag operation in regard to the 9/11 attack?
If it was proven that explosives brought down any of the WTC buildings, there would be a flood of breaking news all over the news channels, but as it is, warnings flowing in from around the world that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were in the final stages of carrying out their terrorist attack on America was a clue that 9/11 had nothing to do with a False Flag operation. Underline that when bin Laden claimed responsibility for 9/11 and al-Qaeda's release of those martyr videos.
To sum that up, warnings issued from around the world pointed their fingers at Osama bin Landen and al-Qaeda, not the United States government.
a reply to: skyeagle409
After reading your last reply, I'm beginning to think you may be beyond reach. It's like you don't want to address the topic that you started. You continue to just throw out some outlandish conspiracy claims and then debunk them. I'm not disagreeing with you on anything you have debunked. So you're debating yourself, again. You say you debunk one conspiracy at a time, but you are debunking things that aren't being mentioned by anyone other than you. I'm only disagreeing with your claim that the CIA just "lost track" of Almihdhar and Alhazmi in Thailand.
I asked you since you (and I) know that lack of information and knowledge lead to incorrect conclusions, do you also apply that to yourself. So if I am to show you your lack of information and knowledge, would you consider that maybe you have drawn an incorrect conclusion. And you respond to that by telling me all about how some other people say Flight 93 landed in Cleveland???? What??? See, you're not responding to me. You are just throwing out things you can debunk and debunking them. I agree with you. Flight 93 didn't land in Cleveland. But who cares? That has nothing to do with anything. It's like you think everyone posting here believes every conspiracy presented. Please don't respond to this post to tell me about holograms, dews, WTC7, demolitions, reptillians, moon landings, JFK ... just focus on your belief about Almihdhar and Alhazmi and see if it's actually supported by facts.
Please read my extensive list of intelligence "blunders." You really need to know what you are saying when you make your claim.
After reading your last reply, I'm beginning to think you may be beyond reach. It's like you don't want to address the topic that you started. You continue to just throw out some outlandish conspiracy claims and then debunk them. I'm not disagreeing with you on anything you have debunked. So you're debating yourself, again. You say you debunk one conspiracy at a time, but you are debunking things that aren't being mentioned by anyone other than you. I'm only disagreeing with your claim that the CIA just "lost track" of Almihdhar and Alhazmi in Thailand.
I asked you since you (and I) know that lack of information and knowledge lead to incorrect conclusions, do you also apply that to yourself. So if I am to show you your lack of information and knowledge, would you consider that maybe you have drawn an incorrect conclusion. And you respond to that by telling me all about how some other people say Flight 93 landed in Cleveland???? What??? See, you're not responding to me. You are just throwing out things you can debunk and debunking them. I agree with you. Flight 93 didn't land in Cleveland. But who cares? That has nothing to do with anything. It's like you think everyone posting here believes every conspiracy presented. Please don't respond to this post to tell me about holograms, dews, WTC7, demolitions, reptillians, moon landings, JFK ... just focus on your belief about Almihdhar and Alhazmi and see if it's actually supported by facts.
Please read my extensive list of intelligence "blunders." You really need to know what you are saying when you make your claim.
a reply to: skyeagle409
The word "conspiracy theorist" is a negative connotation. It is used by mainstream media all the time. It is a form of ridicule to discrete anyone that speaks out against an OS narrative.
It is used by many debunkers defending their OS narratives.
So one must conclude those that like to spend their time on many conspiracy websites focusing on conspiracy theories, and debating conspiracy theories is a "conspiracy theorist."
The fact is my friend, also implies that you are a "conspiracy theorist."
So when you are putting down everyone that opposes your views. by using a negative connotation, you are putting yourself down as well.
Just my opinion.
One example of many is when conspiracy theorist were claiming that United 93 landed at Cleveland Airport
The word "conspiracy theorist" is a negative connotation. It is used by mainstream media all the time. It is a form of ridicule to discrete anyone that speaks out against an OS narrative.
It is used by many debunkers defending their OS narratives.
So one must conclude those that like to spend their time on many conspiracy websites focusing on conspiracy theories, and debating conspiracy theories is a "conspiracy theorist."
The fact is my friend, also implies that you are a "conspiracy theorist."
So when you are putting down everyone that opposes your views. by using a negative connotation, you are putting yourself down as well.
Just my opinion.
a reply to: RomanMaroni
Nice list! Where's the evidence of a False Flag operation? Now, let's take a look at this.
Nothing in those warnings blaming the United States for the upcoming 9/11 attack.
Let me add one more of many to the mix.
Nice list! Where's the evidence of a False Flag operation? Now, let's take a look at this.
