posted on Apr, 16 2015 @ 03:55 PM
a reply to: Zaphod58
I know, I was more pointing out the lack of a K-777 proposal which led to the original "knife in a gunfight" battle between the 767 and the A330.
What IS surprising to me, however, and what I was trying to get at with the whole KC-135/367-80/707 bit was that this first procurement battle was
happening right as the first 787 prototypes were being readied for their first flights.
Now in the 1950s, the USAF was willing to take a gamble on the then-revolutionary 367-80 as the future of their tanker/cargo fleet. At the same time,
Boeing was confident enough in their new airframe to put their reputation on the line by selling this cutting-edge airframe for such a
high-visibility, high-risk role.
The fact that they had the 787, their potential(on paper) ace in the hole against the A330 ready to go, and instead chose to save the 767 tooling from
the scrapper's torches for one last production run and serve up the KC-46 instead speaks volumes about their confidence (or lack thereof) in 787.
What does Boeing know about the 787s durability and airframe longevity (and what does the USAF know about maintaining composite airframes) that
they're keeping on the DL? What would keep them from putting their best foot forward (as they have in the past), especially when billions are on the
edit on 16-4-2015 by Barnalby because: (no reason given)
edit on 16-4-2015 by Barnalby because: (no reason