It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
How do you get that from this when they give two different weights, and say "apart from"?
originally posted by: Psynic
I would like to comment on the previously quoted freight manifest of "Mangosteens and Lithium batteries".
I believe it should read 'Manganese-Lithium' batteries.
MH370 was flying 200kg of lithium ion batteries apart from four tonnes of mangosteens.
According to that source it's even illegal to ship undamaged lithium batteries if the energy density exceeds certain values, etc:
Also, it is illegal to ship "Damaged" Lithium batteries.
“Often, these goods are declared as dangerous goods because of its characteristic but they were within permissible levels of shipment. What this means is that the commodity was within the dangerous goods threshold.
“The dangerous threshold for lithium ion batteries is not measured by its weight but its watt per hour measurement. For instance, a handphone probably would measure 100 grams watt per hour which is not lethal.
About two weeks ago one of reddit comments mentioned "...acoustic measurements from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty en.wikipedia.org... acoustic station at Cape Leeuwin (SW tip of Western Australia), and acoustic logger from near Rottnest Island from CMST - cmst.curtin.edu.au... was used to determine bearing to an acoustic event, possibly a sea surface impact.
If you took the bearing of this event and intersected it with the '7.5th' ping arc you end up with the search region that the Chinese ship and Ocean Shield were searching in.
My source is a colleague at CMST."
It is Mas procedure to switch ACARS, VHF, and High Frequency selection off but this is only for flights to China as the service provider for Mas does not cover China. Some if not all pilots switch them all off for a while and then later switch SATCOMM back on to force the system into SATCOMM mode.
Automated to Death - from IEEE Spectrum
The passengers and crew of Malaysia Airlines Flight 124 were just settling into their five-hour flight from Perth to Kuala Lumpur that late on the afternoon of 1 August 2005.
Approximately 18 minutes into the flight, as the Boeing 777-200 series aircraft was climbing through 36 000 feet altitude on autopilot, the aircraft—suddenly and without warning—pitched to 18 degrees, nose up, and started to climb rapidly. As the plane passed 39 000 feet, the stall and overspeed warning indicators came on simultaneously—something that’s supposed to be impossible, and a situation the crew is not trained to handle.
At 41 000 feet, the command pilot disconnected the autopilot and lowered the airplane’s nose. The auto throttle then commanded an increase in thrust, and the craft plunged 4000 feet. The pilot countered by manually moving the throttles back to the idle position. The nose pitched up again, and the aircraft climbed 2000 feet before the pilot regained control.
The flight crew notified air-traffic control that they could not maintain altitude and requested to return to Perth. The crew and the 177 shaken but uninjured passengers safely returned to the ground.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation discovered that the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU)—which provides air data and inertial reference data to several systems on the Boeing 777, including the primary flight control and autopilot flight director systems—had two faulty accelerometers. One had gone bad in 2001. The other failed as Flight 124 passed 36 571 feet.
The fault-tolerant ADIRU was designed to operate with a failed accelerometer (it has six). The redundant design of the ADIRU also meant that it wasn’t mandatory to replace the unit when an accelerometer failed.
However, when the second accelerometer failed, a latent software anomaly allowed inputs from the first faulty accelerometer to be used, resulting in the erroneous feed of acceleration information into the flight control systems. The anomaly, which lay hidden for a decade, wasn’t found in testing because the ADIRU’s designers had never considered that such an event might occur.
Link to IEEE Spectrum