* July 2001 – Jordanian intelligence told US officials that al-Qaeda was planning an attack on American soil, and Egyptian intelligence warned the CIA that 20 al-Qaeda Jihadists were in the United States, and that four of them were receiving flight training.
* September 2001 – Egyptian intelligence warns American officials that al-Qaeda is in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US.
Nothing in those warnings blaming the United States for the upcoming 9/11 attack.
Let me add one more of many to the mix.
* August 2001 – The United Kingdom has warned three times of an imminent al-Qaeda attack in the United States, the third specifying multiple airplane hijackings.
According to the Sunday Herald, the report is passed on to President Bush a short time later.
edit on 12-8-2015 by skyeagle409 because: (no reason given)
a reply to: Informer1958
Taking a look, some of them have exposed their anti-government mindset, which explains why they blame the government without a shred of evidence despite the fact that countries around the world were pointing their fingers at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, not at the United States.
After their terrorist attack, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda admitted their role in the 9/11 attack.
Taking a look, some of them have exposed their anti-government mindset, which explains why they blame the government without a shred of evidence despite the fact that countries around the world were pointing their fingers at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, not at the United States.
After their terrorist attack, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda admitted their role in the 9/11 attack.
a reply to: RomanMaroni
Unlike conspiracy theorist, I go out of my way to make contacts with experts. For an example, when I needed more information on ACARS, I contacted ARINC, the ACARS experts. When I wanted more details on demolition explosives, I contacted the Protec Co., the demolition implosion experts whose seismic monitors were operational during the 9/11 attack.
The same can be said when ATC personnel from Travis AFB were invited to conduct a briefing on radar information and airspace operations in the local area to members of one of my two chapters last year.
Is it any wonder then, why I have been telling conspiracy theorist why they were wrong? What conspiracy theorist were implying went against the grain from what I was told by the experts.
I asked you since you (and I) know that lack of information and knowledge lead to incorrect conclusions, do you also apply that to yourself.
Unlike conspiracy theorist, I go out of my way to make contacts with experts. For an example, when I needed more information on ACARS, I contacted ARINC, the ACARS experts. When I wanted more details on demolition explosives, I contacted the Protec Co., the demolition implosion experts whose seismic monitors were operational during the 9/11 attack.
The same can be said when ATC personnel from Travis AFB were invited to conduct a briefing on radar information and airspace operations in the local area to members of one of my two chapters last year.
Is it any wonder then, why I have been telling conspiracy theorist why they were wrong? What conspiracy theorist were implying went against the grain from what I was told by the experts.
edit on 12-8-2015 by skyeagle409 because: (no reason given)
a reply to: skyeagle409
So i was right skyeagle409, you're beyond reach. Despite me repeatedly asking you not to respond to claims I'm not making, you figure responding to a claim I'm not making is the best response. Well, I tried. It is so hard to change an adult's mind once it is made up (and the older the more stubborn), and you prove it to the fullest. You're going to believe the same thing on Wednesday that you believed on Monday no matter what happens on Tuesday. It's cool though, we're both Americans and I respect you're right to believe whatever you want, but just remember, the next time you tell someone 9/11 happened due to intelligence blunders, you are knowingly and willingly saying something that you don't understand and refuse to even try to understand.
Seriously skyeagle409, you don't have even have 1 question about the info I posted? Not even 1? You read everything I wrote and nothing in there was puzzling to you? Not even 1 question? I spent hours compiling a list of suspicious activities regarding just 2 of the hijackers, and none of it was of any interest to you? Not even 1 question? I gave you 15 pages (Times New Roman 13 font) of suspicious activities that may counter your preexisting belief and you don't even have 1 question? When I started writing this reply I admit I was a little frustrated, but now every time I type "not even 1 question" it makes me laugh out loud. I mean your responses are so absurd they are comedy.
And then despite me specifically asking you not to reply to me regarding WTC or demolitions, you respond by telling me about the WTC and demolitions. I haven't been on ATS much lately, but is the motto still "Deny Ignorance"?
So i was right skyeagle409, you're beyond reach. Despite me repeatedly asking you not to respond to claims I'm not making, you figure responding to a claim I'm not making is the best response. Well, I tried. It is so hard to change an adult's mind once it is made up (and the older the more stubborn), and you prove it to the fullest. You're going to believe the same thing on Wednesday that you believed on Monday no matter what happens on Tuesday. It's cool though, we're both Americans and I respect you're right to believe whatever you want, but just remember, the next time you tell someone 9/11 happened due to intelligence blunders, you are knowingly and willingly saying something that you don't understand and refuse to even try to understand.
