MH370 missing (Part 2)

Like was said 400 pages ago. This plane (debris) or BB's will never be recovered!
No plane, no debri, no bodies, no floating anything. No jack you know what!
Foul play and hoodwinking!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

a reply to: drwill

Reports say the debris found is not related to MH370.

Turns out that I went to school with the guy that found it and here's a pic he posted on Facebook..

It is unlikely that the buoys are the source of the signals that were picked up, there is however another source which could well be the source of the signals, namely whales tagged with acoustic pingers to track them.

Acoustic tags

I wonder which ultrasonic frequency they use

a reply to: AlphaHawk

Thank you for posting this Alpha Hawk.

Fuselage skin would have rivet lines in both directions attaching the skin via stringers and ribs. This looks like something from a truck canopy either washed overboard from a ship or down a river.

Good spotting thanks

Overall the assumption is that MH370 had a take off weight of about 223.000 kg.

Let's calculate this estimated weight.

239 passengers with luggage x 130kg=31.070 kg
batteries 200 kg
Other cargo 4.000 kg
Aircraft itself, empty weight 138.000 kg
fuel 49.000 kg

total take off weight = 222.270 kg

But these numbers are not official

I also do think the average weight of the people is 80 kg, and i don't think they will take 50 kg of luggage with them.

Now the odd thing of flight MH370, while it normally climbs to, and flies at flight level 370 (it did that at 03-06-2014 and 03-08-2014) on 03-07-2014 it climbed to a lower flight level of 350 and maintained this level.
There was an aircraft which flew the same route as MH370 which did climbed to flight level 370 (MAS52) this aircraft was 30 minutes ahead of them.
So there is not really a reason for MH370 to fly and maintain a lower altitude than normal unless it was more heave and had to burn off fuel before it could climb to a higher altitude (a step climb)

Your thoughts?

a reply to: earthling42
The wiki only says the frequency is less than 100 kHz in salt and over 100 kHz in fresh water, but they have very limited range of only 1km, so it would be hard to detect them. I think they would be pretty useless in the open ocean with such a tiny range.

Also, I doubt they ping anywhere near once a second, because the batteries last for years and if you pinged once a second you would have a hard time getting years out of the batteries.

en.wikipedia.org...

a reply to: Arbitrageur

Yes, agreed.

But i also read they set user defined intervals for the pingers, so they are not constantly transmitting a signal.

Edit:

I just found this journal about whale tracking

The pingers send a acoustic pulse between 25 and 31 KHZ and 1 pulse per second (pps)
On page 4 there are some spectograms.

a reply to: sy.gunson

You mean in like a grid fashion?

He's been saying they won't give it back to him yet and that he still believes it's from a plane.

a reply to: earthling42
Yeah I hope that would be distinguishable from the black box pingers but with crude equipment maybe not. I think it still has pretty limited range, but it's a good find.

Maybe they need to be more selective about frequencies for tracking marine life that can't be confused with black box pingers which are supposed to operate around 38kHz but I think The Air France pinger was only about 33 kHz which is getting kind of close to these whale tracking frequencies, and I was shocked it was so far from the 38.5 +/- 1 kHz specification, which I'd think they could hold, without it dropping all the way to 33 kHz though maybe that was due to weak batteries. Still, there are ways to deal with weak batteries that would reduce the intensity rather than the frequency.

I would like to comment on the previously quoted freight manifest of "Mangosteens and Lithium batteries".

I believe it should read 'Manganese-Lithium' batteries.

Also, it is illegal to ship "Damaged" Lithium batteries.

a reply to: earthling42
The flight level usually assigned by ATC depends on the flight plan. So there is no normal flight level
except that the headings easterly are assigned odd thousand feet and westerly even thousands feet

More pictures

Larger image

originally posted by: Psynic
I would like to comment on the previously quoted freight manifest of "Mangosteens and Lithium batteries".

I believe it should read 'Manganese-Lithium' batteries.

How do you get that from this when they give two different weights, and say "apart from"?

www.fz.com...

MH370 was flying 200kg of lithium ion batteries apart from four tonnes of mangosteens.