Seriously skyeagle409, you don't have even have 1 question about the info I posted? Not even 1? You read everything I wrote and nothing in there was puzzling to you? Not even 1 question? I spent hours compiling a list of suspicious activities regarding just 2 of the hijackers, and none of it was of any interest to you? Not even 1 question? I gave you 15 pages (Times New Roman 13 font) of suspicious activities that may counter your preexisting belief and you don't even have 1 question? When I started writing this reply I admit I was a little frustrated, but now every time I type "not even 1 question" it makes me laugh out loud. I mean your responses are so absurd they are comedy.
And then despite me specifically asking you not to reply to me regarding WTC or demolitions, you respond by telling me about the WTC and demolitions. I haven't been on ATS much lately, but is the motto still "Deny Ignorance"?
edit on 12-8-2015 by RomanMaroni because: To add in response to
skyeagle409's latest reply
a reply to: RomanMaroni
I was already aware of the many blunders committed, which is why I have blamed Bush, Rice, the intelligence services, and even the FAA, but nothing to do with an inside job.
Please read my extensive list of intelligence "blunders." You really need to know what you are saying when you make your claim.
I was already aware of the many blunders committed, which is why I have blamed Bush, Rice, the intelligence services, and even the FAA, but nothing to do with an inside job.
edit on 12-8-2015 by skyeagle409 because: (no reason given)
a reply to: Informer1958
Not in this case.
The fact is my friend, also implies that you are a "conspiracy theorist." So when you are putting down everyone that opposes your views. by using a negative connotation, you are putting yourself down as well.
Not in this case.
a reply to: RomanMaroni
Let's just say there is more to that story.
So i was right skyeagle409, you're beyond reach.
Let's just say there is more to that story.
a reply to: skyeagle409
I would like to remind you, people who blame their government of doing a False Flag, are not "anti-government" yet you lump anyone who does not support your theories. It is a false assumptions.
I believe few people in our government may have been involved in the 911 conspiracies considering all the secrets concerning 911. However, I am not "anti-government" . I believe many people who do real research into 911 and do not support the OS should not be label "anti-government". This is yet another attempt to discrete anyone who does not go alone with the order of how the powers that be want.
It is also a form of ridicule used against people who do not support OS of 911.
It is like saying, shut up! your "anti-government" or your a "conspiracy theorist" no one wants to Liston to you. So as you slip these words in your comments to posters you are labeling them. it is an arrogance to apply that you are above everyone.
Most readers have no trouble spotting this.
Just my opinion.
Taking a look, some of them have exposed their anti-government mindset, which explains why they blame the government without a shred of evidence despite the fact that countries around the world were pointing their fingers at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, not at the United States.
After their terrorist attack, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda admitted their role in the 9/11 attack.
I would like to remind you, people who blame their government of doing a False Flag, are not "anti-government" yet you lump anyone who does not support your theories. It is a false assumptions.
I believe few people in our government may have been involved in the 911 conspiracies considering all the secrets concerning 911. However, I am not "anti-government" . I believe many people who do real research into 911 and do not support the OS should not be label "anti-government". This is yet another attempt to discrete anyone who does not go alone with the order of how the powers that be want.
It is also a form of ridicule used against people who do not support OS of 911.
It is like saying, shut up! your "anti-government" or your a "conspiracy theorist" no one wants to Liston to you. So as you slip these words in your comments to posters you are labeling them. it is an arrogance to apply that you are above everyone.
Most readers have no trouble spotting this.
Just my opinion.
edit on 12-8-2015 by Informer1958 because: (no reason given)
a reply to: skyeagle409
Yes, in this case. Uh, did you just grant yourself to be a very special person from everyone else with very special rules?
I don't think so.
The fact is my friend, also implies that you are a "conspiracy theorist." So when you are putting down everyone that opposes your views. by using a negative connotation, you are putting yourself down as well.
Not in this case.
Yes, in this case. Uh, did you just grant yourself to be a very special person from everyone else with very special rules?
I don't think so.
a reply to: Informer1958
Yeah Informer1958, but Flight 93 didn't land in Cleveland, and the C-130 didn't control Flight 77, and some Watergate people talked, and explosives didn't bring down the towers, and no one warned the US that the US was going to attack the US, and even a child can fly a plane in to building with 20 mins of training, and J Edgar Hoover dropped the ball on Pearl Harbor, and there were blunders in Afghanistan, and remote controlling wasn't possible, and the white jet by Flight 93 was a business jet and despite intelligence tracking the hijackers since 1992 they apparently just "stumbled" upon 9/11, and the E4B spotted over Washington DC was just there for training purposes even though no one has ever responded regarding it ... it's a total non issue, and other countries have intelligence blunders, too. Therefore Informer1958, you're anti-government.
Yeah Informer1958, but Flight 93 didn't land in Cleveland, and the C-130 didn't control Flight 77, and some Watergate people talked, and explosives didn't bring down the towers, and no one warned the US that the US was going to attack the US, and even a child can fly a plane in to building with 20 mins of training, and J Edgar Hoover dropped the ball on Pearl Harbor, and there were blunders in Afghanistan, and remote controlling wasn't possible, and the white jet by Flight 93 was a business jet and despite intelligence tracking the hijackers since 1992 they apparently just "stumbled" upon 9/11, and the E4B spotted over Washington DC was just there for training purposes even though no one has ever responded regarding it ... it's a total non issue, and other countries have intelligence blunders, too. Therefore Informer1958, you're anti-government.
a reply to: Informer1958
Let' me put it this way. I have noticed the CT folks posting bogus and hoaxed videos and disinformation that were debunked years ago.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if debris are outpacing the collapse of a building, that particular building is NOT collapsing at free fall speed. Common sense logic, yet the CT folks continue to push a dead horse that was beaten to death years ago.
On that note, I have also warned the CT folks that there people planting disinformation and hoaxed and bogus videos and yet, they continue to ignore my warnings.
I have long be aware of a campaign to discredit the Truth Movement, but it appears that my warnings are falling of deaf ears, which is why I am amazed at times when I see them post the very videos and photos that I have been warning them about.Case in point, pictures of seismic charts they claim proves demolition explosions at ground zero. With that, I will simply say this: I dare them to take that same seismic data and present it to demolition companies.
Let' me put it this way. I have noticed the CT folks posting bogus and hoaxed videos and disinformation that were debunked years ago.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if debris are outpacing the collapse of a building, that particular building is NOT collapsing at free fall speed. Common sense logic, yet the CT folks continue to push a dead horse that was beaten to death years ago.
On that note, I have also warned the CT folks that there people planting disinformation and hoaxed and bogus videos and yet, they continue to ignore my warnings.
I have long be aware of a campaign to discredit the Truth Movement, but it appears that my warnings are falling of deaf ears, which is why I am amazed at times when I see them post the very videos and photos that I have been warning them about.Case in point, pictures of seismic charts they claim proves demolition explosions at ground zero. With that, I will simply say this: I dare them to take that same seismic data and present it to demolition companies.
edit on 13-8-2015 by skyeagle409 because: (no reason given)
new topics
-
The Baloney aka BS Detection Kit
Social Issues and Civil Unrest: 3 hours ago -
Suspected Iranian agent working for Pentagon while U.S. coordinated defense of Israel
US Political Madness: 3 hours ago -
How does my computer know
Education and Media: 6 hours ago -
USO 10 miles west of caladesi island, Clearwater beach Florida
Aliens and UFOs: 10 hours ago
top topics
-
USO 10 miles west of caladesi island, Clearwater beach Florida
Aliens and UFOs: 10 hours ago, 8 flags -
Suspected Iranian agent working for Pentagon while U.S. coordinated defense of Israel
US Political Madness: 3 hours ago, 5 flags -
How does my computer know
Education and Media: 6 hours ago, 2 flags -
The Baloney aka BS Detection Kit
Social Issues and Civil Unrest: 3 hours ago, 1 flags
active topics
-
Nakedeye Mother of Dragons Comet Is Here!
Space Exploration • 3 • : SchrodingersRat -
The Baloney aka BS Detection Kit
Social Issues and Civil Unrest • 2 • : budzprime69 -
US and Israel Reportedly Conclude Most Hostages Still Held in Gaza Are Dead
War On Terrorism • 146 • : Ohanka -
How does my computer know
Education and Media • 10 • : Scratchpost -
Negotiations and Diplomacy.
History • 13 • : Kurokage -
Brave Russians say NO to 'vote Vlad'
Breaking Alternative News • 121 • : Kurokage -
It has begun... Iran begins attack on Israel, launches tons of drones towards the country
World War Three • 629 • : SchrodingersRat -
Suspected Iranian agent working for Pentagon while U.S. coordinated defense of Israel
US Political Madness • 6 • : CarlLaFong -
Candidate TRUMP Now Has Crazy Judge JUAN MERCHAN After Him - The Stormy Daniels Hush-Money Case.
Political Conspiracies • 191 • : SchrodingersRat -
Running Through Idiot Protestors Who Block The Road
Rant • 47 • : stu119