Also, it is illegal to ship "Damaged" Lithium batteries.

According to that source it's even illegal to ship undamaged lithium batteries if the energy density exceeds certain values, etc:

“Often, these goods are declared as dangerous goods because of its characteristic but they were within permissible levels of shipment. What this means is that the commodity was within the dangerous goods threshold.

“The dangerous threshold for lithium ion batteries is not measured by its weight but its watt per hour measurement. For instance, a handphone probably would measure 100 grams watt per hour which is not lethal.

About two weeks ago one of reddit comments mentioned "...acoustic measurements from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty en.wikipedia.org... acoustic station at Cape Leeuwin (SW tip of Western Australia), and acoustic logger from near Rottnest Island from CMST - cmst.curtin.edu.au... was used to determine bearing to an acoustic event, possibly a sea surface impact.

If you took the bearing of this event and intersected it with the '7.5th' ping arc you end up with the search region that the Chinese ship and Ocean Shield were searching in.

My source is a colleague at CMST."

source

a reply to: AlphaHawk
Small world!
(Yet too big to find MH370.)

About ACARS.

It is Mas procedure to switch ACARS, VHF, and High Frequency selection off but this is only for flights to China as the service provider for Mas does not cover China. Some if not all pilots switch them all off for a while and then later switch SATCOMM back on to force the system into SATCOMM mode.

Malaysia chronicle

Just posting this because is sounds quite similar to what appears to be early events in the flight.

Some maintenance records were said to be destroyed in a fire...could updates never been installed.

Automated to Death - from IEEE Spectrum

The passengers and crew of Malaysia Airlines Flight 124 were just settling into their five-hour flight from Perth to Kuala Lumpur that late on the afternoon of 1 August 2005.

Approximately 18 minutes into the flight, as the Boeing 777-200 series aircraft was climbing through 36 000 feet altitude on autopilot, the aircraft—suddenly and without warning—pitched to 18 degrees, nose up, and started to climb rapidly. As the plane passed 39 000 feet, the stall and overspeed warning indicators came on simultaneously—something that’s supposed to be impossible, and a situation the crew is not trained to handle.

At 41 000 feet, the command pilot disconnected the autopilot and lowered the airplane’s nose. The auto throttle then commanded an increase in thrust, and the craft plunged 4000 feet. The pilot countered by manually moving the throttles back to the idle position. The nose pitched up again, and the aircraft climbed 2000 feet before the pilot regained control.

The flight crew notified air-traffic control that they could not maintain altitude and requested to return to Perth. The crew and the 177 shaken but uninjured passengers safely returned to the ground.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation discovered that the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU)—which provides air data and inertial reference data to several systems on the Boeing 777, including the primary flight control and autopilot flight director systems—had two faulty accelerometers. One had gone bad in 2001. The other failed as Flight 124 passed 36 571 feet.

The fault-tolerant ADIRU was designed to operate with a failed accelerometer (it has six). The redundant design of the ADIRU also meant that it wasn’t mandatory to replace the unit when an accelerometer failed.

However, when the second accelerometer failed, a latent software anomaly allowed inputs from the first faulty accelerometer to be used, resulting in the erroneous feed of acceleration information into the flight control systems. The anomaly, which lay hidden for a decade, wasn’t found in testing because the ADIRU’s designers had never considered that such an event might occur.

Link to IEEE Spectrum

a reply to: roadgravel

If the reports are truthful about the rapid rise in altitude and a rapid descent accompanied with multiple changes in direction, it could very well mean that this aircraft was out of control.
The same as flight 124? they could easily overcome it by switching off the auto pilot and fly manually.
They would surely have installed the updates, i doubt that even if the update was not installed and that this was a similar event that it could have led to a crash.
A bumpy ride maybe untill the auto pilot is switched off and the pilot retakes control of the aircraft.

a reply to: earthling42

I agree that it is a long shot. Why no radio call? Another hole like so many other explanations seems to have. If it was very serious I would think it would have went down near Malaysia.

I have often wondered about what flaws could be in the software that have never been found because of the huge number of possibilities that would have to be tested.

It does point out there could be situations no one could anticipate in this event.